Information Security
Robin Data ComplianceOS (ISMS)
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Robin Data GmbH · www.robin-data.io
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Robin Data ComplianceOS is the information-security side of a self-developed SaaS platform from Robin Data GmbH, a German company registered at Amtsgericht Stendal and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001:2015. Its strongest criterion is information security management, scoring 5: asset classes with per-class protection-need forms, a BSI-style risk analysis, selectable treatment strategies, immutable completed assessments and score trends over time. Audit readiness scores span 4 to 6, and control management and framework coverage span 4 to 5 — controls carry applied yes/no answers with written justification, colour-coded norm deviation, maturity ratings that lock, and evidence created on the fly. The weakest criteria are integrations and automation, where scores span 3 to 4, and sovereignty, where they span 2 to 3: the documented interfaces are Excel export of assets and risks plus content imports behind one homepage sentence about a 'modern interface' and microservices, while hosting location is unconfirmed on the captured pages and ownership and subprocessor exposure are unknown. Own and importable programs cannot be linked, and we found no public prices; the entry point is a bookable meeting.
Speaks for it
- BSI-style risk analysis with per-asset-class protection-need forms, selectable treatment strategies, immutable completed assessments and trend dashboards
- Controls carry applied yes/no answers with written justification, colour-coded status for norm deviation and maturity ratings that lock at completion
- Importable programs cover ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, ISO 55001, DIN 66398, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S and laws including DSGVO and BDSG
- Audits run in-system with configurable types and periods, evidence created on the fly and a created/checked/released workflow
- German GmbH registered at Amtsgericht Stendal (HRB 26213), ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001:2015 certified, TÜV certified and EFRE-funded
Held against it
- The integration story rests on one homepage sentence, with Excel export of assets and risks plus imports of the vendor's own content as the documented interfaces
- Own and importable programs and controls cannot be linked, leaving no evidenced one-control-many-frameworks mapping
- We found no public information on generated statements of applicability, measure owners with due dates, or auditor access roles
- Hosting location is unconfirmed on the captured pages, and ownership and subprocessor exposure are unknown
- We found no public prices for the software or licensed programs, whose control content stays hidden until a licence is acquired
Best for
- You run a German-market ISMS against ISO 27001, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX or B3S and want guided, BSI-style risk analysis instead of spreadsheets
- Your team needs recurring protection-need and risk assessments with immutable history and score trends for management review
- You prepare internal and external audits in-system and link evidence to controls as you work
- You value a local partner network of over 60 partner companies across Germany, plus free webinars and free document support
Avoid if
- You need to feed evidence automatically from your live IT estate — the documented interfaces are Excel import and export, and the automation in evidence amounts to recurring assessments and reminders
- You want to answer one control across many frameworks — the help pages state that own and importable programs cannot be linked with each other
- Your regimes include NIS2 or DORA — the importable catalog lists ISO 27001, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S, DSGVO and further German statutes, and we found no public information on NIS2 or DORA content
- You must verify hosting location, subprocessors or a data processing agreement before buying — the published record lists data residency, ownership and subprocessor exposure as unknown
The scores
Asset & risk management depth
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How this is scored
The ISMS core: asset inventory, risk methodology (identification, assessment, treatment), protection-needs inheritance, incident handling with statutory clocks.
0 — No ISMS substance; "information security" is a chapter in the marketing site.
3 — A flat risk list and an asset spreadsheet import; no treatment tracking, no inheritance, incidents live in the ticket system.
5 — Asset and risk management with configurable matrices and treatment tracking; basic incident handling; inheritance and aggregation need manual work.
8 — A real risk backbone: documented methodology (ISO 27005 or equivalent), inherited protection needs across asset relations, incident workflows with statutory reporting clocks (NIS2 24h/72h), risk acceptance with ownership.
10 — Risk management a certifier works inside: complete asset-risk-treatment chain with inheritance, continuity planning, incident reporting with authority export, and risk reporting the executive level actually reads.
The CISO
Asset and risk management is genuinely built out — BSI-style protection-need assessments configurable per asset class, recurring reviews, risk fields and categories with a calculated overall score, a selectable treatment strategy, immutable completed assessments and trend-over-time dashboards. I found no public information on protection-need inheritance across asset relations, aggregation, incident handling with statutory reporting clocks, or risk acceptance with a named owner — and for me that last one is the difference between a risk register and a filing cabinet. 6 7
The GRC Consultant
Asset classes with per-class protection-need forms, recurring assessments, a documented BSI-style risk analysis walk-through, selectable treatment strategies and immutable completed assessments feeding trend dashboards form a real BSI-flavoured backbone. We found no public information on incident handling with statutory reporting clocks, inherited protection needs across asset relations, or risk acceptance with named owners, which keeps it short of the next level. 6 7
The Drafted IT Officer
The asset-and-risk pair is real: asset classes with repeatable protection-need assessments, custom assessment forms per asset class, a BSI-style risk analysis with a whitepaper walking you through it, treatment strategies, and dashboards showing scores over time — exactly the guided, plain-language setup that runs alongside my day job. We found no public information on incident workflows with statutory reporting clocks, and inheritance of protection needs across related assets appears to be manual work, which holds it at the middle rung for me. 6 7
The Lead Auditor
The risk backbone has substance: protection-need assessments are configurable per asset class and repeated on a recurring cycle, risk assessments carry treatment strategies and derive measures, completed assessments become immutable, and score development over time sits on the dashboard, with a BSI-oriented risk analysis walked through in a whitepaper. I found no public information on incident handling with statutory reporting clocks, on inherited protection needs across asset relations, or on risk acceptance with named ownership, which is what separates this from a certifier-grade core. 6 7
The Evidence Integrator
Asset and risk management are genuine modules: per-asset-class protection-need forms, risks structured into fields and categories with configurable assessment forms, treatment strategy selection with measures derived, score trends over time, and step-by-step BSI-conformant risk-analysis guidance. We found no public information on inherited protection needs across asset relations, incident workflows with statutory reporting clocks, or risk acceptance with named owners, and linking assets to measures runs through a manual matcher. 6 7
The Skeptic
Asset classes with per-class protection-need forms, a BSI-style risk analysis in three steps with selectable treatment strategy, immutable completed assessments and score trend dashboards — that is a real register, not a spreadsheet. But I found no public information on protection-need inheritance across asset relations, risk acceptance with owners, or any incident handling, let alone statutory reporting clocks. 6 7
Controls, SoA & measures
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How this is scored
Control catalogs, statement of applicability, measure tracking and internal audit — whether the control side of the ISMS is operable or a checklist.
0 — A static control checklist; applicability, implementation status and evidence are the consultant's spreadsheet.
3 — Control catalogs with status fields, but no SoA generation, no measure ownership, no link between controls and risks.
5 — Controls linked to risks and measures with owners and due dates; SoA producible with manual assembly; internal audit supported by checklists.
8 — SoA on demand from live control status, measure tracking with delegation and escalation, internal audit workflows with findings management, controls carrying their own evidence.
10 — The control fabric as a living system: catalog updates versioned, SoA always current, audit programs with recurring schedules, and every control answerable with linked evidence at any moment.
The CISO
Controls carry applicability answers with a written justification — the substance of a statement of applicability — plus status with colour-coded norm deviation, per-control maturity ratings and evidence linkable directly to the control. I found no public information on measure owners, due dates, delegation or escalation, or generating a statement of applicability from live status, so the control fabric still runs on manual assembly. 8 9 12
The GRC Consultant
Controls carry applicability yes/no with justification, status, colour-coded deviation, per-control maturity ratings and evidence creatable on the fly, and TOMs from a 350-industry database link to risks — the control side is operable, not a checklist. We found no public information on SoA document generation, findings management or measure delegation with escalation, and the help pages document that imported program content cannot be linked with an organisation's own programs and controls, which breaks the answer-a-control-once story for reusable client catalogs. 8 9 12
The Drafted IT Officer
Controls arrive as importable programs where you answer applied yes/no with a written justification, set status with colour coding for norm deviation, rate maturity per control, and manage measures against a starter database of 350-plus industries with a created/checked/approved release workflow. The measure fields shown include no owner or due date, we found no public information on a generated statement of applicability, and the captured help states own and imported programs cannot be linked with each other — so the same question gets answered once per framework. 8 9 12
The Lead Auditor
Controls arrive as importable programs with an applied/not-applied decision plus written justification, status and colour coding for norm deviations, per-control maturity assessments that lock at completion, and measures run through a created/checked/released workflow. I found no public information on generating a statement of applicability from live status, on measure ownership with due dates, or on delegation and escalation — the justification field is raw material an SoA would still be assembled from by hand. 8 9 12
The Evidence Integrator
Controls arrive via importable programs and carry SoA-grade data — applied yes/no with documented justification, status with color coding for norm deviation, immutable maturity ratings, and evidence records linked on the fly — alongside a TOM catalog with import, industry templates and a create/check/release workflow. We found no public information on measure owners and due dates or on generated statements of applicability, and the help pages state that own and importable programs cannot be linked with each other. 8 9 12
The Skeptic
Controls carry applicability answers (yes/no with justification), status and colour coding, and measures run through a release workflow with created/checked/approved fields plus a 350-industry measure database — enough to assemble an applicability statement by hand. But I found no public information on generated statements of applicability, due dates or delegation, and the help pages state outright that own and importable programs cannot be linked, which caps the control fabric. 8 9 12
Framework & standard coverage
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How this is scored
Which regimes the product actually operationalizes — ISO 27001, NIS2, TISAX/VDA ISA, DORA, BSI IT-Grundschutz, SOC 2 — and whether one control maps across them or each framework is a fresh island.
0 — One framework, hard-coded; anything else is "on the roadmap".
3 — Two or three frameworks as separate checklists; the same control is answered once per framework.
5 — The major regimes for its market with partial cross-mapping; newer regimes (NIS2, DORA) present as content packs of varying depth.
8 — Broad current coverage including NIS2/TISAX/DORA where relevant, one-control-many-frameworks mapping, and visible maintenance as regimes evolve.
10 — Framework coverage as a living product: dozens of regimes, genuine multi-compliance mapping on one data basis, per-industry profiles, and documented update cadence when the standard moves.
The CISO
The importable catalogue covers the German market's core regimes — ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, BSI IT-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S, the DSGVO and further German statutes — but I found no public information on NIS2, DORA or SOC 2 content. The captured help pages also document that own programs cannot be linked with importable ones, which works against answering one control across many frameworks. 8 12
The GRC Consultant
Importable programs cover ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, ISO 55001, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S, DIN 66398 and the GDPR plus a run of German statutes — the major regimes for its German market. We found no public information on NIS2, DORA or SOC 2 content, and no evidenced one-control-many-frameworks mapping; combined with the documented separation between own and imported content, each program risks being worked as its own island. 8 12
The Drafted IT Officer
The importable catalogue is respectable for a German SME: ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, ISO 55001, DIN 66398, BSI IT-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S, plus the GDPR and a shelf of German laws, and you can build your own programs. But we found no public information on NIS2 or DORA content, and with own and importable programs not linkable I see no one-control-many-frameworks mapping — each regime is effectively its own checklist. 8 12
The Lead Auditor
The importable catalog is broad for its home market — ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, DIN 66398, ISO 55001, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S and a dozen German laws including the GDPR — with a matcher that links records bidirectionally under configurable attributes. I found no public information on NIS2, DORA or SOC 2 content or on any documented update cadence as regimes move, and the help text states that own programs and controls are not linkable with importable ones, which limits one-control-many-frameworks work. 8 11 12
The Evidence Integrator
The importable catalog covers the major German-market regimes — ISO 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 27701, ISO 55001, DIN 66398, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S and nine laws including DSGVO and BDSG — plus the ability to build own programs. Cross-mapping is only partial since own and importable programs cannot be interlinked, and we found no public information on NIS2 or DORA content. 7 8 12
The Skeptic
The importable catalogue is genuinely broad for the German market — ISO 27001, ISO 27701, BSI-Grundschutz, TISAX, B3S and a shelf of laws — so this is more than two checklists. But every program imports its own controls with the cross-linking of own and importable programs blocked, and I found no public information on NIS2, DORA or any update cadence when regimes move. 8
Audit readiness & evidence
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How this is scored
Whether the system produces defensible proof: revision-safe history, evidence collection, reports for auditors, authorities and management.
0 — Exports are screenshots; history is overwritten in place.
3 — PDF reports exist but evidence is attached ad hoc and changes leave no reliable trail.
5 — Versioned records, standard report generators, evidence attachments per control; assembling a full audit file still takes days.
8 — Revision-safe change history, audit-scoped evidence packs on demand, management reports current at a click, auditor access roles.
10 — Audit readiness as a standing state: continuous evidence status per framework and scope, exportable proof packs an external auditor accepts as-is, and a defensible answer to "show me the state on date X".
The CISO
Audit management is real: configurable audit types and periods, activities and evidence created from the audit context, evidence types that ship predefined yet stay extendable, a created/checked/approved release trail, and completed ratings that become immutable. I found no public information on revision-safe change history, audit-scoped evidence packs on demand, auditor access roles or reporting to authorities — and exports top out at Excel tables. 9 12 13
The GRC Consultant
Completed risk, protection-need and maturity assessments lock against later change, internal and external audits run as configurable types with periods and activities created from the audit context, evidence records carry typed attachments linkable to controls, and assets and risks export to Excel. We found no public information on revision-safe per-document change history, audit-scoped evidence packs on demand, auditor access roles, or reconstructing the state on a given date — assembling a full audit file still looks like days of assembly. 6 7 12 13
The Drafted IT Officer
The audit module is genuine: internal and external audits with configurable types, audit numbers and periods, activities and evidence creatable straight from the audit context, importable and extendable evidence types, attachments and external links on every record, and completed assessments become immutable — that immutability is what makes a file defensible to an external auditor. We found no public information on auditor access roles or audit-scoped evidence packs on demand, so assembling the full file still lands on my weekend. 12 13 9
The Lead Auditor
Defensibility is engineered where it counts: completed risk and maturity assessments become immutable, the linked maturity model cannot be changed after import, and protection-need and risk scores are tracked over time — pieces of a real answer to "show me the state on date X". Evidence can be linked to controls and created on the fly with extendable evidence types, and audits carry document IDs, periods, attachments and external links; I found no public information on document-level change history, audit-scoped evidence packs or auditor access roles, and the exports shown are Excel tables. 7 12 13
The Evidence Integrator
Audits are run in-system with configurable types, periods, activities and evidence records linked to controls, and evidence types can be imported, customized and extended with form fields; completed assessments become immutable and scores are tracked as trends over time. We found no public information on revision-safe change history across edits, auditor access roles, or audit-scoped evidence packs, and the documented exports are Excel tables of assets and risks. 6 7 12 13
The Skeptic
Audit records are structured (numbers, periods, configurable types) with importable and custom evidence types, attachments, and evidence creatable on the fly from the audit context; completed maturity ratings become immutable. But I found no public information on revision-safe change history, exportable evidence packs for an auditor, auditor access roles, or a defensible answer to the state on a given date. 12 13
Integrations & automation
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How this is scored
Whether the platform feeds from the real IT estate — directory import, CMDB, ticketing, scanners, API — and automates evidence collection instead of re-typing it.
0 — A closed island: manual entry in, PDF out, no API.
3 — CSV/Excel import and export; no live connections, no API worth the name.
5 — Directory import (AD/Entra), a documented REST API for core objects, a handful of native connectors (ticketing, CMDB or SSO); automation is reminders and recurrence.
8 — Real connector set (Jira/ServiceNow-class ticketing, CMDB, cloud and endpoint sources), webhooks, SSO/SCIM, automated evidence tests with human review.
10 — The platform behaves like infrastructure: API parity for the data model, event streams, continuous control monitoring against the live estate, and automation that measurably removes the recurring toil rather than renaming it.
The CISO
The vendor promises that external systems and workflows can be connected "über eine moderne Schnittstelle und Microservices", and assets and risks export to Excel. I found no public information on API documentation, named connectors, directory or single-sign-on integration, or automated evidence collection, so the integration story rests on one homepage sentence. 1 6 7
The GRC Consultant
Beyond Excel import and export for assets, risks and TOMs, the only integration evidence is one homepage sentence about connecting third-party IT services and workflows "über eine moderne Schnittstelle und Microservices". We found no public documentation of an API's objects, directory import, connectors to ticketing, CMDB or scanners, SSO, or automated evidence collection — so evidence feeding from the real IT estate stays manual. 1 6 7 9
The Drafted IT Officer
The homepage promises third-party systems connectable via "eine moderne Schnittstelle" and microservices, but we found no documented API details, no directory import, no connectors to ticketing or CMDB, and no automated evidence collection. What the help documents is Excel export for assets and risks plus imports of TOMs, programs and evidence types — which for someone like me is re-typing by other means. 1 6 7 9
The Lead Auditor
The captured pages show Excel import and export for assets, risks and measures, plus a homepage statement that external IT services and workflows can be attached "über eine moderne Schnittstelle und Microservices". I found no public information on a documented API for core objects, directory import, ticketing or CMDB connectors, single sign-on or automated evidence collection — the automation evidenced is recurring assessment cycles and manual imports, not feeding from the live estate. 1 6 9
The Evidence Integrator
The estate integration story is a single homepage sentence about connecting external IT services and workflows via a modern interface and microservices; we found no public information on a documented API, directory, CMDB or ticketing connectors, SSO, webhooks, or automated evidence collection against the live estate. The documented interfaces are Excel export of assets and risks and imports of the vendor's own content — an island with a spreadsheet drawbridge, with automation that amounts to recurring assessments and reminders. 1 6 7 9
The Skeptic
The entire integration story is one homepage sentence about a 'modern interface and microservices'; I found no public information on API documentation, named connectors, SSO or automated evidence collection. What is actually verifiable is Excel export of assets and risks plus content imports — re-typing avoidance, not a live feed from the estate. 1 6 7
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where the security posture of the whole company actually lives and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. The risk register is itself a target.
0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for the system holding your risk register.
3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.
5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.
8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.
10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.
The CISO
A German GmbH with register court Amtsgericht Stendal, a Merseburg address and European regional-development funding puts the entity firmly in Europe. I found no public information on where the SaaS platform is hosted, on a published DPA or TOMs, or on subprocessors — for the platform that would hold my risk register, the chain behind the entity is undocumented in the captured pages. 3 4
The GRC Consultant
The German GmbH with its Stendal registry entry and the vendor's own ISO 27001 certification and EFRE funding are solid European grounding. We found no public information on a DPA, a subprocessor list, ownership or the hosting location on the vendor's captured pages — the data residency line is unconfirmed, and for the system holding a client's risk register that documentation gap matters. 3 4
The Drafted IT Officer
The vendor is a German GmbH with a register court in Stendal, its own ISO 27001 certificate, EFRE funding, and energy claims comparing to typical European data centres — the posture reads comfortingly local. But we found no public DPA, no subprocessor list, and hosting location is not confirmed on the captured pages, and for the system that would hold my risk register I can't leave that open. 3 4
The Lead Auditor
The vendor side is German: Robin Data GmbH, registered at Amtsgericht Stendal with a Merseburg address, selling a self-developed platform under its own ISO 27001 certificate. I found no public information on where the platform is hosted, on a data processing agreement, or on a subprocessor list — for the system that holds the risk register itself, the captured pages leave the processing chain undocumented. 3 4
The Evidence Integrator
The entity is a German GmbH with a German register court, address and tax number, ISO 27001 and TÜV certifications, and EFRE funding — a solid European anchor for the company. But the vendor's own captured pages do not confirm the hosting location of the platform, and we found no public information on a published DPA, a subprocessor list, or ownership, which is thin documentation for the system that holds the risk register itself. 3 4
The Skeptic
A German GmbH with register court and address is on the record, the company itself holds ISO 27001 and TÜV certificates, and energy claims about its data centres are published. But we found no public information on hosting location, a data processing agreement, or any subprocessor list — for the system meant to hold the buyer's risk register. 3 4
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real invoice — per module, per entity, per year, with consulting unbundled — from public pages alone. Unpublished pricing is the B2B norm in this market, so this criterion describes rather than condemns; the benches weight it accordingly.
0 — No public prices at all; every configuration is a sales conversation.
3 — An entry price exists, but module add-ons, scale steps or bundled consulting make the real total incomputable.
5 — Most editions carry real numbers with billing period stated and software separated from services; at least one commonly needed module or scale step is unpriced.
8 — Every edition and module priced publicly with entity/user boundaries and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.
10 — Complete price computability: modules, scale steps, service packages and renewal rules public, so the invoice for a 100-employee company and a certification project is a two-minute exercise.
The CISO
I found no public information on prices for the software or any module; the captured buying path starts with a get-to-know meeting, and control content in licensed programs is hidden until the user acquires a licence. The real invoice is therefore only computable in a sales conversation. 8 9
The GRC Consultant
The only cost-related facts captured are free webinars and a bookable introductory meeting; we found no public information on edition, module, user or licence prices. Licensed imported programs even hide their control content until the user acquires a licence, with no price stated — the real invoice is not computable from public pages. 8 9
The Drafted IT Officer
We found no public prices for the software, the per-program licences (whose control contents stay hidden until you acquire a licence), or the 60-partner consulting network; the funnel starts with a demo meeting. The only cost statements we found are that webinars and document support are free of charge — welcome, but they don't let me budget an invoice. 3 8 9
The Lead Auditor
We found no public price information on any captured page — no editions, modules, or billing terms — only a bookable introductory meeting and free webinars, so every configuration appears to be a sales conversation. That is the norm in this market, but a buyer cannot compute any part of the invoice from the public pages. 8 9
The Evidence Integrator
We found no public price figures on the captured pages — no edition, module or per-user pricing, with a bookable introductory meeting as the documented entry point and even licensed content programs unnamed in price until a license is acquired. Every configuration is a sales conversation; the only published figure is that webinar participation is free of charge. 3 8 9
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in DE ⚠ unverified | 3/3 pts | 4 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 15 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. Das Land wird nicht ausdrücklich genannt, der Code wird aus dem deutschen Registergericht und der deutschen Anschrift abgeleitet.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We could not confirm any pricing information on the vendor’s own pages as captured, so this page shows none rather than a statement we cannot stand behind. Know more? Tell us
- 27 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 9 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 7 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (13)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.robin-data.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Platform overview www.robin-data.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 About page www.robin-data.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Imprint www.robin-data.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Information security product page www.robin-data.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 Asset & risk management depth — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Asset & risk management depth — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Controls, SoA & measures — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Controls, SoA & measures — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Framework & standard coverage — found from sitemap www.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 Framework & standard coverage — found from sitemap www.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Audit readiness & evidence — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Audit readiness & evidence — found from sitemap help.robin-data.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →