Uniqkey
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Uniqkey A/S · www.uniqkey.eu
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Uniqkey at a glance
- Vendor
- Uniqkey A/S
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in Denmark source, captured 16 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Default not stated; pages mention Europe source, captured 1 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Uniqkey 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Uniqkey A/S, a Danish vendor based in Herlev, sells business password and access management as two modules, UniqPass and UniqAccess, under one quote-based price. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 1 Oct 2026 to 16 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 18 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Uniqkey A/S, a Danish vendor based in Herlev, sells business password and access management as two modules, UniqPass and UniqAccess, under one quote-based price. The bench scored it strongest on sharing and access control, at 6 with no spread, and identity integration at 6 to 7: group sharing with time limits and restricted password visibility, Microsoft Entra ID single sign-on with SCIM 2.0 provisioning, and passkeys with device-bound private keys are documented. Audit and policy sat at 6, on a timestamped log of logins, access changes and admin actions framed for GDPR and NIS2 reporting. The weakest area is pricing transparency at 0 to 2: the pricing pages publish no figures — 'Request a quote for your business' — so no annual cost can be computed. Security architecture, deployment and portability, and sovereignty scored 4 to 5, held back where we found no public information on key derivation, self-hosting or subprocessor names, and by the captured pages giving different figures for what the ISO 27001 certification covers. No flagged split was flagged; the widest score span is pricing transparency itself.
Speaks for it
- Sharing with entire groups, time-limited sharing, restricted password visibility and location-based access are all documented
- Single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID connects with just a Tenant ID and pairs with SCIM 2.0 provisioning and automatic deprovisioning
- The audit log records logins, access changes and admin actions with user, action and timestamp, framed for GDPR and NIS2 reporting
- Passkeys use device-bound private keys with biometric or device-PIN unlock, and the identity provider is stated to get no vault data
- Contracting is with Uniqkey A/S in Denmark, with hosting and operation stated to be in Europe and a data processing agreement referenced in the terms
Held against it
- No prices are published — pricing is quote-based, 'Request a quote for your business' — so no annual cost can be computed from public pages
- We found no public information on key derivation, published audit or penetration-test reports, or a bug bounty
- The captured pages give different figures for what the ISO 27001 certification covers, with one scoping it to the data centre
- Subprocessors are disclosed only by purpose — hosting, system maintenance, email service — without names or locations
- We found no public information on log export, SIEM integration or stated log retention periods
Best for
- Your team already runs Microsoft Entra ID and wants single sign-on with SCIM 2.0 lifecycle automation and Conditional Access policies
- You share credentials across groups and need time-limited sharing, restricted password visibility and location-based access
- You want a Danish contracting entity with hosting and operation stated to be in Europe and are comfortable getting pricing through a quote
- You need a timestamped audit log of logins, access changes and admin actions that the vendor describes as built for GDPR and NIS2 reporting
Avoid if
- You need to know a per-user price before talking to sales — the pricing pages publish no figures and ask you to request a quote
- Your identity provider is not Microsoft Entra ID — the pages state only Entra ID is currently supported for single sign-on
- You want to buy the product for personal use alone — personal use is only available to current or former workplace licence holders
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 0 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
AES-256 and SHA-3 are named, the claim that encryption keys never leave the user's device is stated plainly, and encrypted local storage on each device is described. Beyond that we found no public information on key derivation, on which fields are and are not encrypted, on any independent audit firm or penetration test report, on a bug bounty, or on past security incidents, and the captured pages give different figures for what the ISO 27001 certification covers, with one scoping it to the data centre. 1 8 11 1
The Identity Engineer
AES-256 and SHA-3 are named, the claim that encryption keys never leave the device is repeated, and ISO 27001 is cited for the data centre. We found no public information on key derivation, on any independent audit or penetration test with a published report, or on which fields beyond passwords and secure notes are encrypted — "six layers of military-grade encryption" is marketing, not a design document. 1 11 1
The Compliance Auditor
Zero-knowledge, end-to-end encryption is described with AES-256 and SHA-3 named, keys stated never to leave the device, and ISO 27001 certification claimed for the data centre. For my evidence file, key derivation, which fields are and are not encrypted, and any independent audit report, penetration test, bug bounty or incident disclosure are absent from the captured pages, so the certification claim stands without a named firm, date or report behind it. 1 11 1 1
The SME Owner
Zero-knowledge end-to-end encryption is stated plainly — no one, not even Uniqkey, can access the passwords — with AES-256 and SHA-3 named and encryption keys said never to leave the devices; the captured pages give different figures for what the ISO 27001 certification covers, with one stating the data centre is certified. We found no public information on key derivation, published audit or penetration-test reports, a bug bounty, or which fields are and are not encrypted. Enough to trust the pitch, not enough to hand over the crown jewels. 1 11 1
The DevOps Engineer
The pages name AES-256 and SHA-3, state zero-knowledge end-to-end encryption with keys that never leave the device, and mention ISO 27001 — but that certification is stated for the data centre, and we found no public information on key derivation, published audit or penetration-test reports, a bug bounty, or open-source clients I could review myself. Six layers of military-grade encryption is a marketing line, not a cryptographic design I can verify. 11 1 1 7
The Skeptic
Zero-knowledge and end-to-end encryption are asserted with AES-256 and SHA-3 named, the claim that encryption keys never leave the device, and an ISO 27001 certification — though the captured pages give different scope for it, once for the company and once for the data centre alone. We found no public information on key derivation, which fields are and are not encrypted, audit reports, penetration tests, a bug bounty or incident history; "six layers of military-grade encryption" is marketing language, not a documented design. 1 3 11 1 1
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Sharing to entire groups, time-limited sharing, restriction of the visible password, location-based access and admin-approved SSO recovery are all documented, and SCIM offboarding is stated to leave no access that outlasts employment. We found no public information on the key model behind recovery, emergency access with a waiting period, or one-time sharing with external parties. 6 8 10
The Identity Engineer
Group sharing with time limits, restricted password visibility and location-based access is documented, and SSO recovery with admin approval is a workflow I would actually want. We found no public information on permission levels, emergency access, or what happens to a leaver's shared items — "onboarding and offboarding in seconds" tells me the button exists, not that the company keeps the vault. 6 8 1
The Compliance Auditor
Sharing with entire groups, time-limited sharing with the password's visibility restricted, location-based access, and SSO recovery requiring admin approval are all documented, and SCIM-driven offboarding promises no access outlasting employment. I found no public information on the key model behind recovery, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team, or approval workflows for sharing sensitive items, and named permission levels never appear. 6 8 10
The SME Owner
Sharing logins with entire groups in one go, time-limited sharing, restricting visibility of the actual password and location-based access cover how my team would actually work day to day. Recovery is real — a user who forgets can request SSO recovery and an admin must approve before access is restored — and SCIM keeps access from outlasting employment, with onboarding and offboarding claimed in seconds. We found no public information on permission levels such as read or edit, the key model behind recovery, or emergency access. 6 8 1
The DevOps Engineer
Sharing with entire groups, time-limited sharing, restricting visibility of the actual password, location-based access, onboarding and offboarding, and admin-approved SSO recovery are all documented. We found no public information on the key model behind recovery, explicit permission tiers such as read or edit or manage, emergency access with a waiting period, or sharing with external parties. 6 8 10 2
The Skeptic
Sharing with entire groups, time-limited sharing, restriction of the actual password's visibility and location-based access are described, alongside onboarding and offboarding and an SSO recovery that an admin must approve before access is restored. We found no public information on the key model behind recovery, emergency access, sharing with external parties, or what happens to a leaver's shared items beyond the claim that offboarding happens "in seconds". 2 6 8
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SSO is documented with Microsoft Entra ID as the named provider, joined by SCIM 2.0 provisioning, conditional access policies, automatic deprovisioning and admin-set session lifetimes, and passkeys with device-bound private keys are supported both for logging in and inside the vault. The pages state the identity provider gets no access to stored passwords or vault data, but we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock, and no identity provider besides Entra ID is shown. 7 8 2
The Identity Engineer
The strongest area for my stack: SSO is Entra ID-only but connects with just the tenant ID, SCIM 2.0 automates the user lifecycle with a stated promise that no access outlasts employment, and Microsoft Conditional Access policies apply directly. Passkeys are stored in the product, device-bound and assignable per service. What holds me back is that we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock — only that the identity provider gets no vault data. 7 8 2
The Compliance Auditor
SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented with SCIM 2.0 lifecycle automation, automatic deprovisioning, Microsoft Conditional Access (MFA, trusted locations, compliant devices, risk-based authentication), configurable session lifetime and passkeys with device-bound private keys, and the identity provider is stated not to gain access to vault data. Only one identity provider is supported, and the captured pages do not document how the vault key is derived or released on SSO unlock. 2 7 8
The SME Owner
Single sign-on is documented with Microsoft Entra ID — connect with just a Tenant ID — paired with SCIM 2.0, automatic deprovisioning, Conditional Access for MFA, trusted locations and compliant devices, and configurable session lifetime. Passkeys are covered in depth: biometric or device-PIN unlock, the private key never leaving the device, and more than one passkey per login, with the identity provider stated to get no access to vault data. The pages name only Microsoft as an identity provider, and we found no public information on Okta or Google support or on how the vault key is derived behind the SSO unlock. 2 7 8
The DevOps Engineer
Entra ID single sign-on is documented with Conditional Access policies (MFA, trusted locations, compliant devices, risk-based authentication), SCIM 2.0 lifecycle sync with automatic deprovisioning so access does not outlast employment, and passkeys with device-bound private keys and no SMS codes. Only Microsoft Entra ID is supported on the captured pages, and we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock or on hardware security keys. 8 7 2
The Skeptic
SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented together with Conditional Access policies, SCIM-based provisioning, automatic deprovisioning and configurable session lifetime, and passkeys are supported with device-bound private keys, biometric unlock and no SMS codes. The pages state the identity provider gets no access to vault data, but we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock, and Microsoft Entra ID is the only identity provider named. 7 8
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
The audit log records logins, access changes and admin actions with user, action and timestamp, supports step-by-step backtracking of incidents, and is positioned for GDPR and NIS2 reporting; reusable access policies for IP, time and geo-location show creator and last update, with stronger password requirements, mandatory 2FA and breach monitoring documented alongside. We found no public information on log export, SIEM integration or a stated retention period for the logs. 2 9 10
The Identity Engineer
The audit log records logins, access changes and admin actions with user, action and timestamp, tracks permission changes and admin promotions in real time, and is positioned for GDPR and NIS2 reporting; policies cover mandatory 2FA, password requirements and reusable IP, time and geo rules. We found no public information on log export, SIEM integration or stated log retention, which is exactly what an ISO 27001 auditor will ask me for. 9 10 2
The Compliance Auditor
The Audit Log records logins, access changes and admin-level actions with user, action and timestamp in real time and is explicitly framed for GDPR and NIS2 reporting, paired with reusable enforceable access policies for IP, time and geo that show creator and last update, plus mandatory 2FA, stronger password requirements, security scores and breach monitoring. For my NIS2 file I found no public information on log export or SIEM integration, stated log retention, or events recorded at the level of viewing or copying an individual credential. 2 9 10 2
The SME Owner
The audit log records every user activity — logins, access changes, admin-level actions — with user, action and timestamp, presented as human-readable and described as built for GDPR and NIS2 reporting, which is what an auditor of mine would ask for. Policies go beyond basics with IP, time and geo-location rules reusable across groups, stronger password requirements and mandatory 2FA, plus security scores, data breach monitoring and employee risk assessment. We found no public information on exporting logs, SIEM integration, or a stated log retention period. 9 10 2
The DevOps Engineer
An audit log recording user, action and timestamp across logins, access changes and admin actions, described as built for GDPR and NIS2 reporting, sits alongside enforceable password requirements, mandatory 2FA, reusable IP, time and geo policies, security scores and breach monitoring. We found no public information on exporting logs to a named SIEM target, a log API, or a stated retention period — exactly what I would pipe into our own tooling. 9 10 2
The Skeptic
The audit log records logins, access changes and admin actions with user, action and timestamp, is described as built for GDPR and NIS2 reporting, and is paired with data breach monitoring, employee risk assessment, security scores, and access policies for IP, time and geography with stronger password requirements and mandatory 2FA. We found no public information on log export, SIEM integration, log retention periods, or sharing and export policies. 2 9 10
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Encrypted local storage on each device, a one-hour offline mode, multi-browser compatibility, cross-device sync, import and export, and hosting stated to be in Europe are documented. We found no public information on a self-hosted option, a status page or incident history, a Linux client, or the completeness and encryption of the export, and the offline window is stated as one hour. 11 1 2 2
The Identity Engineer
Offline access is real but stated as a one-hour window, hosting is claimed as hosted and operated in Europe, and an import and export feature is listed with no detail on format or fidelity. We found no public information on self-hosting, a documented export format, or a complete client list per operating system, so a two-thousand-seat deployment and exit plan cannot be written from these pages alone. 11 1 2
The Compliance Auditor
Hosting and operation in Europe is claimed, offline access is documented with a one-hour offline mode and encrypted local storage on each device, and import and export appears as a named feature alongside multi-browser compatibility. I found no public information on a self-hosted option, a named region or infrastructure provider, a status page with incident history, or the format and completeness of the export. 7 11 1 2
The SME Owner
The service is stated to be hosted and operated in Europe, offline password storage is offered with the page's own figure of a one-hour offline mode, passwords can be stored encrypted locally on each device, and import and export are listed as features alongside multi-browser compatibility and cross-device sync. We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises option, an itemised list of desktop and mobile clients, or how complete the export is. That one-hour offline window is what the vendor itself states, and it would matter during an outage. 11 1 2 2
The DevOps Engineer
European hosting, a one-hour offline mode, and encrypted local storage on each user's device are stated, and import and export appear as a feature name with no format or fidelity detail. We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises deployment, an enumerated client platform list, or a status page with incident history — as someone who would rather run the vault in our own data centre, that decides it. 11 1 2 3
The Skeptic
Hosting and operation in Europe are stated, an offline mode is documented — limited to one hour — with encrypted passwords stored locally on each device, and import and export plus multi-browser compatibility are listed as features. We found no public information on a self-hosted option, a client list per operating system, the export's format or completeness, or a status page with incident history. 2 11 1 2
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
Uniqkey A/S in Denmark is the contracting entity and stated data controller, hosting is described as within European infrastructure with European ownership, a data processing agreement is referenced, and outside-EU transfers are described as exceptional and bound to legal requirements. Subprocessors are named only by purpose — hosting, system maintenance, email service — with no names or locations, and we found no public information on the specific country or named infrastructure behind the European hosting. 3 4 7 1
The Identity Engineer
The contracting entity is Danish — Uniqkey A/S, Herlev — a Data Processing Agreement is referenced in the terms, and the vendor states hosting and operation in Europe with no third-party data transfer. The independently checked data residency dimension is marked unknown, and the processors behind hosting, maintenance and email are unnamed, so we found no public information on their identities or locations — the chain is plausible but not proven. 3 4 1
The Compliance Auditor
The contracting entity is Uniqkey A/S in Denmark, hosting is claimed to be in Europe on European infrastructure, and a Uniqkey Data Processing Agreement is referenced in the terms. Beyond that the chain goes dark: subprocessors are disclosed only by purpose — hosting, system maintenance, email service — with no names or locations, and no transfer impact assessment or named data centre region appears. 3 4 7 1
The SME Owner
The contracting entity is Uniqkey A/S in Denmark, and the vendor states the service is hosted and operated in Europe on European infrastructure, with a Uniqkey Data Processing Agreement named in the terms. Subprocessors are listed only by purpose — hosting, system maintenance, email service — without names or locations, and we found no public information on the parent company or where vault metadata and logs sit. Danish entity and European operations are what I want on paper; the chain below the vendor is not published. 3 4 1
The DevOps Engineer
The contracting entity is Uniqkey A/S in Denmark, the vendor states it is 'Hosted and operated in Europe' on European infrastructure, the terms reference a Uniqkey Data Processing Agreement, and the pages state 'No third-party data transfer'. Subprocessors are named only by purpose — hosting, system maintenance, email service — with no identities or locations, and the hosting infrastructure itself is not named, so the chain is European at the ends but undocumented in the middle. 3 4 1 7
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is Uniqkey A/S in Denmark, a Data Processing Agreement is referenced in the terms, hosting and operation in Europe are claimed on the homepage, the company states there is no third-party data transfer, and it is financially backed by EIFO. Service providers for hosting, system maintenance and email are acknowledged by purpose but unnamed, and we found no public information on a named hosting country or infrastructure, a subprocessor list with locations, or a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path. 3 4 7 1 1
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
Pricing is quote-based with no prices published, and the pages direct buyers to request a quote or pricing; a business trial is offered free of charge. No tier price, seat minimum, term or add-on cost can be derived from the captured pages, so a real annual cost cannot be computed from public information alone. 10 2 2
The Identity Engineer
The captured pricing pages are quote-based — "Request a quote for your business" — and no prices are published, only the bundle composition under a single-price model plus a free business trial. A buyer cannot compute any annual cost from public pages; the savings claims of "Save €480 per employee on password resets" are return-on-investment arguments, not prices. 2 2 10
The Compliance Auditor
No prices are published: the pricing pages invite a business to request a quote and describe a single price covering both the password and access manager, with a free business trial offered. I found no public per-user prices, seat minimums, add-ons, minimum term or VAT treatment, so an annual cost cannot be computed from the captured pages. 2 2 2
The SME Owner
Pricing is quote-based with no prices published — the page says "Request a quote for your business" — and the only figures offered are savings claims of €480 per employee on password resets and up to 37% software licence costs. The one useful structural fact is that a single price includes both the password and access manager, and a free business trial is available. For a forty-person firm I cannot compute a euro of annual cost from the public pages, so a sales conversation is mandatory. 2 2 2
The DevOps Engineer
The pricing page shows 'Request a quote for your business' and the captured pages publish no figures; the 'one price' model covering both the password and access manager is described but never priced, and personal use is only available through a workplace licence. A buyer cannot compute any annual cost from these pages alone — every tier is a sales conversation. 2 2 2
The Skeptic
The captured pricing pages show no figures at all: pricing is quote-based, businesses are told to request a quote or talk to an expert, and a one-price model covering both modules is described without any number attached. A business trial is offered, but we found no public price per user, tier, seat minimum or term anywhere on the pricing pages. 2 10 2 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in DK | 2/2 pts | 3 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location |
Not determined
unverified
Why unverified?Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured. |
— | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement |
Published, self-serve
unverified
Why unverified?Only the link to a public support article is shown in this excerpt; the agreement's text itself was not captured, and the page does not state that customers conclude it online. |
1/1 pts | 4 Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Uniqkey
Is Uniqkey European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Uniqkey as EU-Made. Its vendor, Uniqkey A/S, is incorporated in Denmark, per the vendor’s page captured 16 Nov 2026.
Where does Uniqkey store data?
The default storage location for customer data is not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026. The vendor’s pages mention Europe as hosting location, per the vendor’s page captured 1 Oct 2026.
Does Uniqkey have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Uniqkey?
As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Uniqkey alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 1 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Data processing agreement. Only the link to a public support article is shown in this excerpt; the agreement's text itself was not captured, and the page does not state that customers conclude it online.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 112 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 13 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 data fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (12)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 +2 earlier captures: 9 Nov 2026, 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 +2 earlier captures: 9 Nov 2026, 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Security / trust page — found from the homepage www.uniqkey.eu Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →