Zscaler Private Access

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Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 3 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Zscaler, Inc. · zscaler.com

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Zscaler Private Access at a glance

Vendor
Zscaler, Inc.
Headquarters
Incorporated in the United States source, captured 10 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Zscaler Private Access 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Zscaler Private Access (ZPA) gives users remote access to private applications through Network Connectors deployed in the customer's data centre, which dial out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges; connections are established only when each entity holds the others' public and private key pairs. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 10 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 11 Nov 2026. all sources

Zscaler Private Access alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Zscaler Private Access (ZPA) gives users remote access to private applications through Network Connectors deployed in the customer's data centre, which dial out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges; connections are established only when each entity holds the others' public and private key pairs. The top-scoring criteria were visibility and audit, 5 to 7, on filterable, CSV-exportable audit logs kept up to six months and user and connector logs streamed to a SIEM over mutual TLS, and deployment and administration, 6 to 7, with published Terraform and ServiceNow approval-workflow guides. Pricing transparency was weakest at 0 to 2: the only figures published are service-credit mechanics, including a worked example crediting $4,109.59 against a $500,000 fee, we found no public information on per-user price or seat minimums, and the buying path is a demo request. Sovereignty scored 3 with no spread: the contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, US, and we found no public information on hosting locations or subprocessors. Identity and policy split 3 to 4: policy groups are documented; single sign-on, multi-factor authentication and deprovisioning are not.

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Speaks for it

  • Admin audit logs record sign-ins, actions and configuration changes with admin IDs and API client IDs, export to CSV, and are kept up to six months
  • User activity, user status and app connector logs can stream to your own SIEM over mutual TLS, with Splunk deployment guides published
  • Network Connectors deploy inside the customer's data centre and dial out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges, with connections established only when every entity holds the others' key pairs
  • Deployment and administration scored 6 to 7 on published Terraform and ServiceNow approval-workflow guides, OAuth 2.0 enrollment tokens and parent-child accounts for service providers
  • The ZPA service carries a 99.999% monthly availability agreement with a defined service-credit scheme

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Held against it

  • We found no public information on per-user price, tiers, seat minimums or a free tier; the only figures published are service-credit mechanics, and the buying path is a demo request
  • The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, US, and we found no public information on where the control plane, identities or logs are hosted, or which subprocessors are involved
  • Documented client platforms are Windows and macOS only, and Network Connectors can only be deployed with RHEL9 in the RPM format
  • We found no public information on single sign-on, multi-factor authentication, SCIM deprovisioning or device posture checks
  • User and connector logs remain in the console for 14 days, and delivery of logs generated during a connection loss is not guaranteed

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Best for

  • You already run Splunk or another SIEM and want filterable admin audit logs plus streamed user and connector logs for investigations
  • Your platform team deploys through Terraform and ServiceNow approval workflows, or manages several customer tenants through parent-child accounts
  • Your Windows and macOS users need to reach legacy applications that bind real client IPs, such as VoIP or Active FTP

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Avoid if

  • You must compute an annual cost from public pages — pricing transparency scored 0 to 2, and the only published figures are service-credit rules
  • Your rollout needs clients beyond Windows and macOS, or connectors beyond RHEL9 RPM
  • You must keep user activity logs in the console beyond 14 days without running your own log streaming receiver
  • Your security approval requires a published independent audit or penetration-test report — we found no public information on one, and the disclosure-program page was last updated September 21, 2022

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Access model & connectivity

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How this is scored

What the product connects and how: a managed gateway VPN with shared or dedicated gateways and dedicated static IPs, a peer-to-peer mesh between devices and servers, access per application or resource (ZTNA), site-to-site links between offices and cloud networks (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), connectors behind a firewall without inbound ports, the protocols (WireGuard, IPsec, OpenVPN, a vendor protocol), split tunnelling and full tunnelling, always-on and auto-connect, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and ChromeOS, the gateway and relay locations, NAT traversal and relays, and access for contractors without a managed device.

0 — Gives no remote access of its own; a browser extension, a consumer VPN for anonymous browsing or a security tool that only filters traffic.

3 — A VPN client that connects users to one gateway or network; site-to-site, per-resource access, the clients per platform and the locations are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS and Android, a modern protocol (WireGuard or IPsec), access to private networks through a gateway or connector without inbound firewall rules, split tunnelling, dedicated static IPs or self-run gateways, site-to-site or cloud network links, and the gateway or relay locations named.

8 — Access per application or resource rather than whole networks, peer-to-peer connections with relays as fallback, always-on and auto-connect, connectors for the major clouds and Kubernetes, gateways in many named regions, private DNS and split DNS, clientless browser access for contractors, and the protocol and encryption choices documented.

10 — Connectivity a distributed company runs on: every access model above in one product, high-availability gateways and connectors with failover documented, performance and throughput published per gateway type, post-quantum or equivalent key exchange documented, and an exit path to run the same network on self-hosted components.

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The IT Lead

The documented model fits my need: connectors deployed in the application data centre dial out to the vendor's service edges, connections come up only when every entity holds the others' key pairs, and a self-hosted Private Service Edge (two per site) plus a browser-access log type appear. But the captured pages document client platforms as Windows and macOS only and name no protocol, gateway locations, mobile clients, split tunnelling or auto-connect, so I cannot plan the plants' rollout from this alone. 3 8 12

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The DevOps Engineer

The captured help pages document a real outbound connector model — Network Connectors deployed inside the application data center that build secure tunnels out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges, with network segments, key-pair trust between every entity, OAuth-token enrolment, and Windows and macOS clients — which is the no-inbound-ports shape I run. But connectors ship only as RHEL9 RPMs rather than containers, the client platforms beyond Windows and macOS, the protocol, split tunnelling and the edge locations are not described, and that caps it. 3 4

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The MSP Technician

The help pages describe a workable connector model for my client sites: a Network Connector runs in the customer's data centre and tunnels out to VPN Service Edges, connections are only established when every entity holds the others' public and private key pairs, and a legacy-app VPN binds real client IPs for things like VoIP or Active FTP. What I cannot quote yet: the pages cover Windows and macOS clients and RHEL9 connectors only, and we found no public information on the tunnel protocol, service edge locations, split tunnelling or mobile clients. 3 4

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The Operations Manager

The help pages describe a client (Zscaler Client Connector) for Windows and macOS reaching applications through connectors deployed inside the application data centre, with connections established only when every side holds the other's public and private key pairs — an outbound-connector model that suits a freelancer reaching one project system. But the clients are documented only for Windows and macOS, and we found no public information on Linux, iOS or Android clients, the gateway locations, the tunnel protocol, split tunnelling, or clientless browser access for contractors. 1 3 4

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The Information Security Officer

The captured help pages show users reaching private applications through connectors the customer deploys in its own data centre, which dial out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges, with a Windows and macOS client, key pairs required on every entity before a connection is established, and a legacy-app mode preserving real IP binding. The pages name no tunnel protocol, no service edge locations, no iOS, Android or Linux clients, and no site-to-site or cloud network links, so I cannot confirm the reach a distributed operator needs. 1 3 4

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The Skeptic

What is documented is the VPN-for-legacy-apps path: a client connector on Windows and macOS, a Network Connector inside your own data centre that dials out to the vendor's VPN Service Edges, mutual public/private key pairs between every entity, and routing back through the connector IP. That is genuine remote access through an outbound connector, but the captured pages do not name an encryption protocol, a single gateway or relay location, or clients for any platform beyond Windows and macOS, so I cannot place it higher. 3 4

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Identity, access policy & device posture

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How this is scored

Whether access follows identity and the state of the device rather than the network: single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta or any OIDC/SAML provider, SCIM or directory sync so a leaver loses access, multi-factor authentication, groups and per-resource access policies, least-privilege defaults, device posture checks (operating system version, disk encryption, EDR or MDM status, managed device certificates), just-in-time or time-limited access with approval, session lifetimes and re-authentication, and access revoked when a device is lost.

0 — No user identity at all; a shared key or configuration file grants access to the whole network.

3 — User accounts with a password or one identity provider; groups, per-resource policies and device checks are basic or not described.

5 — Single sign-on with Entra ID, Google Workspace and Okta, multi-factor authentication, user groups, access policies that restrict groups to named networks, resources or ports, automatic or SCIM-based deprovisioning, and basic device posture checks such as operating system version.

8 — SCIM provisioning from the major identity providers, per-resource policies with least privilege by default, device posture from EDR or MDM tools (for example CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Intune, Jamf), just-in-time access with approval and expiry, session re-authentication, policies kept as code, and the policy model documented.

10 — Access control a security team can audit and trust: continuous evaluation of identity and device state during a session, policies tested before they apply, emergency revocation documented, device identity bound to hardware, and the decision for every connection explainable from the logs.

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The IT Lead

Access policy structure is real — policy groups with shared criteria, a defined evaluation order, and organisation-wide global rules enforced first — though flagged limited availability and tied to the Experience Centre. For my priorities the pages are silent: no Entra ID single sign-on, SCIM or deprovisioning, MFA, groups or device posture checks appear, only an Authentication Service option and a passing reference to an Okta deployment guide, so a same-day leaver cut-off cannot be proven from these pages. 5 6 7 10

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The DevOps Engineer

The access policy machinery is genuinely documented — policy groups whose shared criteria apply to every rule with a manual evaluation order, organisation-wide global rules enforced first, and legacy policies auto-migrated — but the feature sits in limited availability and requires Experience Center. The captured pages say nothing about identity provider integration, single sign-on, multi-factor authentication, SCIM or device posture; the only identity traces are admin sign-in session logging and a note that an Authentication Service can be enabled. 5 6 7

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The MSP Technician

Access policies are genuinely organised: policy groups apply common criteria to every rule with a settable evaluation order, and global rules enforce organisation-wide requirements before group rules run. The identity side is thin on these pages — a reference to an Authentication Service and an Okta deployment guide title — and we found no public information on single sign-on providers, multi-factor, SCIM deprovisioning or device posture checks. 5 6 7 10

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The Operations Manager

Access policies exist and are ordered — global rules are enforced before policy group rules, a group's common criteria apply to every rule in it, and changes propagate automatically — which looks like a workable structure for limiting each freelancer to one system. We found no public information on single sign-on, multi-factor authentication, deprovisioning when a contract ends, or device posture checks, and the policy group feature itself is marked limited availability with a request to contact support, so I could not confirm the access-lifecycle story I need. 5 6 7

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The Information Security Officer

Access control is genuinely policy-based: global rules enforced before policy-group rules, shared criteria automatically applied to every rule in a group, and a manually editable evaluation order, with an Okta deployment guide referenced. But I found no public information on single sign-on with our identity provider, multi-factor authentication, SCIM deprovisioning when someone leaves, or device posture checks before a connection — the exact facts my auditor demands for control-system access. 5 6 10

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The Skeptic

Access is governed by rule sets — policy groups sharing common criteria joined with an AND operator, a manually editable evaluation order, and global rules enforced ahead of group rules — which is well past a shared key granting the whole network. But we found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM or directory sync, multi-factor authentication, or any device posture check, and an "Authentication Service" is only mentioned in passing as a prerequisite for showing a column. 5 6 7

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Logs, audit trail & incident response

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How this is scored

What can be seen and proven afterwards: connection and access logs (who reached which resource from which device, when), admin and configuration audit logs, how long logs are kept per plan, log export and streaming to a SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Datadog, an S3 bucket), alerts on unusual access, a view of active sessions and the ability to end them, DNS logs where DNS filtering is part of the product, and what the vendor states it does not log, such as the content of traffic.

0 — No logs of any kind; the admin cannot see who connected.

3 — A list of connected users or devices; access logs, admin audit logs, retention and export are basic or not described.

5 — Connection or access logs per user and device, an admin audit log of configuration changes, the retention period stated, log export by CSV or API, a view of active sessions or devices with the option to disconnect or revoke them, and a statement of what traffic data is and is not logged.

8 — Log streaming to named SIEM tools, network flow logs per resource, retention of a year or more stated per plan, alerts or webhooks on security events, logs filterable by user, device and resource, and the log schema documented.

10 — An audit trail that holds up in an investigation: every access decision and admin action recorded with its policy and reason, logs signed or tamper-evident, evidence suitable for ISO 27001, NIS2 or DORA audits, full export in an open format, and the customer able to keep logs entirely on its own infrastructure.

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The IT Lead

Admin audit logs capture sign-ins, actions, API client IDs and configuration changes with filters, search and CSV export in UTC, kept up to six months, and user activity, status and connector logs stream via a mutual-TLS log receiver to a SIEM with Splunk deployment guides published. The catch is that user logs stay only 14 days in the console unless I run my own log streaming receiver, retransmission after a connection loss covers 15 minutes and is not guaranteed, and I found no active-session view I could terminate or any in-product alerting. 7 8

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The DevOps Engineer

Audit logging is concrete: admin sign-ins, actions and configuration changes with fields like Admin ID, Client ID, Action and Resource Type, filterable, CSV-exportable, retained up to six months, with parent-account changes in MSP child accounts captured. User activity and connector logs are kept only fourteen days in-console, but the Log Streaming Service forwards to Splunk with mutual TLS, documented receiver fields and named log types, and retention floors are stated per log class — though no native alerting, per-resource flow logs or a session view with revocation are shown. 7 8

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The MSP Technician

Good bones for an incident handover: admin audit logs capture sign-ins, actions and configuration changes with admin ID, transaction ID and resource fields, are filterable, export as CSV and are kept up to six months; a Log Streaming Service forwards User Activity and App Connector logs to a SIEM with documented Splunk guides and mutual TLS. User logs last only fourteen days in the console before streaming must be set up, and we found no public information on in-product alerts, a live session view or a documented log schema. 7 8

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The Operations Manager

Admin audit logs record sign-ins, sign-outs, actions and configuration changes with timestamps, admin IDs and the API client ID behind each change, are kept up to six months, export to CSV and are filterable; user and connector logs are kept at least fourteen days and can be streamed to our own SIEM via log receivers with mutual TLS, with Splunk deployment guides published. That is a genuinely solid after-the-fact trail, though we found no public information on a live session view to terminate a connection, and log delivery during a connection loss is stated as not guaranteed. 7 8

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The Information Security Officer

Every admin sign-in, action and configuration change is logged with admin ID, API client ID and resource name, searchable, exportable to CSV and kept up to six months, and user, connector and browser-access logs stream to our own SIEM over mutual TLS (Splunk deployment guides published) if we run the log streaming service, since only 14 days sit in the console. That is close to what a NIS2 investigation needs; the pages do not state retention of a year or more, tamper-evident logs, or a live session view I could cut a connection from. 7 8

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The Skeptic

The admin audit trail is real and specific — per-admin sign-ins, actions, configuration changes, the API client ID behind each change, filters, and CSV export in UTC — and log streaming to a named SIEM (Splunk) is documented with mutual TLS to the receiver. I hold it mid-scale because user activity logs disappear from the console after fourteen days, logs generated during a connection loss are not retransmitted (fifteen minutes attempted, delivery not guaranteed), and we found no public information on an active-session view, native alerts, or a statement of what traffic content is not logged. 7 8

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Deployment, API & administration

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How this is scored

How the product is rolled out and run by a small IT team or a service provider: time to the first connection, deployment of clients through MDM (Intune, Jamf, Kandji) with preconfigured settings, a central admin console, a documented REST API, a Terraform provider or configuration as code, roles for administrators, several teams, sites or customer tenants in one account, a multi-tenant console for managed service providers, a self-hosted or on-premises edition, the update process for clients and gateways, and support channels and hours.

0 — No central administration; every client is configured by hand with no console.

3 — A web console to add users and gateways; the API, MDM deployment, admin roles and multi-tenant set-up are basic or not described.

5 — A central admin console, a documented REST API, client deployment through MDM with preconfigured settings, admin roles, several networks or sites in one account, client updates managed centrally, and support channels and response times stated per plan.

8 — A Terraform provider or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers or several organisations, granular admin roles, a self-hosted or on-premises edition documented for production, gateways deployable as containers or cloud images, and webhooks or integrations with ticketing and chat tools.

10 — Administration that scales across many sites and tenants: every setting reachable by API and code with parity stated, staged rollouts of client and gateway updates, a self-hosted edition with feature parity stated, reseller or MSP billing per tenant, and an exit path for configuration and users documented.

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The IT Lead

There is a central admin console with a named role gating audit exports, changes recorded per API client with a transaction ID, connector software versions managed through version profiles with scheduled update statuses, and deployment guides for Terraform and a ServiceNow approval workflow, with parent and child account logging pointing to MSP-style multi-tenancy. I found no evidence of pushing the client through Intune with preconfigured settings, nor stated support hours or a self-hosted edition, and the note that legacy API calls stop managing policies once policy groups are enabled tells me the API surface is in transition. 3 6 7 9

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The DevOps Engineer

This lines up with how I want to run things: a documented Private Access and HashiCorp Terraform deployment guide, a ServiceNow approval workflow where only authorised users apply configurations to production after scanning and verification, OAuth-token connector enrolment, version profiles with scheduled update windows for connectors and their OS, and parent/child MSP accounts. A REST API is evidenced through audit logs capturing the API client ID behind changes, with the caveat that legacy API calls stop being supported for policy management once global rules and policy groups are enabled; MDM client rollout and containerised connectors are not described. 3 6 7 9

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The MSP Technician

For my thirty tenants this reads workable: parent-account changes in child accounts are captured in the audit logs, connectors enrol via OAuth tokens and get version profiles with scheduled upgrade windows, and a Terraform deployment guide with a ServiceNow approval workflow plus a named Private Access Administrator role exist. The planning warning is that the legacy cloud API stops managing policies once global rules and policy groups are enabled, and we found no public information on MDM-based client rollout. 3 6 7 9

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The Operations Manager

There is a central admin console, an API whose keys are even identified in the audit log, connector enrollment by OAuth 2.0 token or provisioning key, centrally managed version profiles and upgrade statuses, parent-and-child accounts for service providers, and published Terraform and ServiceNow approval-workflow guides. But this is specialist territory — prerequisites like Application Scaling and Experience Center, features behind a support call, connectors only on RHEL9 in RPM format — and we found no public information on deploying clients through MDM, so every change would be billed hours from my external provider. 3 5 7 9 12

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The Information Security Officer

Administration is centralised: API changes are themselves audited, a named Private Access Administrator role gates audit-log export, parent accounts capture every change made in a child account for service-provider use, connector updates run through version profiles with scheduled windows, and a Terraform integration guide plus a ServiceNow approval workflow are published. I found no public information on MDM-based client rollout, a self-hosted edition, or support hours per plan. 3 6 7 9

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The Skeptic

A central console manages connectors enrolled via OAuth 2.0 tokens, their software versions, version profiles and update windows; there is a Terraform integration guide, a ServiceNow approval workflow, parent-and-child accounts for service providers, and a named admin role that alone may export audit logs. We found no public information on MDM-based client deployment or a self-hosted edition with stated parity, so I stop below the top band. 3 4 7 9

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Architecture, reliability & security assurance

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How this is scored

How the product is built and how its claims are proven: a published architecture showing what the coordination servers, relays and gateways see, whether traffic passes through the vendor or end to end between devices, encryption and key management, open-source clients or servers, independent security audits and penetration tests with reports or summaries published, a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programme, high availability and failover of the vendor's control plane, what happens to existing connections when the vendor's service is down, the vendor's own public status page and incident history, and an SLA.

0 — Nothing is published about how the product works or is secured.

3 — Encryption is mentioned in marketing terms; architecture, audits, availability and the vendor's status page are basic or not described.

5 — An architecture overview of clients, gateways and the control plane, the encryption protocol and key handling named, an independent security audit or penetration test stated, a vulnerability disclosure contact, the vendor's public status page, and an availability SLA on the business plans.

8 — A security whitepaper with the data flow and what the vendor can see, open-source clients or core components, audit or pentest reports or summaries published by the auditor, a bug bounty, high availability of the control plane documented, existing connections kept alive when the control plane is down, and the incident history public with post-mortems.

10 — Assurance a regulated buyer can verify: fully open-source and reproducible components, recurring independent audits published in full, the control plane self-hostable with no call home, a documented failure mode for every vendor component, and several years of availability published.

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The IT Lead

The components and trust model are described — service edges, connectors in my own data centre, mutual key pairs — alongside a public Trust Portal for health and maintenance notices, a 99.999 percent availability agreement for Private Access with a worked service-credit example, and a Bugcrowd-run disclosure programme with safe harbour and CVSS scoring. Bounties are at the vendor's sole discretion and that page was last updated September 2022, and I found no independent audit or pentest report and nothing on whether live sessions survive a control-plane outage. 3 11 12

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The DevOps Engineer

Component-level architecture is published — VPN Service Edges, Network Connectors in the customer data centre, Client Connector, connections only established when each entity holds the others' public and private key pairs — alongside a public Trust Portal posting cloudwide health notices, a Bugcrowd-based disclosure programme with safe harbour and discretionary bounties, and a 99.999 percent Private Access availability commitment with latency agreements and defined service credits. What I actually came for is missing: no security whitepaper on what the vendor's edges can see, no published independent audit or penetration test, and nothing on what happens to live sessions when the cloud is unreachable. 3 11 12

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The MSP Technician

Published components and trust model help: connectors, service edges and the client connector authenticate with each other's key pairs, the Bugcrowd-run disclosure programme offers safe harbour and discretionary bounties, the Trust Portal posts cloudwide health notices, ZPA carries a 99.999 percent availability agreement, and the contract requires at least two connectors or service edges per site. We found no public information on independent audit reports or published test summaries, so I stay at the middle. 3 11 12

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The Operations Manager

The vendor commits to 99.999% monthly availability for Private Access with a defined service-credit scheme (credits only against future fees, incident reported within 24 hours), posts cloud health notices on a public trust portal, requires at least two connectors per site for redundancy, and runs a Bugcrowd-based disclosure programme with safe harbour and discretionary bounties. We found no public information on independent security audits, a named tunnel protocol, or open-source components, and the documented behaviour on disruption covers logs, not live user connections. 3 8 11 12

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The Information Security Officer

The component architecture is published — VPN Service Edges, connectors in the customer's data centre, key pairs required between every entity — alongside a Bugcrowd-run disclosure programme with safe harbour, a public Trust Portal for health and maintenance notices, and a 99.999% availability commitment for this service backed by a worked credit scheme, with at least two connectors required per site. What I did not find is what I need before this goes near OT: a published independent audit or penetration test report, open-source components, or a statement on whether existing sessions survive a control-plane outage. 3 8 11 12

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The Skeptic

The component architecture is published — service edges, connectors in your environment, the log receiver in the vendor cloud, mutual key pairs between entities — alongside a Bugcrowd-run disclosure programme with safe harbour, a trust portal posting health and maintenance notices, and a 99.999% availability agreement for the Private Access service with defined credits. But no independent audit or penetration test is shown as published or even summarised, the disclosure page itself was last updated September 21, 2022, and nothing in the captured pages says what happens to live user connections when the vendor's cloud is unreachable. 3 8 11 12

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where account data, user and device identities, connection logs and configuration are stored and processed, which party runs the coordination servers, relays and gateways the traffic passes through, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, identity, email, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Gateway and exit locations outside Europe are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the logs and identities are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted or open-source edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting of the control plane and logs unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but the location of the control plane and logs is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting of logs and account data available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (relays, support, identity, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure for the control plane and logs, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps every record and connection on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, or a self-hosted open-source edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The IT Lead

The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, and the captured material gives no location for the control plane, logs or identities; a self-serve data processing agreement and a transfer impact assessment are announced on the legal overview, and I found no subprocessor list. The only regional statement covers B2B federation, where each party's log data is stored in their respective regions, which is not a chain I could describe to a Viennese works council, let alone defend. 1 2 8 12

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The DevOps Engineer

The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, a self-serve data processing agreement template and a transfer impact assessment are announced on the legal overview, and the support terms reference a separate government-cloud trust portal — but where the control plane, identities and logs are hosted, and who the subprocessors are, is not stated on the captured pages. The B2B federation documentation mentions each party's logs stored in their respective regions, which is a federation behaviour, not a residency commitment for the core service. 1 2 8 12

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The MSP Technician

Zscaler, Inc. contracts from Santa Clara, California, the privacy overview points to a DPA template and a transfer impact assessment, and B2B federation stores each party's logs in its own region. But we found no public information on where the control plane and log storage are hosted or who the subprocessors are, which for my German clients is the question I get asked first. 1 2 8 12

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The Operations Manager

The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, US, and a data processing agreement template and transfer impact assessment are published as self-serve downloads, with logs retained during the subscription term. We found no public information on where the control plane, identities or connection logs are hosted or which subprocessors are involved, so for a European consultancy the chain is largely undocumented on the wrong side of the ocean. 1 2 8 12

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The Information Security Officer

The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, and the legal pages announce a self-serve data processing agreement and transfer impact assessment; B2B federation stores each party's log data in its own region. I found no public information on where the control plane, user identities and connection logs are hosted, or which subprocessors process them, so nothing in the captured pages evidences that identities and logs stay in Europe. 1 2 8 12

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity is Zscaler, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, and a self-serve data processing agreement plus a transfer impact assessment are announced on the legal overview — but the pages reached only announce those documents behind a link rather than show their terms. We found no public information on where the control plane, identities or logs are stored, or who the subprocessors are; the sole regional statement is that B2B federation partners each keep their own region's logs, which tells a European buyer nothing about its own chain. 1 2 8 12

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Pricing transparency

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How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user or per device and tier, minimum seats, what dedicated gateways, static IPs, extra networks or sites cost, which features (SSO, SCIM, device posture, log streaming, longer retention, site-to-site) need a higher tier, the free tier and its limits, the price of a self-hosted or on-premises licence, monthly versus annual billing, minimum term and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call or a partner quote.

3 — A starting price or a free tier exists, but how cost scales with users, devices, gateways or features is unclear.

5 — Tiers are public with a price per user and their main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (dedicated gateways or IPs, extra sites, SSO or SCIM, log retention, the self-hosted licence) is unpriced or "on request".

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its scaling rule (users, devices, gateways, networks), dedicated IPs and gateways priced, add-ons priced, minimum seats, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given team size, number of sites, gateways and devices, with every add-on, overage and support fee and the cancellation and data-return terms published.

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The IT Lead

I found no public per-user or per-tier price in the captured material; the buying path shown is "Request a Demo", and the only figures published are service-credit rules — a credit of $4,109.59 on a $500,000 fee in the worked example, capped at thirty days of fees per month and applicable only against future invoices. For a 140-seat budget I cannot compute even a rough annual cost from these pages. 1 12

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The DevOps Engineer

No list prices, tiers, seat minimums or free tier appear on the captured pages — the homepage path is Request a Demo — and the only pricing-adjacent disclosure is contractual: service-credit tiers tied to availability percentages, a worked credit example of $4,109.59 against a $500,000 fee, a thirty-day monthly credit cap, credits applicable only against future fees, and credits as the sole remedy. A buyer cannot begin to compute the annual cost from public pages. 1 12

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The MSP Technician

Nothing here I can put in a client quote: the captured pages show only service-credit mechanics, including a worked example of a $4,109.59 credit against a $500,000 fee and a note that free bundled ZDX is excluded from credits. We found no public information on price per user, tier inclusions, minimum seats, term length or the cost of dedicated components. 12

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The Operations Manager

The only pricing-related figures captured are service-credit mechanics — a worked example crediting $4,109.59 against a $500,000 fee, tiered credit days, no cash refunds, credits as the sole remedy — and the commercial path shown on the site is a demo request. We found no public information on price per user, tiers, minimum seats or what any of the access features cost, so I could not begin to compute an annual cost for fifty people plus freelancers. 1 12

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The Information Security Officer

The only price figure in the captures is a service-credit example — $4,109.59 credited against a $500,000 fee for three days below the availability target — plus a note that some SaaS comes bundled free inside ZIA and ZPA SKUs. I found no public information on per-user or per-tier prices, seat minimums, or the cost of dedicated gateways and longer retention, so no annual cost can be computed from these pages. 1 12

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The Skeptic

The captured legal pages publish service-credit arithmetic — a credit of $4,109.59 worked out against a $500,000 fee, tiered credits below 99.999%, credits as the sole remedy and never cash — but we found no public price per user, no tiers, no minimum seats and no free tier anywhere in the pages read. Every number published is a remedy for downtime, not a price; a buyer cannot compute any annual cost from what is public. 1 12

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European sovereignty — proven facts

3 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Published, self-serve unverified
Why unverified?

The excerpt is only the overview announcing the DPA template behind the 'See the policies' link, not the agreement text itself.

1/1 pts 2 Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Published unverified
Why unverified?

The TIA itself is reached via the 'See the policies' link, so the excerpt announces its publication rather than showing the assessment text.

1/1 pts 2 Report an error

Questions about Zscaler Private Access

Is Zscaler Private Access European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Zscaler Private Access is based. Its vendor, Zscaler, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 10 Nov 2026.

Where does Zscaler Private Access store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026.

Does Zscaler Private Access have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Zscaler Private Access?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Defguard (3.5/5), Firezone (3.5/5) and Tailscale (3.5/5) highest among the other 19 Business VPN & Zero Trust Access products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Defguard (EU-Made, Poland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Zscaler Private Access alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (12)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Legal notice — found from the homepage www.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap help.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap www.zscaler.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →