E-Signature
Autenti
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Autenti sp. z o.o. · autenti.com
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Autenti at a glance
- Vendor
- Autenti sp. z o.o.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 3 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Autenti 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. Autenti is a Polish e-signature platform whose bench scores cluster at 6-7 on signature levels, identity verification, signing workflow and evidence and retention, against a 4-4 range on integration and API. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 3 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 3 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Autenti is a Polish e-signature platform whose bench scores cluster at 6-7 on signature levels, identity verification, signing workflow and evidence and retention, against a 4-4 range on integration and API. Judges credit three documented eIDAS levels — a non-qualified tamper-evident signature, an advanced one behind at least two independent authentication factors, and a qualified signature through Cencert with Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert named as providers — plus bulk signing of up to 100 simple or 50 qualified documents per process, and an evidence package of a qualified timestamp, an event register retained at least 6 years, an ETSI-standard XML validation report and a PDF validation certificate. The API is the weak spot: an open API and a marketplace are named, but the captured pages show no webhooks, sandbox, SDKs or named connectors. Sovereignty spans 4 to 6: the Poznań-registered entity and EU trust providers are proven, while hosting rests on the single word 'EU-based'. Pricing transparency scored 2-3 — no monetary figure appears, only plan names, a free account and a 20% first-period discount code (AUTENTI20EN).
Speaks for it
- Three eIDAS signature levels are documented, with the qualified level delivered through named providers Cencert, Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert.
- Evidence tooling pairs a qualified timestamp and an event register retained at least 6 years with an ETSI-standard XML validation report and a PDF validation certificate.
- The qualified validator also validates documents created outside the Autenti platform.
- Bulk signing covers up to 100 e-signature or 50 qualified-signature documents in a single process.
- Ready-made contract templates (mandate, contract-for-work, commercial offer, NDA) come at no additional cost.
Held against it
- An open API and marketplace are named but undocumented on the captured pages, which show no webhooks, sandbox, SDKs, rate limits or named connectors.
- Hosting is described only as 'EU-based', with no named data centre, subprocessor list or published data processing agreement on the captured pages.
- No captured page maps the three signature levels to the eSign PRO or eSign PREMIUM plans or links the named providers to the EU Trust List.
- The documented qualified path requires the mObywatel app, an NFC smartphone and a Polish e-ID card issued after March 4, 2019.
- Stored documents can be downloaded for one month after the trust service ends.
Best for
- Your HR or administration team sends employment and B2B contracts in volume, mainly to Polish signers — the mObywatel qualified path, bulk caps and expert templates fit workflows the bench scored 6-7.
- You need audit- and court-ready evidence — the qualified validator, qualified timestamps, an event register kept at least 6 years and ETSI/PDF validation reports support the bench's 6-7 evidence scores.
- Your signers must pay nothing, install nothing and hold no certificate — the signer bears no costs and needs no account activation.
- You want handwritten-equivalent validity across the EU — Autenti by Cencert is stated to hold 'the same legal validity as a handwritten signature' in EU courts and public authorities.
Avoid if
- Your product depends on embedding signing inside your own CRM, ERP or portal — integration and API scored a 4-4 range and the captured pages document no webhooks, sandbox, SDKs or named connectors.
- Most of your qualified signers are outside Poland — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- Your procurement requires the sovereignty chain in writing first — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| eIDAS levels & trust services | 3.5 of 5 |
| Signer identification | 3 of 5 |
| Signing workflow & signer experience | 3 of 5 |
| Evidence, validation & retention | 3.5 of 5 |
| Integrations & API | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
eIDAS levels & trust services
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How this is scored
Which signature levels the platform offers — simple, advanced, qualified, and qualified seals — through which qualified trust service provider on the EU Trust List, for which countries and legal regimes (eIDAS, ZertES), and on which plans.
0 — Not an electronic signature service: a PDF annotation or form tool that places a drawn or typed signature image without any eIDAS signature behind it.
3 — Electronic signatures at the simple level (SES) described as compliant with eIDAS; advanced and qualified levels and the trust service provider are basic or not described.
5 — Simple and advanced or qualified signatures (SES with AdES or QES) offered and named as eIDAS levels, with the plans or add-ons that include them and which documents need which level explained for Germany or the EU.
8 — SES, AdES and QES all documented with the plans and countries they are available in, the qualified trust service provider named with its entry on the EU Trust List linked, QES under eIDAS (and ZertES where relevant) stated, qualified electronic seals for company documents, and the signature level shown in the signed document and audit trail.
10 — Levels are an explicit product decision: the provider is or contracts a named QTSP with its conformity assessment published, level selection per document type or template, remote QES without a separate account, EUDI wallet support stated with a date, and the legal effect per level documented for the main EU markets.
The Legal Counsel
All three eIDAS levels are named and distinguished — the non-qualified Autenti e-signature, the Advanced e-signature with two independent authentication factors, and qualified signatures created one-time via Cencert on mObywatel — plus qualified electronic seals and bulk caps quoted per level. The qualified trust service providers are named as Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert, but we found no public information linking them to the EU Trust List, mapping levels to the eSign plans, or covering ZertES and per-country availability. Until the Trust List entries and plan mapping are published, I cannot assign document classes to levels with confidence. 3 4 6 7
The HR Operations Lead
Simple (tamper-evident), advanced (two independent authentication factors) and qualified signatures are all documented as distinct services, with the qualified signature — Autenti by Cencert based on mObywatel — stated to hold 'the same legal validity as a handwritten signature' across the EU, plus qualified seals and a qualified timestamp. Providers are named (Certum Simply Sign, InfoCert, Cencert) and a document can be set to require the qualified level. The captured pages do not show which plans carry which level, the providers' entries on the EU Trust List, or which countries' signers can reach qualified signing outside the Polish mObywatel route. 3 4 6 7
The Revenue Operations Lead
All three levels are documented: the non-qualified tamper-evident e-signature, the advanced signature behind at least two independent authentication factors, and a one-time qualified signature through Cencert based on mObywatel, with Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert named as qualified providers, plus qualified seals and a qualified timestamp. What holds it back is that no captured page ties the levels to specific plans or countries, and the EU Trust List entry is not linked. 3 4 6 7
The Integration Engineer
Three levels are real and named — a non-qualified tamper-evident Autenti signature, an advanced one behind at least two independent authentication factors, and a qualified signature delivered through Cencert, with Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert named as certificate providers — plus qualified seals securing the documents themselves. No captured page ties a level to a specific plan or links the trust providers to the EU Trust List, so I cannot verify QTSP standing or what a given workflow costs. 3 4 7
The Data Protection Officer
All three levels are documented — the tamper-evident Autenti signature, an advanced signature confirmed by at least two independent factors, and a qualified signature delivered through named providers Cencert, Certum (Simply Sign) and InfoCert — alongside an electronic seal based on qualified certificates and a qualified timestamp. What the captured pages do not show is those providers' entries on the EU Trust List, which plans include which level, or ZertES; a one-time qualified signature on mObywatel, where the signer activates nothing and bears no cost, is described for Poland. 3 4 6 7
The Skeptic
Simple, advanced and qualified levels are all named, with qualified signatures issued through named providers — Certum (Simply Sign), InfoCert and the one-time Autenti by Cencert signature — and a qualified seal described as based on qualified certificates. But the captured pages give no link to any trust service provider entry on the EU Trust List, no mapping of levels to the eSign PRO or PREMIUM plans, and the documented qualified path is bound to Poland's mObywatel and e-ID card issued after March 4, 2019. The platform's own policy scopes its services as non-qualified, with the qualified part brokered elsewhere. 3 4 7
Signer identification
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How this is scored
How the signer is identified for each level: email and SMS codes, video ident, eID card (Online-Ausweis), bank ident or EUDI wallet — who performs it, in which countries it works, and what happens to the ID data afterwards.
0 — No signer authentication offered: by the vendor's own description anyone holding the link can sign.
3 — Signers authenticated by an email link with an access code or SMS code; identification for advanced and qualified signatures is basic or not described.
5 — Email, SMS or access-code authentication, plus identification methods for AdES or QES listed by name (for example video ident, eID card, bank ident), with the countries or ID documents they accept stated.
8 — Methods documented per level and country with the identification provider named, automated and agent-based ident distinguished, reuse of an identification for later signatures explained, retention and deletion of ID data stated, and the ident provider listed as subprocessor.
10 — Identification is transparent end to end: every method with its countries, assurance level and completion guidance, EUDI wallet and national eID supported, ID data minimisation and retention committed, and the signer-facing privacy notice published.
The Legal Counsel
Seven identification means are enumerated in the policy, and the Polish path is described end to end: mObywatel, an NFC smartphone and an e-ID card issued after March 4, 2019, with QR code and CAN code steps; OTP SMS and video ident run through BROKER.ID. We found no public information on which identification provider covers which country, on the subprocessor listing, or on retention and deletion of the identification data itself. 3 4 5 6
The HR Operations Lead
Seven identification routes are listed — state eID apps, remote capture of the physical ID with a selfie or liveness check, AML-entity data transfer, electronic ID card validation — alongside SMS OTP and video ID through BROKER ID, and the Polish path is documented step by step down to the CAN code, for ID cards issued after 4 March 2019. A minimum six-year retention for trust-service data is stated. We found no public information on which ID documents signers outside Poland can use, on deletion of ID data, or on reusing one identification for later signatures. 3 4 5 6
The Revenue Operations Lead
Methods are named and concrete — SMS one-time passwords, video identification, selfie with liveness, seven routes listed in the policy, and the mObywatel path where a Polish e-ID issued after March 4, 2019 is held against an NFC phone with a CAN code. Only the Polish route is documented end to end with its country and accepted documents, and reuse of an identification plus separate retention or deletion of the ID data are not broken out. 3 4 5 6
The Integration Engineer
Seven identification routes are enumerated in the trust policy and the Polish path is documented to the last step — mObywatel, the NFC e-ID card with CAN code, selfie and liveness, video ident, and AML-based data transfer — with the hand-off to the Cencert system named for QES. Beyond Poland I found no per-country picture, and no statement on deletion of identification data; the six-year retention figure covers trust-service records generally. 3 4 6
The Data Protection Officer
Seven identification routes are enumerated in the policy — electronic identification means, state-administered applications, selfie with liveness, AML-entity data transfer, data from qualified signatures and from eID document validation — and the mObywatel flow is documented step by step down to the CAN code, requiring a Polish e-ID card issued after March 4, 2019, with Cencert and BROKER ID named as the performing parties. My concerns: the flows are Poland-centred, the pages state no maximum retention or deletion for ID data and face images beyond the at-least-6-year trust-services retention, and we found no public information on the identification providers' subprocessor status or on reuse of an identification for later signatures. 3 4 5 6
The Skeptic
Seven identification routes are listed in the policy — from state eID apps to selfie/liveness and AML-based data — and the mObywatel flow is documented down to scanning the QR code and entering the CAN code, with the requirement of a Polish e-ID card and NFC smartphone. But methods are not mapped per level and country beyond Poland, the identification provider per method is not named, and while data is retained at least 6 years, we found no public information on ID data deletion or a subprocessor listing. A solid method catalogue with thin end-to-end transparency. 3 4 5 6
Signing workflow & signer experience
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How this is scored
Getting a document out and back signed: templates and form fields, signing order and roles, bulk sending, reminders and delegation, signing without an account or app, mobile signing, and accessibility for signers.
0 — Not a signing workflow: the product signs a document locally for the user and sends nothing out to other signers.
3 — Documents sent to one or more signers by email with fields placed on the PDF; templates, signing order and reminders are basic or not described.
5 — Templates with field placement, several signers with a signing order, automatic reminders, signing in the browser on mobile without an account, and a status overview for the sender.
8 — Roles and conditional fields, parallel and sequential order, bulk sending, delegation and substitute signers, team and approval workflows, a branded signer experience, signer languages listed, and signer accessibility addressed.
10 — The workflow is complete and documented: web forms and self-service signing links, mixed signature levels within one process, in-person and remote signing, a published accessibility conformance statement, and team administration with shared templates and audit of sender actions.
The Legal Counsel
Templates with drag-and-drop fields and address-book autofill, approver, reviewer and initialler roles, a configurable signing order, and bulk signing with stated caps of 100 simple and 50 qualified documents — signers need no account, certificate or installation, and the finished document is emailed to every party. We found no public information on reminders, delegation and substitute signers, team approval workflows, or signer accessibility. 4 6 7 8
The HR Operations Lead
Bulk sending is genuinely documented — up to 100 documents with a simple signature and 50 with a qualified signature in one process — and templates with drag-and-drop fields autofill from an address book, with a no-cost library covering mandate, contract-for-work and NDA templates. Recipients can be approvers, reviewers or initiallers, the signing order is configurable, everything runs on a phone with no software installation, and the signed document is emailed to all parties once the last signature lands. We found no public information on reminders, delegation or substitute signers, conditional fields, or signer accessibility. 4 6 7 8
The Revenue Operations Lead
Bulk signing of up to 100 simple or 50 qualified documents at once, drag-and-drop variable templates plus a free library of NDA, mandate and contract templates, configurable signing order with verification-first flows, recipient roles beyond signer, address-book autofill and the finished document emailed to everyone the moment the last signature lands — most of what gets a quote back fast. I found no public information on automatic reminders, delegation or conditional fields, and the flagship qualified flow asks the signer to install the mObywatel app on an NFC phone, which is friction I would have to explain. 4 6 7 8
The Integration Engineer
Templates with drag-and-drop fields and address-book autofill, recipient roles such as approver, reviewer and initialler, a settable signing order, and bulk signing of up to a hundred documents at once make the core workflow credible, with signer languages addressed through automatic language adaptation. I found no public information on automatic reminders, delegation or substitute signers, and nothing on signer accessibility. 4 6 7 8
The Data Protection Officer
Templates with drag-and-drop variable fields autofilled from an address book, a configurable signing order with verification before signing, bulk signing of up to 100 simple and 50 qualified signatures at once, approver, reviewer and initialling roles, automatic language adaptation for signers, and email delivery of the finished document to everyone involved are all documented, with the signer needing no certificate, no account activation and paying nothing. We found no public information on delegation or substitute signers, conditional fields, or signer accessibility. 4 6 7 8
The Skeptic
Templates with drag-and-drop fields and autofill from an address book, ready-made contract templates at no additional cost, configurable signing order, recipient roles of approver, reviewer and initialler, bulk signing capped at 100 e-signature or 50 qualified documents per process, and automatic language adaptation are all documented. We found no public information on automatic reminders, a sender status overview, delegation or substitute signers, or signer accessibility. 4 6 7 8
Evidence, validation & retention
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How this is scored
What proves a signature years later: the audit trail and certificate of completion, qualified timestamps, long-term validation (PAdES-LTV), validation reports, and how long signed documents and evidence are kept — and whether they can leave the platform.
0 — No evidence produced: by the vendor's own description the result is a flattened PDF with a signature image and no audit trail or certificate.
3 — An audit trail or completion certificate with the signed PDF; its contents, timestamps and the retention period are basic or not described.
5 — An audit trail or certificate of completion recording signer events, time and authentication method, attached to or embedded in the signed PDF, timestamps applied, and signed documents downloadable.
8 — PAdES signatures with long-term validation, qualified timestamps from a named provider, a validation tool or report, retention period stated and configurable with automatic deletion, and bulk export of documents with their evidence.
10 — Evidence outlives the subscription: LTV and archive timestamps documented, validation verifiable with independent tools such as the EU DSS validator, export to a DMS or archive with evidence intact, and post-termination access and deletion committed in the terms.
The Legal Counsel
For an eight-year dispute this is credible but incomplete: an event register of technical activities, qualified timestamps, a qualified validator confirming validity at signing time, certificate status and any alteration, an ETSI-conformant XML validation report plus a PDF validation certificate for proceedings, and the Signatures&Seals Card; retention is at least six years with a one-month download window after the trust service ends. We found no public information on PAdES long-term validation or archive timestamps, the named timestamp provider, configurable retention with automatic deletion, or export into an archive with the evidence intact. 2 3
The HR Operations Lead
The evidence package is substantial: a register of technical events, a Signatures&Seals Card recording performance of the trust service, a qualified timestamp, and a qualified validator producing an ETSI-standard XML validation report plus a PDF validation certificate, which even validates documents made outside the platform. Retention of at least six years is stated, and documents can be downloaded for one month after the service ends. We found no public information on PAdES long-term validation, configurable retention or automatic deletion, or bulk export of documents with their evidence. 2 3
The Revenue Operations Lead
There is real evidence tooling: a qualified validator producing an ETSI-standard XML validation report and a PDF validation certificate even for documents made elsewhere, an event register, qualified timestamps, seals and a Signatures&Seals Card, with at least six years of retention and a one-month download window after the service ends. I found no public information on long-term validation in the PAdES sense, a named timestamp provider, configurable retention with automatic deletion, or bulk export with evidence intact. 2 3
The Integration Engineer
This is the strongest area for my DMS pipeline: a qualified timestamp, an event register retained at least six years with integrity guarantees, an ETSI-standard XML validation report plus a PDF validation certificate, and a qualified validator that also checks documents created outside the platform. It falls short of the top band because long-term validation is only described as safeguarding integrity over time without PAdES-LTV being named, retention is not stated as configurable, and post-termination download is limited to one month. 2 3
The Data Protection Officer
An event register maintained by the provider, a Signatures&Seals Card documenting each trust service, a qualified timestamp, and a qualified validator issuing ETSI-compliant XML validation reports plus PDF validation certificates — including for documents created outside the platform — are documented, with trust-services data retained at least 6 years and a one-month download window after the service ends. The pages leave long-term preservation partly open: we found no named timestamp provider, no statement of long-term validation in PAdES terms, and no configurable retention or automatic deletion. 2 3 8
The Skeptic
A qualified validation service producing an ETSI-compliant XML validation report and a PDF validation certificate — also for documents created outside the platform — plus a qualified timestamp, an event register and a Signatures&Seals Card give the evidence real weight. But retention is fixed at a minimum of 6 years with no configurability or automatic deletion stated, download after termination is limited to one month, and we found no public information on PAdES long-term validation or bulk export of documents together with their evidence. 2 3
Integrations & API
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How this is scored
Signing from inside the systems where contracts are made: a documented API with webhooks and a sandbox, embedded signing, and connectors for Microsoft 365, CRM, HR, DMS and ERP systems.
0 — A closed web app by the vendor's own description: no API and no integrations offered.
3 — A few named integrations or a Zapier or Make connector; a documented API is basic or not described.
5 — A documented REST API with webhooks, plus named integrations with Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace and at least one CRM, HR or storage system.
8 — A sandbox, embedded signing in the customer's own application, API access to every signature level, versioned API with rate limits published, SDKs, and connectors for named DMS, ERP or HR systems with their scope.
10 — Integration is a product: white-label and embedded flows documented, API parity with the web app, a status page with incident history, deprecation policy, and a marketplace of integrations with stated maintainers.
The Legal Counsel
An open API is asserted throughout — documents sent and signed from an ERP system, qualified validation fully automated via the API, and a marketplace alongside the standalone platform. We found no public information on webhooks, a sandbox, SDKs, rate limits, versioning, embedded signing, or named Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, CRM, HR or document-management connectors, so I cannot judge API access to each signature level. 1 2 5 8
The HR Operations Lead
An open API is described functionally — documents 'sent and signed directly through your ERP system', qualified validation 'entirely automated via our API', and the choice between the standalone platform and integration — which is the direction my HR system needs. But the captured pages do not document the API itself: no endpoint specification, webhooks, sandbox or SDKs, and no named connectors beyond the generic ERP mention. 1 2 8
The Revenue Operations Lead
An open API is claimed for sending and signing directly from an ERP system, and qualified validation can run entirely via the API, but the captured pages show no webhooks, sandbox, SDKs or endpoints, and not a single CRM, HR or storage connector is named — a marketplace is mentioned without contents. On this evidence I cannot get signing to live inside my CRM, which is where contract turnaround is won or lost. 1 2 5 8
The Integration Engineer
An open API is real and load-bearing — documents can be sent and signed directly from an ERP system through it, the qualified validation runs entirely automated via the API, and a marketplace exists. But the captured pages give me none of what I need before embedding signing in our portal: no webhooks, no sandbox, no versioning, rate limits or SDKs, and no connectors for a named DMS, ERP product or HR system with their scope. 1 2 5 8
The Data Protection Officer
An open API through which documents are sent and signed from ERP systems, fully automated validation via API alongside the web interface, a platform-plus-integration deployment model, and a marketplace are named. We found no public documentation of webhooks, a sandbox, SDKs, or named connectors for Microsoft 365, CRM, HR or document management systems, so a buyer cannot gauge the API's reach from these pages. 1 2 5 8
The Skeptic
An open API for sending and signing documents from an ERP system, API access to the qualified validation, and a marketplace are named, but the API itself is not documented — we found no public information on webhooks, a sandbox, SDKs, rate limits, or any specifically named connector for Microsoft 365, a CRM, HR or storage system. A mentioned API, not a documented one. 1 2 5 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity, the trust service provider and their owners are, where documents, audit trails and ID data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU contracting entity and non-EU storage of documents and signer data, with no EU option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU contracting entity or EU representative, EU data storage stated, an EU qualified trust service provider, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU contracting entity or EU representative and EU storage of documents stated as standard or selectable, with a DPA offered; the hosting, identification or trust service chain is unstated or partly non-EU.
8 — EU entity, documents, audit trails and ID data stored in named EU data centres, an EU qualified trust service provider, subprocessor list with locations published, and certifications (ISO 27001, ETSI conformity) published.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, EU entity and EU QTSP, every processing location and subprocessor European, customer-selectable data residency, and certifications with their scope published.
The Legal Counsel
The contracting and data controller entity is proven European — Autenti sp. z o.o. of Poznań with full Polish registry numbers — and the vendor states EU-based operation with GDPR, eIDAS, DORA and ISO compliance. We found no public information on a data-processing agreement, named EU data centres, a subprocessor list with locations, or certificates with their scope, so the rest of the sovereign chain is unproven to me. 1 3 7
The HR Operations Lead
The core is provably European: Autenti sp. z o.o. of Poznań with full Polish registration numbers, named as data controller, hosting described as 'EU-based', and qualified signatures from EU providers (Certum, InfoCert, Cencert). We found no public information on named data centres, a published subprocessor list with locations, a data processing agreement, or the scope of the ISO compliance claimed. 1 3 7
The Revenue Operations Lead
The contracting entity is proven European — Autenti sp. z o.o. of Poznań with full Polish registration numbers — the homepage states EU-based operation, and GDPR, eIDAS, DORA and ISO are named as compliance frameworks. Beyond that the chain is unproven in the captured pages: no data-centre locations, no subprocessor list, and no published data-processing agreement appears. 1 2 3
The Integration Engineer
The chain that matters is demonstrably European: a Polish company with a KRS registration in Poznań acting as data controller, EU-based hosting stated on the homepage, and qualified signatures from Certum, InfoCert and Cencert. The pages do not name the data centres, publish a subprocessor list with locations, or evidence a DPA, so the residency claim rests on a single word. 1 3 7
The Data Protection Officer
Autenti sp. z o.o. of Poznań is identified with full KRS, NIP and REGON numbers as controller and contracting entity, hosting is described as EU-based, and the qualified signature chain runs through European providers Cencert, Certum and InfoCert. Beyond that the chain goes dark: we found no public information on data-centre locations, a subprocessor list with locations, or a data processing agreement; the ISO compliance claim is stated without scope, and the policy commits only to a minimum 6-year retention of signer data with no stated maximum or deletion commitment. 1 3 7
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is fully evidenced as Autenti sp. z o.o. of Poznań with Polish KRS, NIP and REGON numbers, hosting is described only as 'EU-based', and the qualified certificates come from EU providers Certum and InfoCert. But no data centre is named, we found no published subprocessor list or data processing agreement, no certification scope beyond the bare word ISO, and every sovereignty dimension the independent pipeline checked came back unknown. A European entity is proven; the rest of the chain is assertion. 1 3 7
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the cost of their signing volume from public pages alone — plan prices, envelope or document limits, the per-signature price of AdES and QES, identification fees, API pricing and overage.
0 — No public prices at all; every plan is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced plan, per user or flat.
5 — Plan prices public for the main plans with the billing period stated and the envelope or document limits and main features per plan listed.
8 — Every plan and limit priced publicly, AdES and QES priced per signature, identification fees and overage stated, API pricing published, and contract term and notice period given.
10 — Complete cost computability: the cost of a given monthly volume per signature level derivable from public pages, volume tiers published, and every add-on and price-change term on a public page.
The Legal Counsel
The only public pricing facts are a free account and free trial, pay-only-for-success on successfully issued qualified certificates, scalable signature packages, expert templates at no additional cost, and a 20% discount on the first billing period of the annual eSign PRO and PREMIUM plans. We found no public information on any plan price, per-signature rate for advanced or qualified signatures, identification fee, package price or contract term, so a buyer cannot compute a monthly cost. 4 5 6 8
The HR Operations Lead
Only the shape of the pricing is public: a free account, annual plans named eSign PRO and eSign PREMIUM with '20% off the first billing period' for new customers, scalable signature packages, signers paying nothing, and a pay-only-for-success model — 'charged exclusively for successfully issued qualified certificates, with no fees for failed attempts'. No monetary figure appears on the captured pages — no plan price, no per-signature price for any level, no identification or API fees, no term or notice period — so I cannot price my two hundred contracts a year before signing the first one. 4 6 8
The Revenue Operations Lead
I can see the shape of a price list — a free account, a free trial, eSign PRO and PREMIUM annual plans carrying a 20% first-period promo code for new customers, scalable signature packages, and a pay-only-for-successfully-issued-qualified-certificates model with no fees for failed attempts — but not a single amount, document limit or per-signature figure appears on any captured page. No buyer can budget a signing volume from this. 4 5 6 8
The Integration Engineer
What is public amounts to a free account, a free trial, the plan names eSign PRO and eSign PREMIUM with a 20% first-billing-period promo code on annual plans, scalable signature packages, zero cost for signers, and payment only for successfully issued qualified certificates. No euro figure for any paid plan appears on the captured pages, nor per-signature qualified-signature prices, document limits or API pricing, so I could not compute even a sample monthly cost. 4 6 8
The Data Protection Officer
Public are a free account, a 20% discount code for the first billing period of annual eSign PRO and PREMIUM plans, signature packages scalable to need, ready-made templates at no additional cost, a pay-only-for-successfully-issued-certificates model, and signers bearing no cost. No figure for any paid plan, per-signature price, identification fee or document limit appears on the captured pages, so a buyer cannot compute the cost of their signing volume. 4 5 6 8
The Skeptic
Not one currency figure appears: we found a free account, a 20% discount code for the first billing period of annual eSign PRO and PREMIUM, a model where you pay only for successfully issued qualified certificates, scalable signature packages, and zero cost to recipients. But there is no plan price, no envelope or document limit per plan, no per-signature price for advanced or qualified signing, no identification fee and no API pricing — a buyer cannot compute any monthly cost from these pages. 4 5 6 8
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Autenti
Is Autenti European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Autenti is based.
Where does Autenti store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
Does Autenti have a free plan?
Yes. Autenti has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 3 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Autenti?
As of 3 Nov 2026, the panel rates sproof sign (3.5/5), MOXIS (3.5/5) and Signicat Sign (3/5) highest among the other 22 E-Signature products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is sproof sign (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Autenti alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 3 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 11 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (8)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Security / trust page — found from the homepage autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 EIDAS levels & trust services — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 EIDAS levels & trust services — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Signer identification — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Signer identification — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Signing workflow & signer experience — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Signing workflow & signer experience — found from sitemap autenti.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →