Business Instant Messaging
Element
UK / wider Europe Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Element (New Vector Ltd) · element.io
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Element, a Matrix-based business messaging platform, scores highest where cryptography and custody live: encryption & access control at 9-10 and deployment & data custody at 9-10, resting on end-to-end encryption by default, QR/emoji device verification, an AGPL server with official Helm charts, air-gapped install with vendor support, and LTS releases every 6 months. The weakest product categories are integrations (4 — widgets and identity plumbing, but no documented API, webhooks or bot framework) and channels, threads & search, where unlimited history and federation are credited but the evidence is silent on search, mentions, edit history and pins. The split is sovereignty, 4-7 — over weight, not facts: rationales cite the same UK controller (Element Creations Ltd, London, under the UK ICO), AWS hosting in Amsterdam and Stockholm with customer region choice, and a published subprocessor list including US processors, then score differently on how far air-gapped self-hosting offsets them. Retention, discovery & co-determination sits at 5-6 — rules-based retention, no profiling of homeserver users, but no legal hold or eDiscovery export. Pricing transparency sits at 2: Pro is 'Priced per seat/month' beside 'Talk to an expert'.
Speaks for it
- End-to-end encryption on by default across the platform, with device verification by QR code or emoji string
- Self-hosting is real: AGPL server distribution, official Helm charts, air-gapped install with vendor support, LTS every 6 months
- Rules-based retention for messages and media with a 7-day window before permanent deletion, and no profiling of homeserver users
- Vendor-agnostic federation on an open standard governed by The Matrix.org Foundation, with unlimited data history
- Free Community edition under AGPL — frontend and backend, including Element Call
Held against it
- No search evidenced on the captured pages — no full-text search, mentions, edit history or pins
- No documented REST API, webhooks or bot framework evidenced; integrations are named widgets plus identity plumbing
- No legal hold, eDiscovery export or administrative audit trail evidenced; auditing covers in-room discussion, not admin actions
- Data controller is Element Creations Ltd of London under the UK ICO, with US processors (Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce) on the published subprocessor list
- The Community homeserver is 'not for use in production environments', pushing production self-hosting to the paid tier
Best for
- You need to run messaging on your own infrastructure — air-gapped deployment with vendor support, no internet connectivity needed, on Kubernetes with official Helm charts
- Your baseline is end-to-end encryption on by default, alongside OIDC SSO and LDAP/SCIM provisioning
- You need cross-organisation rooms over vendor-agnostic federation on an open standard governed by The Matrix.org Foundation
- You want a genuine exit path — an AGPL distribution with data export positioned against vendor lock-in
Avoid if
- You need full-text search across message history — the evidence evidences no search, mentions, edit history or pins
- Your legal regime requires legal hold or eDiscovery export with a documented format
- You plan to build custom tooling against a documented REST API, webhooks or a bot framework
- You require an EU-based contracting entity — the controller is Element Creations Ltd of London under the UK ICO, and the published subprocessor list names US processors (Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce)
The scores
Channels, threads & search
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How this is scored
The daily surface: channel model, threading, mentions, files, and whether search can find a decision made eighteen months ago.
0 — Flat group chats with no threads; search covers recent messages only, and history is capped.
3 — Channels and direct messages with basic search, but threading is awkward or absent and file handling is a plain attachment list.
5 — Public and private channels, real threads, mentions and reactions, file sharing with previews, and full-text search across the whole history.
8 — Cross-organisation or guest channels with clear boundaries, message editing history, pinned and saved items, search with filters by channel, person and date, and a documented history limit or none at all.
10 — The archive is a working knowledge base: search that ranks well across years, threads that stay readable, channel lifecycle management (archive, rename, merge) without losing history, and export of a conversation in a form a human can read.
The Team Lead
Real threads, reactions, polls, attachments and explicitly unlimited history are confirmed, and federation gives cross-organisation rooms — but the evidence is completely silent on search, message-edit history, pins and channel lifecycle. The anchor-5 requirement of full-text search across the whole history is unevidenced, and my team lives on finding last spring's decision, so I interpolate between 3 and 5. 1 2
The Security Officer
Threads, reactions, attachments, polls and unlimited history are confirmed, and vendor-agnostic federation gives genuinely cross-organisation rooms — but the evidence is completely silent on search: no full-text search, no filters, no message-editing history, no pins. An archive you cannot evidence as findable after eighteen months is an archive I cannot trust as a record. 2 1
The Works Council Advocate
Real threads, reactions, attachments, polls and unlimited history are all evidenced, and federation reaches across organisations. But the evidence is entirely silent on search, mentions, edit history and pins — a works council that cannot find the decision made eighteen months ago is flying blind, and silence is information. 2 1
The Compliance Counsel
Threads, reactions, attachments, polls and explicitly unlimited history are confirmed, and federation gives real cross-organisation rooms — but the evidence is silent on search altogether, with no full-text search, filters, edit history or mentions evidenced. Search is how I find the decision from eighteen months ago, so I cannot credit the anchor that turns the archive into a working knowledge base. 1 2
The Platform Engineer
Threads, reactions, polls, voice messages, attachments and unlimited history are all evidenced, and federation gives genuine cross-organisation rooms with boundaries. But the evidence says nothing about search anywhere — no full-text, no filters, no edit history, no pins — and silence on the one thing that turns an archive into a knowledge base caps it at the anchor that doesn't depend on it. 1 2
The Skeptic
Threads, reactions, polls, attachments and 'Unlimited data history' are on the record with no stated exclusion — but search, the thing that finds a decision made eighteen months ago, appears nowhere on the captured pages, nor do mentions, edit history, pins or a human-readable export of a conversation. I score what is written, not what Matrix is rumoured to do, and search is not written. 2
Encryption & access control
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How this is scored
What is encrypted and against whom, plus who can reach which room. Judged on documented mechanism, since "encrypted" in this category usually means the vendor holds the keys.
0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; no role model beyond admin, guests indistinguishable from members.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest with vendor-held keys, basic roles, and guest access that mostly works.
5 — The above plus configurable roles per channel, SSO, guest accounts with scoped visibility, and a clear statement of what the vendor can read.
8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for direct messages or private rooms with the trade-offs named, device verification, session management an admin can revoke, and documented key handling.
10 — End-to-end encryption as a first-class mode — documented or open cryptography, cross-device key management that ordinary users survive, identity verification, and the vendor stating plainly what it cannot decrypt.
The Team Lead
The entire platform is end-to-end encrypted by default with non-encrypted rooms as the configurable exception, device verification via QR code or emoji string that ordinary users survive, and open-source Matrix underpinnings. The vendor states plainly that E2EE content is never accessed by its teams or shared externally — this is the anchor-10 package, not a bolt-on. 2 3
The Security Officer
This is what the category should look like: the entire platform is end-to-end encrypted by default including calls, devices verify by QR code or emoji string via cross-signing, the cryptography is open (Matrix, AGPL-licensed server), and the vendor states plainly that end-to-end encrypted information is "never accessed by our teams or shared externally". The one thing the evidence never documents is an administrator revoking a user's sessions and devices — MDM and server deprovisioning appear, per-user session revocation does not. 2 3 1
The Works Council Advocate
End-to-end encryption is the default mode on an open, source-visible protocol, devices verify by QR code or emoji string, and the vendor states plainly that encrypted content is never accessed by its teams. Docked one point because admin-revocable session management and guest accounts with scoped visibility are not evidenced anywhere in the evidence. 2 3 1
The Compliance Counsel
The entire platform is E2EE by default with configurable non-encrypted rooms, cross-signed device verification by QR or emoji, OIDC SSO with LDAP/SCIM, and the vendor states plainly that end-to-end encrypted information is never accessed by its teams — a first-class mode built on a foundation-governed open standard. Only admin-revocable session management and documented key handling go unevidenced, which keeps it just shy of the top anchor. 1 2 3
The Platform Engineer
E2EE is the default across the whole platform with the non-encrypted option named as an explicit configuration, device verification via QR code or emoji is exactly the cross-signing UX ordinary users survive, and the vendor states plainly that end-to-end encrypted data is never accessed by their teams. One point held back because admin-revocable session management and documented key handling don't appear on these pages. 2 3
The Skeptic
The sentence I hunt for exists in the open: 'The entire platform is end-to-end encrypted by default' with non-encrypted rooms as the named exception, not the rule, plus cross-signed device verification by QR or emoji and the vendor stating E2EE content 'is never accessed by our teams or shared externally'. Docked one because documented key handling and admin-revocable sessions are absent from the captured text, even with OIDC SSO present. 1 2 3
Retention, discovery & co-determination
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How this is scored
The archive as a legal object: retention policies, export for discovery, audit, and the monitoring features a works council will ask to have switched off.
0 — No retention policy, no export beyond a manual copy, no audit log, and presence or activity analytics that cannot be disabled.
3 — Manual export of some data and a global history limit, but no per-channel retention, no audit log and no admin control over analytics.
5 — Configurable retention per channel or workspace, admin export in a documented format, an audit log of administrative actions, and status or presence that a user can control.
8 — Legal-hold and eDiscovery export including edits and deletions, retention executed per policy and evidenced, full admin audit trail, and activity analytics switchable off organisation-wide.
10 — Built to pass a works agreement and a subpoena on the same day: granular retention with documented deletion, discovery export a lawyer can use, complete audit, and no individual-level productivity scoring anywhere in the product.
The Team Lead
Rules-based retention for messages and media and in-room auditing capturing an official record for compliance are evidenced, and no user profiling plus opt-in internal Matomo analytics is genuinely good. But there's no legal hold, no eDiscovery export format, and the audit covers room discussion rather than administrative actions, so it sits between the 5 and 8 anchors. 2 3
The Security Officer
Rules-based retention policies with a documented 7-day window before permanent deletion including media, in-room auditing for regulation, user-level data export, and an explicit statement that users are not profiled — the works council will like the last part. But there is no evidence of legal-hold or eDiscovery export capturing edits and deletions, the auditing is scoped to rooms rather than a full administrative audit trail, and presence control is unaddressed. 2 3
The Works Council Advocate
Rules-based retention with a documented seven-day window before permanent deletion — deletion that deletes rather than hides — and an explicit statement that homeserver users are not profiled, which is exactly what I ask for. But legal hold, eDiscovery export, an administrative audit trail and user-controlled presence are all unevidenced; the 'auditing' on offer is an in-room record, not an admin log. 2 3
The Compliance Counsel
There are rules-based retention policies for messages and media, a documented 7-day window before permanent deletion of redactions, in-room auditing for compliance records, and opt-in self-hosted analytics with a stated no-profiling position — respectable. But legal hold, eDiscovery export including edits and deletions, an admin-action audit trail and a documented export format are all absent; 'easily migrate your data' protects against lock-in, it does not satisfy a subpoena. 2 3
The Platform Engineer
Rules-based retention for messages and media with a documented 7-day deletion window, no user profiling, and opt-in Matomo analytics hosted in London — the works-council questions have answers. But the 'auditing' fact is an in-room record of discussion, not an administrative audit trail, there's no legal hold or eDiscovery export, and the export format is unspecified. 2 3
The Skeptic
Rules-based retention for messages and media, a documented 7-day window to permanent deletion including all media, in-room auditing framed for regulation and no profiling of homeserver users — but legal hold, eDiscovery export a lawyer could use, and an audit trail of administrative actions are all missing from the evidence. 'Easily migrate your data' is an exit story, not a discovery format. 2 3
Deployment & data custody
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How this is scored
Whether the customer can hold their own archive: self-hosting, private cloud, open source, federation, and what an exit actually looks like.
0 — Cloud-only, proprietary, with export limited to a partial archive.
3 — Cloud-only, but with a documented full export in an open-ish format.
5 — A private-cloud or dedicated-instance option, or a self-hosted edition that lags the cloud significantly; full export documented.
8 — A genuine self-hosted edition close to feature parity, or open-source core with a documented upgrade path, plus complete export including files and metadata.
10 — Custody is the customer's: open-source or source-available server, self-hosting supported as a first-class deployment, open protocol or federation, and a migration path in and out that the vendor documents rather than resists.
The Team Lead
AGPL community edition, official helm charts for Kubernetes, S3 media repository, custom push gateway, and air-gapped deployment with no internet needed, on an open federated protocol with export explicitly positioned against vendor lock-in — custody is effectively the customer's. Docked one point because the free community homeserver is explicitly 'not for use in production environments', making the production-grade self-host path the paid edition. 1 2
The Security Officer
Custody is genuinely the customer's: AGPL-licensed server suite, official Helm charts for Kubernetes, install and support for air-gapped instances needing no internet, an open federated protocol, and a vendor that markets against lock-in rather than resisting exit. The single dent is that Element itself labels the community homeserver "not for use in production environments," nudging production self-hosting into the paid tier. 2 1
The Works Council Advocate
Custody can genuinely be the customer's: an AGPL FOSS distribution of frontend and backend, self-hosting as a first-class deployment including air-gapped with no internet, official Helm charts, vendor-agnostic federation, and export positioned against lock-in. One point off because the community homeserver is declared not for production and the export format itself is undocumented. 2 1 3
The Compliance Counsel
Custody is genuinely the customer's: an AGPL Server Suite Community edition free of charge, official helm charts on Kubernetes, air-gapped deployments needing no internet, customer-selected AWS regions, and vendor-agnostic federation on an open standard governed by the Matrix.org Foundation. What keeps it from a clean 10 is that export contents (files and metadata) are asserted rather than documented, and the community homeserver carries a not-for-production caveat that pushes production self-hosting onto the paid tier. 1 2 3
The Platform Engineer
This is the one I'd actually run: an AGPL server distribution, official helm charts with GitOps, air-gapped install with vendor support, and an LTS every 6 months with security backports — a supported deployment, not a hobby build. Federation runs on a vendor-neutral open standard governed by the Matrix.org Foundation, the customer owns their homeserver's data, and exit means moving to any Matrix server. Custody is genuinely the customer's. 1 2 3
The Skeptic
Custody is genuinely the customer's: AGPL server, official helm charts on Kubernetes, air-gapped and mesh deployment, vendor-agnostic federation on an open standard, and export framed against lock-in. One asterisk in the vendor's own words — the free Community homeserver is 'not for use in production environments' — so first-class production self-hosting is the paid suite, which is why this is not a 10. 1 2
Integrations & extensibility
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How this is scored
Bots, webhooks, app framework, identity — whether the chat becomes the place work is noticed, and whether that is buildable without a partner agreement.
0 — No API, no webhooks, no bots.
3 — Incoming webhooks and a handful of native integrations; no bot framework, no documented limits.
5 — Documented REST API, incoming and outgoing webhooks, slash commands, a bot account model, and SSO.
8 — A proper app framework with interactive components, event subscriptions with retries, SCIM provisioning, documented rate limits and a sandbox.
10 — A platform: versioned API with a deprecation policy, an app directory or plugin system with permissions a customer can audit, and integrations the vendor maintains rather than lists.
The Team Lead
Named widgets (NeoBoard, OpenProject, Jira), LDAP/SCIM provisioning and OIDC SSO are real, and SCIM is an anchor-8 item. But the evidence evidences no documented REST API, webhooks, bot framework, rate limits or sandbox — my team can't build on what isn't documented. 1 2
The Security Officer
A handful of named widgets (NeoBoard, OpenProject, Jira) plus LDAP/SCIM provisioning and OIDC SSO get identity right, but the evidence says nothing about a documented REST API, webhooks, slash commands or any bot framework. If I cannot see the extension surface, I cannot audit what an integration is allowed to touch. 2 1
The Works Council Advocate
Named integrations exist — Jira, OpenProject, NeoBoard widgets — alongside SCIM, LDAP and OIDC identity plumbing. But the evidence evidences no documented REST API, no webhooks, no slash commands, no bot account model and no rate limits, so I cannot confirm this is buildable without a partner agreement. 2 1
The Compliance Counsel
Named widgets (NeoBoard, OpenProject, Jira), OIDC SSO and SCIM/LDAP provisioning are real and evidenced, but the evidence shows no REST API, no webhooks, no slash commands and no bot framework. A handful of native integrations plus identity plumbing sits between the 'native integrations only' and 'documented API with bots' anchors. 1 2
The Platform Engineer
The identity side is solid — OIDC SSO, LDAP, SCIM provisioning and MDM — and widgets like NeoBoard, OpenProject and Jira exist. But the evidence evidences no REST API, no webhooks, no bot framework, no rate limits and no app directory; none of the developer surface I'd build against is on the page, so I can't credit it. 1 2
European sovereignty
panel opinion
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
Where the archive and its metadata live, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors touch it. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated or non-EU, subprocessors unnamed.
3 — EU data residency offered for message content while metadata, search indexes or support tooling remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.
5 — EU hosting as standard and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — notifications, AI features, analytics — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, full subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: vendor, entity, hosting and every subprocessor European, certification published, and a self-hosted option that removes the question.
The Team Lead
Hosting is named EU infrastructure (AWS Amsterdam/Stockholm, with customer region choice) and the subprocessor list is published — but the contracting entity is Element Creations Ltd in London under the UK ICO, outside the EU, and named subprocessors like Cloudflare, Twilio and Salesforce come with no stated jurisdiction or legal basis. Self-hosting and air-gap options let me remove the question entirely, which keeps this at 5 rather than the UK-entity baseline of 3. 2 3
The Security Officer
The pipeline marks the formal attributes unknown, but the evidence's own privacy policy names a UK contracting entity (Element Creations Ltd, London, with US and EU subsidiaries), EU hosting on named AWS regions with customer choice, and a published subprocessor list — several of them US processors (Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce) with purposes named but no legal basis for the transfer. The self-hostable, air-gapped deployment is what keeps this defensible for a sovereignty-minded buyer; without it, the UK entity and US subprocessors would pull the score lower. 3 2 1
The Works Council Advocate
Deployments can sit in EU AWS regions and the privacy policy does publish a subprocessor list — but the controller and contracting entity are Element Creations Ltd in London under the UK ICO, and the chain includes Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce, Salesloft and Hubspot. The air-gapped self-hosted edition is what actually removes the question, and it should not have to. 3 2
The Compliance Counsel
The contracting entity is Element Creations Ltd of London — outside the EU on its face — and the published subprocessor list includes US processors (Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce, Salesloft, Hubspot) with no stated transfer safeguards or certifications. EU hosting in Stockholm/Amsterdam with customer region choice and an air-gapped self-hosted option that largely removes the question lift this above the floor, but nothing here is sovereign end to end, whatever the Bundeswehr deployments imply. 2 3
The Platform Engineer
The pipeline logged unknowns, but the vendor's own policy names a UK controller (Element Creations Ltd), AWS hosting in Amsterdam/Stockholm with customer region choice, and a published subprocessor list that includes US processors — Cloudflare, Twilio, Salesforce, Hubspot. EU-region content hosting with a named chain sits mid-scale; the self-hosted, air-gapped edition removes most of the question for a buyer like me, but the contracting entity is still not EU. 2 3
The Skeptic
EU hosting is evidenced — AWS Amsterdam and Stockholm with customer region choice — and the subprocessor list is published and specific (Cloudflare, Twilio, LiveKit, MapTiler, a US marketing stack), but the contracting entity is Element Creations Ltd of London with a US subsidiary, so the chain is UK/EU rather than European end to end. The air-gapped, self-hostable deployment is what actually removes the question, and it is the strongest thing keeping this above the midline. 2 3
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their headcount — including the retention, compliance and guest features they actually need — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A per-user headline exists, but the tier where retention control, SSO or compliance export begins is unstated.
5 — Per-user prices public with billing period stated, but at least one commonly needed capability (unlimited history, SSO, eDiscovery) sits in an unpriced enterprise tier.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with per-user maths, history and storage limits, feature boundaries, minimum term and VAT treatment stated; self-hosted licensing priced too where offered.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given headcount and deployment choice, including guest users, storage and any per-instance licence.
The Team Lead
The only public number is zero: the AGPL Community edition is free, but Element Server Suite Pro is 'Priced per seat/month' with no figure and a 'Talk to an expert' prompt, and even the server-limit terms reference unspecified 'price minimums'. No annual invoice is computable from these pages, which lands just above the all-sales-conversation anchor. 2
The Security Officer
The Community edition is free and public, but the tier anyone would run in production is "Priced per seat/month" with no number and a "Talk to an expert" button, and "price minimums" for additional servers are referenced without figures. No buyer can compute the annual invoice for the deployment that actually matters from these pages. 2
The Works Council Advocate
The community edition is genuinely free, but the Pro tier says 'Priced per seat/month' directly beside 'Talk to an expert', with unnamed 'price minimums' per additional server. No public number exists anywhere on the evidence, so no works council can compute the annual invoice from published pages. 2
The Compliance Counsel
The Community edition is free and public, but Pro is 'Priced per seat/month' with no figure captured anywhere, a 'Talk to an expert' prompt, and 'price minimums' per server left unstated. I cannot compute an annual invoice for any paying deployment from these pages, which for me means the tier where compliance and support begin is effectively a sales conversation. 2
The Platform Engineer
The Community edition is publicly free under AGPL, which is more than nothing. But the paid tier is 'Priced per seat/month' with no figure and a 'Talk to an expert' button, and the per-server price minimums that govern real deployments are unstated — no buyer can compute an invoice for any headcount from this page. 2
The Skeptic
The community edition is honestly free under AGPL, but the production tier says 'Priced per seat/month' with no figure next to 'Talk to an expert', and even the server-limit disclosure defers to 'the same price minimums' without ever stating a minimum. A buyer cannot compute the annual invoice for any headcount from these pages; the sales conversation is the price list. 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | US CLOUD Act reach ⚠ unverified | 0/2 pts | 3 Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 15 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. The text following 'specifically:' (server region) is truncated in the excerpt, and the privacy policy additionally names Stripe as payment processor and LiveKit Cloud as an optional call provider for the hosted service.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 25 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 10 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (10)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage element.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing element.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy element.io Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Legal notice element.io Checked 21 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Channels, threads & search — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption & access control — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Encryption & access control — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Deployment & data custody — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Deployment & data custody — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Integrations & extensibility — found from sitemap element.io Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →