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Video Conferencing

Jitsi Meet

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Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 2 of 4 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by 8x8, Inc. · jitsi.org

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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The Security Officer

Weighted verdict

Wants to know what the vendor can see, and reads "encrypted" as a question rather than an answer. Asks which meetings get end-to-end encryption, what stops working when they do, who holds the keys, and who can walk into a meeting with a link.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The Security Officer

The meeting itself

How this is scored

Whether the call works: participant capacity, video and audio quality under load, screen sharing, breakout rooms, moderation, and what happens on a bad connection.

0 — Small meetings only, no screen sharing worth the name, no moderation controls, and the call degrades without telling anyone.

3 — Standard meetings with screen sharing and mute-all, but low participant limits, no breakout rooms and no bandwidth adaptation stated.

5 — Meetings at the scale most teams need with screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation, and documented behaviour on constrained connections.

8 — Large meetings and webinars with published capacity limits, per-participant moderation and waiting rooms, layout control, simulcast or adaptive bitrate stated, and reliable behaviour on mobile networks.

10 — Scale and control are engineering claims the vendor stands behind: capacity published per plan and per region, selective forwarding with adaptive quality documented, live streaming, hardware-room support, and diagnostics an admin can read after a bad call.

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The Security Officer

The videobridge relays rather than mixes, and the engineering numbers stand behind scale — 1056 streams at roughly 20% CPU on a single rented server, with Last-N trimming for large rooms. Control is the weak flank: on the public service all users are moderators and the moderation controls are documented as "soft, and for everyone", and I found no public information on waiting rooms, breakout rooms or per-meeting participant capacity. 6 7 3 2

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Encryption & meeting access

How this is scored

What is actually encrypted and against whom, plus who can get into a meeting. Judged on documented mechanism rather than on the word "encrypted".

0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; meetings joinable by anyone with a link and no lobby.

3 — TLS in transit and encryption at rest, with the vendor holding all keys; access control is a passcode.

5 — The above plus a lobby or waiting room, host-controlled admission, per-meeting passcodes, and a clear statement that the vendor can technically access media.

8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for meetings with the trade-offs named (which features stop working), documented key handling, SSO-gated joining, and per-meeting access policies.

10 — End-to-end encryption available without surrendering the product — its cryptography documented or open source, key management explained, identity verification for participants, and the vendor stating plainly what it can and cannot see.

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The Security Officer

The mechanism is documented honestly rather than waved at: hop-by-hop DTLS-SRTP whose outer layer the bridge strips in multiparty meetings, and optional end-to-end encryption whose second layer is "never removed" at the server, with the trade-offs named since chat and polls sit outside it. I hold it below the top band because the key is a shared passphrase every participant types rather than per-device keys or identity verification, and getting in is a link plus an optional password; I found no public information on a lobby or SSO-gated joining. 8 3 6 5

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Reach & accessibility

How this is scored

Whether everyone who needs to join can: browser without an install, dial-in, low bandwidth, guests without accounts, captions and keyboard operation.

0 — A desktop client is the only way in; guests must create an account.

3 — Browser joining exists but is degraded, guests can join by link, and there is no dial-in and no accessibility statement.

5 — Full-feature browser joining without an install, guest access by link, mobile apps, and a stated accessibility posture.

8 — Telephone dial-in with numbers listed, live captions, keyboard-navigable and screen-reader-tested interface, and documented low-bandwidth behaviour.

10 — Reach is designed for: browser parity with the client, dial-in across the regions the customer operates in, live captions and translation, a published accessibility conformance report, and a usable experience on a poor mobile connection.

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The Security Officer

Browser joining without an install and guests without accounts are the design centre, with mobile apps on the App Store, Google Play and F-Droid, plus a dial-in information endpoint and speech-to-text transcription. The pages stop short of reach as a promise, though: we found no public information on dial-in numbers, accessibility conformance, keyboard and screen-reader testing, or low-bandwidth behaviour beyond Last-N stream trimming. 2 9 10 7

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Recordings, retention & admin control

How this is scored

A recording is personal data about everyone in the room. Who may record, who is told, where it is stored, how long it lives, and what the works council can switch off.

0 — Anyone can record, storage location unstated, no retention rule, no admin policy.

3 — Host-only recording with a notification, but storage region unstated, retention manual, and no organisation-wide policy control.

5 — Admin policy over who may record, participant notification and consent prompt, stated storage region, and manual deletion that works.

8 — Automatic retention and deletion per policy, recordings encrypted at rest with access logged, transcription handled with its own retention rule, and attendance or analytics features that can be switched off for co-determination.

10 — Built for a works agreement: every recording, transcript and analytics feature independently switchable and documented, retention executed and evidenced, an audit trail of who accessed which recording, and no participant-level behavioural scoring at all.

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The Security Officer

The default is discard: rooms are ephemeral, chat and speaker statistics are destroyed when the meeting ends, and a cloud recording sits on the servers at most 24 hours before upload to the destination the organiser chose. Governance is where the pages go quiet — we found no public information on who may start a recording, participant notification or consent, organisation-wide recording policy, storage region, or an access log for stored recordings. 3 6 9

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Integrations & deployment

How this is scored

Calendar, identity and the wider stack — plus, in this category, whether the product can be run on the customer's own infrastructure at all.

0 — No calendar integration, no SSO, no API; cloud-only with no alternative.

3 — One calendar integration and basic SSO, no API worth building on, cloud-only.

5 — Calendar integration for the major suites, SAML or OIDC SSO, a documented API for scheduling, and room-system support.

8 — The above plus SCIM provisioning, embedding via SDK, webhooks for meeting events, and either a self-hosted option or a documented private-cloud deployment.

10 — Deployment is the customer's choice: a genuine on-premises or private-cloud option with the same features, open protocols or open source, embeddable SDKs, and identity integration that does not require the vendor's directory.

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The Security Officer

Deployment freedom is the strong card: a stack that is 100% open source under Apache 2.0, self-hostable in about fifteen minutes via Docker, controllable over XMPP and a REST interface, embeddable through the external API, with tenant-named meeting URLs. The conventional stack side is thinner — we found no public information on calendar integration with the major suites, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or webhooks. 3 10 6 5

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Where media and metadata are processed, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors carry the traffic. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it — which in this category is heavily.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, media routed through unstated regions, subprocessors unnamed.

3 — EU data residency for storage while media relays or metadata remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.

5 — EU hosting and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — relays, analytics, support tooling, transcription — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.

8 — Media and metadata processed in the EU on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, complete subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: media never leaves the EU, every subprocessor European, certification published, and an on-premises option that removes the question entirely.

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The Security Officer

The independent sovereignty assessment sits at the bottom of the scale and I weigh that heavily here: the contracting party is 8x8, Inc. of Campbell, California, disputes are litigated in New York courts, and analytics on the public service run to Amplitude, Datadog and Crashlytics. We found no public information on where media for the vendor-run service is processed, on any EU contracting entity, or on a complete subprocessor list; self-hosting would move the question onto the customer's own infrastructure, but that is a deployment the buyer builds, not a guarantee these pages evidence. 5 3

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their host count — including the capacity, dial-in and recording storage they actually need — from public pages alone.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A per-host headline exists, but participant caps, dial-in minutes or recording storage are unpriced or unmentioned.

5 — Per-host prices public with billing period stated and capacity limits given, but at least one commonly needed piece (webinar capacity, dial-in, storage) sits in an unpriced add-on.

8 — Every tier and add-on priced publicly with per-host maths, capacity limits, dial-in rates, storage allowances, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: a calculator producing the annual invoice for a given host count, meeting size and recording volume, including overage and per-region dial-in.

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The Security Officer

The headline is public and simple — the demo service is free, "all day, every day", with no account — but the same pages say it is not meant for use in production applications, and we found no public pricing for the managed Jitsi-as-a-Service offering a production buyer would actually run on. The terms also reserve 8x8's right to require a transition to a paid service at its sole discretion above a usage limit we found no public figure for, so no annual invoice is computable from public pages. 2 10 5

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European sovereignty — proven facts

2 of 4 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Ownership Foreign-controlled ⚠ unverified 0/2 pts 3 Report an error
Data residency Not determined — uncited Report an error
Subprocessors Not determined ⚠ unverified — uncited Report an error

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

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Sources (10)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Project homepage jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Product page jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Security page jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Source named in a correction jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Terms of service jitsi.org Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
  6. 6 The meeting itself — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  7. 7 The meeting itself — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Encryption & meeting access — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Recordings, retention & admin control — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Integrations & deployment — found from sitemap jitsi.org Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →