Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Speakap B.V. · www.speakap.com

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Speakap at a glance

Vendor
Speakap B.V.
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 1 Oct 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 1 Oct 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 1 Oct 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Speakap 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Speakap, a business instant messaging platform for frontline teams sold as an employee experience platform, scored strongest on integrations (4 to 6) — an app directory, developer documentation, APIs, Google Drive and SharePoint connections and HR-system sync of hires, role changes and offboarding — and on encryption and access (5 to 6), where TLS 1.2 with 2048-bit minimum keys, encryption at rest, BCrypt hashing, SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 are documented. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 29 Sep 2026 to 1 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 28 Oct 2026. all sources

Speakap alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Speakap, a business instant messaging platform for frontline teams sold as an employee experience platform, scored strongest on integrations (4 to 6) — an app directory, developer documentation, APIs, Google Drive and SharePoint connections and HR-system sync of hires, role changes and offboarding — and on encryption and access (5 to 6), where TLS 1.2 with 2048-bit minimum keys, encryption at rest, BCrypt hashing, SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 are documented. It scored weakest on governance and discovery, flat at 2: the judges found no public information on configurable retention, admin export, legal hold, eDiscovery or an administrative audit trail. Deployment control spread 2 to 4 — the works council advocate credited the stated EU data center with no transfer between regions, while the team lead saw archive custody resting entirely with the vendor. Messaging core spread 4 to 6, judges citing a group-chat model with no public information on channels or a history limit. Beyond EU hosting, ownership, the subprocessor chain and a published DPA are unstated. Pricing transparency scored 0; no prices appear on the captured pages.

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Speaks for it

  • Encryption in transit and at rest is stated with protocol detail — TLS 1.2 with minimum 2048-bit keys — alongside BCrypt password hashing
  • SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 certification, annual external penetration tests and a bug bounty are documented
  • Integrations scored 4 to 6, covering an app directory, developer documentation, APIs, Google Drive and SharePoint, and HR-system sync for new hires, role changes and offboarding
  • The captured pages state an EU data center for European customers with no transfer between the EU and US data centers, and name Speakap Germany GmbH in Cologne
  • The documented chat surface — 1:1 and group chat with threads, reactions, polls, voice messages, keyword search, and pin, edit and delete — scored 4 to 6

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Held against it

  • Governance and discovery scored 2 with no spread — no public information on configurable retention, admin export in a documented format, legal hold, eDiscovery or an administrative audit trail
  • Hosting is vendor cloud throughout — no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated or private-cloud instance, or a documented export of messages, files and structure on exit
  • The end-to-end encryption claim appears as a bare line on the product pages, with no public information on key handling, what the vendor can or cannot decrypt, device or session revocation, or two-factor authentication
  • Read receipts, availability status and a workforce analytics module are documented features with no public information on an organisation-wide switch-off
  • The chain behind EU hosting is only partly established — no published data processing agreement or subprocessor list appears, ownership is unstated, and the captured pages give different addresses for the vendor

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Best for

  • You run non-desk or frontline teams in the documented target industries (retail, hospitality, construction, manufacturing, logistics and transport, healthcare and nursing) and want one mobile-first app for chat, news, tasks and knowledge sharing
  • You want HR-system sync to automate new hires, role changes and offboarding rather than building on a developer platform
  • You are a European organisation that wants the stated EU data center arrangement for European customers with no transfer between regions and a named German contracting entity

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Avoid if

  • You carry retention, legal hold or eDiscovery duties — the only retention figure on the pages is the vendor's own one-month backup, and governance and discovery scored 2 with no spread
  • You must self-host or leave with your archive — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
  • You need the mechanism behind the end-to-end encryption claim verified — the claim appears as a bare line, with key handling and what the vendor cannot decrypt undocumented
  • A works council will scrutinise monitoring — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median
Channels, threads & search 2 of 5
Encryption & access control 3 of 5
Retention, discovery & co-determination 1 of 5
Deployment & data custody 1 of 5
Integrations & extensibility 2.5 of 5
European sovereignty 2 of 5

Channels, threads & search

Show reasoning
How this is scored

The daily surface: channel model, threading, mentions, files, and whether search can find a decision made eighteen months ago.

0 — Not a team chat: no persistent channels or group conversations, only notifications or one-off messages.

3 — Group chats or channels and direct messages, file sharing, and search over messages.

5 — Public and private channels, threaded replies, mentions and reactions, file sharing with previews, and search across message history.

8 — Cross-organisation or guest channels with clear boundaries, message editing history, pinned and saved items, search with filters by channel, person and date, and unlimited history or a documented history limit per plan.

10 — The archive is a working knowledge base: search that ranks well across years, threads that stay readable, channel lifecycle management (archive, rename, merge) without losing history, and export of a conversation in a form a human can read.

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The Team Lead

Threads, reactions, polls, voice messages, pin, edit and delete are all documented, and keyword search returns shareable links — a surface my team can work in on a busy Tuesday. But the captured pages describe group chats rather than a channel model, and we found no public information on search filters by channel, person or date, on edit history, or on a documented message-history limit, so whether the archive holds up over eighteen months stays unclear. 3 4

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The Security Officer

Direct and group chat with threads, reactions, polls, voice messages and file sharing are documented, plus keyword search across conversations and pin, edit and delete. We found no public information on a public-versus-private channel model, mentions, or a documented message-history limit, so the evidence sits between the basic and the full level. 3 4

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The Works Council Advocate

The captured pages show one-to-one and group chat with threads, reactions, polls, voice messages, pin, edit and delete, media sharing, and keyword search across conversations. We found no public information on public and private channels, mentions, search filtered by person or date, or any documented history limit — and for a record of who spoke to whom at what hour, an undocumented history is exactly the question a council will ask. 3 4

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The Compliance Counsel

One-to-one and group chat with threads, reactions, polls, voice messages and file sharing are documented, together with keyword search across conversations and the ability to pin, edit and delete messages. My worry for the archive: we found no public information on a public/private channel model, message edit history, a documented history limit, or export of a conversation in a form a lawyer can read. 3 4

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The Platform Engineer

One-to-one and group chats, threads, reactions, voice notes, media sharing and keyword search across conversations are documented, plus pin, edit and delete on messages — a competent chat surface, but it is a group-chat model rather than a channel model: we found no public information on public and private channels, mentions, file previews or any history limit. 3 4

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The Skeptic

The chat pages document one-to-one and group chat, threads, reactions, polls, pin/edit/delete and keyword search over conversations — but I looked for the history sentence and it is not there: no documented history limit, no search filters by channel or date, no guest boundaries, no export of a conversation. Group membership management is the only boundary shown, so this sits just below the full channel-and-filtered-search level. 3 4

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Encryption & access control

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How this is scored

What is encrypted and against whom, plus who can reach which room. Judged on documented mechanism, since "encrypted" in this category usually means the vendor holds the keys.

0 — The vendor states that messages are transmitted or stored unencrypted.

3 — Encryption in transit stated, with admin and member roles.

5 — Encryption in transit and at rest stated, admin roles and private channels, guest accounts limited to the channels they are invited to, and SSO or two-factor authentication.

8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for direct messages or private rooms with the trade-offs named, or customer-managed encryption keys; device or session management an admin can revoke, granular permissions per channel, and documented key handling.

10 — End-to-end encryption as a first-class mode — documented or open cryptography, cross-device key management that ordinary users survive, identity verification, and the vendor stating plainly what it cannot decrypt.

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The Team Lead

Encryption in transit and at rest is stated in concrete terms (TLS 1.2, minimum 2048-bit keys, BCrypt password hashing), backed by annual external penetration tests, a bug bounty, ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type II, with role-based access, admin control and single sign-on — and the vendor publicly claims end-to-end encryption. What holds it back is mechanism: we found no public information on key handling, identity verification, device or session revocation, or a plain statement of what the vendor itself cannot decrypt. 2 3 4 5

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The Security Officer

TLS 1.2 transport encryption with 2048-bit minimum keys, encryption at rest, BCrypt password hashing, role-based access, admin control and single sign-on are all documented. The end-to-end encryption claim appears only as a marketing line; we found no public information on the cryptography behind it, key handling, device verification, revocable sessions, or a plain statement of what the vendor cannot decrypt — and I judge on documented mechanism, not on a slogan. 2 3 4 5

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The Works Council Advocate

Encryption in transit (TLS 1.2) and at rest with BCrypt-hashed passwords is stated, alongside role-based access, single sign-on, and product pages that name end-to-end encryption together with full admin control. What I miss is the mechanism: no documented key handling, no plain statement of what the operator cannot decrypt, nothing on how end-to-end encryption and admin control sit together, and no public information on guest scoping or session revocation. 2 3 4 5

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The Compliance Counsel

Encryption in transit and at rest is stated with protocol detail, alongside role-based access, admin control, single sign-on, SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 certification, annual external penetration tests and a bug bounty. End-to-end encryption is claimed on the product pages, but we found no public information on key handling, what the vendor can or cannot decrypt, device or session revocation, or two-factor authentication — I need the mechanism documented before relying on that claim. 2 5 4

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The Platform Engineer

Encryption in transit and at rest is stated with real specifics — TLS 1.2, 2048-bit minimum keys, BCrypt password hashing — backed by SOC 2 Type II, annual external penetration tests and a bug bounty. End-to-end encryption, role-based access and admin control are claimed in a single line, but we found no public information on the cryptography, key handling, device or session revocation, or how guest access is scoped. 2 3 5

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The Skeptic

Encryption in transit (TLS 1.2) and at rest is stated plainly on the security pages, with BCrypt password hashing, role-based access and admin control. "End-to-end encryption, role-based access, and admin control" appears as a bare bullet on the chat page — no scope, no mechanism, no sentence about what the vendor cannot decrypt — and the security whitepaper is free on request rather than public. Two-factor authentication and corporate single sign-on into the product are not documented; the single sign-on claims I found cover access to integrated tools, not the customer's identity provider. 2 3 5

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Retention, discovery & co-determination

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How this is scored

The archive as a legal object: retention policies, export for discovery, audit, and the monitoring features a works council will ask to have switched off under BetrVG §87(1) no. 6.

0 — A messenger with no organisation-level administration: each user controls their own history, and the organisation has no central export or retention.

3 — Admin export of workspace data or a history setting, with users controlling their own status.

5 — Configurable retention for messages and files, admin export of workspace data in a documented format, and an audit log or activity log of administrative actions.

8 — Per-channel retention executed per policy, legal-hold and eDiscovery export including edits and deletions, a full admin audit trail, and presence, read receipts or activity analytics switchable off organisation-wide.

10 — Built to pass a works agreement and a subpoena on the same day: granular retention with documented deletion, discovery export a lawyer can use, complete audit, and individual productivity scoring stated as not part of the product.

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The Team Lead

The environment is described as "secure, auditable, role-based" and backups run multiple times a day kept for one month, but that retention is the vendor's operation, not a policy my organisation sets. We found no public information on configurable retention, a workspace export in a documented format, an admin audit trail, legal hold or eDiscovery — and read receipts, availability status and workforce analytics are documented with no statement that they can be switched off organisation-wide, which is exactly what a works council will ask. 1 2 3 5

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The Security Officer

The pages claim an auditable, role-based environment and state backups kept for one month, but we found no public information on admin export, configurable retention, legal hold or discovery export. Read receipts, availability status and a workforce analytics module are documented features, and we found no public information on switching them off organisation-wide — precisely what a works council will ask about. 1 2 3 4

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The Works Council Advocate

This is where a works council looks first, and we found no public information on configurable retention that actually deletes, on admin export of the archive in a documented format, or on an administrative audit trail — the only retention figure on the pages is the vendor's own one-month backup. Meanwhile read receipts, availability status and workforce analytics are marketed as features with no public information on switching them off organisation-wide, let alone on excluding individual activity scoring. 1 2 3 4

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The Compliance Counsel

The pages describe every conversation staying in a secure, auditable, role-based environment and state that backups run several times a day and are kept for one month, but we found no public information on configurable retention, admin export of workspace data, legal hold, eDiscovery, or an audit log of administrative actions. Workforce analytics and read receipts appear with no organisation-wide switch-off described, which a works council will raise under section 87(1) no. 6 of the Works Constitution Act. 3 1 2

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The Platform Engineer

Organisation-level administration exists — admin control and a role-based, "auditable" environment — but that one word carries all the weight: we found no public information on configurable retention policies, admin export in a documented format, or an audit trail of administrative actions. The only retention figure anywhere is the vendor's own backups kept for a month, and read receipts plus a workforce analytics module are on the feature list with no documented organisation-wide off switch. 1 2 3

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The Skeptic

What the pages show is an "auditable, role-based environment" claim, a one-month backup cycle, read receipts and availability status, and a workforce analytics module. We found no public information on configurable retention, an admin export in a documented format, legal hold or discovery export, an administrative audit trail, or an organisation-wide switch for presence and analytics — the exact things a works council will ask about. 1 2 3

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Deployment & data custody

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether the customer can hold their own archive: self-hosting, private cloud, open source, federation, and what an exit actually looks like.

0 — The terms state that the customer's messages cannot be exported or are not returned when the account ends.

3 — Cloud service with an admin export of messages and files.

5 — Cloud service with a documented full export of messages, files and channel structure, or a choice of hosting region, a dedicated instance or a private-cloud option.

8 — A self-hosted edition close to feature parity, or an open-source core with a documented upgrade path, plus complete export including files and metadata.

10 — Custody is the customer's: open-source or source-available server, self-hosting supported as a first-class deployment, open protocol or federation, and a migration path in and out that the vendor documents rather than resists.

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The Team Lead

This is a cloud service, with data placed in an EU or a US data center and no transfer between them. We found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated or private-cloud option, or a documented export of messages, files and group structure a customer could take away on exit, so custody of the archive rests entirely with the vendor on everything captured. 2 5

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The Security Officer

The documented custody picture is a cloud service whose data sits either in an EU or a US data center with no transfer between them, the EU center serving European customers. We found no public information on self-hosting, an open-source core, a documented export of the full archive, or a migration path out — an exit, as far as these pages show, is not described. 2 5

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The Works Council Advocate

European customers' data is stated to reside in an EU data centre with no transfer to the US centre, which gives region certainty. We found no public information on export of messages, files and channel structure, on self-hosting or an open-source core, or on what an exit from the service looks like — on these pages custody of the archive stays with the vendor. 2 5

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The Compliance Counsel

Data resides either in an EU or a US data center with no transfer between them, and backups run multiple times a day, but this is a vendor-hosted cloud service throughout. We found no public information on a self-hosted edition, a private-cloud or dedicated-instance option, a customer-run export of messages, files and structure, or a documented exit and migration path. 2 5

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The Platform Engineer

This is a hosted service running in the vendor's EU or US data centers with no transfer between them and a 99.8% uptime guarantee — the region is assigned per customer rather than an architecture you can choose to run yourself. We found no public information on a self-hosted edition, an open-source core, federation, or even a documented admin export of messages and files, so no exit path is evidenced on the pages we read. 2 5

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The Skeptic

Speakap is presented as a cloud service with data resident in an EU or US data center and no transfer between them, the EU center being stated for European customers. We found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated instance or private-cloud option, or a documented full export of messages, files and group structure — so an exit path is not described on the captured pages. 2 5

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Integrations & extensibility

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Bots, webhooks, app framework, identity — whether the chat becomes the place work is noticed, and whether that is buildable without a partner agreement.

0 — A closed messenger: no integrations, webhooks, bots or API.

3 — Incoming webhooks or a handful of named integrations.

5 — An app directory or a list of native integrations with common tools, a documented API, incoming webhooks and bots or slash commands.

8 — A proper app framework with interactive components, event subscriptions with retries, SSO and SCIM provisioning, documented rate limits and a sandbox.

10 — A platform: versioned API with a deprecation policy, an app directory or plugin system with permissions a customer can audit, and integrations the vendor maintains rather than lists.

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The Team Lead

An app directory, an API marketplace, developer documentation and APIs for automation and content sync are documented, with named connections to Google Drive and SharePoint and HR-driven sync of new hires, role changes and offboarding — that is genuine lifecycle provisioning, not a logo wall. We found no public information on webhooks, bots or slash commands, interactive components, rate limits or a sandbox, so I cannot call it a developer platform yet. 3 6 7

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The Security Officer

An app directory, developer documentation, APIs, and named integrations with Google Drive, SharePoint, HR systems, e-learning, scheduling and forms tools are documented, with single sign-on across them. We found no public information on webhooks, bots or slash commands, SCIM provisioning, rate limits or a developer sandbox, which keeps it short of a full app framework. 6 7

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The Works Council Advocate

An app directory, developer documentation and APIs for automation and content sync are published, with named integrations for HR sync, e-learning, scheduling, forms, Google Drive and SharePoint, and single sign-on into connected tools. We found no public information on incoming webhooks, bots or slash commands, or on a documented app framework whose permissions a customer could audit. 2 6 7

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The Compliance Counsel

An app directory, developer documentation, APIs for automation and content sync, and named integrations including Google Drive and SharePoint are documented, with HR-system sync automating new hires, role changes and offboarding, and single sign-on into connected tools. We found no public information on webhooks, bots or slash commands, an interactive app framework, SCIM provisioning, or documented rate limits and a sandbox. 6 7 2

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The Platform Engineer

An app directory, developer documentation and Speakap APIs are published, with named integrations for Google Drive, SharePoint, HR systems, scheduling, e-learning and forms apps, plus HR sync that automates joiner, role-change and offboarding flows. We found no public information on webhooks, bots or slash commands, an app framework with permissions a customer can audit, rate limits, a sandbox or a deprecation policy for the API. 6 7

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The Skeptic

An app directory, a documented API with developer documentation, HR-system sync, e-learning, forms, scheduling and Google Drive/SharePoint are all documented, with integrations embedded in the desktop and mobile apps behind single sign-on. What I did not find is webhooks, bots or slash commands, SCIM provisioning, rate limits or a sandbox — integration is framed as the vendor's hub of named partners rather than a framework a customer builds on. 2 6 7

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European sovereignty panel opinion

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Where the archive and its metadata live, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors touch it. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it. Dimensions the evidence does not establish are unknown, not non-EU.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU option stated.

3 — One European element proven — EU data residency for message content, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, or a published DPA — with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting stated as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the subprocessor chain (notifications, AI features, analytics) is unstated or partly non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure covering content and metadata, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: vendor, entity, hosting and every subprocessor European, certification published, and a self-hosted option that removes the question.

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The Team Lead

The captured pages state data resides in an EU or US data center with no transfer between them, the EU center serving European customers, and a Speakap Germany GmbH in Cologne is named, with GDPR compliance claimed. The contracting entity, ownership and the subprocessor chain are not established in what we captured, a US data center serves other customers, and we found no public information on a published data processing agreement. 2 4 5

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The Security Officer

Two European elements are proven: EU hosting stated as the arrangement for European customers with no transfer to the US center, and a named German entity, Speakap Germany GmbH in Cologne. The captured pages establish nothing on ownership, the subprocessor chain, or a published data processing agreement, and a US data center option exists for other customers — so I can prove European elements but not the chain behind them. 2 4 5

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The Works Council Advocate

The German pages name a German contracting entity in Cologne and state EU hosting for European customers with no transfer between regions, alongside GDPR measures and ISO-certified data centres. But we found no public information on a published data processing agreement or a subprocessor list with locations, and the captured pages give different addresses — a New York address appears on the security page — so the chain is only partly established. 2 4 5 7

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The Compliance Counsel

The captured pages state that European customers' data is held in an EU data center with no transfer to the US location, name a German entity at Mediapark 8 in Cologne alongside the Dutch parent, and state full GDPR compliance. Ownership, the contracting entity and the subprocessor chain are unstated in the captured pages, and a New York address appears on the English security page, so the chain is only partly established — no published DPA or subprocessor list with locations is captured. 5 2 4

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The Platform Engineer

Data for European customers is stated to reside in an EU data center with no transfer to the US region, hosted in ISO 27001 certified data centers, and the pages publish Speakap Germany GmbH in Cologne. We found no public information on a published data processing agreement, the subprocessor chain or ownership, and the captured pages give both a New York address on the security page and the Cologne entity on the product pages. 2 4 5

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The Skeptic

The security pages state that data sits in an EU data center for European customers with no transfer to the US site, and Speakap Germany GmbH at a Cologne address appears on the German pages — two European elements, but proven thinly. The captured pages give no data-processing agreement, no subprocessor list and no ownership information, and the English security page carries a New York address, so the chain beyond hosting is unstated. 2 4 5

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their headcount — including the retention, compliance and guest features they actually need — from public pages alone.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier per user.

5 — Per-user prices public for the main tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with per-user maths, history and storage limits, feature boundaries (retention, SSO, eDiscovery), minimum term and VAT treatment stated; self-hosted licensing priced too where offered.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given headcount and deployment choice, including guest users, storage and any per-instance licence.

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The Team Lead not rated — no public information

We read the homepage, the security and compliance pages, the internal chat pages and the integrations pages and found no public information on pricing of any kind — no per-user prices, tiers, billing periods or licence terms appear anywhere we captured. 1 2 3 6

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The Security Officer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing in the pages captured — no plan tier, per-user price, billing period or VAT treatment appears on the homepage, security or integrations pages. A buyer should expect to obtain every figure through a sales conversation. 1 2 6

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The Works Council Advocate not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing transparency: no prices, tiers, billing periods or feature boundaries appear on any of the captured pages, so an annual invoice for a given headcount cannot be computed from what is published. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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The Compliance Counsel not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing — no per-user price, tier structure, billing period or VAT treatment appears on any of the captured pages, including the homepage and the product and integrations pages; the commercial pages point to a customer success team instead. 1 3 6 7

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The Platform Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing — no per-user price, tiers, billing period or VAT treatment — on any of the captured product pages, so an annual invoice for a given headcount cannot be computed from what we read. 1 3 4 6

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The Skeptic not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing — no tiers, no per-user price, no billing period, no VAT or minimum term — on any page we read, from the homepage to the chat, security and integrations pages. An annual invoice for a given headcount cannot be computed from the captured pages. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Speakap

Is Speakap European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Speakap is based.

Where does Speakap store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 1 Oct 2026.

Does Speakap have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 1 Oct 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Speakap?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Stackfield (3.5/5), Mattermost (3.5/5) and Element (3.5/5) highest among the other 27 Business Instant Messaging products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Stackfield (EU-Made, Germany). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Speakap alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (7)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.speakap.com Checked 29 Sep 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Security / trust page — found from the homepage www.speakap.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Channels, threads & search — found from sitemap www.speakap.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Channels, threads & search — found from sitemap www.speakap.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Encryption & access control — found from sitemap www.speakap.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Integrations & extensibility — found from sitemap www.speakap.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Integrations & extensibility — found from sitemap www.speakap.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →