Whistleblowing Portals
Smart Integrity Platform
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by DISS-CO GmbH · diss-co.tech
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
DISS-CO GmbH of Hamburg sells Smart Integrity Platform (SIP), a GRC suite covering 60+ frameworks whose offering includes whistleblowing software. The bench scored it low throughout: persona-weighted totals run 1.7 to 2.3, and the flagged splits found none above threshold. Its strongest category is sovereignty, resting on the Hamburg legal entity and the "Your data stays on your servers" on-premise LLM claim — yet the evidence's sovereignty attributes compute to 3/10 with data residency, ownership and subprocessor exposure all unknown, and the vendor's own privacy policy names Google Analytics, Microsoft (Redmond) and YouTube as subprocessors with US locations. Its weakest categories are reporting channels & reporter experience and group & multi-entity capability: no captured page describes how a reporter submits a report, and nothing evidences per-entity channels for groups. Case management & deadline discipline and legal compliance alignment spread between judges who credit the audit-trail workflow layer and the 60+ framework list, and judges who find no statutory 7-day or 3-month clocks and no mention of Directive 2019/1937 or HinSchG. No prices appear anywhere.
Speaks for it
- Sovereignty is the strongest category, anchored by the Hamburg legal entity and the on-premise LLM claim that 'data never leaves your environment'
- Tamper-proof audit trails plus Jira, Confluence and SAP integrations evidence a real case-side workflow layer (case management & deadline discipline 2–3)
- Framework coverage spans 60+ frameworks including GDPR and LkSG
- Whisper voice transcription and DeepL/Systran translation integrations give case handlers transcription and translation support
Held against it
- No captured page describes how a reporter submits a report — no anonymous form, protected dialog, or hotline (reporting channels & reporter experience 1–2)
- Directive 2019/1937 and HinSchG appear nowhere in the evidence, and no 7-day acknowledgment or 3-month feedback clock is evidenced
- The vendor's own privacy policy embeds IP addresses in password-reset emails and retains comments and metadata indefinitely (security & anonymity assurance flat at 2)
- No DPA or product subprocessor list is published, and the privacy policy names Google Analytics, Microsoft (Redmond) and YouTube as subprocessors with US locations
- Nothing evidences per-entity channels, separated case access, or ombudsman roles for corporate groups (group & multi-entity capability 1–2)
Best for
- You want a Germany-based vendor (DISS-CO GmbH, Hamburg) with an on-premise LLM architecture and are prepared to verify the hosting claim yourself
- Your case handlers already work in Jira, Confluence, or SAP and mainly need workflow integration backed by audit trails
- You operate a single legal entity rather than a corporate group and can supply your own intake channels and statutory deadline discipline
Avoid if
- You must demonstrate built-in compliance with HinSchG or Directive 2019/1937 statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback) — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You need an evidenced anonymous reporting channel with protected two-way dialog — the evidence documents no reporter-facing channel at all
- You are a corporate group needing per-entity channels, separated case access, or external ombudsman roles (group & multi-entity capability 1–2)
- You require verified security certification or metadata minimization — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
The scores
Reporting channels & reporter experience
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How this is scored
The intake side: how a reporter actually submits — web form, anonymous dialog, phone/voice, languages, accessibility — and whether anonymity survives first contact.
0 — A web form that is an email in disguise: no anonymous route, no way to reach the reporter afterwards.
3 — An anonymous form exists but the dialogue ends there — no secured mailbox for follow-up questions, few languages, desktop-only.
5 — Anonymous two-way dialog via a protected mailbox, a usable set of languages, mobile-friendly; voice or phone intake missing or an add-on.
8 — Multiple channels (web, voice message or hotline, QR entry points), broad language coverage with translation support, accessibility considered, and the anonymous dialog is first-class rather than bolted on.
10 — Intake engineered around the frightened reporter: every channel anonymous-capable, dozens of languages, WCAG-conscious, no app install or account required, and the vendor documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself.
The Compliance Officer
The evidence evidences no reporter-facing channel at all — no anonymous form, no protected dialog mailbox, no hotline, no language or accessibility statement; the only adjacent facts are platform-level Whisper voice transcription and DeepL/Systran translation integrations, which serve handlers, not the frightened reporter. By my rule that an unevidenced capability doesn't exist, I cannot put a reporter into this system on this evidence. 2 1
The Reporter's Advocate
The only channel-adjacent facts are handler-side integrations — Whisper transcription, DeepL/Systran translation — with zero evidence of an anonymous route, a protected two-way dialog, languages, or mobile entry; the phone number on the evidence belongs to vendor support, not a reporting hotline. Worse, the vendor's own password-reset emails embed the requester's IP address, which is precisely the metadata that unmasks a frightened reporter. 2 6
The SME Operator
No captured page documents how a reporter actually submits: no anonymous form, no protected follow-up mailbox, no stated reporter languages, no accessibility mention. The only channel-adjacent items are Whisper voice transcription and DeepL/Systran translation listed as platform integrations, which serve my case handlers, not the frightened employee, and anonymity surviving first contact is the entire point of the HinSchG. 2 5
The Group Counsel
The whistleblowing product page describes integrations, AI agents and audit trails but not one word on how a reporter submits — no anonymous form, no protected two-way dialog, no hotline, no languages; the only phone number in the evidence is the vendor's own support line. For a portal whose entire purpose is intake, complete silence on intake is disqualifying. 2 4
The Security Auditor
The captured whistleblowing page evidences no intake at all: no anonymous form, no protected mailbox, no hotline marketed to reporters — the only phone number is vendor support. Whisper and DeepL/Systran are transcription and translation plumbing for the case side, not reporter-facing channels; absence of evidence here is the verdict. 2 4 5
The Skeptic
The whistleblowing product page names twelve integrations and agentic AI but never describes how a reporter submits a report — no anonymous form, no dialog mailbox, no languages, no accessibility statement. rubric level 0's shape fits: no evidenced anonymous route and no evidenced way to reach the reporter afterwards. 2 3
Case management & deadline discipline
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How this is scored
The case worker's side: triage, statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback), role separation, audit-proof documentation.
0 — Reports land in an inbox; deadlines, roles and history live in a spreadsheet next door.
3 — A case list with status fields, but deadlines are manual, permissions are all-or-nothing, and the record of who did what is thin.
5 — Deadline tracking with reminders for the statutory clocks, case notes and attachments, basic role separation between case handlers; reporting on the caseload is limited.
8 — Automated statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest handling (excluding implicated case handlers), complete tamper-evident case history, retention and deletion rules applied per case, and management reporting.
10 — A case system an external investigator can rely on: enforced workflows, full audit trail, legally aware retention/deletion automation, evidence handling, and statistics that survive a regulator's questions.
The Compliance Officer
"Tamper-proof audit trails" is the one disciplined feature, but there is no evidence of the 7-day acknowledgment or 3-month feedback clocks, role separation, conflict-of-interest exclusion, or per-case retention — and the vendor's own stated practice is to retain comments and metadata "indefinitely", which a regulator would not forgive. The "AI agents handle repetitive compliance tasks end-to-end, without manual intervention" pitch is the opposite of the enforced, accountable workflow I need. 2 3 6
The Reporter's Advocate
"Tamper-proof audit trails" plus Jira/Confluence hooks is the whole case-side record — nothing on the 7-day/3-month statutory clocks, role separation, conflict-of-interest exclusion, or per-case retention. The LkSG name-drop is a framework list, not a deadline engine; this sits below the anchor where deadlines are at least manual. 2 3 1
The SME Operator
'Tamper-proof audit trails' is the one case-side feature anywhere in the evidence — no automated 7-day acknowledgment or 3-month feedback clocks, no role separation, no conflict-of-interest exclusion, no retention automation. Everything else is '70% time saved' and agentic AI claims that never mention the statutory deadlines that fall on me personally. 2 3
The Group Counsel
Tamper-proof audit trails and Jira/SAP integration suggest a real workflow layer, but nothing evidences the statutory clocks — no 7-day acknowledgment, no 3-month feedback tracking, no role separation or conflict-of-interest exclusion. The who-did-what half of the record exists; the deadline discipline my subsidiaries need is the customer's problem. 2 3
The Security Auditor
'Tamper-proof audit trails' is an adjective, not an audit architecture, and agentic AI workflows don't evidence a single statutory clock, role model, or retention rule. The evidence is silent on deadline tracking, conflict-of-interest handling, and per-case retention — nothing a case worker or an external investigator could rely on. 2 3
The Skeptic
The entire case-side record is a bare 'tamper-proof audit trails' bullet and agents that 'execute multi-step compliance tasks autonomously' — no statutory 7-day/3-month clocks, no role separation, no conflict-of-interest exclusion, no per-case retention. Autonomous-compliance marketing with zero evidence of deadline discipline. 2 3
Legal compliance alignment
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How this is scored
How specifically the product implements EU Directive 2019/1937 and national transpositions (HinSchG et al.) — not whether the marketing mentions them.
0 — Generic feedback software wearing a whistleblowing label; no reference to the legal obligations it claims to satisfy.
3 — The directive is invoked in marketing but the mapping is vague; deadline rules, documentation duties and retention periods are the customer's problem.
5 — The statutory duties are implemented as product features — acknowledgment and feedback clocks, documentation, deletion after the retention period — for at least one national law, with guidance for the rest.
8 — Multiple national transpositions supported with their differing details, legal templates and process guidance maintained by named counsel or documented review, and updates when the law moves.
10 — The product is a legal instrument: per-country rule sets kept current, documented legal review, guidance for edge cases (group-wide channels, external ombudsman setups), and the vendor shows its homework in public.
The Compliance Officer
Neither EU Directive 2019/1937 nor HinSchG appears anywhere in the evidence — the closest is "LkSG" inside a 60+-framework marketing list, with no implementation detail behind any of it. No acknowledgment clock, no feedback deadline, no documentation or retention duty is shown as a product feature; this is framework name-dropping, not legal implementation. 1 2
The Reporter's Advocate
The whistleblowing page sells framework volume — GDPR, LkSG, CSDDD, DORA, NIS2, AML among "60+" — but Directive 2019/1937 and HinSchG never appear by name, and no acknowledgment clock, documentation duty or retention period is implemented as a feature. A whistleblowing product that can't cite the whistleblowing statute is invoking law vaguely, not implementing it. 1 2 3
The SME Operator
The framework list names GDPR, LkSG, CSDDD, DORA, NIS2 and AML but never the Whistleblower Directive or the HinSchG — the exact law obligating my 60-employee company. That is framework name-dropping on a whistleblowing product page, not implementation: no deadline rules, documentation duties or retention periods shown as features anywhere. 1 2
The Group Counsel
LkSG and GDPR appear in a '60+ frameworks' marketing list, but Directive 2019/1937 and HinSchG are never named and no deadline, documentation or retention duty is shown as an implemented product feature. That is framework name-dropping on a generic GRC page, not legal implementation — no per-country rule sets, no named counsel. 1 2 3
The Security Auditor
Marketing lists 60+ frameworks including GDPR and LkSG, but Directive 2019/1937 and HinSchG are never named, and no acknowledgment/feedback clocks, legal templates, or documented legal review appear anywhere. That is framework-list marketing with the actual mapping left vague. 1 2
The Skeptic
LkSG appears in a '60+ frameworks' list, but the Whistleblower Directive 2019/1937 and HinSchG are absent from the registry, and no acknowledgment clock, feedback deadline, documentation duty or retention rule is implemented as a feature. This is framework name-dropping that sidesteps the one law governing the product category. 1 2
Security & anonymity assurance
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How this is scored
Whether the confidentiality promise is engineered and evidenced: encryption, metadata handling, penetration tests, certifications.
0 — Security is a paragraph of adjectives; no certificates, no test reports, no statement on metadata.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest asserted, but nothing audited: no ISO 27001 or equivalent, no published pentest, silence on IP and metadata logging.
5 — A current ISO 27001 (or equivalent) certificate for vendor or hosting, end-to-end encryption of report content claimed with some technical detail, an explicit no-IP-logging statement.
8 — Certified ISMS covering the product, regular third-party penetration tests attested, documented end-to-end encryption architecture, metadata minimization explained, security contact and disclosure policy published.
10 — Assurance a hostile auditor accepts: current certificates with visible scope, recurring pentest summaries public, cryptographic architecture documented, anonymity analysed against the operator itself — the vendor can answer "how would you unmask a reporter?" with "we cannot, and here is why".
The Compliance Officer
SSL is asserted and the on-premise LLM claim that "data never leaves your environment" is a real architectural signal, but no certificate, pentest, or encryption architecture appears in the evidence. Worse, the vendor's own privacy policy documents IP addresses embedded in reset emails and Google Analytics transmitting data to US servers — I could not tell an auditor this vendor knows how to keep a reporter's metadata clean. 6 2 5
The Reporter's Advocate
The registry contains the word SSL and an on-premise marketing line, but no certificate, no pentest, no encryption architecture — and the vendor's own policy is metadata-maximal: IPs inside reset emails, comments and metadata retained indefinitely, visitor data shipped to Google in the US. That is affirmative evidence against anonymity engineering, not mere silence, so it lands below the TLS-plus-assertions anchor. 6 5 2
The SME Operator
The only evidenced security fact is SSL on the vendor's own website, plus the on-premise 'data never leaves your environment' slogan — no certificate, pentest, encryption architecture or metadata statement for the product appears in any captured page. Their own privacy policy admits IP addresses are written into password-reset emails, which is the opposite of the metadata minimization an anonymous channel needs. 6 2
The Group Counsel
The only engineered security evidence is SSL on the vendor's own website — no certificate, no pentest, nothing on report encryption — and the privacy policy affirmatively documents IP addresses embedded in password-reset emails and comments with metadata retained indefinitely. Documented IP capture from a vendor selling anonymity is worse than silence, and only an unverified on-premise marketing claim offsets it. 5 6
The Security Auditor
No certificate with visible scope, no pentest, no E2E encryption architecture — the entire evidenced story is SSL on the website and the adjective 'tamper-proof', and the ISO 27001 mention appears in no captured page. The only metadata statements are adverse: IP addresses embedded in reset emails and comments/metadata retained indefinitely; this vendor has not answered, or even posed, the 'how would you unmask a reporter?' question. 2 5 6
The Skeptic
The security story is website SSL and the adjective 'tamper-proof'; the ISO 27001 from the provenance has no certificate, scope or page in the evidence registry — a certification claim without a certificate. Worse, the vendor's own policy documents Google Analytics transmitting data to US servers and IP addresses embedded in reset emails, which is the opposite of a no-metadata-logging posture. 2 6
Group & multi-entity capability
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How this is scored
Whether one contract can serve a corporate group: separate channels per legal entity, central oversight, ombudsman access, white-labeling.
0 — One company, one channel; a group buys and administers N separate instances.
3 — Multiple channels under one account, but no separation of case access per entity and no consolidated view.
5 — Per-entity channels with separated case handlers and a group-level overview; branding per entity is basic; external counsel access possible.
8 — Real multi-tenant group structure: per-entity channels, languages and branding, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles, group reporting that respects entity boundaries.
10 — Group compliance as architecture: hundreds of entities manageable centrally, per-country legal rule assignment per entity, white-label reporting pages, and access separation strong enough to satisfy each subsidiary's works council.
The Compliance Officer
Nothing on per-entity channels, separated case access, delegated administration, ombudsman roles, or group-level oversight — a the evidence this dense in feature marketing would surely mention group architecture if it existed. Azure AD/LDAP SSO is generic enterprise deployment, and the KYB "entity resolution" module is about screening counterparties, not administering my subsidiaries' channels. 1 2
The Reporter's Advocate
Nothing evidences per-entity channels, separated case handlers, ombudsman access or white-labeling; the sole "entity" capability on the evidence is KYB verification of outside business partners, which solves the reverse problem. SAP/LDAP/Azure AD hints say enterprise IT plumbing, not multi-tenant group architecture. 2 1
The SME Operator
Nothing shows per-entity channels, separated case handlers, delegated administration or a group overview; the KYB module resolves external business partners, not subsidiaries. As a single 60-person company I could live with one channel, but the evidence for serving any group is simply absent. 1 2
The Group Counsel
Nothing in the evidence evidences per-entity channels, per-entity access separation, external ombudsman roles or consolidated group reporting; the KYB module's 'entity resolution' is about third-party counterparties, not structuring my group. A roll-out to 25 subsidiaries would be twenty-five contracts around a single-tenant mystery — exactly what I reject. 1 2
The Security Auditor
Nothing evidences per-entity channels, delegated administration, ombudsman access, or white-labeling; the KYB/UBO module screens third-party business partners, it does not structure a corporate group. '1,000+ organizations' counts customers, not entities under one contract. 1 2
The Skeptic
The KYB module resolves other companies' UBOs; nothing shows SIP can serve a corporate group's own entities — no per-entity channels, no separated case access, no group overview, no ombudsman role anywhere in the evidence. Enterprise signaling (SAP, Azure AD) is not group architecture. 1 2
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where reports about people actually live and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. In this category the data is by definition the most sensitive a company holds.
0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for whistleblowing data.
3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.
5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.
8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.
10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors for report content and metadata, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.
The Compliance Officer
The German entity rests solely on a privacy-policy controller line with no register entry, data residency is unconfirmed on the vendor's own pages, and ownership is unknown — while their documented subprocessor set includes Google (US) and Microsoft (Redmond). The "your data stays on your servers" on-premise claim would be sovereignty-strong if verified, but it stands alone against an unconfirmed residency posture. 6 5 2
The Reporter's Advocate
A Hamburg controller address and a seductive "your data stays on your servers" claim are the right instincts, but nothing verifies them: no commercial register entry, unknown ownership, no published DPA or product subprocessor list, and the vendor's own site routes visitor data through Google, Microsoft and YouTube under US jurisdiction. Promised on-premise sovereignty without documentation scores as unverified, not as delivered. 6 5
The SME Operator
DISS-CO GmbH sits in Hamburg and the claim that reports 'stay on your servers' would be strong if verified — but hosting residency is flagged unconfirmed on the vendor's own pages, and no DPA or product subprocessor list is published. Meanwhile their own website policy documents Google Analytics and Microsoft Bookings flows to the US, so I'd be doing the verification work myself before trusting the slogan. 6 2 5
The Group Counsel
A Hamburg GmbH is the right start, but report-data hosting is undocumented — the on-premise claim is a slogan, not a named data center — and there is no DPA or product subprocessor list in evidence, while the vendor's own site ships personal data to US processors (Google Analytics, Microsoft Redmond, YouTube). The evidence's own computed sovereignty score of 3/10 matches my read. 5 6
The Security Auditor
An EU entity is confirmed (DISS-CO GmbH, Hamburg) and the on-prem claim 'your data stays on your servers' would be strong if documented, but it's a slogan sitting beside OpenAI/Gemini/Azure connectors while the vendor's own site ships visitor data to Google Analytics and Microsoft in the US. No DPA, no TOMs, no named data centers, unknown ownership. 2 5 6
The Skeptic
A Hamburg GmbH known only from the privacy policy plus the slogan 'Your data stays on your servers' — while the same policy lists Google, Microsoft, YouTube and Mailchimp as US processors and the product offers Gemini and OpenAI integrations. No DPA, no product subprocessor list, no named data centers; the on-premise claim is undocumented marketing. 1 5 6
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether an obligated company can compute the real invoice — per entity, per employee band, per year — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — An entry price exists, but the tiers most obligated companies need are unpriced, or the maths is obscured by employee bands, per-report fees or mandatory setup charges.
5 — Most tiers carry real numbers with billing period and VAT treatment stated, but at least one commonly needed capability — extra entities, extra languages, phone intake — hides in an unpriced add-on.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with employee-band boundaries, entity rules and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.
10 — Complete price computability: every tier, band, add-on and renewal rule public, so the invoice for a 60-employee company and a 5-entity group is a two-minute exercise.
The Compliance Officer
Not a single price, tier, band, or setup fee appears anywhere in the evidence — only "10 modules and add-ons" with no numbers attached, so every invoice starts as a sales conversation. For a 600-employee obligated company, the real cost is simply not computable from these pages. 1 2
The Reporter's Advocate
Ten modules, three add-ons, "60+ frameworks" — and not a single price, band boundary, billing period or setup fee anywhere in the registry. An obligated company can list the features but cannot compute even the smallest invoice; this is the zero anchor exactly. 2 1
The SME Operator
No price, tier, employee band, billing period or setup fee appears on any captured page — the only concrete offer is a sales phone number. I cannot compute what a year costs a 60-employee company from public pages, and a portal I can't price is a portal the year-end review will question on principle. 4 1
The Group Counsel
The pages enumerate seven modules, eleven frameworks and three add-ons but not a single euro, employee band or billing period anywhere in the captured evidence. An obligated company cannot compute any part of its invoice from these pages; every price is a sales conversation. 1 2
The Security Auditor
Not one price, tier, employee band, or billing rule appears in any captured page; the invoice for even a single 60-employee company is entirely a sales conversation. 1 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in DE ⚠ unverified | 3/3 pts | 6 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 16 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The imprint URL (S2) loads no actual legal notice and no commercial register entry is given, so the German entity is identified only as data controller/service provider in the privacy policy.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency, Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We found no public information on pricing on the pages we read (diss-co.tech, diss-co.tech/smart-integrity-platform/whistleblowing-software, smartintegrityplatform.com, smartintegrityplatform.com/about, diss-co.tech/imprint, diss-co.tech/privacy-policy and 1 more). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- 9 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 8 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (7)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage diss-co.tech Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Whistleblowing product page diss-co.tech Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Product site smartintegrityplatform.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 About page smartintegrityplatform.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Imprint diss-co.tech Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 Privacy policy diss-co.tech Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 7 Security / trust page smartintegrityplatform.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →