Video Conferencing
Jitsi Meet
Rest of world Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by 8x8, Inc. · jitsi.org
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Jitsi Meet is open-source video conferencing from 8x8, Inc.: free on meet.jit.si, self-hostable under the Apache License, Version 2.0. Its strongest criterion is encryption and access at 7-8 — DTLS-SRTP on all media by default, with an optional end-to-end layer the pages say is never removed at the server. Integrations score 6-7 on deployment freedom: self-hosting in as little as fifteen minutes, XMPP and REST control, an embeddable API. Sovereignty is lowest at 1-4 and genuinely split — higher scores credit self-hosting on your own infrastructure; lower scores weigh the vendor's own offering: 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California as contracting party, New York City courts for disputes, meet.jit.si analytics through Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics. Meeting core sits at 5-7 — published load tests show 1056 streams at over 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU, but moderation is soft, with all users moderators on meet.jit.si. Reach and recording governance sit low at 4-6, where we found no public information on accessibility testing or recording consent; pricing transparency splits 2-6, with no public prices for the hosted offering.
Speaks for it
- Optional end-to-end encryption sits on top of DTLS-SRTP on all media, with the pages stating the second layer is never removed at the server
- Published load tests show 1056 streams at over 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU on a single quad-core server
- The stack is fully open source under the Apache License, Version 2.0, self-hostable via Docker in as little as 15 minutes, with XMPP and REST control and an embeddable external API
- Rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker statistics are destroyed when a meeting ends, and names and e-mail addresses are not retained afterwards
- Guests join from a browser with no install and participants create no account, with mobile apps on the App Store, Google Play and F-Droid
Held against it
- Sovereignty scores sit at 1-4, with the contracting entity 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, disputes litigated in New York City courts, and no public information on where vendor-run media is processed
- On meet.jit.si all users are moderators with controls described as soft, and we found no public information on breakout rooms or waiting rooms
- We found no public information on an accessibility statement, screen-reader or keyboard testing, or listed dial-in numbers
- Cloud recordings are kept until upload to a destination you indicate (currently Dropbox), and we found no public information on participant consent, storage region, or who may record
- We found no public prices for the hosted Jitsi-as-a-Service offering, and the terms reserve 8x8's right to require a transition to a paid service at a usage limit we found no public figure for
Best for
- You can run your own servers and want the whole stack on infrastructure you choose, with a self-hosted install documented at as little as fifteen minutes
- You need external guests to join from a browser with no install and no account for participants
- You want inspectable encryption — the cryptography is open source under Apache 2.0, with optional end-to-end encryption documented alongside its trade-offs
- You run large meetings and want published scale numbers — 1056 streams at over 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU on one server
Avoid if
- You require a European contracting entity or stated EU data residency — the pages name 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, litigate disputes in New York City courts, and we found no public information on residency for vendor-run services
- You need reserved host control on the public service — the pages state that on meet.jit.si all users are moderators and the controls are soft
- You need end-to-end encryption covering chat and polls — the pages state it is limited to audio, video and screen sharing
- You need a vendor-hosted production service — the terms provide the service as-is without support or any uptime commitment, and state that meet.jit.si is not meant for production applications
The scores
The meeting itself
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How this is scored
Whether the call works: participant capacity, video and audio quality under load, screen sharing, breakout rooms, moderation, and what happens on a bad connection.
0 — Small meetings only, no screen sharing worth the name, no moderation controls, and the call degrades without telling anyone.
3 — Standard meetings with screen sharing and mute-all, but low participant limits, no breakout rooms and no bandwidth adaptation stated.
5 — Meetings at the scale most teams need with screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation, and documented behaviour on constrained connections.
8 — Large meetings and webinars with published capacity limits, per-participant moderation and waiting rooms, layout control, simulcast or adaptive bitrate stated, and reliable behaviour on mobile networks.
10 — Scale and control are engineering claims the vendor stands behind: capacity published per plan and per region, selective forwarding with adaptive quality documented, live streaming, hardware-room support, and diagnostics an admin can read after a bad call.
The IT Administrator
The published load tests are exactly what I want before a board call: over a thousand streams at roughly 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU on a quad-core Xeon, on a Selective Forwarding Unit that relays rather than mixes, with Last N mode for large rooms. What holds it back is the bad day — on the public service all users are moderators with soft controls, we found no public information on breakout rooms, waiting rooms, room-system support or behaviour on mobile networks, and the hosted demo carries no uptime commitment and is expressly not meant for production use. 6 7 3 5 10
The Security Officer
The videobridge relays rather than mixes, and the engineering numbers stand behind scale — 1056 streams at roughly 20% CPU on a single rented server, with Last-N trimming for large rooms. Control is the weak flank: on the public service all users are moderators and the moderation controls are documented as "soft, and for everyone", and I found no public information on waiting rooms, breakout rooms or per-meeting participant capacity. 6 7 3 2
The Works Council Advocate
The engineering is real and published: a selective forwarding unit shown distributing over a thousand streams on a single quad-core server, desktop sharing, and a Last-N mode that protects constrained connections. But we found no public information on breakout rooms, waiting rooms or per-participant moderation, and the vendor states that on the public instance all users are moderators — a room where everyone holds every button is a room nobody controls. 2 3 6 7
The Educator
The published load tests stand behind the scale — 1056 streams at roughly 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU on one quad-core server, a selective forwarding unit that relays video rather than mixing it, and Last-N so large conferences distribute only the most recent speakers. Screen sharing, integrated chat and Etherpad are documented, but I found no public information on breakout rooms, waiting rooms or per-participant moderation: on the public instance all users are moderators and the controls are described as soft, with stronger host control available only by configuring your own instance. 7 6 2 3
The Accessibility Advocate
The selective-forwarding bridge comes with published load tests — 1056 streams at over 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU on a rentable server — plus a Last-N mode that documents behaviour under load, and screen sharing and integrated chat are on the product page. But the pages say every participant is a moderator on meet.jit.si and the controls are "soft, and for everyone", so host control is shared rather than reserved. We found no public information on breakout rooms, waiting rooms, layout control, or behaviour on mobile networks. 2 3 6 7
The Skeptic
Screen sharing, integrated chat and HD Opus audio are stated, and the selective-forwarding architecture comes with published load numbers — 1056 streams at over 550 Mbps for about 20% CPU — plus a Last-N mode that trims distribution to the most recent speakers and distributed tracing across the backend. What I could not find is a published participant cap per meeting, breakout rooms, or a lobby; on meet.jit.si moderation is described as "soft, and for everyone" because all users are moderators, with strong authentication available only on instances customers run themselves. 2 3 6 7 9
Encryption & meeting access
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How this is scored
What is actually encrypted and against whom, plus who can get into a meeting. Judged on documented mechanism rather than on the word "encrypted".
0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; meetings joinable by anyone with a link and no lobby.
3 — TLS in transit and encryption at rest, with the vendor holding all keys; access control is a passcode.
5 — The above plus a lobby or waiting room, host-controlled admission, per-meeting passcodes, and a clear statement that the vendor can technically access media.
8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for meetings with the trade-offs named (which features stop working), documented key handling, SSO-gated joining, and per-meeting access policies.
10 — End-to-end encryption available without surrendering the product — its cryptography documented or open source, key management explained, identity verification for participants, and the vendor stating plainly what it can and cannot see.
The IT Administrator
This is documentation I can defend to security: DTLS-SRTP on all traffic by default, optional end-to-end encryption via a shared key with the trade-offs named plainly (chat and polls sit outside it), and the pages state outright that the outer encryption layer is removed at the videobridge while packets live in memory only and are never persisted — all under Apache 2.0, so the crypto is inspectable. We found no public information on SSO-gated joining, a lobby, or participant identity verification, which keeps it off the top. 3 8 6 5
The Security Officer
The mechanism is documented honestly rather than waved at: hop-by-hop DTLS-SRTP whose outer layer the bridge strips in multiparty meetings, and optional end-to-end encryption whose second layer is "never removed" at the server, with the trade-offs named since chat and polls sit outside it. I hold it below the top band because the key is a shared passphrase every participant types rather than per-device keys or identity verification, and getting in is a link plus an optional password; I found no public information on a lobby or SSO-gated joining. 8 3 6 5
The Works Council Advocate
Encryption is documented as mechanism, not slogan: DTLS-SRTP on all media by default, optional end-to-end encryption whose costs are named plainly (chat and polls stay outside it), key handling explained as a shared passphrase, and a candid statement that the outer layer is stripped at the videobridge while packets live only in memory — all in open source we can audit. What holds it back is admission: it rests on a shared password, and we found no public information on lobby admission or joining gated by our own single sign-on. 3 6 8
The Educator
End-to-end encryption is switchable from the overflow menu, its trade-offs are named plainly — audio, video and screen sharing are covered while chat and polls are not — and the pages say exactly what the server sees: the outer DTLS-SRTP layer is removed at the videobridge but packets live only in memory and are never persisted. With the code 100% open source I can inspect the cryptography myself, and retention of names, emails and chat is documented as lasting only the meeting; I found no public information on SSO-gated joining or per-participant identity verification, and the meeting key is one shared passphrase. 8 3 2
The Accessibility Advocate
End-to-end encryption is a real, documented option — a shared passphrase, Chromium 83 or the Electron client, and a layer the page says is never removed at the bridge — with the trade-offs named plainly: chat and polls sit outside it. The cryptography is open source under the Apache License, Version 2.0, and the vendor states what it tracks. We found no public information on identity verification for participants, SSO-gated joining, or a lobby on the public service; a password per meeting is the access control shown. 3 5 8
The Skeptic
The sentence I look for exists: end-to-end encryption can be switched on per meeting via a shared password entered by all participants, the extra layer "is never removed (nor can it be)" at the server, and the pages name the trade-offs plainly — it "doesn't cover chat, polls, etc." and needs Chromium 83 or the Electron client. The cryptography is open source under Apache 2.0 and the pages state what is tracked and when it is destroyed. But meeting access rests on an optional meeting password and an unpredictable room name; we found no public information on a lobby, single sign-on gated joining, or any verification of who a participant is. 3 5 6 8
Reach & accessibility
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How this is scored
Whether everyone who needs to join can: browser without an install, dial-in, low bandwidth, guests without accounts, captions and keyboard operation.
0 — A desktop client is the only way in; guests must create an account.
3 — Browser joining exists but is degraded, guests can join by link, and there is no dial-in and no accessibility statement.
5 — Full-feature browser joining without an install, guest access by link, mobile apps, and a stated accessibility posture.
8 — Telephone dial-in with numbers listed, live captions, keyboard-navigable and screen-reader-tested interface, and documented low-bandwidth behaviour.
10 — Reach is designed for: browser parity with the client, dial-in across the regions the customer operates in, live captions and translation, a published accessibility conformance report, and a usable experience on a poor mobile connection.
The IT Administrator
Browser-first over WebRTC with end-to-end encryption and Picture-in-Picture working in the browser, guests join by link with no account, mobile apps ship on all three stores including F-Droid, a per-meeting dial-in information page exists, and speech-to-text transcription is published. But we found no public information on an accessibility statement, screen-reader or keyboard testing, listed dial-in numbers, or low-bandwidth behaviour, so I cannot put a worst-case guest in front of this with confidence. 8 9 3 10
The Security Officer
Browser joining without an install and guests without accounts are the design centre, with mobile apps on the App Store, Google Play and F-Droid, plus a dial-in information endpoint and speech-to-text transcription. The pages stop short of reach as a promise, though: we found no public information on dial-in numbers, accessibility conformance, keyboard and screen-reader testing, or low-bandwidth behaviour beyond Last-N stream trimming. 2 9 10 7
The Works Council Advocate
Anyone can join from a browser with no install and no account, guests arrive by link, and mobile apps ship through the App Store, Google Play and F-Droid. But we found no public information on an accessibility statement, live captions, keyboard or screen-reader testing, or dial-in numbers — only an undocumented per-room dial-in information page. 1 2 3 9 10
The Educator
Joining from a browser with no install and no account is the product's default — no need for an account, ever — though the captured pages give different figures for hosting, since the security page says the room creator has needed an account since August 24, 2023, and mobile apps ship on three stores including F-Droid. For the half of my class on a phone in a dead spot, I found no public information on an accessibility statement, keyboard or screen-reader testing, or live captions; transcription gets one line, and dial-in appears only as an endpoint address on the developer page with no numbers listed. 2 3 9 10
The Accessibility Advocate
Anyone joins from a browser with no account and no install, and apps ship on App Store, Google Play and F-Droid — guest reach is excellent. Transcription is evidenced and a per-room dial-in information page is documented, but we found no public information on listed dial-in numbers or regions. Crucially, we found no public information on keyboard operation, screen-reader testing, an accessibility statement, or a conformance report — and without a report I cannot hand this to a deaf colleague or a screen-reader user to run. 2 3 9 10
The Skeptic
Browser meetings without an install, guests joining with no account, and mobile apps on three stores including F-Droid are all stated on the captured pages. Beyond that it thins out fast: we found no public information on listed dial-in numbers (only a URL pattern where a dial-in information page would sit), no accessibility statement or conformance report, and no documented behaviour on poor connections beyond the stream-limiting mode aimed at server load. 2 3 9 10
Recordings, retention & admin control
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How this is scored
A recording is personal data about everyone in the room. Who may record, who is told, where it is stored, how long it lives, and what the works council can switch off.
0 — Anyone can record, storage location unstated, no retention rule, no admin policy.
3 — Host-only recording with a notification, but storage region unstated, retention manual, and no organisation-wide policy control.
5 — Admin policy over who may record, participant notification and consent prompt, stated storage region, and manual deletion that works.
8 — Automatic retention and deletion per policy, recordings encrypted at rest with access logged, transcription handled with its own retention rule, and attendance or analytics features that can be switched off for co-determination.
10 — Built for a works agreement: every recording, transcript and analytics feature independently switchable and documented, retention executed and evidenced, an audit trail of who accessed which recording, and no participant-level behavioural scoring at all.
The IT Administrator
The destruction posture is unusually strong: rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker stats are destroyed when the meeting ends, names and emails are not retained, and cloud recordings leave for the destination you indicate (currently Dropbox) with anything still on the servers deleted within 24 hours. What an organisation needs around that is absent from the captured pages — we found no public information on admin policy over who may record, participant notification or consent prompts, storage region, an access audit trail, or a retention rule for transcription. 3 9
The Security Officer
The default is discard: rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker statistics are destroyed when the meeting ends, and a cloud recording sits on the servers at most 24 hours before upload to the destination the organiser chose. Governance is where the pages go quiet — we found no public information on who may start a recording, participant notification or consent, organisation-wide recording policy, storage region, or an access log for stored recordings. 3 6 9
The Works Council Advocate
The minimisation defaults are the best I have seen: rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker stats are destroyed when the meeting ends, no names or e-mail addresses are retained, cloud recordings leave the servers within 24 hours, and the software ships with no preconfigured analytics engine, so no behavioural scoring sits waiting to be switched on. The gaps are mine to name: we found no public information on participant notification or consent when a recording starts or on any audit trail of recording access, the storage region is unstated and recordings head to Dropbox, and with every user a moderator on the public instance there is no hierarchy of who may record. 3 6 9
The Educator
The retention story is unusually clean: rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker stats are destroyed when the meeting ends, names and emails are not kept, and cloud recordings leave the servers for your Dropbox within 24 hours or are deleted. But a recording is personal data about everyone in my room, and I found no public information on who may record, participant notification or consent, storage region, or organisation-wide policy — while on the public instance every user is a moderator. 3 6 9
The Accessibility Advocate
The ephemeral defaults are strong: rooms die when the last participant leaves, chat and speaker stats are destroyed with them, and cloud recordings are deleted after at most 24 hours once uploaded to the destination you indicated — currently Dropbox. But that third-party destination raises the storage question rather than answering it. We found no public information on participant notification or consent when recording, storage region, or organisation-wide admin policy over who may record. 3 5 6
The Skeptic
The data lifecycle is concrete and public — rooms are destroyed when the last participant leaves, chat and speaker stats go with them, and cloud recordings sit on the servers at most 24 hours before deletion after upload to the customer's Dropbox. Recording happens through the jibri tooling and transcription exists, but for the questions a works council actually asks — who may record, whether participants are notified or asked to consent, which region the servers sit in, and any organisation-wide policy or access log — we found no public information. 3 6 9
Integrations & deployment
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How this is scored
Calendar, identity and the wider stack — plus, in this category, whether the product can be run on the customer's own infrastructure at all.
0 — No calendar integration, no SSO, no API; cloud-only with no alternative.
3 — One calendar integration and basic SSO, no API worth building on, cloud-only.
5 — Calendar integration for the major suites, SAML or OIDC SSO, a documented API for scheduling, and room-system support.
8 — The above plus SCIM provisioning, embedding via SDK, webhooks for meeting events, and either a self-hosted option or a documented private-cloud deployment.
10 — Deployment is the customer's choice: a genuine on-premises or private-cloud option with the same features, open protocols or open source, embeddable SDKs, and identity integration that does not require the vendor's directory.
The IT Administrator
Deployment is genuinely the customer's choice — fully open source under Apache 2.0, a Docker or quick-install path in as little as 15 minutes, control over XMPP and a REST interface, an embeddable external API, and a hosted JaaS option with tenant domains. That side is as good as it gets; but for the daily stack we found no public information on calendar integrations, SSO, or room-system support, and the public server is explicitly for testing rather than production integrations. 3 6 10 5
The Security Officer
Deployment freedom is the strong card: a stack that is 100% open source under Apache 2.0, self-hostable in about fifteen minutes via Docker, controllable over XMPP and a REST interface, embeddable through the external API, with tenant-named meeting URLs. The conventional stack side is thinner — we found no public information on calendar integration with the major suites, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or webhooks. 3 10 6 5
The Works Council Advocate
Deployment genuinely is our choice: the whole stack is open source and self-installable in as little as fifteen minutes, with documented API access, an embeddable external API, tenant naming and XMPP/REST control interfaces. What is missing from the captured pages: we found no public information on calendar integration, single sign-on, automated provisioning or webhooks for meeting events. 2 3 6 10
The Educator
Deployment is the customer's choice in a way few products match: full API documentation, an embeddable external API, control over XMPP and a REST interface, tenant-named rooms, managed JaaS hosting, and a self-hosted install documented at fifteen minutes on an Apache-2.0 codebase. The office plumbing is where the pages go quiet — I found no public information on calendar integration, single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, webhooks or room-system support. 10 6 3
The Accessibility Advocate
Deployment really is the customer's choice: the same open-source product self-hosts via Docker or a quick-install in as little as 15 minutes, with an embeddable external API, full API documentation, and XMPP or REST control interfaces. But the calendar-and-identity half of this criterion goes unaddressed — we found no public information on calendar integration, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, webhooks, or room-system support. 2 3 6 10
The Skeptic
Deployment choice is the strong suit: the whole product is Apache-2.0 open source, self-hostable via Docker in about 15 minutes, controllable over XMPP and a REST interface, embeddable through the external API, and offered as a managed service (JaaS) with tenant domains. What the captured pages do not show is the office plumbing — we found no public information on calendar integration, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, webhooks, or room-system support. 2 3 5 6 10
European sovereignty
panel opinion
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
Where media and metadata are processed, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors carry the traffic. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it — which in this category is heavily.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, media routed through unstated regions, subprocessors unnamed.
3 — EU data residency for storage while media relays or metadata remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.
5 — EU hosting and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — relays, analytics, support tooling, transcription — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.
8 — Media and metadata processed in the EU on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, complete subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: media never leaves the EU, every subprocessor European, certification published, and an on-premises option that removes the question entirely.
The IT Administrator
For the vendor-run services the captured pages give me nothing to stand on: the contracting entity is 8x8 in the United States, disputes go to New York courts, data residency is unstated, and the named analytics services (Amplitude, Datadog, Crashlytics) come with no published regional safeguards. The one real answer is structural — the software is fully open source and self-hostable, so media and metadata can run entirely on our own EU infrastructure with no vendor in the chain — but we found no public information on EU hosting, certification, or subprocessor commitments for any 8x8-run offering. 5 3 2
The Security Officer
The independent sovereignty assessment sits at the bottom of the scale and I weigh that heavily here: the contracting party is 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, disputes are litigated in New York courts, and analytics on the public service run to Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics. We found no public information on where media for the vendor-run service is processed, on any EU contracting entity, or on a complete subprocessor list; self-hosting would move the question onto the customer's own infrastructure, but that is a deployment the buyer builds, not a guarantee these pages evidence. 5 3
The Works Council Advocate
This buyer weighs sovereignty heavily, and the hosted offering fails it: the contracting entity is 8x8, Inc. in California, disputes are litigated in New York, meet.jit.si analytics run through the US services Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics, and we found no public information on where media and metadata are processed. The open-source self-hosted path is the redemption — on our own European servers the vendor's regions disappear from the chain — but that is a path we build ourselves, not a commitment the vendor publishes. 1 3 5
The Educator
The hosted service contracts through 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, with disputes litigated exclusively in New York, analytics running through Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics, and I found no public information on where media or metadata are processed. What lifts it for me is that the same pages document running my own instance, which puts every packet on infrastructure my school chooses; nothing evidences EU operation of the vendor's own cloud. 5 3 10
The Accessibility Advocate
The contracting entity is 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, disputes are litigated exclusively in New York City, and total liability for any claim is capped at TEN DOLLARS (USD$10); the demo service runs analytics through Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics, and data residency for what 8x8 hosts is unknown on the captured pages. Self-hosting lets an organisation take the question entirely in-house, but we found no public EU residency, certification, or safeguard commitments for the vendor's own hosted services. 3 5
The Skeptic
The contracting party is 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, with all claims litigated exclusively in New York City courts, no statement of where media or metadata are processed, and the analytics services named for meet.jit.si — Amplitude, Datadog, Crashlytics — are US providers. We found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity, or any published certification. The open-source self-hosted deployment is the one route that takes this vendor out of the chain entirely, but as offered here nothing European is evidenced, and I weigh that heavily. 3 5
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their host count — including the capacity, dial-in and recording storage they actually need — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A per-host headline exists, but participant caps, dial-in minutes or recording storage are unpriced or unmentioned.
5 — Per-host prices public with billing period stated and capacity limits given, but at least one commonly needed piece (webinar capacity, dial-in, storage) sits in an unpriced add-on.
8 — Every tier and add-on priced publicly with per-host maths, capacity limits, dial-in rates, storage allowances, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: a calculator producing the annual invoice for a given host count, meeting size and recording volume, including overage and per-region dial-in.
The IT Administrator
For the self-hosted software the headline is unambiguous — completely free, no account needed — and the performance page even names the class of server it ran on, so my self-hosting invoice computes to zero. But the same pages advertise a managed JaaS offering for which we found no public information on prices, dial-in and recording costs are unmentioned, and the terms reserve 8x8's right to move excessive users to a paid service at its sole discretion. 1 2 5 7 10
The Security Officer
The headline is public and simple — the demo service is free, "all day, every day", with no account — but the same pages say it is not meant for use in production applications, and we found no public pricing for the managed Jitsi-as-a-Service offering a production buyer would actually run on. The terms also reserve 8x8's right to require a transition to a paid service at its sole discretion above a usage limit we found no public figure for, so no annual invoice is computable from public pages. 2 10 5
The Works Council Advocate
The published price for the product itself is "completely free", open source, with no tiers to decode, so a self-hosted deployment carries no vendor invoice to miscompute. But we found no public prices for the Jitsi as a Service hosted offering, and the terms let 8x8 require users it judges excessive to "transition to a paid service", for which we found no public price. 1 2 5 10
The Educator
The headline price is public and unusual — all day, every day, for free, with no account needed — and the self-hosted path carries no vendor invoice at all. But the free service is stated to be not meant for use in production applications, the managed JaaS offering shows only a start-now link with no figures, and the terms reserve the right to require a transition to a paid service at a usage limit that is never published, so I cannot compute the annual cost of a real deployment. 2 10 5
The Accessibility Advocate
The software's price is public and simple — "completely free", usable "all day, every day, for free — with no account needed" — and the performance page speaks of a server "rentable for about a hundred dollars" for the self-hosted path. But the hosted production service has no prices on the captured pages; the terms only warn that 8x8 may "require You to transition to a paid service". We found no public information on dial-in rates or recording storage allowances. 1 2 5 7
The Skeptic
The headline is honest and extreme — the service is free "all day, every day" with no account, and the open-source download is free as well. But a buyer cannot compute a bill for the commercial path: we found no public information on pricing for the managed JaaS offering, no participant caps are published, and the terms let 8x8, in its sole discretion, require a "transition to a paid service" for exceeding a usage limit the pages never state. 2 5 9 10
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in US ⚠ unverified | 0/3 pts | 5 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Foreign-controlled ⚠ unverified | 0/2 pts | 3 Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 21 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Ownership. The page shows the Jitsi brand and service belong to 8x8, Inc., a US corporation, but says nothing about 8x8's own shareholder structure (e.g., listed or private equity owned).
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The jurisdiction comes from the meet.jit.si Terms of Service, which names the contracting party 8x8, Inc.; no imprint page for the Jitsi project itself is present in the excerpts.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 3 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (10)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Project homepage jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Product page jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Security page jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Source named in a correction jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Terms of service jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 The meeting itself — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 The meeting itself — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Encryption & meeting access — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Recordings, retention & admin control — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Integrations & deployment — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →