Appgate SDP
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Appgate, Inc. · appgate.com
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Appgate SDP at a glance
- Vendor
- Appgate, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Appgate SDP 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. AppGate ZTNA, Appgate's zero trust access product, was judged from its support manuals alone. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 10 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 11 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
AppGate ZTNA, Appgate's zero trust access product, was judged from its support manuals alone. Access and connectivity scored 7-8: access runs through per-resource entitlements evaluated when traffic is attempted, clients span Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile, ChromeOS, headless and Kubernetes sidecars, and the tunnel defaults to TLS 1.3 with single packet authorization and mutual TLS. Visibility and audit rests on audit logs described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, streamed to ten named destinations. Identity and policy is a flat 6: we found no public information on SCIM or automated deprovisioning, so a leaver is cut off by a hand-written stop policy. The split is architecture and assurance: the architecture is documented in depth, but the low score rests on no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty, a status page or an SLA. Sovereignty spans 0-7: higher scores credit customer-run appliances; the zeros are marked not rated for lack of public information. We found no prices on the pages; the only cost facts: per-user licensing and the always-on client consuming two user licenses.
Speaks for it
- Access runs through per-resource entitlements, evaluated when traffic is attempted rather than per whole network.
- Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile and ChromeOS, plus headless clients and a Kubernetes injector that adds clients to pods as sidecars.
- Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, streamed to ten named destinations including Splunk, Datadog and Azure Monitor.
- The admin UI runs entirely on REST APIs published as an OpenAPI v3 subset covering nearly all admin actions.
- Appliances are stateless and linearly scalable, with transparent failover that keeps established connections alive.
Held against it
- We found no public information on independent security audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty, a status page or an SLA.
- We found no public information on SCIM or directory-based deprovisioning, so a leaver is cut off by a stop policy written by hand.
- We found no public information on the contracting entity, its jurisdiction, subprocessors or a data processing agreement.
- We found no public information on clientless browser access for contractors or connectors for the major clouds beyond Kubernetes.
- We found no public information on a Terraform provider, a multi-tenant console for service providers, or support channels and response times.
Best for
- You need a contractor or partner to reach named hosts and ports without opening a whole network.
- Your team wants to automate administration through the REST APIs the admin console itself runs on.
- You want to run the appliances yourself so tunnels and audit logs stay on infrastructure you control.
- You need an audit trail of who accessed which resource and which administrator changed what, exported to your existing SIEM.
Avoid if
- You must show an auditor an independent audit, penetration test or SLA before adoption.
- You need leavers to lose access the same day without an administrator writing a stop policy by hand.
- You plan MFA onboarding on headless always-on clients, which the documentation states is unsupported.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Access model & connectivity | 3.5 of 5 |
| Identity, access policy & device posture | 3 of 5 |
| Logs, audit trail & incident response | 3.5 of 5 |
| Deployment, API & administration | 3 of 5 |
| Architecture, reliability & security assurance | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 3.5 of 5 |
Access model & connectivity
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How this is scored
What the product connects and how: a managed gateway VPN with shared or dedicated gateways and dedicated static IPs, a peer-to-peer mesh between devices and servers, access per application or resource (ZTNA), site-to-site links between offices and cloud networks (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), connectors behind a firewall without inbound ports, the protocols (WireGuard, IPsec, OpenVPN, a vendor protocol), split tunnelling and full tunnelling, always-on and auto-connect, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and ChromeOS, the gateway and relay locations, NAT traversal and relays, and access for contractors without a managed device.
0 — Gives no remote access of its own; a browser extension, a consumer VPN for anonymous browsing or a security tool that only filters traffic.
3 — A VPN client that connects users to one gateway or network; site-to-site, per-resource access, the clients per platform and the locations are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS and Android, a modern protocol (WireGuard or IPsec), access to private networks through a gateway or connector without inbound firewall rules, split tunnelling, dedicated static IPs or self-run gateways, site-to-site or cloud network links, and the gateway or relay locations named.
8 — Access per application or resource rather than whole networks, peer-to-peer connections with relays as fallback, always-on and auto-connect, connectors for the major clouds and Kubernetes, gateways in many named regions, private DNS and split DNS, clientless browser access for contractors, and the protocol and encryption choices documented.
10 — Connectivity a distributed company runs on: every access model above in one product, high-availability gateways and connectors with failover documented, performance and throughput published per gateway type, post-quantum or equivalent key exchange documented, and an exit path to run the same network on self-hosted components.
The IT Lead
Entitlements give access per application, so the ERP and file server are reachable without opening the plant networks; there is an always-on client that connects before sign-in, silent install switches, clients for every platform including mobile and ChromeOS, a Kubernetes sidecar injector, match-domain DNS, and the tunnel documented as TLS 1.3 or QUIC behind single-packet authorization and mutual TLS, with multiple sites live at once and transparent failover. We found no public information on clientless browser access for contractors or a dedicated static egress IP for a supplier portal. 1 2 3 7 10
The DevOps Engineer
Access is gated per resource through entitlements with access control evaluated when traffic is attempted, clients exist for Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile and ChromeOS, and headless clients plus a Kubernetes Injector that injects clients into pods as sidecars cover the servers and clusters. The always-on client connects before sign-in and can capture the default route, and the protocol choices are published: TLS 1.3 default with QUIC available, mutual TLS and single packet authorization keeping gateways dark. I found no public information on clientless browser access for contractors or connectors for the major clouds, so I stop short of the top of the scale. 1 2 3 7 10
The MSP Technician
Access is granted per entitlement rather than per whole network, which is exactly what I want when a client's accountant should only ever see their own RDS host. Clients exist for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS and Android plus headless server clients and a Kubernetes sidecar injector, the always-on client keeps a machine connected before anyone signs in with a default route capturing all traffic, and the tunnel is TLS 1.3 with QUIC optional and single packet authorization on top. We found no public information on named gateway regions, clientless browser access for contractors, or dedicated static IPs, so it stops short of the top band. 1 2 7 10
The Operations Manager
Access is granted per entitlement — a user reaches named hosts and ports rather than a whole network, which is precisely the "freelancer sees one project system and nothing else" model I need, with always-on Windows clients that connect before sign-in and clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile and ChromeOS. The tunnelling is documented down to default TLS 1.3, optional QUIC, single packet authorization and mutual TLS, plus match-domain DNS policies. The captured pages name no gateway locations and show no browser-based access for contractors who cannot install a client, which keeps it below the top band. 1 2 7 9 10
The Information Security Officer
Access is per entitlement — the product grants access to network resources through access rules called entitlements, and entitlement access control is evaluated when traffic is attempted. An always-on client connects before the user signs in, headless clients cover servers, a Kubernetes injector plants clients into pods, and the tunnel choices are documented (TLS 1.3 default, QUIC option, single-packet authorization, mutual TLS). We found no public information on clientless browser access for contractors, peer-to-peer connections, or gateway locations. 1 2 3 7 10
The Skeptic
Access is built around entitlements — per-resource rules evaluated at the moment traffic is attempted — rather than whole-network VPN access, with clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile and ChromeOS, an always-on client that connects before the user signs in, and headless clients injectable into Kubernetes pods as sidecars. Split DNS is policy-driven, the tunnel runs TLS 1.3 by default with QUIC optional, and single packet authorization plus mutual TLS are documented. I found no public information on clientless browser access for contractors, peer-to-peer connections with relays, or connectors for the major clouds beyond Kubernetes. 1 2 3 7 10
Identity, access policy & device posture
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How this is scored
Whether access follows identity and the state of the device rather than the network: single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta or any OIDC/SAML provider, SCIM or directory sync so a leaver loses access, multi-factor authentication, groups and per-resource access policies, least-privilege defaults, device posture checks (operating system version, disk encryption, EDR or MDM status, managed device certificates), just-in-time or time-limited access with approval, session lifetimes and re-authentication, and access revoked when a device is lost.
0 — No user identity at all; a shared key or configuration file grants access to the whole network.
3 — User accounts with a password or one identity provider; groups, per-resource policies and device checks are basic or not described.
5 — Single sign-on with Entra ID, Google Workspace and Okta, multi-factor authentication, user groups, access policies that restrict groups to named networks, resources or ports, automatic or SCIM-based deprovisioning, and basic device posture checks such as operating system version.
8 — SCIM provisioning from the major identity providers, per-resource policies with least privilege by default, device posture from EDR or MDM tools (for example CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Intune, Jamf), just-in-time access with approval and expiry, session re-authentication, policies kept as code, and the policy model documented.
10 — Access control a security team can audit and trust: continuous evaluation of identity and device state during a session, policies tested before they apply, emergency revocation documented, device identity bound to hardware, and the decision for every connection explainable from the logs.
The IT Lead
Access follows identity and policy: five policy types, criteria with AND, OR and custom Boolean logic, JavaScript claim scripts for users and devices, entitlement conditions re-checked when traffic is attempted and at token renewal, MFA providers, and OIDC and LDAP identity providers. We found no public information on SCIM or directory sync for same-day leaver deprovisioning, device-posture integrations with tools like Intune or CrowdStrike, or just-in-time access. 3 4 9
The DevOps Engineer
Identity Providers and MFA Providers are core sections with OIDC and LDAP profiles and weighted fallback between them, access turns on entitlements and criteria expressions with AND, OR and custom JavaScript logic, and admin rights are assigned through per-role policies. Device posture shows up as device claim scripts and OS-family conditions in stop policies, though MFA onboarding is documented as unsupported on the always-on headless client. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, named single-sign-on providers, EDR or MDM posture checks, or just-in-time access with approval. 3 4 9
The MSP Technician
MFA providers and identity providers including OIDC and LDAP are first-class menus, and policy is entitlement-based with AND/OR/custom-Boolean criteria, stop policies that block by OS family or GeoIP, and entitlement checks evaluated when traffic is attempted — the policy model is documented in real depth. Device claims and device claim scripts exist, but we found no public information on posture from MDM or EDR tools, SCIM deprovisioning, or just-in-time approval with expiry, which is what I need when a leaver must lose access the same day. 3 4 9
The Operations Manager
Entitlements are driven by user and device claims, with identity providers including OIDC and LDAP, configurable MFA providers, and stop policies that can cut off a named user or device outright — that covers contract-end, but only manually. The device checks shown are claim-based (operating system family, GeoIP) rather than a stated posture feed from EDR or MDM tools, and I found no SCIM or automatic deprovisioning in the captured pages, so a leaver depends on an administrator acting. 3 4 9
The Information Security Officer
The policy model is thoroughly documented: five policy types including admin and stop policies, criteria combining modes with JavaScript claim scripts, identity providers, MFA providers and device claim scripts, with device conditions such as operating system family able to gate access. We found no public information on SCIM-based deprovisioning, device posture fed by EDR or MDM tools, or just-in-time access with approval and expiry. 2 3 4 8
The Skeptic
Identity providers with MFA, five policy types with Boolean criteria and JavaScript assignment scripts, device claim scripts, and per-entitlement conditions evaluated when traffic is attempted give a genuinely granular policy model. But the captured documentation names only generic OIDC and LDAP rather than the major identity providers, and I found no public information on SCIM or directory-based deprovisioning, EDR or MDM posture integrations, or just-in-time approval. As far as these pages show, a leaver is handled by a stop policy an admin writes by hand. 3 4 9
Logs, audit trail & incident response
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How this is scored
What can be seen and proven afterwards: connection and access logs (who reached which resource from which device, when), admin and configuration audit logs, how long logs are kept per plan, log export and streaming to a SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Datadog, an S3 bucket), alerts on unusual access, a view of active sessions and the ability to end them, DNS logs where DNS filtering is part of the product, and what the vendor states it does not log, such as the content of traffic.
0 — No logs of any kind; the admin cannot see who connected.
3 — A list of connected users or devices; access logs, admin audit logs, retention and export are basic or not described.
5 — Connection or access logs per user and device, an admin audit log of configuration changes, the retention period stated, log export by CSV or API, a view of active sessions or devices with the option to disconnect or revoke them, and a statement of what traffic data is and is not logged.
8 — Log streaming to named SIEM tools, network flow logs per resource, retention of a year or more stated per plan, alerts or webhooks on security events, logs filterable by user, device and resource, and the log schema documented.
10 — An audit trail that holds up in an investigation: every access decision and admin action recorded with its policy and reason, logs signed or tamper-evident, evidence suitable for ISO 27001, NIS2 or DORA audits, full export in an open format, and the customer able to keep logs entirely on its own infrastructure.
The IT Lead
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, there is an active-sessions view, and records stream to ten named destinations including Splunk, Datadog and Azure Monitor with retention configurable in days on Elasticsearch, plus OpenTelemetry with built-in Prometheus and an example acting on alert messages by blacklisting users and revoking tokens. Retention on the appliances themselves, per-plan log terms and the full log schema were not detailed on the captured pages. 5 6 8
The DevOps Engineer
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, an Active Sessions page lists username, identity provider and client type, and a LogForwarder streams to ten named destinations including Splunk, Datadog, Azure Monitor and AWS Kinesis, with retention set in days on the customer's own Elasticsearch. An example integration acts on alert messages over rsyslog to denylist users and revoke tokens. I found no public information on a documented log schema, filtering by user, device and resource, or stated retention periods per plan. 5 6 8
The MSP Technician
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, an Active Sessions page shows current users with identity provider and client type, and the LogForwarder streams to Splunk, Datadog, Azure Monitor, Sumo Logic and several more — for a client asking who touched what after an incident, that is the core of it. Retention is only configurable in days on an external Elasticsearch instance, and we found no public information on retention per plan or on ending a live session from the console, so it does not reach the top band. 5 6 8
The Operations Manager
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, an Active Sessions page lists current users with identity provider and client type, and a LogForwarder streams to Splunk, Datadog, Azure Monitor, Kafka, AWS Kinesis and others, with retention configurable in days. A documented example has scripts react to ALERT messages, for instance blacklisting a user automatically. The pages stop short of a fully documented log schema or any tamper-evident storage, which is what an investigation-grade trail would need. 5 6 8
The Information Security Officer
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, an active sessions view lists users with identity provider and client type, and the LogForwarder streams to named destinations including Splunk, Datadog, Azure Monitor, Elasticsearch and Sumo Logic with configurable retention and TLS. This answers my core question of who reached which resource and which admin changed what, though we found no public information on tamper-evidence or a stated retention floor. 5 6 8
The Skeptic
Audit logs are described as a definitive record of all accesses and administrative actions, active sessions list username, identity provider and client type, and a dedicated forwarder streams them to ten named destinations including Splunk, Datadog, Azure Monitor and Elasticsearch with a configurable retention period. An rsyslog example even shows acting on alert messages to revoke tokens or denylist a user. I found no public information on a statement of what traffic content is not logged, on tamper-evident storage, or on ending an active session from the console. 5 6 8
Deployment, API & administration
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How this is scored
How the product is rolled out and run by a small IT team or a service provider: time to the first connection, deployment of clients through MDM (Intune, Jamf, Kandji) with preconfigured settings, a central admin console, a documented REST API, a Terraform provider or configuration as code, roles for administrators, several teams, sites or customer tenants in one account, a multi-tenant console for managed service providers, a self-hosted or on-premises edition, the update process for clients and gateways, and support channels and hours.
0 — No central administration; every client is configured by hand with no console.
3 — A web console to add users and gateways; the API, MDM deployment, admin roles and multi-tenant set-up are basic or not described.
5 — A central admin console, a documented REST API, client deployment through MDM with preconfigured settings, admin roles, several networks or sites in one account, client updates managed centrally, and support channels and response times stated per plan.
8 — A Terraform provider or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers or several organisations, granular admin roles, a self-hosted or on-premises edition documented for production, gateways deployable as containers or cloud images, and webhooks or integrations with ticketing and chat tools.
10 — Administration that scales across many sites and tenants: every setting reachable by API and code with parity stated, staged rollouts of client and gateway updates, a self-hosted edition with feature parity stated, reseller or MSP billing per tenant, and an exit path for configuration and users documented.
The IT Lead
The admin UI runs entirely on the REST API, published as an OpenAPI subset with admin rights carrying over to API users, admin roles are assignable through policies, one Collective spans many sites, and the silent install switch plus profiles pushed by device policy is what an Intune-style rollout needs even though Intune is not named. We found no public information on a Terraform provider, a multi-tenant console for service providers, or support hours, and the vendor reserves the right to change REST calls between releases. 2 7 8
The DevOps Engineer
The admin UI exclusively uses REST API calls to the Controller and the Controller APIs cover nearly all admin-UI actions, with an OpenAPI v3 subset, a versioned API and the API user inheriting its admin rights — enough for me to script the whole estate. Client profiles deploy by device policy, silent installs and upgrades run from the command line with auto-update, and admin policies give granular per-role rights. I found no public information on a Terraform provider, MDM deployment by name, or a multi-tenant console for service providers, which limits Git-driven policy work. 2 3 7 8
The MSP Technician
The Controller exposes a REST API that the admin UI itself runs on, covering nearly all admin actions with an OpenAPI v3 subset, and admin policies grant role-based rights over both the UI and the APIs — solid for automation. Silent install switches, centrally managed client profiles and auto-updating always-on clients make fleet deployment plausible, but we found no public information on a multi-tenant console for service providers with per-client tenants, MDM deployment specifics, configuration as code, or support hours and response times. 7 8 3 2
The Operations Manager
There is a central admin console that itself runs entirely on REST APIs, a published OpenAPI v3 subset covering nearly all console actions, and admin rights assigned per role across the UI and the API alike. Clients install silently with documented switches, profiles can be pushed by device policy, and the appliances are described as stateless and linearly scalable. I found no public information in the captures on Terraform or configuration-as-code, a multi-tenant console for service providers, or support channels and hours. 2 3 7 8
The Information Security Officer
The admin UI itself runs on REST APIs that cover nearly all admin actions, are published as an OpenAPI v3 subset, and inherit admin rights; client profiles can be pushed by device policy with silent install switches, auto-update is central, and admin rights are governed by policy with roles. We found no public information on a Terraform provider, a multi-tenant console for service providers, container or cloud images for gateways, or support channels and response times. 2 3 7 8
The Skeptic
The admin interface is built entirely on the documented REST APIs, exposed as an OpenAPI v3 subset covering nearly every admin action, and admin rights are themselves a policy type assignable to roles — an automation story a small team can actually use. Clients install silently from the command line, take centrally managed profiles, and auto-update. I found no public information on Terraform or configuration as code, a multi-tenant console for service providers, or support channels and response times. 2 3 7 8
Architecture, reliability & security assurance
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
How the product is built and how its claims are proven: a published architecture showing what the coordination servers, relays and gateways see, whether traffic passes through the vendor or end to end between devices, encryption and key management, open-source clients or servers, independent security audits and penetration tests with reports or summaries published, a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty programme, high availability and failover of the vendor's control plane, what happens to existing connections when the vendor's service is down, the vendor's own public status page and incident history, and an SLA.
0 — Nothing is published about how the product works or is secured.
3 — Encryption is mentioned in marketing terms; architecture, audits, availability and the vendor's status page are basic or not described.
5 — An architecture overview of clients, gateways and the control plane, the encryption protocol and key handling named, an independent security audit or penetration test stated, a vulnerability disclosure contact, the vendor's public status page, and an availability SLA on the business plans.
8 — A security whitepaper with the data flow and what the vendor can see, open-source clients or core components, audit or pentest reports or summaries published by the auditor, a bug bounty, high availability of the control plane documented, existing connections kept alive when the control plane is down, and the incident history public with post-mortems.
10 — Assurance a regulated buyer can verify: fully open-source and reproducible components, recurring independent audits published in full, the control plane self-hostable with no call home, a documented failure mode for every vendor component, and several years of availability published.
The IT Lead
The architecture is documented in real depth: stateless, linearly scalable appliances, high availability at several levels with fallback sites and cross-Collective failover, transparent failover keeping established connections alive, and gateways that stay invisible behind single-packet authorization and mutual TLS over TLS 1.3 tunnels. We found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty, a public status page or an SLA, so assurance rests on the vendor's own manuals. 1 9 10
The DevOps Engineer
The tunnel-architecture and HA pages publish the model in detail: software-defined perimeter, TLS 1.3 or QUIC tunnels, mutual TLS and single packet authorization, stateless linearly scalable appliances, and transparent failover with the client controlling the process so a Controller outage does not block it — including honest limits such as no stateful failover when SNAT is enabled. Traffic terminates on the customer's own Gateways rather than a vendor relay, which is the part I need to trust. I found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty, a status page or an SLA. 9 10
The MSP Technician
The tunnel and HA architecture is published in unusual depth: stateless linearly scalable appliances, built-in high availability at every level including cross-Collective failover, fallback Sites with client-controlled transparent failover when a Controller site dies, plus single packet authorization, mutual TLS and TLS 1.3. We found no public information on independent security audits, a bug bounty, a public status page or an SLA, so the assurance side rests entirely on the vendor's own documentation. 9 10
The Operations Manager
The architecture is published in real depth — the software-defined perimeter model, single packet authorization, mutual TLS, cloaking and default TLS 1.3 — and failover is documented to the second, including transparent failover where established connections survive and the client itself controls fallback if the Controller site is down, so my travellers would not be stranded mid-session. What the captured pages do not show is any independent audit, penetration test, bug bounty, status page or availability commitment, so the assurance side rests unproven. 5 9 10
The Information Security Officer
The architecture is documented in depth: a software-defined perimeter with single-packet authorization, mutual TLS and a TLS 1.3 default tunnel, stateless linearly scalable appliances, and failover at several levels including cross-Collective HA and transparent failover where established connections continue. We found no public information on an independent security audit, penetration test, bug bounty, status page or SLA, so I have nothing to show my auditor on independent examination of the product. 9 10
The Skeptic
This is where my usual complaint about a dead control plane gets an answer: appliances are stateless and linearly scalable, failover is transparent with established connections kept alive, and the fallback process is client-controlled so an outage of a Controller Site does not prevent it. The software-defined perimeter model, TLS 1.3 default, QUIC option, single packet authorization and mutual TLS are documented in real depth. But the captured pages give me nothing to verify against: I found no public information on independent audits or penetration tests, a bug bounty or disclosure contact, the vendor's status page, an SLA, or open-source components. 9 10
European sovereignty
panel opinion
n/r
n/r
n/r
n/r
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where account data, user and device identities, connection logs and configuration are stored and processed, which party runs the coordination servers, relays and gateways the traffic passes through, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, identity, email, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Gateway and exit locations outside Europe are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the logs and identities are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted or open-source edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting of the control plane and logs unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but the location of the control plane and logs is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting of logs and account data available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (relays, support, identity, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure for the control plane and logs, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps every record and connection on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, or a self-hosted open-source edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The IT Lead
Everything captured describes a Collective of appliances the customer runs itself, so audit records, sessions and tunnels stay on infrastructure the buyer controls — the strongest position short of open source. The captured pages give no information on the contracting entity, subprocessors or a data processing agreement, and the client binaries download from a vendor domain, leaving the commercial chain unverified. 2 5 9 10
The DevOps Engineer
The documented model is appliances the customer operates: Controllers, Gateways and LogForwarders belong to the organization, audit-log retention sits in the customer's own Elasticsearch instance, and connections pass through the customer's own Gateways — a self-run chain for records and traffic. Every sovereignty dimension from the pipeline is marked unknown, and I found no public information on the contracting entity, subprocessors, a data processing agreement, vendor call-home or certifications, so I place this one notch below the fully sovereign end. 6 9 10
The MSP Technician not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where account data, identities and logs are held, hosting options, subprocessors, or a data processing agreement — every sovereignty dimension is unknown on the support pages we read, so nothing can be scored here. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The Operations Manager not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity, where account data, user identities or connection logs are stored and processed, who runs the coordination infrastructure, or which subprocessors are involved; every sovereignty dimension is marked unknown. The captured documentation is technical support material only, and this is an appliance-based system the customer deploys, which makes the residency question about our own hosting choices as much as the vendor's. 1 5 9
The Information Security Officer not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where identities and logs are stored and processed, who runs the coordination and gateway components, or any listed subprocessors. Every sovereignty dimension in the material we read is unstated, so we cannot place the product on this scale either way. 1 6
The Skeptic not rated — no public information
I found no public information in the captured documentation on the contracting entity or its jurisdiction, where account data, user and device identities or configuration are stored, who runs the coordination servers and gateways, or which subprocessors are involved. The pages I read — the client guide and the API and logging manuals — are technical documentation only, and no data processing agreement is mentioned in them. 1 8
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user or per device and tier, minimum seats, what dedicated gateways, static IPs, extra networks or sites cost, which features (SSO, SCIM, device posture, log streaming, longer retention, site-to-site) need a higher tier, the free tier and its limits, the price of a self-hosted or on-premises licence, monthly versus annual billing, minimum term and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call or a partner quote.
3 — A starting price or a free tier exists, but how cost scales with users, devices, gateways or features is unclear.
5 — Tiers are public with a price per user and their main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (dedicated gateways or IPs, extra sites, SSO or SCIM, log retention, the self-hosted licence) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its scaling rule (users, devices, gateways, networks), dedicated IPs and gateways priced, add-ons priced, minimum seats, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given team size, number of sites, gateways and devices, with every add-on, overage and support fee and the cancellation and data-return terms published.
The IT Lead
We found no public information on a price per user, tiers, seat minimums or billing terms; the pages only show that licensing is per user — the always-on client consumes two user licenses and observability is a separately licensed feature — so an annual cost for 140 people cannot be computed from public pages. 2 5
The DevOps Engineer not rated — no public information
I found no public pricing information in the captured support pages. The only cost-adjacent facts are that the always-on client consumes two user licenses and that Observability is a separately licensed feature — neither carries a price, tier, minimum seats or a free-tier limit. 2 5
The MSP Technician
The documentation shows licensing is per user — the always-on client consumes two user licenses — and that observability telemetry is a separately licensed feature, which at least tells me the scaling basis. Beyond that we found no public prices, tiers, minimum seats or free tier on the captured pages, so I cannot quote anything for a client without contacting the vendor. 2 5
The Operations Manager not rated — no public information
We found no public information on prices, tiers, seat minimums, term lengths or VAT treatment in the captured pages. The only pricing-related fact is a licensing mechanic — the always-on client consumes two user licenses — which tells me the cost scales per user but gives no figure I could put in front of my finance team. 2 7
The Information Security Officer
The only pricing-related facts on the captured pages are that the always-on client consumes two user licenses and that observability is a separately licensed feature. We found no public information on prices per user or tier, seat minimums, licence terms, or the cost of licensed add-ons. 2 5
The Skeptic not rated — no public information
I found no public information on prices in the captured documentation: no per-user cost, no tiers, no seat minimums, and no price for add-ons such as the Observability license, which is described as a licensed feature without ever being priced. Every page I read is a technical manual; where a support contact is referenced for undocumented APIs, no commercial terms accompany it. 5 8
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Appgate SDP
Is Appgate SDP European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Appgate SDP is based.
Where does Appgate SDP store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026.
Does Appgate SDP have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 10 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Appgate SDP?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Defguard (3.5/5), Firezone (3.5/5) and Tailscale (3.5/5) highest among the other 19 Business VPN & Zero Trust Access products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Defguard (EU-Made, Poland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Appgate SDP alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 10 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We found no public information on pricing on the pages we read (support.appgate.com/docs/client-guide-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/windows-always-on-client-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/policies-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/identity-v6-7, support.appgate.com/docs/monitoring-logging-and-auditing-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/external-log-settings-v6-7 and 4 more). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- We found no public information on compliance on the pages we read (support.appgate.com/docs/client-guide-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/windows-always-on-client-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/policies-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/identity-v6-7, support.appgate.com/docs/monitoring-logging-and-auditing-v7-0, support.appgate.com/docs/external-log-settings-v6-7 and 4 more). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- 3 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (10)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Access model & connectivity — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Identity, access policy & device posture — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Logs, audit trail & incident response — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Deployment, API & administration — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Architecture, reliability & security assurance — found from sitemap support.appgate.com Checked 10 Nov 2026 Details →