Pomerium
Provenance unknown Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 3 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Pomerium, Inc. · pomerium.com
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Pomerium at a glance
- Vendor
- Pomerium, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Outside the EU by default; pages mention the US source, captured 10 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Pomerium 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. Pomerium is an open-source identity-aware proxy that replaces network-wide access with named routes: HTTP and HTTPS apps open in an ordinary browser, SSH natively, other TCP and UDP services through a client, all signed in through your own identity provider with allow and deny policy per route. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 10 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 11 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Pomerium is an open-source identity-aware proxy that replaces network-wide access with named routes: HTTP and HTTPS apps open in an ordinary browser, SSH natively, other TCP and UDP services through a client, all signed in through your own identity provider with allow and deny policy per route. Its strongest area is identity and policy, scoring 7 across the board, with access and connectivity and deployment and administration close behind at 6–7; judges credited authorization logs that record why each request was allowed or denied, a documented configuration API with Terraform and Helm, and a self-hosted path in which Core and the Enterprise control plane run in your environment. Weakest are sovereignty at 4–6 and architecture and assurance at 5–6, the latter with no published independent audit, bug bounty or availability SLA found. Sovereignty spans 4–6 as judges weigh the U.S.-based hosted plane against the documented self-hosting route. Visibility and audit spans 5–7, and pricing transparency sits lowest at 2–3, with no public prices for the two named editions.
Speaks for it
- Identity and policy holds at 7 across the board, on sign-in through your own OIDC provider with per-route allow and deny rules.
- Authorization logs record why each request was allowed or denied, with a documented log-field schema reaching custom headers.
- Self-hostable end to end, with Core as the self-managed data-plane engine and the Enterprise control plane in your environment.
- Administration runs as code, with a documented configuration API, Terraform support, and Helm or Docker deployment.
- An open-source core under Apache 2.0, with published pages stating plainly what the product protects and what it does not.
Held against it
- No published independent audit, penetration test, bug bounty or availability SLA was found, and the SOC 2 text describes a customer's obligations rather than a certification of Pomerium.
- Long-running TCP or WebSocket connections are not terminated when the policy that allowed them becomes invalid, per the documented behavior.
- The contracting entity is Pomerium, Inc. of Beaverton, Oregon, its own servers are stated to be in the U.S., the subprocessor list is available only on request, and we found no published data processing agreement.
- Desktop clients cover Windows, macOS and Linux, and we found no public information on iOS or Android clients.
- We found no public information on log retention periods, SIEM streaming, alerting on unusual access, or MDM-based client rollout.
Best for
- You need contractors or freelancers to reach specific internal HTTP and HTTPS apps from an ordinary browser, with no dedicated connector installed.
- Your platform team runs Kubernetes and wants access policy managed as code through Terraform, a documented API and Helm.
- You must keep the data plane, control plane and logs on your own servers, with identity from your own provider such as self-hosted Keycloak.
- You want every access decision explained after the fact, because the authorize logs record why each request was allowed or denied.
Avoid if
- You need a managed control plane hosted outside the U.S. — Pomerium's own servers are stated to be in the U.S., and self-hosting is your own operational work.
- You must cut off live sessions the moment access is withdrawn — the documented behavior leaves long-running TCP or WebSocket connections open.
- Procurement requires third-party assurance — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You expect a click-through setup run by non-specialists — in every deployment model the data plane runs as a cluster in your own environment.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Access model & connectivity | 3.5 of 5 |
| Identity, access policy & device posture | 3.5 of 5 |
| Logs, audit trail & incident response | 3 of 5 |
| Deployment, API & administration | 3.5 of 5 |
| Architecture, reliability & security assurance | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
Access model & connectivity
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How this is scored
What the product connects and how: a managed gateway VPN with shared or dedicated gateways and dedicated static IPs, a peer-to-peer mesh between devices and servers, access per application or resource (ZTNA), site-to-site links between offices and cloud networks (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), connectors behind a firewall without inbound ports, the protocols (WireGuard, IPsec, OpenVPN, a vendor protocol), split tunnelling and full tunnelling, always-on and auto-connect, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and ChromeOS, the gateway and relay locations, NAT traversal and relays, and access for contractors without a managed device.
0 — Gives no remote access of its own; a browser extension, a consumer VPN for anonymous browsing or a security tool that only filters traffic.
3 — A VPN client that connects users to one gateway or network; site-to-site, per-resource access, the clients per platform and the locations are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS and Android, a modern protocol (WireGuard or IPsec), access to private networks through a gateway or connector without inbound firewall rules, split tunnelling, dedicated static IPs or self-run gateways, site-to-site or cloud network links, and the gateway or relay locations named.
8 — Access per application or resource rather than whole networks, peer-to-peer connections with relays as fallback, always-on and auto-connect, connectors for the major clouds and Kubernetes, gateways in many named regions, private DNS and split DNS, clientless browser access for contractors, and the protocol and encryption choices documented.
10 — Connectivity a distributed company runs on: every access model above in one product, high-availability gateways and connectors with failover documented, performance and throughput published per gateway type, post-quantum or equivalent key exchange documented, and an exit path to run the same network on self-hosted components.
The IT Lead
This is per-application access rather than a whole-network VPN: internal web apps are published by name, SSH, RDP, MySQL, Redis, DNS and other TCP/UDP services go through a desktop client for Windows, macOS and Linux, and contractors can reach HTTP and HTTPS apps straight from a browser. Gateways are self-run in our own environment, across cloud, on-prem or hybrid. What I did not find is any mobile client, always-on or auto-connect behaviour, or a dedicated static egress IP for things like our supplier portal, and the clientless path covers HTTP and HTTPS only. 4 5 6 7
The DevOps Engineer
This is per-resource zero trust rather than a whole-network VPN: HTTP and HTTPS in the browser with no connector to install, documented native SSH with a trusted certificate authority, and TCP/UDP routes (SSH, RDP, MySQL, Redis, DNS) through the CLI and a desktop client for Windows, macOS and Linux. Connectors run as Docker images and Helm charts across AWS, Azure, GCP and on-prem, and origins stay private behind published routes — but we found no public information on iOS, Android or ChromeOS clients, a peer-to-peer mesh, gateway regions, or split DNS, and arbitrary TCP/UDP usually needs a local connector. 3 4 5 6 7
The MSP Technician
Pomerium gives per-application access rather than network-wide tunnels — clientless browser routes for HTTP and HTTPS, a documented native SSH path, and client-assisted TCP and UDP — which is what I want for letting a bookkeeper reach exactly one intranet app. Desktop clients cover Windows, macOS and Linux and mTLS is supported, but we found no public information on iOS or Android clients, site-to-site links, split tunnelling or named gateway regions, and my clients' staff do use phones. 4 6 7
The Operations Manager
This is per-application access rather than a network VPN: each internal app is published as a named route and a freelancer reaches exactly one system through an ordinary browser with nothing installed, which is precisely my model. The documented desktop client covers Windows, macOS and Linux only — we found no public information on iOS or Android clients — and non-HTTP protocols (SSH, TCP, UDP) need the CLI or desktop connector, with traffic encrypted from user to proxy and mutual TLS available to the upstream. 4 5 6 7 15
The Information Security Officer
Access is granted per named resource rather than per network — the guidance to publish only the named resource and keep the origin private is exactly the model I need for control-system adjacency. Clientless browser access covers contractors without a managed device, and native SSH plus client-assisted TCP and UDP for services like RDP, MySQL and Redis are documented, with desktop clients for Windows, macOS and Linux. I found no public information on mobile clients, always-on or auto-connect behaviour, or named gateway regions for the managed control plane. 4 5 6 7 15
The Skeptic
Access is per named resource rather than per network: routes publish only the named app, browser-based clientless access covers HTTP and HTTPS, and native or client-assisted paths cover SSH, TCP and UDP — with docs honest enough to say clientless does not secure an unmanaged endpoint by itself. Desktop clients exist only for Windows, macOS and Linux; we found no public information on iOS or Android clients, always-on auto-connect, or named gateway regions, and no failover or throughput figures. The self-managed Core engine does mean the data plane runs wherever the customer runs it, including Kubernetes via Helm. 1 4 6 7
Identity, access policy & device posture
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How this is scored
Whether access follows identity and the state of the device rather than the network: single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta or any OIDC/SAML provider, SCIM or directory sync so a leaver loses access, multi-factor authentication, groups and per-resource access policies, least-privilege defaults, device posture checks (operating system version, disk encryption, EDR or MDM status, managed device certificates), just-in-time or time-limited access with approval, session lifetimes and re-authentication, and access revoked when a device is lost.
0 — No user identity at all; a shared key or configuration file grants access to the whole network.
3 — User accounts with a password or one identity provider; groups, per-resource policies and device checks are basic or not described.
5 — Single sign-on with Entra ID, Google Workspace and Okta, multi-factor authentication, user groups, access policies that restrict groups to named networks, resources or ports, automatic or SCIM-based deprovisioning, and basic device posture checks such as operating system version.
8 — SCIM provisioning from the major identity providers, per-resource policies with least privilege by default, device posture from EDR or MDM tools (for example CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Intune, Jamf), just-in-time access with approval and expiry, session re-authentication, policies kept as code, and the policy model documented.
10 — Access control a security team can audit and trust: continuous evaluation of identity and device state during a session, policies tested before they apply, emergency revocation documented, device identity bound to hardware, and the decision for every connection explainable from the logs.
The IT Lead
Sign-in runs through your own identity provider — Google Groups and generic OIDC are documented — and policy is set per route with allow and deny rules matching email and group membership, plus device posture signals such as operating-system version, encryption, screen lock and endpoint protection, re-evaluated when signals change. Policies can live in Git. I did not find Microsoft Entra or Okta named with directory sync for same-day leaver cut-off, and the pages state that long-lived TCP or WebSocket connections are not terminated when a policy becomes invalid — that matters to me. 3 7 8 9 10
The DevOps Engineer
Sign-on goes through your own identity provider including self-hosted Keycloak and generic OIDC, policies allow or deny by email, group and device signals, posture pulls from endpoint tools such as FleetDM, and policy lives as code in Git. Two gaps matter to me: just-in-time approval flows and SCIM from the major providers are not documented, and a TCP connection is authorized only when it is opened — a long-running session outlives a policy change with no documented mechanism to terminate it. 1 4 7 8 9
The MSP Technician
Access follows identity tightly: sign-in through your identity provider including a self-hosted Keycloak, allow and deny policies on email and group membership, policy as code, directory sync in Enterprise, and device posture signals from operating-system version through encryption to endpoint protection with a FleetDM integration. Every authorization decision is logged with allow-why and deny-why reasons, though we found no public information on just-in-time access with approval, and the TCP client documentation states long-running connections are not terminated when a policy becomes invalid while other pages describe posture being re-evaluated when signals change. 7 8 9 10
The Operations Manager
Sign-in runs through my own identity provider (any OIDC, including Keycloak and Google), allow and deny rules by email or group are evaluated on every request, and directory sync plus namespaces and RBAC arrive with the Enterprise edition — so removing a leaver from the IdP group closes the browser door cleanly. Device posture signals are documented with refreshingly honest limits, but the pages show no just-in-time approval flow, posture sources only via FleetDM rather than the mainstream MDM tools, and no mechanism to kill a long-running SSH or TCP connection once the policy that allowed it is withdrawn. 3 4 7 8 9 10
The Information Security Officer
Policy is per route with a documented allow and deny language, sign-in through our own identity provider (Keycloak or any OIDC), directory sync in Enterprise, and device posture signals covering operating-system version, encryption and endpoint protection with re-evaluation when signals change. Two things hold it back for my audit: the documentation states there is no mechanism to terminate a long-running TCP connection once its policy becomes invalid, and I found no public information on just-in-time access with approval and expiry. 1 4 7 8 9 10
The Skeptic
Single sign-on through generic OIDC providers including self-hosted Keycloak, policies on email and group membership, a documented policy language with allow and deny rule semantics, plus Enterprise directory sync and RBAC. The authorize logs record why a request was allowed or denied, posture checks can draw on FleetDM host data, and the posture pages are refreshingly candid that signals can be stale, incomplete or forged. But directory sync is documented with Keycloak rather than the major providers, no SCIM provisioning or just-in-time approval is described, and a TCP or websocket connection validated at connect time keeps running even if the policy that allowed it later becomes invalid — the captured pages say there is no mechanism to terminate it. 3 4 7 8 9 10
Logs, audit trail & incident response
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How this is scored
What can be seen and proven afterwards: connection and access logs (who reached which resource from which device, when), admin and configuration audit logs, how long logs are kept per plan, log export and streaming to a SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Datadog, an S3 bucket), alerts on unusual access, a view of active sessions and the ability to end them, DNS logs where DNS filtering is part of the product, and what the vendor states it does not log, such as the content of traffic.
0 — No logs of any kind; the admin cannot see who connected.
3 — A list of connected users or devices; access logs, admin audit logs, retention and export are basic or not described.
5 — Connection or access logs per user and device, an admin audit log of configuration changes, the retention period stated, log export by CSV or API, a view of active sessions or devices with the option to disconnect or revoke them, and a statement of what traffic data is and is not logged.
8 — Log streaming to named SIEM tools, network flow logs per resource, retention of a year or more stated per plan, alerts or webhooks on security events, logs filterable by user, device and resource, and the log schema documented.
10 — An audit trail that holds up in an investigation: every access decision and admin action recorded with its policy and reason, logs signed or tamper-evident, evidence suitable for ISO 27001, NIS2 or DORA audits, full export in an open format, and the customer able to keep logs entirely on its own infrastructure.
The IT Lead
Every HTTP request is logged with configurable fields including the user and a request ID, and the authorize log records allow and deny together with the reason each rule passed — the kind of trail that answers 'who reached the ERP and why'. Non-HTTP connections log identity as well, and the Enterprise edition adds audit and deployment history. We found no public information on retention periods, streaming to a SIEM, alerts, or a console view to end an active session. 4 7 10 11
The DevOps Engineer
Every request emits an access log entry with a documented, configurable field schema, the authorize logs record why each allow or deny decision was made, non-HTTP traffic is covered, and because the data plane is self-hosted the logs land in your own journalctl or Postgres rather than the vendor's store. What I did not find: stated retention periods, streaming to a SIEM, alerting on unusual access, or an end-session control described in depth beyond the enterprise sessions feature. 3 4 7 10 11
The MSP Technician
Per-request access logs carry user identity, a request identifier and configurable fields, connection attempts are logged with identity, and the customer story calls the access logs critical to ongoing compliance — after an incident I could show a client who reached what. But we found no public information on retention periods, export or streaming to a SIEM, or a console view to end active sessions, which I would need before putting thirty tenants on it. 3 7 10 11
The Operations Manager
Every request emits a log entry with configurable fields including user identity, and the authorize logs record why each decision was allowed or denied — exactly what I need after an incident. However the captured pages state no log retention period, show no streaming to a SIEM, and beyond a single word in the Enterprise feature list we found no public information on a console that lists and terminates live sessions. 3 4 7 10 11
The Information Security Officer
Per-request access logs carry identity with a documented field schema down to custom headers, connection attempts are logged as an audit trail, and the authorize log records why each request was allowed or denied — the decision explainability an incident review needs, with an Enterprise audit and deployment history for configuration changes. However, I found no public information on log streaming to a named SIEM tool, retention periods, or alerting on unusual access, which is what I would need to prove to my auditor. 3 4 7 10 11
The Skeptic
Every request can emit an access log with identity, and the authorization logs record allow and deny with the reason each rule passed or failed, plus databroker version numbers to establish what data a decision used — enough to explain a decision afterwards, and SSH session recording exists too. Because Core and Enterprise run in the customer's environment, the logs land in the customer's own journald or postgres, which is where I want them held. We found no public information on a stated retention period, streaming to any named SIEM, or alerts on unusual access. 1 4 7 10 11
Deployment, API & administration
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How this is scored
How the product is rolled out and run by a small IT team or a service provider: time to the first connection, deployment of clients through MDM (Intune, Jamf, Kandji) with preconfigured settings, a central admin console, a documented REST API, a Terraform provider or configuration as code, roles for administrators, several teams, sites or customer tenants in one account, a multi-tenant console for managed service providers, a self-hosted or on-premises edition, the update process for clients and gateways, and support channels and hours.
0 — No central administration; every client is configured by hand with no console.
3 — A web console to add users and gateways; the API, MDM deployment, admin roles and multi-tenant set-up are basic or not described.
5 — A central admin console, a documented REST API, client deployment through MDM with preconfigured settings, admin roles, several networks or sites in one account, client updates managed centrally, and support channels and response times stated per plan.
8 — A Terraform provider or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers or several organisations, granular admin roles, a self-hosted or on-premises edition documented for production, gateways deployable as containers or cloud images, and webhooks or integrations with ticketing and chat tools.
10 — Administration that scales across many sites and tenants: every setting reachable by API and code with parity stated, staged rollouts of client and gateway updates, a self-hosted edition with feature parity stated, reseller or MSP billing per tenant, and an exit path for configuration and users documented.
The IT Lead
There is a self-hosted edition with an Enterprise console, an API managing routes, policies and service accounts, and Terraform support, deployable via Helm or Docker — I could run it beside the ERP and file server without a weekend firewall change. The desktop client installs from binaries, RPM/DEB packages, Homebrew or Docker, with support by email and a community forum. We found no public information on rolling the client out through Intune or MDM with preconfigured settings, on centrally managed client updates, or on support hours and response times. 3 4 7 12 13
The DevOps Engineer
This is close to how I want to run things: configuration is manageable through Terraform, a documented API covers routes, policies and service accounts, installs ship as binaries, RPM/DEB packages, Homebrew and Docker, Kubernetes goes through Helm, and both Core (data plane) and Enterprise (control plane, namespaces, RBAC, audit history) are self-hostable. Client rollout through MDM, support response times per plan, and staged update processes are not documented on the captured pages. 3 4 7 11 13
The MSP Technician
The pieces a service provider wants are largely there: a documented REST API covering routes, policies and service accounts, Terraform support, Helm and Docker deployment, an Enterprise Console with namespaces and RBAC, and a self-hosted control plane documented for production. The multi-tenant story is thin for my world — Zero lists organizations among its features without detail — and we found no public information on MDM rollout of clients, per-tenant billing for resellers, or support response times per plan. 3 4 11 13
The Operations Manager
There is a documented configuration API, Terraform support, Helm for Kubernetes, and an Enterprise console with centralized configuration, RBAC and audit history; the CLI installs from packages, Homebrew or Docker. What I do not see is MDM-based client rollout or stated support hours and response times, and in every model the data plane runs as a cluster in my own environment — a job for my hourly-billed provider, not a setup a non-specialist clicks through. 3 4 7 11 12 13
The Information Security Officer
A self-hosted control plane is documented for production with an Enterprise Console, a configuration API covering routes, policies and service accounts, namespaces with role-based access, Terraform support, and Helm and Docker deployment — a small team can run this as code. I found no public information on MDM-based client rollout with preconfigured settings or on support response times per plan. 3 4 7 11 13
The Skeptic
A documented configuration API covering policies, routes, service accounts and settings, Terraform deployment, Helm for Kubernetes, RPM/DEB, Homebrew and Docker channels for the CLI, and an Enterprise Console with namespaces, RBAC and multi-replica scaling — with Pomerium Zero listing organizations and quotas, which suggests multi-tenant use. The self-hosted edition is the documented production path, not an afterthought. We found no public information on MDM-based client rollout, stated support response times, or any MSP billing and staged-update story. 1 3 4 7 12 13
Architecture, reliability & security assurance
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How this is scored
How the product is built and how its claims are proven: a published architecture showing what the coordination servers, relays and gateways see, whether traffic passes through the vendor or end to end between devices, encryption and key management, open-source clients or servers, independent security audits and penetration tests with reports or summaries published, a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programme, high availability and failover of the vendor's control plane, what happens to existing connections when the vendor's service is down, the vendor's own public status page and incident history, and an SLA.
0 — Nothing is published about how the product works or is secured.
3 — Encryption is mentioned in marketing terms; architecture, audits, availability and the vendor's status page are basic or not described.
5 — An architecture overview of clients, gateways and the control plane, the encryption protocol and key handling named, an independent security audit or penetration test stated, a vulnerability disclosure contact, the vendor's public status page, and an availability SLA on the business plans.
8 — A security whitepaper with the data flow and what the vendor can see, open-source clients or core components, audit or pentest reports or summaries published by the auditor, a bug bounty, high availability of the control plane documented, existing connections kept alive when the control plane is down, and the incident history public with post-mortems.
10 — Assurance a regulated buyer can verify: fully open-source and reproducible components, recurring independent audits published in full, the control plane self-hostable with no call home, a documented failure mode for every vendor component, and several years of availability published.
The IT Lead
The core is open source, the security boundary is documented in unusual honesty — what is protected within the routes, and the residual risks such as origin bypass and long-lived connections outliving their context — and there is a public status page and a security contact. Encryption from user to proxy is stated, with full end-to-end encryption requiring TLS or mTLS at the upstream. We found no public information on independent audits or penetration tests, a bug bounty, or an availability SLA, and the captured pages do not claim the vendor itself is SOC 2 certified. 2 5 6 7 14 15
The DevOps Engineer
The architecture is published and unusually honest: Core runs the data plane in your environment, Zero or Enterprise provide the control plane, and the security-properties pages state plainly what the boundary protects and what it does not — including that routes bypassed by an origin or outlived by long connections escape the policy. The code is open on GitHub under Apache 2.0 and a status page and security contact exist, but we found no published independent audit or pentest report, no bug bounty, and no availability SLA. 2 4 5 14 15
The MSP Technician
The core is open source under Apache 2.0 with an active repository, the architecture is laid out across Core, Zero and Enterprise, and the security-properties pages are unusually candid about what is protected within the documented boundary and what is not. A status page and a security contact exist, but we found no public information on independent audits or penetration tests of Pomerium itself, a bug bounty, or an availability SLA. 2 4 5 14 15
The Operations Manager
The core is open source under Apache 2.0, and the vendor publishes unusually candid boundary documents stating what Pomerium protects and what it does not, with traffic encrypted from user to proxy and mutual TLS upstream. The captured pages show no independent audit or penetration test report, no bug bounty, no availability SLA, and no statement on what happens to running connections if the control plane goes away — only that a public status page exists. 5 7 13 14 15
The Information Security Officer
The core is open source under Apache 2.0 and the published security pages state plainly what the product protects and what it does not — residual risks such as origin bypass and connections outliving their context are written down rather than glossed over, with a security contact and a status page. I found no public information on an independent audit or penetration test of the product; the SOC 2 text describes a customer's compliance obligations, not a certification of Pomerium, and no bug bounty, control-plane high-availability statement or SLA is documented. 2 3 5 6 7 13 14 15
The Skeptic
An open-source core in Go, a candidly published security boundary saying what Pomerium protects and what it does not — including origin bypasses and long-lived connections outliving their context — plus encryption from user to proxy and mTLS upstream, a security contact and a status page link. What I did not find anywhere: a published independent audit or penetration test, a bug bounty, an availability SLA, or a documented failure mode for the vendor's own control plane; the SOC 2 mention in the customer story is about a customer's obligations, not the vendor's certification. That gap between honest engineering docs and absent third-party assurance is what holds this down. 2 5 6 7 14 15
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where account data, user and device identities, connection logs and configuration are stored and processed, which party runs the coordination servers, relays and gateways the traffic passes through, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, identity, email, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Gateway and exit locations outside Europe are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the logs and identities are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted or open-source edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting of the control plane and logs unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but the location of the control plane and logs is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting of logs and account data available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (relays, support, identity, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure for the control plane and logs, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps every record and connection on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, or a self-hosted open-source edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The IT Lead
The contracting entity is Pomerium, Inc. of Beaverton, Oregon, and their own servers are stated to be in the U.S., with the subprocessor list available only on request by email. GDPR data protection terms are mentioned, but we found no public information on a published data processing agreement or EU hosting for the hosted edition. The documented self-hosted path is what keeps this above the floor for us: Core runs in our environment and the Enterprise control plane stays there too, so our records and connections would sit on our own European servers. 2 4
The DevOps Engineer
Pomerium, Inc. is a US company whose own servers are stated to be in the US, with the subprocessor list available only on request by email and no data processing agreement surfaced on the captured pages. The redeeming path for a European buyer is self-hosting: Core carries the traffic in your environment, Enterprise keeps even the control plane in your environment, and the records sit in your own Postgres — a customer's own European chain, though we found no stated certification to back the hosted route. 2 4 5 10
The MSP Technician
Pomerium, Inc. is a US company in Beaverton, Oregon, and the privacy policy states its servers are located in the US, with subprocessors named only on request and no data processing agreement found. The saving grace for a Hamburg provider is that Core and Enterprise run in our own environment — the control plane, the databroker's Postgres store and a self-hosted Keycloak identity provider can all sit on German servers — while the hosted Zero control plane defaults to the US. 2 4 9 10
The Operations Manager
The managed control plane sits on servers the privacy policy locates in the US, the contracting entity is in Beaverton, Oregon, and subprocessors are disclosed only on request by email; GDPR data-protection terms are offered but we found no published data processing agreement. The documented self-hosted editions change the chain — Core and Enterprise run in my environment, with identities in my own Postgres database and logs on my own systems — which would keep every record on my servers, though no certifications back the vendor's own seat. 2 4 10
The Information Security Officer
The contracting entity is Pomerium, Inc. of Beaverton, Oregon, its own servers are stated to be in the U.S., and the subprocessor list is available only on request — a non-EU chain I could not accept for the hosted control plane. The documented self-hosted path changes the picture for a regulated buyer: the data plane and the Enterprise control plane run in my environment, identity comes from my own provider, and logs stay in my journal and Postgres database, keeping records and connections on our own European servers. I found no published data processing agreement, EU representative or certification of the product itself in the captured pages. 2 4 5 9 10
The Skeptic
The published default is blunt: Pomerium, Inc. of Beaverton, Oregon, servers located in the U.S., a subprocessor list available only by email request, transfers framed under the Privacy Shield frameworks — and we found no published data processing agreement or certification claimed for the vendor itself. What lifts it is the documented self-hosted path: Core is the self-managed data-plane engine and Enterprise keeps the control plane in the customer's environment, so a European customer can run the entire chain on its own servers. That escape hatch is real, but taking it is the customer's work; the hosted seat is U.S.-based as published. 2 4 5
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user or per device and tier, minimum seats, what dedicated gateways, static IPs, extra networks or sites cost, which features (SSO, SCIM, device posture, log streaming, longer retention, site-to-site) need a higher tier, the free tier and its limits, the price of a self-hosted or on-premises licence, monthly versus annual billing, minimum term and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call or a partner quote.
3 — A starting price or a free tier exists, but how cost scales with users, devices, gateways or features is unclear.
5 — Tiers are public with a price per user and their main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (dedicated gateways or IPs, extra sites, SSO or SCIM, log retention, the self-hosted licence) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its scaling rule (users, devices, gateways, networks), dedicated IPs and gateways priced, add-ons priced, minimum seats, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given team size, number of sites, gateways and devices, with every add-on, overage and support fee and the cancellation and data-return terms published.
The IT Lead
The captured pages name two editions — Pomerium Zero, the managed control plane, and Pomerium Enterprise, the self-hosted one — and the site links a pricing page, but no price figures, per-user rates, seat minimums, licence terms or billing conditions were captured on the pages I read. I cannot compute an annual cost for my team from this, which is exactly what the next budget round will ask for. 1 4
The DevOps Engineer
Two editions are named — Pomerium Zero and Pomerium Enterprise — with a pricing page linked, but the captured pages show no figures at all: no price per user, no free tier limits, no self-hosted licence cost, no seat minimums or VAT treatment. The only scaling hint is that active users for billing purposes are identified in the authorization logs, so an annual cost is not computable from public information I could read. 1 10
The MSP Technician
The homepage names two platforms, Pomerium Zero and Pomerium Enterprise, alongside a pricing link, but we found no public prices, seat minimums or per-user figures in the captured pages. The documented path is a personalized demo call, so I cannot quote a client a real annual cost without talking to the vendor first. 1
The Operations Manager
Two plans are named — Pomerium Zero and Pomerium Enterprise — with a pricing link on the site, a free open-source self-managed edition underneath, and billing referenced as active-user based through the authorization logs. No per-user price, no Enterprise licence cost, and no seat minimums or terms appear in the captured pages, so I cannot compute an annual cost without a sales call. 1 5 10
The Information Security Officer
Two editions — Pomerium Zero and Pomerium Enterprise — are named and a pricing link exists, but I found no public prices in the captured pages: no price per user, no tier inclusions, and no licence cost for the self-hosted Enterprise edition. The open-source Core is usable at no licence cost under Apache 2.0 and billing is described as determined by active users visible in the authorization logs, so a real annual cost cannot be computed from public information. 1 5 10 13
The Skeptic
Two plans are named — Pomerium Zero and Pomerium Enterprise — and the site links to a pricing page, but no page we read states a price per user, seat minimums, billing term, VAT treatment or the cost of the Enterprise licence. The open-source Core can be run without a licence fee, which is a starting point, yet nothing public lets a buyer compute the annual cost of either the hosted control plane or self-hosted support. 1 4 5
European sovereignty — proven facts
3 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location |
Outside the EU
unverified
Why unverified?The statement covers Pomerium's own services and website; self-hosted Core/Enterprise deployments run in the customer's own environment, but the published default for Pomerium's servers is the U.S. |
0/4 pts | 2 Report an error |
| Hosting options | Self-hostable | 1/1 pts | 4 Report an error |
| Open source |
Open source (permissive)
unverified
Why unverified?Official published binaries, packages and container images are distributed under a modified Apache 2.0 license rather than the unmodified licence. |
1/1 pts | 5 Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Pomerium
Is Pomerium European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Pomerium is based.
Where does Pomerium store data?
Pomerium stores customer data outside the EU by default, per the vendor’s page captured 10 Nov 2026. The vendor’s pages mention the US as hosting location, per the vendor’s page captured 10 Nov 2026.
Does Pomerium have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Pomerium?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Defguard (3.5/5), Firezone (3.5/5) and Tailscale (3.5/5) highest among the other 19 Business VPN & Zero Trust Access products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Defguard (EU-Made, Poland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Pomerium alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 10 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Open source. Official published binaries, packages and container images are distributed under a modified Apache 2.0 license rather than the unmodified licence.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. The statement covers Pomerium's own services and website; self-hosted Core/Enterprise deployments run in the customer's own environment, but the published default for Pomerium's servers is the U.S.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 7 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (15)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Privacy policy — found from the homepage www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Security / trust page — found from the homepage www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Self-hosting / on-premises installation docs — found from the homepage www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Code repository (open-source licence) — found from the homepage github.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 13 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 14 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 15 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.pomerium.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →