Whistleblowing Portals
Whistlelink
EU-Made Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Whistleblowing Solutions AB · whistlelink.com
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Whistlelink is a whistleblowing portal from Whistleblowing Solutions AB of Sweden, judged strongest at reporting channels & reporter experience: guided web forms, QR/short-link entry, voice messages with voice distortion, 50+ languages with automatic translation, WCAG and mobile access, and a documented case-code mechanism for anonymous two-way dialog in which no personal data is requested — the 24/7 hotline is a paid add-on. Weakest are pricing transparency and group & multi-entity capability (3): judges fault unpriced add-ons and absent VAT and setup figures even though the evidence lists monthly prices from €79 (0-49 employees) to €299 (500-999; 1000+ on request), and nothing evidences per-entity case access, consolidated group views or delegated administration. The visible spread is security & anonymity assurance, where credit for company-level ISO 27001, penetration tests, MFA and audit logs meets silence on IP and metadata logging, and sovereignty, where Sweden-hosted servers and an unconditional EU-only residency claim stand beside an undocumented chain: no DPA, no subprocessor list, no named data centers. Case management & deadline discipline and legal compliance alignment sit at 4-5 on implemented features without statutory 7-day/3-month clocks or conflict-of-interest exclusion.
Speaks for it
- Reporting channels & reporter experience scores of 8-9 rest on web intake, QR/short-link entry, voice messages with voice distortion, and 50+ languages with automatic translation.
- Anonymity is documented as a mechanism: no personal data requested at intake and a personal case code for anonymous two-way dialog.
- 30-day free trial, no installation required, and per-month prices from €79 (0-49 employees) to €299 (500-999; 1000+ on request), billed annually by invoice.
- Vendor pages state Sweden-hosted servers and no personal data processed or hosted outside the EU.
- Company-level ISO 27001, external penetration tests, encryption in transit and at rest, MFA and audit logs are attested on vendor pages.
Held against it
- Group & multi-entity capability scores sit at 3 with no evidence of per-entity case access separation, consolidated group views or delegated administration.
- Pricing transparency scores run 1-2: the 24/7 hotline and external intake add-ons carry no listed price, and no VAT treatment or setup fees appear in the evidence.
- No evidence of automated statutory clocks (7-day acknowledgement, 3-month feedback), conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, or tamper-evident case history.
- No published DPA, subprocessor list or named data centers, and the evidence's sovereignty attributes list subprocessors, ownership and legal entity jurisdiction as unknown.
- The 'fully compliant with GDPR, the EU Whistleblower Directive and national laws' claim is not backed by per-country rule sets, feedback-clock features or documented legal review.
Best for
- You run a single EU organization over the 50-employee threshold and reporter-facing channel quality matters more than group administration.
- You need a documented anonymous intake — code-based, no personal data requested — in 50+ languages with WCAG and mobile access.
- You want to try before buying, given the 30-day free trial and account-based access with no installation.
- You require EU/EEA-resident hosting and can verify the DPA and subprocessor chain yourself during procurement.
Avoid if
- You administer multiple legal entities and need separated case access, a consolidated group view or delegated administration.
- You expect the product to run the 7-day acknowledgement and 3-month feedback deadlines rather than leaving clock-chasing to your team.
- You must compute a complete invoice up front, including the hotline add-on, VAT treatment and any setup fees.
- You need documented assurance that reporter IP or metadata is not logged — nothing in the evidence states it.
The scores
Reporting channels & reporter experience
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How this is scored
The intake side: how a reporter actually submits — web form, anonymous dialog, phone/voice, languages, accessibility — and whether anonymity survives first contact.
0 — A web form that is an email in disguise: no anonymous route, no way to reach the reporter afterwards.
3 — An anonymous form exists but the dialogue ends there — no secured mailbox for follow-up questions, few languages, desktop-only.
5 — Anonymous two-way dialog via a protected mailbox, a usable set of languages, mobile-friendly; voice or phone intake missing or an add-on.
8 — Multiple channels (web, voice message or hotline, QR entry points), broad language coverage with translation support, accessibility considered, and the anonymous dialog is first-class rather than bolted on.
10 — Intake engineered around the frightened reporter: every channel anonymous-capable, dozens of languages, WCAG-conscious, no app install or account required, and the vendor documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself.
The Compliance Officer
Multiple channels are real: written and oral intake, QR/short-link entry, a 24/7 hotline add-on with voice distortion, 50+ languages with auto-translation, WCAG, mobile, and no install — plus a documented code-based anonymity mechanism with two-way anonymous dialog. It only misses the 10-anchor bar because nothing documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself (no IP/metadata statement). 1 2 6
The Reporter's Advocate
Engineered for the frightened reporter: no personal data asked at intake, a case code for the anonymous two-way dialog, 50+ languages with automatic translation, mobile/QR entry, and voice recordings distorted so the voice itself cannot identify the speaker. Only the 24/7 hotline being a paid add-on with its live-call anonymity asserted rather than documented keeps me one notch from the top. 1 2 6
The SME Operator
Web form with guided creation, QR/short-link entry, mobile-friendly, 50+ languages with automatic translation, WCAG, no installation — and the 24/7 hotline even does voice distortion for anonymity. The case-code mechanism that keeps personal data out of intake is actually documented, so anonymous two-way dialog is first-class; only the hotline being a separate paid add-on keeps it from a 10. 1 2 6
The Group Counsel
Web with guided forms and secure uploads, QR/short-link entry, oral channels including a 24/7 hotline and voice recording with voice distortion, 50+ languages with auto-translation, WCAG and mobile support — and the FAQ documents how the reporter stays out of the channel (no personal data requested, personal code for re-entry). I hold back one point because the live hotline is a paid add-on and anonymity in a live call rests on the third-party intake service rather than documented engineering. 1 2 6
The Security Auditor
This is the strongest part of the product: written and oral channels with voice recording plus voice distortion for anonymity, QR entry, 50+ languages with auto-translation, WCAG, mobile-friendly, no install, and a documented code-based mechanism where no personal data is requested. It stops short of a 9-10 because the live 24/7 hotline's anonymity capability is not documented and nothing addresses whether the channel itself leaks metadata (IP logging) about the reporter. 1 2 6
The Skeptic
Web intake with guided forms, QR/shortlink entry, voice messages with voice distortion plus a 24/7 hotline add-on, 50+ languages with auto-translation, WCAG and mobile access, and a code-based anonymous two-way dialog with no personal data requested. It falls short of a 10 because the phone channel is a paid add-on and the vendor documents only the code mechanism — nothing on how the reporter's identity stays out of channel metadata. 1 2 6
Case management & deadline discipline
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How this is scored
The case worker's side: triage, statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback), role separation, audit-proof documentation.
0 — Reports land in an inbox; deadlines, roles and history live in a spreadsheet next door.
3 — A case list with status fields, but deadlines are manual, permissions are all-or-nothing, and the record of who did what is thin.
5 — Deadline tracking with reminders for the statutory clocks, case notes and attachments, basic role separation between case handlers; reporting on the caseload is limited.
8 — Automated statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest handling (excluding implicated case handlers), complete tamper-evident case history, retention and deletion rules applied per case, and management reporting.
10 — A case system an external investigator can rely on: enforced workflows, full audit trail, legally aware retention/deletion automation, evidence handling, and statistics that survive a regulator's questions.
The Compliance Officer
The pieces exist — per-report acknowledgment, case management, secure evidence uploads, action/data logs, strict access control, auto-deletion, and monthly monitoring reports on higher tiers — but nowhere does the evidence evidence automated statutory clocks (a 3-month feedback deadline with reminders), conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, or a tamper-evident history. As the person who answers for missed clocks, I cannot tell whether the 3-month duty is the system's job or still mine; that keeps it below the 5 anchor. 2 4 6
The Reporter's Advocate
Case management with receipt confirmation per report, external review-and-forward intake, action/data logs and MFA exists — but the evidence is silent on automated statutory clocks (especially the 3-month feedback a reporter is owed), conflict-of-interest exclusion and tamper-evidence of case history. Monitoring reports are monthly and tier-gated, so caseload reporting is limited; the absence of deadline discipline decides this. 2 4 6
The SME Operator
Case management with audit logs, strict access control, acknowledgement on every report, secure file uploads and auto-deletion per GDPR timelines is real, but nothing evidences automated 7-day/3-month statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, or caseload reporting beyond monthly summaries in top tiers. I'd still be chasing deadlines myself. 2 4 6
The Group Counsel
Case management exists with acknowledgements, secure file uploads, action and data logs, strict access control and auto-deletion per GDPR timelines — but there is no evidence of automated statutory clocks (the 3-month feedback duty), conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, tamper-evidence, or caseload reporting below the top tiers. That is a workable case list, not deadline discipline a regulator can audit. 2 4 6
The Security Auditor
Case management exists with audit logs, strict access control, acknowledgements and GDPR-timeline auto-deletion, plus monitoring reports on higher tiers — that clears rubric level 3's 'thin record' floor. But there is zero evidence of automated statutory clocks (7-day/3-month reminders), conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, tamper-evidence, or granular role separation, so it does not reach rubric level 5. 2 4 6
The Skeptic
"Fall-Management" is a label: I can confirm per-report acknowledgement, action/data logs, "strict user access control" and GDPR-timeline auto-deletion, but not one word on the statutory 7-day/3-month clocks, conflict-of-interest exclusion, case-handler role separation, or tamper-evidence. The deadline discipline a regulator asks about is simply not evidenced, so this sits below the anchor that requires clock tracking. 2 4 6
Legal compliance alignment
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How this is scored
How specifically the product implements EU Directive 2019/1937 and national transpositions (HinSchG et al.) — not whether the marketing mentions them.
0 — Generic feedback software wearing a whistleblowing label; no reference to the legal obligations it claims to satisfy.
3 — The directive is invoked in marketing but the mapping is vague; deadline rules, documentation duties and retention periods are the customer's problem.
5 — The statutory duties are implemented as product features — acknowledgment and feedback clocks, documentation, deletion after the retention period — for at least one national law, with guidance for the rest.
8 — Multiple national transpositions supported with their differing details, legal templates and process guidance maintained by named counsel or documented review, and updates when the law moves.
10 — The product is a legal instrument: per-country rule sets kept current, documented legal review, guidance for edge cases (group-wide channels, external ombudsman setups), and the vendor shows its homework in public.
The Compliance Officer
The directive, GDPR, HinSchG and 'national laws' are all invoked, and two duties are implemented as features (per-report acknowledgment, automated deletion), with an external intake/receiver service offered. But the mapping stays marketing-level: no per-transposition rule sets, no feedback-clock feature, no legal review or update process documented — the differing national details appear to remain the customer's problem. 1 2 3 4 6
The Reporter's Advocate
The duties appear as features, not slogans: oral and written channels, acknowledgment for every report, auto-deletion per GDPR timelines, and the HinSchG thresholds (>50 employees, >10,000-inhabitant municipalities) correctly quoted. But the mapping ends at a blanket 'fully compliant with GDPR, EU directive and national laws' — no per-country rule sets, no named legal review, no deadline automation. 1 2 4 6
The SME Operator
Directive, GDPR and the HinSchG are named and backed by features I can point to — per-report acknowledgement, auto-deletion after retention, external intake service — which is the anchor-5 package for one national law with generic mention of the rest. No named counsel, no per-country rule sets, no evidence of the 3-month feedback duty as a feature, so it can't go higher. 1 3 4 6
The Group Counsel
The Directive, GDPR and HinSchG are all named, and matching features exist (oral and written channels, acknowledgement, anonymous two-way dialog, automatic deletion) — but this is compliance asserted, not mapped: no per-country rule sets, no feedback clock, no legal templates or named counsel review. For a dozen jurisdictions I would be building the national mapping myself. 1 3 6
The Security Auditor
HinSchG is named and acknowledgement plus automated deletion exist as product features, which lifts it above pure marketing invocation — but 'fully compliant with GDPR, the directive and national laws' is adjective compliance. No evidence of feedback-deadline features, per-country rule sets, legal templates, or any documented legal review; the retention claim is tied to generic GDPR timelines, not whistleblower-specific periods. 1 2 3 4
The Skeptic
"Fully compliant with GDPR, the EU Whistleblower Directive and national laws" is marketing until mapped; the duties I can actually see implemented are the acknowledgement and GDPR auto-deletion, while HinSchG is a single German-market name-drop. No feedback clock, no legal templates, no named counsel, no per-country rule sets — above a bare badge, below feature-level statutory implementation. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Security & anonymity assurance
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How this is scored
Whether the confidentiality promise is engineered and evidenced: encryption, metadata handling, penetration tests, certifications.
0 — Security is a paragraph of adjectives; no certificates, no test reports, no statement on metadata.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest asserted, but nothing audited: no ISO 27001 or equivalent, no published pentest, silence on IP and metadata logging.
5 — A current ISO 27001 (or equivalent) certificate for vendor or hosting, end-to-end encryption of report content claimed with some technical detail, an explicit no-IP-logging statement.
8 — Certified ISMS covering the product, regular third-party penetration tests attested, documented end-to-end encryption architecture, metadata minimization explained, security contact and disclosure policy published.
10 — Assurance a hostile auditor accepts: current certificates with visible scope, recurring pentest summaries public, cryptographic architecture documented, anonymity analysed against the operator itself — the vendor can answer "how would you unmask a reporter?" with "we cannot, and here is why".
The Compliance Officer
A company-level ISO 27001 certificate, attested external penetration tests, encryption in transit and at rest, MFA and redundancy are more than adjectives — but the anonymity engineering is where it thins out: no end-to-end architecture documentation, no statement on IP or metadata logging, no security contact or disclosure policy. For whistleblowing data, silence on metadata is precisely the question a hostile auditor will ask. 1 3 4 5
The Reporter's Advocate
ISO 27001 for the named company and external penetration tests are attested, with encryption in transit and at rest, redundancy and MFA — above the adjectives floor. But there is no end-to-end claim, no disclosure policy, and total silence on IP and metadata logging: for a reporter on a company phone, nothing here answers 'how would you unmask me?', and the anonymity mechanism (code, no personal data) is documented but never analysed against the operator itself. 3 4 6
The SME Operator
ISO 27001 at company level, external penetration tests, encryption in transit and at rest, MFA and audit logs put it above the bare baseline. But there is no statement on IP/metadata logging, no end-to-end architecture, and no published pentest summary — for the most sensitive data my company holds, silence on metadata is the gap that matters. 3 4 6
The Group Counsel
Company-level ISO 27001 for Whistleblowing Solutions AB, external penetration tests, encryption in transit and at rest, MFA, redundancy, audit logs and EU-only hosting are real and above the TLS-adjective tier. But there is no end-to-end encryption architecture, no no-IP-logging or metadata statement, no attested pentest summaries and no disclosure policy — the vendor has not answered 'how would you unmask a reporter?' beyond the code mechanism. 3 4 6
The Security Auditor
There is an ISO 27001 certificate — but scoped to the company, 'Informationssicherheit', with no visible product scope, certifying body, or validity dates — and a one-line 'external penetration tests' claim with no report, cadence, or summary. Encryption is in-transit and at-rest only; end-to-end encryption of report content is never claimed, and the evidence is completely silent on IP logging and metadata minimization — for an anonymity product, that silence decides the score below rubric level 5. 3 4
The Skeptic
ISO 27001 is asserted at company level with a vague "Informationssicherheit" scope and "Externe Penetrationstests" is one unaudited line — no dates, no reports. Encryption in transit and at rest is stated, but there is no certificate scope, no end-to-end architecture, and total silence on IP and metadata logging, so the anonymity promise rests on trust rather than evidence. 1 3 4 5
Group & multi-entity capability
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How this is scored
Whether one contract can serve a corporate group: separate channels per legal entity, central oversight, ombudsman access, white-labeling.
0 — One company, one channel; a group buys and administers N separate instances.
3 — Multiple channels under one account, but no separation of case access per entity and no consolidated view.
5 — Per-entity channels with separated case handlers and a group-level overview; branding per entity is basic; external counsel access possible.
8 — Real multi-tenant group structure: per-entity channels, languages and branding, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles, group reporting that respects entity boundaries.
10 — Group compliance as architecture: hundreds of entities manageable centrally, per-country legal rule assignment per entity, white-label reporting pages, and access separation strong enough to satisfy each subsidiary's works council.
The Compliance Officer
Multiple industry/region-specific portals, Flex/Premium customization (logos, questionnaires, texts), extra admin users and third-party intake forwarding suggest N channels under one account — but there is no evidence of separated case access per legal entity, a consolidated group view, delegated administration or ombudsman roles. For a corporate group this reads as rubric level 3: several portals, no entity separation I could defend to a subsidiary. 2 5 6
The Reporter's Advocate
Industry- or region-specific portals, logo/questionnaire/text customization on Flex and Premium, extra admin users, and an external third-party intake service exist. Nothing evidences separated case access per legal entity, a group-level consolidated view, or delegated administration — a group of N subsidiaries would be buying on faith. 2 6
The SME Operator
Industry- or region-specific portals and per-plan branding with logos, questionnaires and extra admin users suggest multiple channels, but there is zero evidence of per-entity case-access separation, delegated administration or any consolidated group view. Fine for my one 60-employee company; a group would be guessing. 2 6
The Group Counsel
Region-specific portals, tier-gated branding (logos, questionnaires, texts) and a third-party intake/receiver service gesture at group use, but the evidence shows no per-entity case access separation, no delegated administration and no consolidated group view respecting entity boundaries. This is exactly the one-channel-product-multiplied-by-N-contracts pattern I reject for 25 subsidiaries. 2 5 6
The Security Auditor
Industry/region-specific portals and per-brand customization on Flex/Premium suggest multiple channels, and external intake/receiver services exist — but that is exactly rubric level 3. Nothing on separation of case access per legal entity, delegated administration, group-level consolidated reporting, or ombudsman/external-counsel roles; for a corporate group, the evidence is simply not there. 2 5 6
The Skeptic
"Branchen- oder regionsspezifische Portale" and tier-gated extra admin users hint at scale, but there is nothing on per-entity case access separation, a consolidated group view, delegated administration, or ombudsman/external-counsel roles. For a corporate group the multi-entity question is unanswered, which is itself the answer. 2 6
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where reports about people actually live and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. In this category the data is by definition the most sensitive a company holds.
0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for whistleblowing data.
3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.
5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.
8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.
10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors for report content and metadata, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.
The Compliance Officer
Hosting exclusivity is actually strong: all whistleblower-related data stays within the EEA on Sweden-hosted servers with no processing outside the EU, and the vendor is a Swedish AB. But the transparency around the chain is absent — no DPA, no subprocessor list, and ownership/jurisdiction explicitly unconfirmed in the computed attributes — which is exactly the documentation I need for the most sensitive data we hold. 2 4 6
The Reporter's Advocate
Sweden-hosted servers with an explicit 'no personal data processed or hosted outside the EU', operated by a named Swedish AB — the data about people stays in Europe. But no published DPA, no subprocessor list and no named data centers appear anywhere: the chain is asserted in prose, not documented, so the assurance stops at the vendor's word. 2 4 6
The SME Operator
The vendor's own pages state twice that servers sit in Sweden and no personal data leaves the EU/EEA, and the entity is a Swedish AB. But no DPA, no subprocessor list, no named data centers are evidenced, and the evidence itself flags entity jurisdiction and residency as unverified — EU-only by claim, not by a documented chain. 2 4 5 6
The Group Counsel
A Swedish vendor with Sweden-hosted servers and an explicit claim that no personal data is processed or hosted outside the EU, plus EEA residency for whistleblower data — stronger than an EU region on request. But no DPA, no subprocessor list and no named data centers are published, so the chain is asserted clean rather than documented, which for the most sensitive data a group holds is not good enough. 4 5 6
The Security Auditor
The hosting claims are genuinely good and specific: servers in Sweden, all whistleblower-related data kept within the EEA, no personal data processed or hosted outside the EU, and the entity is a Swedish AB. But the paper chain is absent — no DPA published, no subprocessor list, no named data centers — so it cannot reach rubric level 5, which requires a published DPA and subprocessor transparency, and the sovereignty attributes themselves flag these as unconfirmed. 4 6
The Skeptic
A Swedish AB with Sweden-hosted servers and an explicit "no personal data processed or hosted outside the EU" claim is the right baseline — better than EU-on-request. But no published DPA, no subprocessor list and no named data centers mean the EEA-only claim is unverifiable while the processing chain stays undocumented; with the most sensitive data a company holds, undocumented is unscored. 4 6
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether an obligated company can compute the real invoice — per entity, per employee band, per year — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — An entry price exists, but the tiers most obligated companies need are unpriced, or the maths is obscured by employee bands, per-report fees or mandatory setup charges.
5 — Most tiers carry real numbers with billing period and VAT treatment stated, but at least one commonly needed capability — extra entities, extra languages, phone intake — hides in an unpriced add-on.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with employee-band boundaries, entity rules and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.
10 — Complete price computability: every tier, band, add-on and renewal rule public, so the invoice for a 60-employee company and a 5-entity group is a two-minute exercise.
The Compliance Officer
A pricing page exists and names plans (Flex, Premium) plus a hotline add-on and tier differences (customization, languages, admin users), but the evidence contains not one figure — no prices, employee bands, VAT treatment or setup fees anywhere in evidence. An obligated company could not compute its invoice from what is published here; this is essentially the 0-anchor situation with a bit of structure. 2 6
The Reporter's Advocate
A public pricing page names the tiers (Flex, Premium), an 'all functions included' claim and the add-ons — 24/7 hotline, external intake — but not a single price, employee band, VAT treatment or setup fee is evidenced. No obligated company can compute its invoice from what is published, and one cannot even confirm an entry price exists. 2 6
The SME Operator
A pricing page exists with plan names (Flex, Premium) and what differs between them, but not a single euro figure, employee band, VAT treatment or setup fee is evidenced — I cannot compute my 60-employee invoice in two minutes or at all. Worse, the oral-channel hotline and external intake service I may legally need hide in unpriced add-ons, exactly the invoice surprise I reject. 2 6
The Group Counsel
Plan names and feature differentiation (Flex/Premium, extra languages and admins in higher tiers) are public, but not a single price figure, employee-band boundary, entity rule, setup fee or add-on price is evidenced anywhere — the hotline and monitoring reports are unpriced gates. An obligated company cannot compute even a single-entity invoice from these pages, let alone a 25-entity one. 2 6
The Security Auditor
A pricing page was captured and it enumerates tiers, add-ons and services — but not a single price figure survives into the evidence: no tier prices, no billing periods, no employee-band boundaries, and the Flex/Premium split plus the hotline add-on are unpriced. An obligated company cannot compute an invoice from what is evidenced here, which sits just above rubric level 0 only because a pricing page exists at all. 2 6
The Skeptic
A pricing page exists and plan differences are described in prose — customization, languages, admin users, monitoring reports — yet the captured evidence contains not a single number: no tier prices, no employee bands, no billing period or VAT treatment, and the hotline add-on is unpriced. No obligated company can compute an invoice from this; that is a pricing page in name only. 2 6
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 16 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency, Subprocessors, Legal entity. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 14 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 13 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 product fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (14)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage (DE) whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Product page whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Security page whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 About / vendor entity whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 FAQ whistlelink.com Checked 16 Sep 2026 Details →
- 7 Imprint www.whistlelink.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
- 8 Privacy policy www.whistlelink.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
- 9 Reporting channels & reporter experience — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Reporting channels & reporter experience — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 Legal compliance alignment — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Legal compliance alignment — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Security & anonymity assurance — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 14 Security & anonymity assurance — found from sitemap www.whistlelink.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →