Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Palo Alto Networks, Inc. · www.paloaltonetworks.com

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Prisma Access at a glance

Vendor
Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Headquarters
Incorporated in the United States source, captured 17 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Prisma Access 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Prisma Access is Palo Alto Networks' managed business VPN and zero-trust access service. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 19 Nov 2026. all sources

Prisma Access alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Prisma Access is Palo Alto Networks' managed business VPN and zero-trust access service. Scores peak on visibility and audit at 6-7, on a field-level log schema: who authenticated, with which multi-factor vendor and factor, against which rule, with microsecond timestamps, exportable in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS and LEEF, with an on-premise collector option. The genuine split is access and connectivity, 4 to 7: the rationales repeatedly flag the same gaps — client platforms, gateway locations, split-tunnelling behaviour — but weigh them differently; the operations manager, at 4, could not judge what a contractor installs, while higher scores credited documented GlobalProtect agent, agentless and IPsec remote-network access plus bring-your-own-IP, IPv6 and a FedRAMP environment. Sovereignty sits at 3-4: the contracting entity is US-based, Santa Clara, California; transfers rest on standard contractual clauses and the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework; we found no public information on EU hosting or where logs and identities sit. A leaver gap recurs: removing a user from the Okta group needs a manual push or the user retains access; no price appears on any captured page, only named licences.

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Speaks for it

  • Log schema documented field by field — who authenticated, with which multi-factor vendor and factor, against which rule, at microsecond timestamps
  • Logs exportable in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS and LEEF, with an on-premise log collector as an alternative location
  • Broad documented access: GlobalProtect agent, agentless access, IPsec remote networks with IKE, BGP, NAT-T and DPD, bring-your-own-IP, IPv6 and a FedRAMP environment
  • Okta SCIM provisioning over OAuth 2.0, with multi-factor events logged per vendor and group-based policy fed by device-posture and quarantined-device data
  • Coordinated vulnerability disclosure with a PSIRT contact and PGP key, published security advisories, and a Trust 360 programme with an information security measures document

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Held against it

  • Removing a user from the Okta group does not automatically revoke access — a manual push is required or the user retains access
  • We found no public information on log retention periods, an administrator configuration audit log, or a way to view and end active sessions
  • The contracting entity is US-based in Santa Clara, California, and we found no public information on EU hosting or where the control plane, identities and logs are stored
  • Penetration tests and Statements of Applicability are available only under NDA, and compensation for security reports is expressly prohibited
  • The documented path to private applications requires a next-generation firewall deployed at headquarters or the data centre

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Best for

  • You need field-level, exportable connection and authentication logs to feed a SIEM or audit workflow
  • Your identity provider is Okta and your offboarding process can absorb a documented manual-push step
  • You already run Palo Alto next-generation firewalls at your data centre and want documented IPsec remote networks and service connections on top of them
  • You are a non-EU buyer for whom a US contracting entity with standard contractual clauses and DPF adherence is an acceptable transfer basis

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Avoid if

  • You need to evidence an EU-resident chain for a GDPR- or NIS2-scoped deployment — we found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity, or where the control plane, identities and logs are stored
  • Your leaver offboarding must be fully automatic — the documentation states Okta removals keep access until an administrator manually pushes the change
  • You have no next-generation firewall at headquarters or your data centre — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
  • You must hand an auditor public compliance reports — penetration tests and Statements of Applicability are available only under NDA

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Access model & connectivity

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How this is scored

What the product connects and how: a managed gateway VPN with shared or dedicated gateways and dedicated static IPs, a peer-to-peer mesh between devices and servers, access per application or resource (ZTNA), site-to-site links between offices and cloud networks (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), connectors behind a firewall without inbound ports, the protocols (WireGuard, IPsec, OpenVPN, a vendor protocol), split tunnelling and full tunnelling, always-on and auto-connect, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and ChromeOS, the gateway and relay locations, NAT traversal and relays, and access for contractors without a managed device.

0 — Gives no remote access of its own; a browser extension, a consumer VPN for anonymous browsing or a security tool that only filters traffic.

3 — A VPN client that connects users to one gateway or network; site-to-site, per-resource access, the clients per platform and the locations are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS and Android, a modern protocol (WireGuard or IPsec), access to private networks through a gateway or connector without inbound firewall rules, split tunnelling, dedicated static IPs or self-run gateways, site-to-site or cloud network links, and the gateway or relay locations named.

8 — Access per application or resource rather than whole networks, peer-to-peer connections with relays as fallback, always-on and auto-connect, connectors for the major clouds and Kubernetes, gateways in many named regions, private DNS and split DNS, clientless browser access for contractors, and the protocol and encryption choices documented.

10 — Connectivity a distributed company runs on: every access model above in one product, high-availability gateways and connectors with failover documented, performance and throughput published per gateway type, post-quantum or equivalent key exchange documented, and an exit path to run the same network on self-hosted components.

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The IT Lead

The captured documentation shows a managed service with agent-based GlobalProtect for mobile users, agentless browser access, IPsec service connections and remote-network tunnels into the headquarters or data centre, plus bring-your-own-IP, IPv6 and named compute locations — that is the shape my two plants and the fixed IP for the supplier portal need. What I could not see was which client platforms exist, or any described split-tunnelling or always-on behaviour, which keeps it a notch below the top. 3 4 9 10

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The DevOps Engineer

Remote networks connect over IPsec tunnels with IKE, NAT-T, DPD and redundant ECMP paths, mobile users come in through GlobalProtect, and secure agentless access covers browser users, with IPv6, bring-your-own-IP, service connections into headquarters and data centers, and traffic from AWS WorkSpaces documented. We found no public information on client coverage per platform, named gateway locations, split tunnelling, or outbound-only connectors for private apps; the documented path to private applications requires a next-generation firewall deployed at the data center. 3 4 9 10

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The MSP Technician

Mobile users connect through the GlobalProtect agent, there is a clientless VPN portal plus documented agentless access, and offices tie in through IPsec remote-network tunnels and service connections into a head-office firewall — the troubleshooting pages even detail IKE phases, NAT-T, DPD and BGP across redundant tunnels. Bring-your-own-IP, IPv6, AWS WorkSpace access and country blocking are all documented. We found no public information on the client apps per operating system, named gateway locations, split tunnelling or always-on behaviour. 3 4 9 10

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The Operations Manager

The captured documentation shows GlobalProtect mobile users, IPsec service connections and remote network links, DNS resolution, bring-your-own-IP and secure agentless access — the last being exactly what rotating freelancers on their own laptops need. But these pages never name the client platforms, the gateway locations or split tunnelling behaviour, so I cannot judge what a contractor in a hotel lobby actually installs or connects to. 3 4 9

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The Information Security Officer

The captured documentation shows a full SASE connectivity stack: IPsec remote networks with IKE negotiation, BGP and tunnel failover checks, service connections into headquarters and data centres, agent-based GlobalProtect mobile users plus a documented agentless access path, alongside IPv6, bring-your-own-IP and DNS resolution for agent-based and remote network deployments. Named gateway regions, always-on behaviour and per-application access rules are not described on the captured pages, which keeps this short of the top of the scale. 3 8 9

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The Skeptic

The captured documentation shows a broad spread of access models: an agent-based GlobalProtect client, secure agentless access, IPsec site-to-site remote networks with IKE negotiation, BGP, NAT-T and DPD spelled out, service connections into headquarters and data centres, bring-your-own-IP, IPv6 and a FedRAMP environment. What I could not find is the named list of gateway locations, per-platform client coverage, split tunnelling, always-on behaviour, or any failover documentation, which keeps it below the top band. 3 4 9 10

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Identity, access policy & device posture

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How this is scored

Whether access follows identity and the state of the device rather than the network: single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta or any OIDC/SAML provider, SCIM or directory sync so a leaver loses access, multi-factor authentication, groups and per-resource access policies, least-privilege defaults, device posture checks (operating system version, disk encryption, EDR or MDM status, managed device certificates), just-in-time or time-limited access with approval, session lifetimes and re-authentication, and access revoked when a device is lost.

0 — No user identity at all; a shared key or configuration file grants access to the whole network.

3 — User accounts with a password or one identity provider; groups, per-resource policies and device checks are basic or not described.

5 — Single sign-on with Entra ID, Google Workspace and Okta, multi-factor authentication, user groups, access policies that restrict groups to named networks, resources or ports, automatic or SCIM-based deprovisioning, and basic device posture checks such as operating system version.

8 — SCIM provisioning from the major identity providers, per-resource policies with least privilege by default, device posture from EDR or MDM tools (for example CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Intune, Jamf), just-in-time access with approval and expiry, session re-authentication, policies kept as code, and the policy model documented.

10 — Access control a security team can audit and trust: continuous evaluation of identity and device state during a session, policies tested before they apply, emergency revocation documented, device identity bound to hardware, and the decision for every connection explainable from the logs.

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The IT Lead

Okta provisioning over SCIM is documented in detail with MFA factors in the logs, group-based policy and Host Information Profile device data, so access clearly follows identity and device state. The sting for me is in the same documentation: removing a user from the Okta group does not automatically remove them here — a manual push is required or the user retains access, which is precisely the manual step I want gone on a leaver's last day. 5 6 8

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The DevOps Engineer

Okta provisioning over SCIM with OAuth 2.0 client credentials, group synchronisation, MFA recorded per factor in the authentication logs, and redistributed host information profile data plus quarantined-device state feeding policy put real weight behind identity-driven access. Two things hold my score down: the documentation states a user removed from an Okta group keeps access until an administrator manually pushes the change, which is a leaver-retains-access risk in a sixty-person company, and the captured pages cover only Okta rather than Entra ID, Google Workspace or any generic OIDC/SAML provider. 5 6 8

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The MSP Technician

SCIM provisioning from Okta into Strata Cloud Manager is documented down to the OAuth service account, multi-factor events are logged per vendor and factor number, and policy is enforced per user and user group with host information profile data and quarantined-device status shared across the estate. The catch for a service desk: removing a user from the Okta group does not remove them automatically — a manual push is required, otherwise the user retains access. We found no public information on just-in-time access, policies as code, or single sign-on with Entra ID or Google Workspace. 5 6 8

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The Operations Manager

Okta SCIM provisioning over OAuth with a dedicated service account, multi-factor authentication recorded per vendor, policy enforcement by users and user groups, and host-information-profile device data with quarantined devices give me most of what I need. What holds it down is the stated behaviour that removing someone from the Okta group does not remove them unless an administrator manually pushes the change — for contractors whose access must end with the contract, that is the one failure I cannot afford. 5 6 8

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The Information Security Officer

Okta SCIM provisioning, multi-factor authentication with the factor vendor recorded, policy enforced per user and user group, and host information profile data including quarantined devices are all documented. The documentation itself states that removing a user from the Okta group leaves that user's access in place until a manual push is done — exactly the leaver scenario my auditor probes — and EDR or MDM posture sources, just-in-time approval and continuous re-evaluation are not shown on the captured pages. 5 6 8

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The Skeptic

Okta SCIM provisioning with OAuth service accounts, multi-factor authentication recorded per event with vendor fields, group-based policy enforcement, and HIP device-posture data redistributed across the environment are all documented. But the same pages state that removing a user from Okta does not automatically revoke their access in Strata Cloud Manager — the group must be pushed manually or the leaver retains access — and I found no evidence of just-in-time approval, session re-authentication, or least-privilege defaults. 5 6 8

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Logs, audit trail & incident response

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How this is scored

What can be seen and proven afterwards: connection and access logs (who reached which resource from which device, when), admin and configuration audit logs, how long logs are kept per plan, log export and streaming to a SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Datadog, an S3 bucket), alerts on unusual access, a view of active sessions and the ability to end them, DNS logs where DNS filtering is part of the product, and what the vendor states it does not log, such as the content of traffic.

0 — No logs of any kind; the admin cannot see who connected.

3 — A list of connected users or devices; access logs, admin audit logs, retention and export are basic or not described.

5 — Connection or access logs per user and device, an admin audit log of configuration changes, the retention period stated, log export by CSV or API, a view of active sessions or devices with the option to disconnect or revoke them, and a statement of what traffic data is and is not logged.

8 — Log streaming to named SIEM tools, network flow logs per resource, retention of a year or more stated per plan, alerts or webhooks on security events, logs filterable by user, device and resource, and the log schema documented.

10 — An audit trail that holds up in an investigation: every access decision and admin action recorded with its policy and reason, logs signed or tamper-evident, evidence suitable for ISO 27001, NIS2 or DORA audits, full export in an open format, and the customer able to keep logs entirely on its own infrastructure.

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The IT Lead

The log schema is documented to the individual field — user, device OS, matched rule and its UUID, MFA vendor, microsecond timestamps — with export in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS, LEEF and email formats, an option to keep logs on an on-premises collector, and baseline-driven incident alerts for events like clientless VPN authentication timeouts. Retention periods, an admin change log and a way to view and end active sessions did not appear in what I read. 3 4 7 8

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The DevOps Engineer

The Strata Logging Service reference documents tunnel and authentication log schemas in depth — microsecond timestamps, matched rule name and UUID, device serial, OS family and version, MFA vendor — with export in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS, LEEF and email formats, an on-premises log collector option, and automatic incidents that raise and clear against baselines. We found no public information on retention periods per plan, an admin configuration audit log, or a live session view with the ability to terminate sessions. 7 8 4

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The MSP Technician

The log schema is documented to field level: who authenticated, with which multi-factor vendor and factor, from which device category and OS family, which security policy rule matched, with microsecond timestamps, held per Cortex Data Lake tenant and exportable in Syslog, CEF, LEEF, HTTPS or email formats. Baseline-breach incidents such as clientless VPN authentication timeouts are raised and cleared automatically, and a log field indicates data can also sit on an on-premise log collector. We found no public information on retention periods per plan, an administrator configuration audit log, or a live session view with the option to disconnect. 3 4 7 8

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The Operations Manager

The authentication and tunnel log schemas are documented field by field — user, device operating system and MAC address, matched rule, multi-factor detail, high-resolution timestamps — with export in Syslog, CEF, LEEF, HTTPS and email, and baseline-driven alerts that raise and clear automatically. We found no public information in these pages on retention periods per plan, an administrator audit log of configuration changes, or a view to end an active session. 3 4 7 8

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The Information Security Officer

The authentication, tunnel and traffic log schemas are documented field by field — user and domain, device model, operating system family and MAC address, the matched security policy rule, MFA vendor, Prisma Access location and millisecond-precision timestamps — with export in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS and LEEF and incidents that raise and clear on defined baselines. The captured pages state no retention period for these logs and show no audit log of administrator configuration changes, so I could answer who connected but not prove who changed the policy or how long the evidence survives. 4 7 8

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The Skeptic

The log schema is documented down to the field: who authenticated, with which factor, from which device OS version, matched against which security rule, with microsecond timestamps, exportable in Syslog, CEF, HTTPS and LEEF formats, with an on-premise log collector as an alternative location. What I could not find is a retention period for these connection logs, an admin configuration audit log, a way to view and terminate active sessions, or any statement of what traffic data the vendor does not log — and by default the records land in the vendor's Cortex Data Lake cloud service. 4 7 8

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Deployment, API & administration

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How this is scored

How the product is rolled out and run by a small IT team or a service provider: time to the first connection, deployment of clients through MDM (Intune, Jamf, Kandji) with preconfigured settings, a central admin console, a documented REST API, a Terraform provider or configuration as code, roles for administrators, several teams, sites or customer tenants in one account, a multi-tenant console for managed service providers, a self-hosted or on-premises edition, the update process for clients and gateways, and support channels and hours.

0 — No central administration; every client is configured by hand with no console.

3 — A web console to add users and gateways; the API, MDM deployment, admin roles and multi-tenant set-up are basic or not described.

5 — A central admin console, a documented REST API, client deployment through MDM with preconfigured settings, admin roles, several networks or sites in one account, client updates managed centrally, and support channels and response times stated per plan.

8 — A Terraform provider or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers or several organisations, granular admin roles, a self-hosted or on-premises edition documented for production, gateways deployable as containers or cloud images, and webhooks or integrations with ticketing and chat tools.

10 — Administration that scales across many sites and tenants: every setting reachable by API and code with parity stated, staged rollouts of client and gateway updates, a self-hosted edition with feature parity stated, reseller or MSP billing per tenant, and an exit path for configuration and users documented.

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The IT Lead

Management runs through Strata Cloud Manager or Panorama with named admin roles — superuser plus network and security administrator — published release versions, and an API surface through the SCIM and OAuth endpoints, which is a workable centre for a three-person team. I found no public information on rolling clients out through Intune or other MDM, on how client and gateway updates are handled, or on support channels and hours, and the Intune gap is the one that hurts most. 3 6 9 10

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The DevOps Engineer

Central management comes through Strata Cloud Manager or Panorama with named admin roles (Superuser, Network Administrator, Security Administrator), Preferred and Innovation release tracks, and an AI troubleshooting agent that only runs read-only CLI and presents remediation for review in an Action Center. For what I actually run day to day we found no public information on a Terraform provider or configuration as code, MDM-based client rollout, a multi-tenant console, container-deployable gateways, or support channels and hours. 3 9 10 6

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The MSP Technician

Everything runs through the Strata Cloud Manager or Panorama console with several remote networks and service connections per account, and administrator roles are real — Superuser for administration, Network or Security Administrator for daily work, IAM Administrator for the SCIM service account. For a provider like me the gaps hurt: we found no public information on a multi-tenant console with one tenant per client, MDM client deployment, a Terraform provider, or support channels and hours. 3 6 9

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The Operations Manager

Management runs through one cloud console with defined roles — Superuser, Network and Security Administrator, IAM Administrator — and identity changes go through documented API endpoints, which a non-specialist could follow. We found no public information on MDM-based client rollout, a general REST API, a service-provider console or support terms, and the captured prerequisites ask for a next-generation firewall at headquarters for private applications — a heavy ask for a firm with no IT department. 3 6 9 10

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The Information Security Officer

Administration runs through Strata Cloud Manager or Panorama with documented roles (superuser, network administrator, security administrator), a service account for SCIM over OAuth 2.0, published release trains and downloadable documentation. Client deployment through MDM, a general documented REST API, multi-tenant service-provider use and support response times are not shown on the captured pages. 3 6 9 10

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The Skeptic

Strata Cloud Manager or Panorama manage the estate, with named admin roles (Superuser, Network Administrator, Security Administrator, IAM Administrator), multiple remote network and service connection sites in one deployment, preferred and innovation release trains, and an AI troubleshooting agent whose remediations are staged for review rather than auto-executed. I found no public information on MDM client deployment, a Terraform provider or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers, a self-hosted edition, or support channels and response times. 3 6 9

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Architecture, reliability & security assurance

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How this is scored

How the product is built and how its claims are proven: a published architecture showing what the coordination servers, relays and gateways see, whether traffic passes through the vendor or end to end between devices, encryption and key management, open-source clients or servers, independent security audits and penetration tests with reports or summaries published, a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programme, high availability and failover of the vendor's control plane, what happens to existing connections when the vendor's service is down, the vendor's own public status page and incident history, and an SLA.

0 — Nothing is published about how the product works or is secured.

3 — Encryption is mentioned in marketing terms; architecture, audits, availability and the vendor's status page are basic or not described.

5 — An architecture overview of clients, gateways and the control plane, the encryption protocol and key handling named, an independent security audit or penetration test stated, a vulnerability disclosure contact, the vendor's public status page, and an availability SLA on the business plans.

8 — A security whitepaper with the data flow and what the vendor can see, open-source clients or core components, audit or pentest reports or summaries published by the auditor, a bug bounty, high availability of the control plane documented, existing connections kept alive when the control plane is down, and the incident history public with post-mortems.

10 — Assurance a regulated buyer can verify: fully open-source and reproducible components, recurring independent audits published in full, the control plane self-hostable with no call home, a documented failure mode for every vendor component, and several years of availability published.

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The IT Lead

There is a genuine disclosure programme — PSIRT contact with a PGP key, coordinated disclosure, rules of engagement, researcher acknowledgements — alongside a Trust 360 programme, published security advisories, and penetration tests and statements of applicability offered under NDA. What I could not see: a published architecture showing what the vendor's control plane can inspect, audit reports in the open, a status page or an SLA. 11 12

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The DevOps Engineer

There is a genuine coordinated disclosure programme with a PSIRT contact, PGP key and rules of engagement, a Trust 360 white paper and information security measures document, published security advisories, and documentation of SASE resilience, business continuity and primary/secondary tunnel failover. Penetration tests and statements of applicability are only available under NDA rather than published, compensation for vulnerability reports is explicitly prohibited so there is no bug bounty, and we found no public information on what the vendor's own control plane can see, an open-source component, a status page with incident history, or an SLA. 11 12 9 3

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The MSP Technician

There is a proper coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme with a PSIRT address and PGP key, public security advisories, published technical and organisational security measures, and a Trust 360 programme; penetration test reports and Statements of Applicability exist but are available only under NDA. Tunnel security is documented at IKE and crypto-profile level. We found no public information on an architecture overview of the control plane, a public status page with incident history, an availability SLA, or ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications stated on these pages. 2 3 11 12

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The Operations Manager

There is a genuine coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme with a PSIRT address, PGP key, rules of engagement and researcher acknowledgements, plus public security advisories, a Trust 360 programme and tunnel failover through redundant paths documented in the troubleshooting pages. Penetration test material is offered only under NDA, no bounty is paid, and we found no public information on a status page, an availability SLA or a published architecture document. 3 11 12

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The Information Security Officer

A coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme with a PSIRT email and PGP key, a security advisories page, a Trust 360 programme and penetration tests are stated — but the compliance reports are available only under NDA rather than published, and the disclosure policy explicitly prohibits requesting compensation, so I cannot hand my auditor an independent public report. Encryption key handling, control-plane high availability, a public status page and an SLA are not evidenced on the captured pages; resilience appears only as a business continuity topic. 9 11 12

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The Skeptic

There is a genuine vulnerability disclosure programme — a PSIRT contact with a PGP key, coordinated disclosure, researcher acknowledgements and timely security advisories — plus a Trust Center with an Information Security Measures document, a supply chain programme and a Trust 360 white paper. But penetration tests and Statements of Applicability are available only under NDA rather than published, compensation for security reports is expressly prohibited, and I found no published architecture showing what the control plane can see, no public status page, no SLA, and nothing on whether existing tunnels survive an outage of the vendor's service. 2 3 11 12

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where account data, user and device identities, connection logs and configuration are stored and processed, which party runs the coordination servers, relays and gateways the traffic passes through, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, identity, email, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Gateway and exit locations outside Europe are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the logs and identities are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted or open-source edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting of the control plane and logs unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but the location of the control plane and logs is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting of logs and account data available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (relays, support, identity, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure for the control plane and logs, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps every record and connection on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, or a self-hosted open-source edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The IT Lead

The contracting entity is Palo Alto Networks, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, with a data processing agreement and a subprocessor list referenced, and transfers resting on standard contractual clauses and the EU-US Data Privacy Framework with CBPR and PRP certification. I found no public information on where the control plane, identities or logs are hosted, and no EU contracting entity or EU hosting appears anywhere I read — as a Vienna buyer, the chain stays in US hands as far as I can verify. 2

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The DevOps Engineer

The contracting entity is Palo Alto Networks, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, and a data processing agreement and subprocessors list are referenced with standard contractual clauses and Data Privacy Framework adherence stated as transfer safeguards. We found no public information on where the control plane, identities or connection logs are hosted, on an EU contracting entity or representative, or on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification; the certifications the pages do show are the privacy-focused CBPR and PRP schemes. 2 12

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The MSP Technician

The contracting entity is Palo Alto Networks, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, with transfers to Europe relying on standard contractual clauses and the EU-US Data Privacy Framework; a data processing agreement and a subprocessors list are referenced from the privacy statement. We found no public information on where the control plane, logs and identities are hosted, or on EU hosting or a European entity. For my Hamburg clients that reads as a US chain end to end on paper. 2 12

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The Operations Manager

The vendor is a US company at a Santa Clara address, with a data processing agreement and a subprocessor list referenced through its Trust Center, and international transfers covered by the EU-US Data Privacy Framework and standard contractual clauses. Where the control plane, logs and identities are hosted is not stated in the captured pages, and no European hosting option is shown, so I cannot evidence a European chain for my client data. 2 12

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The Information Security Officer

The vendor is a US company with a Santa Clara, California address, a data processing agreement and a subprocessors list are referenced, and international transfers rely on the EU-U.S. Data Protection Framework and standard contractual clauses. Where the control plane, identities and connection logs are stored and processed is not stated on the captured pages, and no EU hosting or EU contracting entity is evidenced — for a NIS2-scoped utility that caps this score. 2

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity is US-based in Santa Clara, California, transfers lean on the Data Privacy Framework and standard contractual clauses, and a data processing agreement and a subprocessor list are referenced — but where account data, identities and connection logs are stored is not stated in the captured pages, and the logs flow into the vendor's Cortex Data Lake cloud logging service. I found no EU hosting option, EU contracting entity, or EU data residency claim in the captured pages, so a European buyer gets a US chain with safeguards but no European seat. 2 8

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

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How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user or per device and tier, minimum seats, what dedicated gateways, static IPs, extra networks or sites cost, which features (SSO, SCIM, device posture, log streaming, longer retention, site-to-site) need a higher tier, the free tier and its limits, the price of a self-hosted or on-premises licence, monthly versus annual billing, minimum term and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call or a partner quote.

3 — A starting price or a free tier exists, but how cost scales with users, devices, gateways or features is unclear.

5 — Tiers are public with a price per user and their main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (dedicated gateways or IPs, extra sites, SSO or SCIM, log retention, the self-hosted licence) is unpriced or "on request".

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its scaling rule (users, devices, gateways, networks), dedicated IPs and gateways priced, add-ons priced, minimum seats, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given team size, number of sites, gateways and devices, with every add-on, overage and support fee and the cancellation and data-return terms published.

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The IT Lead

No price figure appears anywhere I read; the pages name licence prerequisites such as a Prisma Access licence and AI-Powered ADEM without any figures attached. That means the per-user cost that has to survive my next budget round cannot be computed from public pages and the number has to come from a sales conversation. 4 9

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The DevOps Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing. The captured pages state that a Prisma Access license is required, that the AI-Powered ADEM license is needed for the incident feature, and that the troubleshooting agent is a beta available on request through the account team, but no price, tier, seat minimum or billing term appears on any page we read. 1 4 5 9

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The MSP Technician

The captured pages name the licences that gate features — a Prisma Access licence, an AI-Powered ADEM licence for the incident tooling, Strata Cloud Manager Pro — but we found no public prices for any tier, user count or add-on. Beta features and some functions are switched on through the account team or support, so quoting a client would start with a call to the vendor rather than a price page. 3 4 5 9

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The Operations Manager

None of the pages I read carries a price, a tier or a seat minimum; capabilities are gated behind named licences — a Prisma Access licence, an AI-Powered ADEM licence — with no public numbers attached. I cannot compute an annual cost for fifty staff plus freelancers from public information, which for me means a sales negotiation before anyone signs anything. 4 5 9

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The Information Security Officer

We found no prices on any captured page, and the captured documentation shows capabilities gated behind licences (an AI-Powered ADEM licence, a Prisma Access licence for identity redistribution) with at least one feature enabled only on request through the account team. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from what was captured. 3 4 5

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The Skeptic

I found no price in any of the captured pages: no per-user or per-device figures, no tiers, no free tier, nothing a buyer could multiply into an annual cost. Capabilities are gated behind named licences — a Prisma Access licence and an AI-Powered ADEM licence — and at least one feature is enabled only on request through the account team, so the real cost is a sales conversation, not a computation. 3 4 9

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European sovereignty — proven facts

2 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Published, self-serve unverified
Why unverified?

The excerpt only points to an existing DPA alongside the Trust Center; the agreement text itself and any online conclusion process are not shown in these sources.

1/1 pts 2 Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Prisma Access

Is Prisma Access European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Prisma Access is based. Its vendor, Palo Alto Networks, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 17 Nov 2026.

Where does Prisma Access store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

Does Prisma Access have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Prisma Access?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Defguard (3.5/5), Firezone (3.5/5) and Tailscale (3.5/5) highest among the other 19 Business VPN & Zero Trust Access products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Defguard (EU-Made, Poland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Prisma Access alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (12)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Legal notice — found from the homepage www.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap docs.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.paloaltonetworks.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →