Business Instant Messaging
Siilo
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Siilo B.V. · siilo.com
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Siilo at a glance
- Vendor
- Siilo B.V.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Siilo 0.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Siilo B.V., now called Doctolib Connect, is judged here as a free messenger for healthcare professionals plus a 'tailored solution' closed secure network for organisations, on a stated 10 M monthly messages from 1.2 M professional users and 225 K care organisations in Europe. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 20 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 21 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Siilo B.V., now called Doctolib Connect, is judged here as a free messenger for healthcare professionals plus a 'tailored solution' closed secure network for organisations, on a stated 10 M monthly messages from 1.2 M professional users and 225 K care organisations in Europe. Sovereignty and pricing transparency ran highest, both at 1-2; the sovereignty credit rests on the Dutch vendor entity, with no public information on hosting, subprocessors or certification and no sovereignty attributes on record. Integrations sit at a flat 0 across the bench, with no public information on an API, webhooks or provisioning. The genuine splits are in governance and discovery and in deployment control, both spanning 0-1: in governance, the higher scores counted a processor agreement stated as available, while the scores at 0 held that with nothing documented on retention, export or audit logging the archive is not a record system; the deployment split sits on identical findings of a vendor-run service with no public information on self-hosting or a documented exit. Messaging core and encryption and access also ran 0-1 behind 'Data security guaranteed' assurance.
Speaks for it
- Stated network scale of 10 M monthly messages, 1.2 M professional users and 225 K care organisations in Europe
- Individual product publicly stated as the free secure messaging solution for healthcare professionals
- Processor agreement stated as available for GDPR paperwork
- Onboarding and support stated as included with the organisational offering
- Vendor trades as Siilo B.V., a Dutch company form, the European signal behind the sovereignty scores
Held against it
- No public information on channels, threading, search, file handling or how far back message history reaches
- No public information on the encryption mechanism, key custody or guest scoping behind the 'Data security guaranteed' heading
- No public information on retention configuration, discovery export or audit logging of administrative actions
- No public information on self-hosting, a documented export path or the contracting entity under the Doctolib Connect rename
- No public information on an API, webhooks, single sign-on or provisioning, leaving integrations at a flat 0
Best for
- You need a no-cost messenger for individual healthcare professionals and the publicly stated free product covers your users
- You want to reach clinicians on an existing network the vendor states at 1.2 M professional users
- You need a processor agreement in place and a vendor-run hosted service is acceptable to you
- Your association wants a tailored, closed network where members communicate and collaborate
Avoid if
- You need to search and export message history for legal discovery or a works council review
- You must self-host or hold a documented exit path for your clinical archive
- Your sign-off requires documented encryption mechanisms, key custody and administrative audit logs
- Your team builds against the messenger through APIs, bots or directory provisioning
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Channels, threads & search | 0.5 of 5 |
| Encryption & access control | 0.5 of 5 |
| Retention, discovery & co-determination | 0.5 of 5 |
| Deployment & data custody | 0 of 5 |
| Integrations & extensibility | 0 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1 of 5 |
Channels, threads & search
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How this is scored
The daily surface: channel model, threading, mentions, files, and whether search can find a decision made eighteen months ago.
0 — Flat group chats with no threads; search covers recent messages only, and history is capped.
3 — Channels and direct messages with basic search, but threading is awkward or absent and file handling is a plain attachment list.
5 — Public and private channels, real threads, mentions and reactions, file sharing with previews, and full-text search across the whole history.
8 — Cross-organisation or guest channels with clear boundaries, message editing history, pinned and saved items, search with filters by channel, person and date, and a documented history limit or none at all.
10 — The archive is a working knowledge base: search that ranks well across years, threads that stay readable, channel lifecycle management (archive, rename, merge) without losing history, and export of a conversation in a form a human can read.
The Team Lead
The captured page markets a free secure messenger and a closed network for organisations, but I found no public information on channels, threading, mentions, file handling, or search. For the surface my team opens on a busy Tuesday, nothing here is evidenced at all. 1
The Security Officer
The captured page confirms a live messenger carrying ten million monthly messages, plus a closed-network product for organisations, but we found no public information on threads, channel structure, file handling or search across history. A clinical decision made eighteen months ago has to be findable for the archive to count as a record, and nothing here shows that it is. 1
The Works Council Advocate
The captured page evidences a messenger with a closed network for organisations, but I found no public information on threads, search, file handling, history limits, or export of a conversation in readable form. A chat log a works council cannot show to be retrievable eighteen months later is not yet a record system. 1
The Compliance Counsel
The captured page shows a service carrying ten million monthly messages for over a million healthcare professionals, but I found no public information on the channel model, threading, mentions, file handling, or any documented history limit. A messenger whose ability to find an eighteen-month-old decision is entirely undocumented is, for my purposes, not a record system. 1
The Platform Engineer
The captured site sells a "closed secure network" where an organisation's members can communicate, and that is the whole of what it says about the message surface. I found no public information on channels, threads, mentions, file handling, or search, let alone how a decision from eighteen months ago would be retrieved. 1
The Skeptic
The page markets messaging at scale — ten million monthly messages and a closed network where members communicate and collaborate — but shows nothing of the daily surface. We found no public information on a channel model, threading, search, file handling, or any statement of how far back message history reaches. 1
Encryption & access control
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How this is scored
What is encrypted and against whom, plus who can reach which room. Judged on documented mechanism, since "encrypted" in this category usually means the vendor holds the keys.
0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; no role model beyond admin, guests indistinguishable from members.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest with vendor-held keys, basic roles, and guest access that mostly works.
5 — The above plus configurable roles per channel, SSO, guest accounts with scoped visibility, and a clear statement of what the vendor can read.
8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for direct messages or private rooms with the trade-offs named, device verification, session management an admin can revoke, and documented key handling.
10 — End-to-end encryption as a first-class mode — documented or open cryptography, cross-device key management that ordinary users survive, identity verification, and the vendor stating plainly what it cannot decrypt.
The Team Lead
The only access-relevant content is a 'Data security guaranteed' heading about keeping patient data safe — a promise, not a documented mechanism — and a processor agreement stated as available. I found no public information on what is encrypted and against whom, SSO, role models, or guest scoping. 1
The Security Officer
Security is the whole pitch — the page promises "Data security guaranteed" and patient data kept safe in clinical settings — yet we found no public information on the encryption mechanism, key custody, device verification, guest scoping, or sessions an admin can revoke. A guarantee is not a statement of what the vendor cannot decrypt; until the cryptography is written down, a buyer must assume the service operator can read the archive. 1
The Works Council Advocate
Security appears only as assurance language — data security "guaranteed", messaging "secure" — with no documented mechanism: I found no public information on transport or at-rest encryption, key handling, role model, guest scoping, or what the vendor can read. Asserted security without a stated mechanism earns almost nothing from this chair. 1
The Compliance Counsel
Security appears as positioning — a heading reading 'Data security guaranteed' and a 'closed secure network' for organisations — yet I found no public information on the encryption mechanism, key custody, session or device management, configurable roles, SSO, or guest scoping. A published processor agreement signals contractual intent, but a guarantee without a documented mechanism is something I would have to qualify in any opinion letter. 1
The Platform Engineer
The page promises "Data security guaranteed" for clinical messaging and offers a processor agreement, but I found no public information on the encryption mechanism, who holds the keys, per-channel roles, SSO, or guest scoping. Judged on documented mechanism, nothing is documented. 1
The Skeptic
The claim reads "Data security guaranteed" for clinical messaging, but a guarantee is not a mechanism. We found no public information on transport or at-rest encryption, key custody, end-to-end encryption, per-channel roles, SSO, or how guest visibility is scoped, so there is nothing documented to score against. 1
Retention, discovery & co-determination
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How this is scored
The archive as a legal object: retention policies, export for discovery, audit, and the monitoring features a works council will ask to have switched off.
0 — No retention policy, no export beyond a manual copy, no audit log, and presence or activity analytics that cannot be disabled.
3 — Manual export of some data and a global history limit, but no per-channel retention, no audit log and no admin control over analytics.
5 — Configurable retention per channel or workspace, admin export in a documented format, an audit log of administrative actions, and status or presence that a user can control.
8 — Legal-hold and eDiscovery export including edits and deletions, retention executed per policy and evidenced, full admin audit trail, and activity analytics switchable off organisation-wide.
10 — Built to pass a works agreement and a subpoena on the same day: granular retention with documented deletion, discovery export a lawyer can use, complete audit, and no individual-level productivity scoring anywhere in the product.
The Team Lead
I found no public information on retention policies, admin export formats, audit logs, or whether presence and analytics can be switched off. A works council reviewing this product would have nothing documented to agree on. 1
The Security Officer
We found no public information on retention policies, export for discovery, audit logging, or whether presence and activity analytics can be switched off. The only governance-adjacent items are a tailored network for organisations and an available processor agreement, which is listed but not shown; a works council reviewing this product today has nothing to read. 1
The Works Council Advocate
I found no public information on retention policy, export for discovery, audit logging, or admin control over presence and activity analytics. A processor agreement is offered, which is GDPR paperwork a buyer will need, but it gives a works council no evidence on whether the archive deletes on schedule or whether individual activity can be scored. 1
The Compliance Counsel
The one hard governance artefact is a published processor agreement; beyond it I found no public information on retention configuration per channel or workspace, legal hold, discovery export that includes edits and deletions, audit logging of administrative actions, or any organisation-wide control over analytics. Nothing here lets me tell a client the archive would survive a subpoena or a works council negotiation on the same day. 1
The Platform Engineer
A processor agreement is the one governance artifact on the captured site; I found no public information on retention policy, export formats for discovery, audit logging, or any switch for presence and activity analytics. Nothing here would survive a works council negotiation or a subpoena request as far as these pages show. 1
The Skeptic
A processor agreement is offered for signature, and that is where the legal story both starts and ends on this evidence. We found no public information on retention configuration, admin export in any format, an audit log, or whether presence and activity analytics can be switched off. 1
Deployment & data custody
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How this is scored
Whether the customer can hold their own archive: self-hosting, private cloud, open source, federation, and what an exit actually looks like.
0 — Cloud-only, proprietary, with export limited to a partial archive.
3 — Cloud-only, but with a documented full export in an open-ish format.
5 — A private-cloud or dedicated-instance option, or a self-hosted edition that lags the cloud significantly; full export documented.
8 — A genuine self-hosted edition close to feature parity, or open-source core with a documented upgrade path, plus complete export including files and metadata.
10 — Custody is the customer's: open-source or source-available server, self-hosting supported as a first-class deployment, open protocol or federation, and a migration path in and out that the vendor documents rather than resists.
The Team Lead
I found no public information on self-hosting, private-cloud or dedicated-instance options, federation, or what export and exit actually look like. Custody of the archive is simply not addressed on the public pages. 1
The Security Officer
The page describes a vendor-operated service — over one million professionals on their network — and we found no public information on self-hosting, a private-cloud option, open source, or any export and migration path. For a clinical archive, an undocumented exit is a custody decision the buyer is being asked to make blind. 1
The Works Council Advocate
The captured page presents a hosted free service, and I found no public information on self-hosting, a private-cloud edition, open-source code, federation, or a documented export path out. Custody of the archive rests with the vendor on this evidence, and no exit route is evidenced. 1
The Compliance Counsel
Everything captured describes a hosted service — a free individual product and a tailored closed network for organisations — and I found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated-instance option, open source, a documented full export, or a migration path in either direction. Custody of the archive appears to rest with the vendor, and I found no public information on what an exit would look like. 1
The Platform Engineer
Every deployment statement on the captured page describes a vendor-run service — a free clinician app plus a "tailored solution" for organisations — and I found no public information on self-hosting, source availability, full export, federation, or any open protocol. The rebrand to Doctolib Connect is exactly the moment I would want a written migration path, and I found no public information on that either. 1
The Skeptic
We found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated-instance or private-cloud option, an open-source edition, or any documented export, so an exit path cannot be planned from these pages. The renaming to Doctolib Connect is stated as a marketing fact with no custody implications attached. 1
Integrations & extensibility
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How this is scored
Bots, webhooks, app framework, identity — whether the chat becomes the place work is noticed, and whether that is buildable without a partner agreement.
0 — No API, no webhooks, no bots.
3 — Incoming webhooks and a handful of native integrations; no bot framework, no documented limits.
5 — Documented REST API, incoming and outgoing webhooks, slash commands, a bot account model, and SSO.
8 — A proper app framework with interactive components, event subscriptions with retries, SCIM provisioning, documented rate limits and a sandbox.
10 — A platform: versioned API with a deprecation policy, an app directory or plugin system with permissions a customer can audit, and integrations the vendor maintains rather than lists.
The Team Lead
I found no public information on an API, webhooks, a bot or app framework, SCIM provisioning, or SSO. The page is patient-safety positioning plus adoption statistics, with no evidence the chat can be built on. 1
The Security Officer
We found no public information on an API, webhooks, a bot framework, single sign-on or user provisioning. The product is presented as a closed secure network for organisations, and whether anything can be built against it without a partner agreement is not documented publicly. 1
The Works Council Advocate
We found no public information on an API, webhooks, a bot or app framework, single sign-on, or provisioning; no integration surface appears on the captured page. Extensions a works council could audit and switch off are not a subject the page addresses at all. 1
The Compliance Counsel
I found no public information on an API, incoming or outgoing webhooks, a bot account model, slash commands, SCIM provisioning, SSO, or documented rate limits. The organisations offering speaks of members who communicate, connect and collaborate, which describes people rather than a programmable platform. 1
The Platform Engineer
I found no public information on an API, webhooks, a bot or app framework, or identity provisioning on the captured page. An operator has nothing documented to build against, and no rate limits, sandbox, or directory to plan around. 1
The Skeptic
We found no public information on an API, incoming or outgoing webhooks, slash commands, a bot or app framework, SCIM provisioning, or SSO. Nothing on the captured page evidences an extension surface of any kind, let alone documented limits or a sandbox. 1
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where the archive and its metadata live, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors touch it. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated or non-EU, subprocessors unnamed.
3 — EU data residency offered for message content while metadata, search indexes or support tooling remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.
5 — EU hosting as standard and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — notifications, AI features, analytics — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, full subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: vendor, entity, hosting and every subprocessor European, certification published, and a self-hosted option that removes the question.
The Team Lead
The vendor trades as Siilo B.V., a Dutch company form, and a processor agreement is stated as available, which is the only European signal on the page. I found no public information on hosting location, subprocessors, or certification, and no sovereignty attributes were on record. 1
The Security Officer
The vendor trades as Siilo B.V., which reads as a Dutch entity, and reports 225,000 care organisations across Europe — but we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors, or certifications, and the processor agreement is announced rather than published. The announced rename to Doctolib Connect also leaves the contracting entity under the new name unstated on the captured page. European users do not make a European data chain. 1
The Works Council Advocate
The vendor is named as a Dutch private limited company, the only European signal present, while the recorded sovereignty attributes are empty and I found no public information on hosting location, subprocessors, certification, or EU-standard data residency. The rebrand to Doctolib Connect leaves the contracting entity unanswered by the public capture, which is precisely the question a works council needs settled. 1
The Compliance Counsel
The contracting entity is Siilo B.V., a Dutch company form, and the claimed footprint is European — 225,000 care organisations — but I found no public information on where message content and metadata are hosted, on any subprocessor list, or on residency guarantees or certification. The announced rename to Doctolib Connect also leaves open which entity a customer will contract with and under whose custody the archive will sit. 1
The Platform Engineer
The vendor entity is Siilo B.V. and the page counts "225 K care organisations in Europe", but I found no public information on where the archive is hosted, on the contracting entity after the rebrand to Doctolib Connect, or on a single named subprocessor. For a health-data product the only custody signal is a published processor agreement. 1
The Skeptic
The vendor trades as a Dutch B.V. and the product now carries Doctolib's name, which points toward Europe — but pointing is all this evidence does. Hosting location, the contracting chain behind the new name, subprocessors and certifications are all unevidenced: we found no public information on any of them. 1
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their headcount — including the retention, compliance and guest features they actually need — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A per-user headline exists, but the tier where retention control, SSO or compliance export begins is unstated.
5 — Per-user prices public with billing period stated, but at least one commonly needed capability (unlimited history, SSO, eDiscovery) sits in an unpriced enterprise tier.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with per-user maths, history and storage limits, feature boundaries, minimum term and VAT treatment stated; self-hosted licensing priced too where offered.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given headcount and deployment choice, including guest users, storage and any per-instance licence.
The Team Lead
The base messenger is publicly stated as free, but the organisational offering is described as a 'tailored solution' with no price, billing period, or feature boundary stated. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice for their headcount from these pages. 1
The Security Officer
The individual offering is publicly stated as free for healthcare professionals, but the organisational network is described only as a tailored solution with no price given, and we found no public information on paid tiers, limits, or what administrative and compliance capabilities cost. An organisation cannot compute its annual invoice from these pages. 1
The Works Council Advocate
The individual app is published as a "free secure messaging solution for healthcare professionals", but the organisational offering — where retention and administrative controls would sit — carries no public price, term, or VAT treatment that I could find. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice for their headcount; the only numbers published are usage statistics, not prices. 1
The Compliance Counsel
A public price does exist for individuals — a 'free secure messaging solution for healthcare professionals' — but the organisations tier, where a care provider would actually contract and where retention and compliance capabilities would sit, is described only as tailored. I found no public information on per-user pricing for that tier, billing period, minimum term, VAT treatment, or feature boundaries, so an annual invoice cannot be derived from public pages. 1
The Platform Engineer
The public price is "the free secure messaging solution for healthcare professionals" — zero for individual clinicians — while the organisational offering is described only as a "tailored solution". I found no public information on per-user prices, billing period, minimum term, or VAT treatment, so an operator cannot compute an annual invoice for their headcount from these pages. 1
The Skeptic
The base product is advertised as "the free secure messaging solution for healthcare professionals", and that is the entirety of the public pricing. The organisational offer is described as a tailored solution with no price stated, and we found no public information on billing terms, feature boundaries, minimum term, or VAT treatment. 1
Questions about Siilo
Is Siilo European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Siilo is based.
Where does Siilo store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026.
Does Siilo have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Siilo?
As of 20 Oct 2026, the panel rates Element (3.5/5), Mattermost (3.5/5) and Stackfield (3/5) highest among the other 19 Business Instant Messaging products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Element (UK / wider Europe). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Siilo alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 20 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We found no public information on pricing on the pages we read (siilo.com). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- We found no public information on compliance on the pages we read (siilo.com). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- 1 product fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (1)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.