AI Agents & Assistants
Lindy
Provenance unknown Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Lindy · www.lindy.ai
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Lindy at a glance
- Vendor
- Lindy
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in United States source, captured 3 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Outside the EU by default; pages mention United States source, captured 3 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Lindy 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Lindy is a no-code AI agent platform whose strongest categories are administration and access, where scores cluster at 6, and integrations and knowledge at 6-7, built on a library of 1,500+ apps and MCP support that auto-creates actions from the tools a hosted server publishes. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 3 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 4 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Lindy is a no-code AI agent platform whose strongest categories are administration and access, where scores cluster at 6, and integrations and knowledge at 6-7, built on a library of 1,500+ apps and MCP support that auto-creates actions from the tools a hosted server publishes. Agent capabilities score 5-7; the customer-service director sits at 5, citing no public information on test and evaluation tooling before go-live or documented failure handling. Pricing transparency is the weakest category, spread from 1 to 3 — the skeptic finds no public prices beyond $50 in free credits with no credit card required, while higher scores credit the terms' description of subscription, per-user or usage-based billing. Processing and models and sovereignty both cluster at 4: the terms state the services are hosted in the United States under Crivello Corp, the security page says residency requirements are supported, and the judges found no public information on EU hosting or EU inference. Data use and training scores 4-6 on a written no-training commitment with thin retention detail. Persona-weighted totals fall between 4.6 and 5.6.
Speaks for it
- The terms commit in writing that neither Lindy nor its model providers train on customer contributions, with a DPA and standard contractual clauses offered.
- Enterprise single sign-on and SCIM provisioning run through WorkOS, and every agent action is logged with visibility.
- MCP support auto-creates actions from any hosted server's published tools, on top of 1,500+ apps including Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot.
- Agents run multi-step tasks without code on schedules and triggers, under user-set revocable permissions with approvals built in.
- Subprocessors are named with their locations — Anthropic, AWS, Google Cloud, Deepgram and WorkOS among them.
Held against it
- Pricing transparency scores 1-3 — we found no public per-seat, per-tier or usage rate; the only public figures are $50 in free credits and no credit card required.
- Retention is stated only as keeping data as long as necessary, and we found no public information on admin-configurable retention or chat-deletion controls.
- The terms state the services are hosted in the United States, and we found no public information on an EU processing option, provider exclusion or bring-your-own-key.
- We found no public information on test or evaluation tooling before release, agent versioning or per-agent cost monitoring.
- We found no public information on exportable audit logs, group-level permissions over models and connectors, or documented usage analytics.
Best for
- You need no-code agents handling routine multi-step work across a wide stack, with built-in approvals and a log of every action before consequential steps.
- Your compliance review hinges on a written no-training commitment covering vendor and model providers, standard contractual clauses, and a SOC 2 Type 2 report available on request.
- You accept SCC-based transfers over a documented United States stack in exchange for subprocessor transparency that names every provider and its location.
- You want to pilot before committing spend, starting with $50 in free credits and no credit card required.
Avoid if
- Your deployment requires EU hosting, an EU contracting entity or EU inference — the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, and the judges report every disclosed provider and hosting region as United States or global.
- You must forecast annual spend from public prices — the captured pages publish no per-seat or per-tier figure, and the terms state purchases are non-refundable with prices changeable at any time.
- You need documented retention control — the privacy statement keeps personal information only as long as necessary, and we found no public information on admin-configurable retention periods or chat-deletion controls.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Data use, training & retention | 3 of 5 |
| Models & processing location | 2 of 5 |
| Admin, identity & access controls | 3 of 5 |
| Integrations, connectors & knowledge | 3 of 5 |
| Agent capabilities & guardrails | 3.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 1.5 of 5 |
Data use, training & retention
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How this is scored
What happens to prompts, uploaded files, connected data and outputs: whether any of it trains a model (the vendor's or a model provider's), how long it is kept and where logs live, whether zero-retention is available, and whether a data processing agreement covers it.
0 — No statement on training or retention; the privacy policy is a website policy that does not cover the product.
3 — A general statement that business data is "not used for training", with no word on retention, on the model providers behind the product or on logs.
5 — Business data excluded from training by contract, retention periods stated for chats and files, and a DPA offered to business customers.
8 — No-training commitments stated for the vendor and every model provider it routes to, retention configurable by the admin (including deletion of chat history), zero-data-retention terms with the model providers named, and abuse-monitoring retention described.
10 — Data use fully accounted for: training, retention, logging and abuse monitoring stated per model provider, customer-controlled retention and deletion with an audit trail, outputs and connected data treated as customer data in the DPA, and an independent audit (SOC 2, ISO 27001 or ISO 42001) covering the product.
The Head of IT
The terms commit in writing that neither Lindy nor its model providers train on customer contributions, a DPA with processor terms and standard contractual clauses is offered, and SOC 2 Type 2 is claimed — that is the contractual core I need before a rollout. Retention, though, is only the privacy-policy statement that personal information is kept as long as necessary; I found no public information on admin-configurable retention, chat-deletion controls, or abuse-monitoring retention, and zero-data-retention is mentioned for just one inference provider. Good enough for a pilot, not yet the full accounting I would put in front of our DPO. 2 3 4 6
The Data Protection Officer
The terms commit contractually that neither Lindy nor its AI model providers use contributions to train models, processor terms with a DPA are offered, and a SOC 2 Type 2 report is available — that much I can take to the DPA signing. But retention is stated only as "as long as necessary" with no admin-configurable periods or chat-history deletion controls, and zero-data-retention terms are documented for a single inference provider, Baseten; we found no public information on abuse-monitoring retention. 2 3 4 6
The Automation Lead
The terms commit in writing that neither Lindy nor its model providers train on customer contributions, and processor terms with Standard Contractual Clauses sit in the contract — the contractual exclusion I want. Retention is stated only as keeping personal information 'as long as it is necessary', and we found no public information on admin-configurable retention or abuse-monitoring retention, though the trust pages publish Baseten's zero-data-retention claim for inference. 2 3 4 6
The Customer-Service Director
The terms commit in writing that neither Lindy nor its AI model providers use our content to train models, processor terms and standard contractual clauses are offered, and SOC 2 Type 2 is claimed on the trust page — that clears my compliance desk. But retention is stated only as keeping data as long as necessary, with no periods for chats and files, no admin-configurable retention and no chat-history deletion controls documented, which is what I would need before letting it log customer calls. 2 3 4 6
The Works Council Member
The terms keep the no-training promise in writing for the vendor and for its model providers — the assurance I need before staff prompts leave the building — and a data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses is offered. We found no public information on retention periods for chats, files or logs beyond keeping data only as long as necessary, on admin-configurable deletion, or on abuse-monitoring retention, and only one inference provider is described as zero-retention. 2 3 4 6
The Skeptic
The terms commit both Lindy and its model providers by agreement not to train on customer contributions, a DPA with Standard Contractual Clauses is offered, and SOC 2 Type 2 is claimed — that is contract, not a marketing line. But retention is stated only as keeping data as long as necessary; we found no public information on retention periods for chats, files and agent runs, on admin-configurable deletion, or on abuse-monitoring retention. Zero-data-retention is documented for one inference provider only, Baseten. 2 3 4 6
Models & processing location
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How this is scored
Which models sit behind the product and who runs them, where inference and storage happen, whether the customer can pin processing to the EU, choose or exclude model providers, bring its own model or key, or run the product in its own cloud or on premises.
0 — The models behind the product and the processing location are not stated.
3 — The model family is named, but where inference runs and through which provider (the model maker, a hyperscaler, the vendor) is unstated.
5 — Models and their providers named, with an EU processing option stated for storage and at least the default model.
8 — Each available model listed with provider and inference region, EU-only processing selectable by the admin and enforced across models, model providers excludable, and bring-your-own-key or own-cloud deployment documented.
10 — Processing fully under the customer's control and documented: EU-only or on-premises inference for every feature including agents and connectors, open-weight or self-hosted models supported, data flows per feature published, and a residency commitment in the contract rather than on a marketing page.
The Head of IT
The subprocessor list is unusually candid — Anthropic, OpenAI, Baseten, Deepgram and others are named with their locations, and the terms state plainly that the services are hosted in the United States. Everything documented runs United States-side or globally, and I found no public information on an EU processing option, on excluding specific model providers, on bring-your-own-key, or on any own-cloud deployment. A security page says residency requirements are supported, which is not the same as a selectable EU region. 2 3 4 6
The Data Protection Officer
Model providers are named — Anthropic, OpenAI, Perplexity, ElevenLabs, Deepgram — with inference regions shown for some (Anthropic and Deepgram in the United States, Baseten global), which is more disclosure than most. But the terms state plainly that the services are hosted in the United States, and we found no public information on an EU processing option, on pinning inference, on excluding providers, or on bring-your-own-key deployment. 2 3 4
The Automation Lead
Anthropic (Claude) and Deepgram run inference in the USA and Baseten runs model APIs across global regions — real provider and location disclosure — but the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, and we found no public information on an EU processing option, provider exclusion, or bring-your-own-key. The security page says residency requirements are supported, and the captured pages give different signals there. 2 3 4 6
The Customer-Service Director
The subprocessor list names the model providers — Anthropic, OpenAI, Perplexity, ElevenLabs, Deepgram, with Baseten handling inference on global infrastructure — so I know whose models touch my customers' words. But the terms state the service is hosted in the United States, and I found no public information on an EU processing option, on pinning or excluding a provider, or on bring-your-own-key or own-cloud deployment. 2 3 4
The Works Council Member
The model providers are named with their inference locations — Anthropic, Baseten and Deepgram, all in the United States or global regions — and the terms state plainly that the service is hosted in the United States. We found no public information on an EU processing option, on excluding specific providers, or on bringing your own model or key. 2 3 4
The Skeptic
The models and their runners are named and located — Anthropic for Claude inference in the USA, OpenAI, Baseten for model inference across global regions, Deepgram for transcription — which is more disclosure than most wrappers give. But the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, while the security page says residency requirements are supported without naming any EU region; we found no public information on choosing or excluding model providers, bring-your-own-key, or EU inference. 2 3 4 6
Admin, identity & access controls
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How this is scored
What the IT department controls: SSO and SCIM provisioning, roles and groups, which models, agents and connectors each group may use, retrieval that respects the permissions of the source system, audit logs, usage reporting, and policies such as data-loss prevention — and whether reporting on staff use is scoped and documented.
0 — No admin features documented; accounts are individual sign-ups.
3 — A team workspace with an owner and member invitations, but no SSO, no roles and no audit log.
5 — SSO, admin and member roles, user management, and an admin view of usage.
8 — SAML/OIDC SSO with SCIM provisioning, group-based permissions for models, agents and connectors, retrieval that inherits source-system permissions, exportable audit logs, and usage analytics with documented scope.
10 — Governance a regulated company can operate: fine-grained policies (DLP, content filters, prompt and output logging rules), audit logs streamed to a SIEM, per-agent ownership and approval, usage reporting that can be aggregated or pseudonymised for works-council agreements, and every admin action logged.
The Head of IT
WorkOS is listed as the provider of enterprise single sign-on and directory synchronization, workspace owners and admins set team policy and can revoke shared connections, least-privilege access with built-in approvals is described, and every Lindy action is claimed to be logged — a real part of my checklist. I found no public information on group-level control over which teams get which models or agents, retrieval that inherits the source system's permissions, export of audit logs to a SIEM, or usage analytics with documented scope. For eight hundred staff, per-user permissions and a log viewer will not carry a governed rollout. 4 6 9
The Data Protection Officer
Enterprise SSO and SCIM provisioning run through WorkOS, every Lindy action is logged with visibility, least-privilege access with built-in approvals is stated, and workspace owners set team policy. We found no public information on exportable or streamable audit logs, group-level entitlements to specific models, agents or connectors, retrieval that inherits source-system permissions, or the scope of usage reporting on staff. 4 6 9
The Automation Lead
SSO and SCIM are evidenced through WorkOS as the enterprise identity provider, and 'every action Lindy takes is logged' with visibility — the run-log accountability I insist on. Workspace owners and admins set team policy and can revoke shared MCP connections, and permissions are user-set and revocable at any time. We found no public information on group-level model or connector policies, exportable audit logs, or scoped usage reporting. 2 4 6 9
The Customer-Service Director
Enterprise single sign-on and SCIM provisioning come through WorkOS, workspace owners and admins set sharing policy, least-privilege access with built-in approvals is described, and every agent action is logged — that is the core of what my IT team needs. I found no documented group-level permissions per model or connector, no exportable audit logs and no usage analytics, so it stops short of what a forty-seat contact centre runs on. 4 6 9
The Works Council Member
Single sign-on with directory synchronisation runs through WorkOS, workspace owners and admins set team policy including revoking connector sharing, and every agent action is logged with visibility — good bones for co-determination. We found no public information on usage reporting on staff, on aggregated or pseudonymised statistics a works council could rely on, or on exporting audit logs to a SIEM. 4 6 9
The Skeptic
WorkOS is engaged for enterprise single sign-on and directory synchronization, workspace owners and admins set sharing policy and can revoke it, and the security pages state that every action the agent takes is logged, under least-privilege access with built-in approvals. We found no public information on group-based permissions over models, agents and connectors, exportable audit logs, or the documented scope of usage reporting. 4 6 9
Integrations, connectors & knowledge
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How this is scored
How the product reaches company knowledge and systems: connectors to file stores, wikis, mail, CRM, ticketing and ERP, how fast and how completely they sync, the API, support for open protocols such as MCP, and how the assistant cites the sources it answers from.
0 — No integrations; users paste text or upload files one at a time.
3 — File upload and one or two connectors (for example a drive), with no API and no statement on sync or citations.
5 — A connector library covering the common file stores, wikis and collaboration tools, answers citing sources, and a documented API.
8 — Connectors to file stores, wikis, mail, CRM and ticketing with incremental sync, custom connectors or MCP support, an API and webhooks for embedding assistants and agents in other tools, and source citations on every grounded answer.
10 — The product sits in the company's systems: read and write connectors with documented scopes, MCP servers and clients, contact-centre or telephony integration where relevant, a knowledge layer that can be audited and corrected, and the data, agents and configuration exportable when the customer leaves.
The Head of IT
The breadth is real: 1,500+ apps including Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot, mail, calendar and CRM connections that read and act, meeting joining with recording and transcription, a phone capability, and MCP support where pointing at any hosted server auto-builds actions from its tool catalog with several authentication modes. I found no public information on a documented API, webhooks, sync frequency, or how answers cite their sources. Before I treat it as a knowledge layer, the citation story is the gap I would have to verify. 1 2 7 8 9
The Data Protection Officer
A library of 1,500+ apps covering Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot, plus any MCP server whose published tools Lindy turns into actions automatically, with authentication options, change-based triggers and workspace sharing policy documented. We found no public information on a documented API, webhooks, sync cadence or completeness, or source citations on grounded answers. 1 2 8 9
The Automation Lead
MCP is a first-class client: point Lindy at a hosted server and it auto-creates an action for every supported tool, with bearer, custom-header or OAuth authentication — exactly the open-protocol reach I build on. It claims 1,500+ connectors including Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot, reads and acts in connected systems, and triggers workflows when something changes. We found no public information on a documented API or webhooks for embedding Lindy in other tools, on sync behaviour, or on source citations for answers. 1 2 8 9
The Customer-Service Director
With 1,500+ apps including Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot, connectors that read and act in email, calendar and CRM, and support for any MCP server that auto-creates actions, this reaches far into my stack. I found no public information on sync frequency, on a documented API or webhooks for embedding it in my own tools, or on how answers cite their sources — which matters when an agent tells a customer something. 1 2 8 9
The Works Council Member
The product reaches a wide surface — 1,500-plus apps including Gmail, Slack, Notion and HubSpot, read-and-act connectors for mail, calendar and CRM, and genuine MCP support that auto-builds actions from any hosted server's tool catalog with several authentication options. We found no public information on a documented API, webhooks, sync behaviour, or how answers cite their sources. 1 2 7 8 9
The Skeptic
The connector library is broad — Gmail, Slack, Notion, HubSpot and 1,500+ more, plus email, calendar and CRM connections that read and act on data — and MCP support is documented down to authentication options and automatic action creation from a server's tool catalog. What we found no public information on is a documented API, sync behaviour and speed, or how answers cite the sources they are drawn from. 1 3 7 8 9
Agent capabilities & guardrails
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How this is scored
What an agent can actually do and where it stops: multi-step tasks, tool use and actions in other systems, scheduling and triggers, human approval before consequential actions, run logs, evaluation and testing before release, and the limits the vendor states rather than hides.
0 — No agents; the product is a chat window, whatever the marketing says.
3 — Saved prompts or custom assistants with instructions and files, but no actions in other systems and no run history.
5 — Agents that call tools or APIs and run multi-step tasks, built without code, with a log of each run.
8 — Agents that act in connected systems with scoped permissions, human approval configurable per action, triggers and schedules, test and evaluation tooling before release, and documented limits and failure handling.
10 — Agents a business can put in production and account for: versioning and staged rollout, evaluation against test sets, monitoring of quality and cost per agent, handover to a human with full context, every action attributable to the agent and the person who deployed it, and the vendor's own statement of what agents must not be trusted with.
The Head of IT
Agents are built without code, run multi-step work across 1,500+ apps and any MCP server, act on triggers and schedules such as a Monday 9am routine, operate under user-set revocable permissions, have approvals built in, and every action is logged with what happened, when and why. I found no public information on test or evaluation tooling before release, versioned rollouts, per-agent cost monitoring, or the vendor's own stated limits on what agents should not be trusted with. Capable platform; the guardrails half of my checklist stays open. 4 6 7 8
The Data Protection Officer
Agents run multi-step cross-app tasks without code, on scheduled routines and change triggers, under user-set revocable permissions with approvals built in, and every action is logged — approval before consequential action is exactly what I look for. We found no public information on test and evaluation tooling before release, versioned rollout, or the vendor's stated failure handling and limits. 4 5 6 7
The Automation Lead
Agents act across connected systems with user-set, revocable permissions under least-privilege access control, 'approvals are built in', every action is logged, and routines run on schedules like every Monday at 9am — all built without code. What stops it short for production use is that we found no public information on test or evaluation tooling before release, agent versioning, per-agent quality or cost monitoring, or the vendor's own statement of what agents must not be trusted with. 4 6 7 8
The Customer-Service Director
Agents run multi-step tasks across apps in plain language with no code, act through MCP and Google Workspace actions, run on schedules and triggers, and every run is logged with built-in approvals — that covers the routine work I want off my agents' desks. But I found no public information on test and evaluation tooling before go-live, on handover to a human with the full conversation context, or on documented failure handling and limits — exactly the three things I need before it answers a live customer. 2 6 7 8 9
The Works Council Member
Agents run multi-step tasks across apps without code, on schedules and triggers, with least-privilege permissions, built-in human approvals and a log of every action — the human-in-the-loop before anything touches a colleague's data is in writing, which is what I ask for. We found no public information on per-action approval configuration, test and evaluation tooling before release, or the vendor's own statement of what agents must not be trusted with. 2 5 6 7 8
The Skeptic
Agents run multi-step tasks across connected apps on schedules and triggers, built in plain language rather than workflows, act under scoped permissions with built-in approvals, and every action is logged — including code execution in a sandboxed environment. We found no public information on test or evaluation tooling before release, versioning, monitoring of quality and cost per agent, or any vendor statement of what agents must not be trusted with unsupervised. 4 5 6 7 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where customer data is hosted, and who the subprocessors are — model providers above all, then hosting, search, telephony and email. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; for an AI product the model provider is a subprocessor, so a European interface over a non-European model counts as such.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors (including model providers) unnamed.
3 — A privacy policy exists, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the model providers behind the product are not named as subprocessors.
5 — EU hosting stated and an EU contracting entity, but prompts reach non-EU model providers or other subprocessors without a stated safeguard or EU region.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, every subprocessor listed with its location including model providers, EU inference available, and a DPA offered.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and model processing, every subprocessor European or optional, data export and deletion documented, and a security or certification statement published rather than implied.
The Head of IT
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp in the United States, the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, and the subprocessor list is genuinely transparent — Anthropic, AWS, Google Cloud, Temporal, E2B, Deepgram and Recall are each named with location, which is more than most US vendors publish. The captured pages show a United States stack throughout; I found no public information on EU hosting or EU inference, and the transfer safeguard on offer is the standard contractual clauses with a named Data Protection Officer. For a European deployment that means a documented DPA over a US-processed stack, nothing more. 2 3 4
The Data Protection Officer
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp in Oregon, the terms state hosting in the United States, and the subprocessor register is unusually complete — model providers, cloud, telephony, analytics and SSO each named with locations — backed by SCCs and a DPA. Every model provider and hosting region disclosed is American or global; we found no public information on EU hosting, a European entity, or any EU inference option. 2 3 4
The Automation Lead
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp in Oregon and the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, with a subprocessor list that names every provider and its location — Anthropic, AWS, Google Cloud, WorkOS, all USA. Standard Contractual Clauses and a designated Data Protection Officer exist, so the disclosure is honest, but this is a US stack end to end; the security page says residency requirements are supported, and the captured pages give different signals on that. 2 3 4 6
The Customer-Service Director
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp in Oregon, the terms state hosting in the United States with AWS and Google Cloud listed there, and a full subprocessor list with locations is published — transparent, but the entity, hosting and named model providers all sit in the USA. Standard contractual clauses and a processor arrangement are offered, so my legal team would treat this as a non-EU supplier with transfer paperwork rather than a European option. 2 3 4
The Works Council Member
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp of Oregon, hosting is stated to be the United States, and every subprocessor is listed with its location — model providers, storage, telephony and analytics, essentially all American — with standard contractual clauses and a DPA offered. We found no public information showing a European option for the entity, hosting or model processing. 2 3 4
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is Crivello Corp in Oregon, the terms state the services are hosted in the United States, and every subprocessor we saw — Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS, Google Cloud, Deepgram, Recall.ai among them — is US or global, so European prompts reach US model providers with SCCs and a DPA as the safeguard. Full subprocessor transparency with locations earns real credit; we found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity, or EU inference. 2 3 4
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a company can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per seat, per agent, per conversation or per usage unit, what is included in each tier, usage limits and overage, which models, connectors or agents cost extra, minimum seats and term.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price or "from" figure exists, but usage limits, included models and what scales the cost are unclear.
5 — Prices per tier are public with the main inclusions, but usage limits, overage, agent runs or enterprise features (SSO, audit logs, EU processing) are unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with seat or usage units, usage limits and overage rates, add-ons listed, minimum seats and term stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of seats, agents or conversations, with every usage rate, model surcharge, add-on and support tier and the cancellation and data-return terms published.
The Head of IT
The only public figures are $50 in free credits and no credit card required; the terms describe billing as subscription fees based on users or usage with included credits, optional overages at unspecified rates, non-refundable purchases and trial seats that convert to paid. I found no public information on tier prices, per-seat costs, usage limits, or how enterprise features such as SSO are priced. I could not compute an annual cost for eight hundred staff from these pages. 2 8
The Data Protection Officer
The captured pages give a "$50 in free credits" starting figure and describe the billing mechanics — subscription fees based on users or usage, credit allowances, optional overages at unspecified rates, non-refundable purchases in US dollars. We found no public per-seat or per-tier prices, no usage limits, and no published rates for extra model or agent usage, so a company cannot compute its real annual cost from these pages. 2 8
The Automation Lead
The only figures made public are $50 in free credits and no credit card required; the terms describe billing as subscription fees plus charges based on users or usage, with credit allowances and optional overages 'subject to the applicable rates and limits' whose rates we found no public information on. We found no public information on per-seat or per-tier prices, and the terms state all purchases are non-refundable with cancellation taking effect at the end of the current paid term. 2 8
The Customer-Service Director
All I found publicly is $50 in free credits with no credit card required, plus terms saying fees may be subscription, per-user or usage-based with credit allowances, optional overages at unspecified rates, non-refundable purchases and prices changeable at any time. No per-seat or per-conversation price appears on the captured pages, so my CFO cannot forecast what forty agents and half our call volume would cost. 2 8
The Works Council Member
The terms describe the billing shape — subscription fees, charges per user or usage, included credits, optional overages at rates we could not find, non-refundable purchases — and 50 dollars in free credits is published. We found no public per-seat or per-tier price, so no works council can compute an annual cost from these pages. 2 8
The Skeptic
We found no public prices on the captured pages — no per-seat, per-tier or per-usage figure — only "$50 in free credits" and no credit card required. The terms describe a credit-and-allowance model with overages "subject to the applicable rates and limits", prices changeable at any time, non-refundable purchases, cancellation effective at the end of the paid term, and trial seats that convert to paid unless removed — without a single rate figure. What a thousand seats cost cannot be computed from the pages we read. 2 8
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in US | 0/2 pts | 2 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Outside the EU ⚠ unverified | 0/4 pts | 4 Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Lindy
Is Lindy European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Lindy is based. Its vendor, Lindy, is incorporated in United States, per the vendor’s page captured 3 Nov 2026.
Where does Lindy store data?
Lindy stores customer data outside the EU by default, per the vendor’s page captured 3 Nov 2026. The vendor’s pages mention United States as hosting location, per the vendor’s page captured 3 Nov 2026.
Does Lindy have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Lindy?
As of 3 Nov 2026, the panel rates Langdock (4/5), Dust (3.5/5) and Unique AI (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 AI Agents & Assistants products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Langdock (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Lindy alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 3 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. The finding rests on the subprocessor table's hosting locations rather than an explicit data-residency statement, and other listed subprocessors are marked 'Global / multiple regions' or 'United States and other jurisdictions'.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 16 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 9 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 subprocessors fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (9)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Terms of service — found from the homepage www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy — found from the homepage www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Security / trust page — found from the homepage trust.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Models & processing location — found from sitemap www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Admin, identity & access controls — found from sitemap www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Admin, identity & access controls — found from sitemap www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Integrations, connectors & knowledge — found from sitemap www.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Integrations, connectors & knowledge — found from sitemap docs.lindy.ai Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →