Business Instant Messaging
Zoho Cliq
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Zoho Corporation · cliq.zoho.com
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Zoho Cliq at a glance
- Vendor
- Zoho Corporation
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Zoho Cliq 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Zoho Cliq is a cloud business-messaging service from Zoho Corporation. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Zoho Cliq is a cloud business-messaging service from Zoho Corporation. Encryption and access leads the scoring at 5 to 7: transport and at-rest encryption are documented in unusual depth — a DEK/KEK/master key hierarchy, six-month rotation, a restricted and audited in-house key service, and bring-your-own-key through six named key managers. Integrations follow at 5-6: a marketplace gating organization-wide installs to admins, slash commands, per-action bot consent, and a model-agnostic MCP server exposing channels, threads, users and roles to AI clients. Governance and discovery sits at a flat 4 and messaging core at 4-5, held back by chat export documented only as user-data import and export — the detailed EML-in-ZIP pages cover Zoho Mail — and by no public information on message history limits or threading for humans. Sharpest warnings: deployment control at a flat 2, everything captured being a cloud service with no public information on self-hosting, and sovereignty at 1-2, where legal entity, ownership, data residency and subprocessor exposure are each listed unknown. Scoring stayed in narrow bands; plan names appear only through poll limits, with no prices public.
Speaks for it
- Encryption in transit and at rest documented in unusual depth, with a key hierarchy, six-month rotation, self-encrypting drives and bring-your-own-key through six named key managers.
- Marketplace gates organization-wide extension installs to admins while users install for their own teams, with slash commands and per-action bot consent.
- Channels categorized as organization, teams, external and personal carry permission-based controls, and unified search spans messages, users, channels and departments with search tags.
- eDiscovery, retention policies, audit logs and conversation archiving are each named on the security pages.
- A model-agnostic MCP server exposes channels, threads, users, roles and past conversations to AI clients such as Cursor, Windsurf, Claude and VS Code.
Held against it
- Deployment control scores sit at a flat 2: everything captured is a cloud service, with no public information on a self-hosted edition, source availability or federation.
- Legal entity, ownership, data residency and subprocessor exposure are each listed unknown; the only European signals are an EU support address and EU among extension regions.
- The only export documented in detail — EML files in a ZIP, up to one year — belongs to Zoho Mail, with no format or scope documented for chat conversations.
- No public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification, administrator session revocation, or what the vendor itself can read.
- No public information on threading for humans, message edit history, or any documented message history limit.
Best for
- You want cloud chat with unusually deep, published cryptography and the option to bring your own encryption keys.
- Your team builds bots and AI workflows and wants an auditable extension permission model plus a model-agnostic MCP server.
- You keep external collaboration separate from internal conversations, with external data stored in a separate space.
Avoid if
- You must hold your own archive or follow a documented exit path — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You need a named contracting entity, data residency commitments or a published subprocessor list before signing — each attribute is listed unknown.
- Your legal discovery process needs chat conversations in a documented export format — the detailed export documentation captured covers Zoho Mail.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Channels, threads & search | 2 of 5 |
| Encryption & access control | 3 of 5 |
| Retention, discovery & co-determination | 2 of 5 |
| Deployment & data custody | 1 of 5 |
| Integrations & extensibility | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1 of 5 |
Channels, threads & search
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How this is scored
The daily surface: channel model, threading, mentions, files, and whether search can find a decision made eighteen months ago.
0 — Flat group chats with no threads; search covers recent messages only, and history is capped.
3 — Channels and direct messages with basic search, but threading is awkward or absent and file handling is a plain attachment list.
5 — Public and private channels, real threads, mentions and reactions, file sharing with previews, and full-text search across the whole history.
8 — Cross-organisation or guest channels with clear boundaries, message editing history, pinned and saved items, search with filters by channel, person and date, and a documented history limit or none at all.
10 — The archive is a working knowledge base: search that ranks well across years, threads that stay readable, channel lifecycle management (archive, rename, merge) without losing history, and export of a conversation in a form a human can read.
The Team Lead
Channels come in organisation, team, external and personal categories with permission controls over who can post or add people, and unified search spans messages, users, channels and departments with tags to narrow results. The word "threads" appears only where the AI-server page lists what an agent can reach, with nothing on how threads read for a human. I found no public information on mentions, reactions, file previews, search filters by person and date, or any documented history limit, which is exactly what decides whether the archive can answer an eighteen-month-old question. 2 3 8
The Security Officer
Channels come in organization, team, external and personal varieties with permission controls, and a unified search bar covers messages, users, channels and departments, with search tags to narrow results; threads appear as first-class objects in the AI-server material. We found no public information on message edit history, pinned items, filters by person or date, or any documented history limit, so whether search still finds a decision from eighteen months ago is unverifiable from the captured pages. 2 3 8
The Works Council Advocate
Channels come in organization, teams, external and personal categories with unified search across messages, users, channels and departments, plus search tags to narrow results — a workable daily surface. We found no public information on threading, message editing history, file previews or any documented history limit, so whether a decision from eighteen months ago stays findable is not something these pages can answer. 2 3
The Compliance Counsel
Channels are categorised into organisation, team, external and personal with permission controls on every type, external collaboration keeps its data in a separate space, and the unified search reaches messages, users, channels and departments with tags to narrow results. I found no public information on threading behaviour, message edit history, pinned items or any documented history limit, and the detailed export mechanics in the captured pages belong to Zoho Mail rather than to conversations. An archive whose long-term limits are unstated is exactly what I will later be asked to produce. 2 3 7
The Platform Engineer
Channels are real and well-typed — organisation, teams, external and personal — with unified search across messages, users, channels and departments plus search tags to narrow results, and conversations archived for future reference. Threads are only confirmed in passing on the AI integration page, and I found no public information on pinned items, message-edit history, or a documented history limit. A solid daily surface, nothing that makes the archive a working knowledge base. 2 3 8
The Skeptic
Channels come in four categories with permission controls over who adds participants or sends, and search is described as unified across messages, users, channels and departments with tags to narrow results. The word "threads" appears only in the AI server's list of what an agent can access, and we found no public information on threading in the interface, mentions, reactions, file previews, message history limits, or how far back search reaches. Search is a step above basic; the rest of what makes an eighteen-month-old decision findable is untested on these pages. 2 3 8
Encryption & access control
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How this is scored
What is encrypted and against whom, plus who can reach which room. Judged on documented mechanism, since "encrypted" in this category usually means the vendor holds the keys.
0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; no role model beyond admin, guests indistinguishable from members.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest with vendor-held keys, basic roles, and guest access that mostly works.
5 — The above plus configurable roles per channel, SSO, guest accounts with scoped visibility, and a clear statement of what the vendor can read.
8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for direct messages or private rooms with the trade-offs named, device verification, session management an admin can revoke, and documented key handling.
10 — End-to-end encryption as a first-class mode — documented or open cryptography, cross-device key management that ordinary users survive, identity verification, and the vendor stating plainly what it cannot decrypt.
The Team Lead
Transport and at-rest encryption are documented in unusual depth — AES 256 with a key hierarchy, six-month rotation, restricted and audited access to the key service, bring-your-own-key through six external key managers, plus role-based access, two-factor and IP restrictions. I found no public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification or admin-revocable sessions, and no plain statement of what the vendor itself can read, so the keys sit with the provider unless a customer brings their own. 3 4 5
The Security Officer
The cryptography is unusually well documented: TLS 1.2/1.3 with forward secrecy, AES-256 at rest, an in-house key management service with a key hierarchy, six-monthly rotation, and bring-your-own-key against six external key managers, alongside channel-level permissions, two-factor authentication and IP restriction. But the keys are the vendor's to manage by default, and we found no public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification, or administrator session revocation, nor any plain statement of what the vendor cannot decrypt — the three things I weigh first. 3 4 5
The Works Council Advocate
TLS 1.2/1.3 with perfect forward secrecy, AES-256 at rest, self-encrypting drives, a documented key hierarchy with six-monthly rotation and BYOK through six named key services is a serious, well-published crypto story with the vendor holding the keys unless you bring your own. Channel-level permissions, role-based access, two-factor authentication and external collaboration stored separately cover who reaches which room. We found no public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification, admin-revocable sessions, or any plain statement of what the vendor itself can read. 3 4 5
The Compliance Counsel
Encryption in transit and at rest is documented in real depth — TLS 1.2/1.3 with forward secrecy, AES-256 per service, a DEK/KEK hierarchy under an in-house key management service with six-monthly rotation, and KMS access restricted and audited. Bring-your-own-key through external key managers hands the ultimate key control to the customer rather than the vendor, and permission-based controls across all channel types plus directory-based identity round out the model. I found no public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification, or sessions an administrator can revoke. 3 4 5
The Platform Engineer
The crypto documentation is unusually concrete: AES-256 at rest with a DEK/KEK/master hierarchy, six-monthly key rotation, a restricted and audited in-house key management service, TLS 1.2/1.3 with forward secrecy, and bring-your-own-key through Zoho Directory with named external key managers. Access control runs deep — per-channel permission settings, roles, two-factor, IP restriction, mobile device management, and external networks stored separately. I found no public information on end-to-end encryption, device verification, or a plain statement of what the vendor itself can decrypt. 3 4 5
The Skeptic
Encryption in transit and at rest is documented in unusual depth — key hierarchy, six-month rotation, self-encrypting drives, restricted and audited key-service access, and bring-your-own-key through six named external key managers — with per-channel permissions and external collaboration stored separately. The default mode has the vendor's own key service allotting each organisation its key. We found no public information on end-to-end encryption, single sign-on, device verification, or a plain statement of what the vendor can read in message content. 3 4 5
Retention, discovery & co-determination
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How this is scored
The archive as a legal object: retention policies, export for discovery, audit, and the monitoring features a works council will ask to have switched off.
0 — No retention policy, no export beyond a manual copy, no audit log, and presence or activity analytics that cannot be disabled.
3 — Manual export of some data and a global history limit, but no per-channel retention, no audit log and no admin control over analytics.
5 — Configurable retention per channel or workspace, admin export in a documented format, an audit log of administrative actions, and status or presence that a user can control.
8 — Legal-hold and eDiscovery export including edits and deletions, retention executed per policy and evidenced, full admin audit trail, and activity analytics switchable off organisation-wide.
10 — Built to pass a works agreement and a subpoena on the same day: granular retention with documented deletion, discovery export a lawyer can use, complete audit, and no individual-level productivity scoring anywhere in the product.
The Team Lead
Retention policies, eDiscovery and audit logs are each named in a single line on the security page, and archiving of conversations is claimed on the product pages. I found no public information on per-channel retention, legal hold, export of edits and deletions, or whether presence and activity analytics can be switched off. The one export that is documented — emails as EML inside a ZIP — belongs to Zoho Mail rather than Cliq conversations, so a discovery format a lawyer could use for chat is not evidenced. 3 4 7
The Security Officer
eDiscovery and retention policies, conversation archiving and audit logs are all named features, which is more than a global history cap. We found no public information on per-channel retention granularity, a documented chat export format (the EML-in-ZIP export documentation captured concerns Zoho Mail rather than the chat archive), whether discovery covers edits and deletions, or whether monitoring features and the AI's reading of past conversations can be switched off organisation-wide — the first questions a works council will ask. 3 4 7 8
The Works Council Advocate
Retention policies, eDiscovery, audit logs and conversation archiving are all named, but everything stays at headline level: we found no public information on per-channel retention, documented deletion, presence a person controls, or any organisation-wide off-switch for activity monitoring. The audit log is framed around breach investigation rather than administrative actions, and channel activity notifications plus AI monitoring of connected systems come with no documented co-determination hook. The detailed export machinery we could read belongs to Zoho Mail, while Cliq's own user data export is described without format or scope. 3 4 7 8
The Compliance Counsel
Retention policies, eDiscovery and audit logs are each asserted for audits and legal proceedings, and conversation archiving is mentioned, which clears the basic bar. But the only export mechanics documented in detail belong to Zoho Mail — EML files in a ZIP, at most a year at a time — while for chat conversations export is described only as user data import and export with no format stated; I found no public information on legal hold, on whether exports capture edits and deletions, or on switching activity analytics off organisation-wide. An archive I cannot show a lawyer in a documented format is not yet a discovery object. 3 4 7
The Platform Engineer
eDiscovery, retention policies and audit logs are all named on the security page, which is more than many clouds manage, but at marketing depth — nothing on per-channel retention, legal hold, or whether exports capture edits and deletions. Cliq's own export is described only as quickly importing or exporting user data; the detailed export documentation I found, EML files in a ZIP with PST migration, sits on the Zoho Mail help pages, a different product. I found no public information on admin control over presence or activity analytics. 3 4 7
The Skeptic
eDiscovery, retention policies, audit logs and archiving are each named on the security page, a step above the manual-copy floor. But the only export format documented in the captured pages is the mail service's — EML files in a ZIP, exportable up to one year — so we found no public information on what an export of the chat product itself contains or whether edits and deletions are captured. Retention granularity, legal hold and an organisation-wide switch for presence and activity analytics are likewise unevidenced, while the security page promotes real-time monitoring of threats, leaks and risks delivered to channels. 3 4 7
Deployment & data custody
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How this is scored
Whether the customer can hold their own archive: self-hosting, private cloud, open source, federation, and what an exit actually looks like.
0 — Cloud-only, proprietary, with export limited to a partial archive.
3 — Cloud-only, but with a documented full export in an open-ish format.
5 — A private-cloud or dedicated-instance option, or a self-hosted edition that lags the cloud significantly; full export documented.
8 — A genuine self-hosted edition close to feature parity, or open-source core with a documented upgrade path, plus complete export including files and metadata.
10 — Custody is the customer's: open-source or source-available server, self-hosting supported as a first-class deployment, open protocol or federation, and a migration path in and out that the vendor documents rather than resists.
The Team Lead
Everything captured describes a cloud service — an admin panel, an Active Directory sync tool, extensions offered across regions — and I found no public information on a self-hosted edition, a private instance or open-source code. Import and export of Cliq user data is claimed but without a documented format or scope. The documented ZIP-of-EML export covers mail rather than chat history, so an exit path for the actual archive is not evidenced. 3 7 9
The Security Officer
This is a cloud service: we found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated instance, an open-source edition or federation, and the only on-premises artefact captured is a directory-sync installer. User data import and export is confirmed as a capability, but no format or coverage is documented for the chat archive itself, so an exit path cannot be assessed; bring-your-own-key moves key custody, not data custody. 3 5 9
The Works Council Advocate
Everything captured is a cloud service — a Windows directory-sync tool for Active Directory and an MCP server for AI clients — and we found no public information on self-hosting, a dedicated-instance option, open source or federation for Cliq. A generic user data import/export statement exists, but its format, completeness and migration path are undocumented, so custody of the archive stays with the vendor as far as these pages show. 3 8 9
The Compliance Counsel
The captured pages show a cloud service whose only documented on-premise component is an Active Directory sync tool; I found no public information on a self-hosted edition, an open-source core, or federation. For exit, the fully documented export path belongs to Zoho Mail, and for Cliq itself only user data import and export is asserted with no format, scope or metadata coverage stated — a custody question I cannot answer from public material. 3 7 9
The Platform Engineer
This is a rented platform: cloud-only and proprietary, and I found no public information on self-hosting, federation or an open-source core — the nearest things are an on-premises Active Directory sync client and an MCP server that opens channels, threads and past conversations to AI clients. Custody of the archive stays with the vendor, and the export path for chat history is undocumented; the only detailed export pages cover Zoho Mail. For a buyer who wants to hold their own archive, that is the whole question. 3 8 9
The Skeptic
The captured pages describe a multi-region cloud — the Poll extension lists US, IN, EU, AU and CN, and the support address sits at eu.zohocliq.com — and we found no public information on a self-hosted edition, source availability, or federation. The closest on-premises artefact is a Windows installer for the directory-sync tool, which synchronises Active Directory rather than hosting anything. Import and export of user data is claimed available, but with no documented format or completeness for the chat product, an exit is a claim rather than a path. 3 7 9 10
Integrations & extensibility
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How this is scored
Bots, webhooks, app framework, identity — whether the chat becomes the place work is noticed, and whether that is buildable without a partner agreement.
0 — No API, no webhooks, no bots.
3 — Incoming webhooks and a handful of native integrations; no bot framework, no documented limits.
5 — Documented REST API, incoming and outgoing webhooks, slash commands, a bot account model, and SSO.
8 — A proper app framework with interactive components, event subscriptions with retries, SCIM provisioning, documented rate limits and a sandbox.
10 — A platform: versioned API with a deprecation policy, an app directory or plugin system with permissions a customer can audit, and integrations the vendor maintains rather than lists.
The Team Lead
There is a genuine platform here: over fifty integrations and flexible APIs are claimed, two fully documented bots with slash commands, widgets, install scoping between organisation and team, per-action consent prompts, and a model-agnostic MCP server exposing channels, threads and roles to external clients. I found no public information on webhooks, SCIM provisioning, documented rate limits or a sandbox, so the extensibility story rests on vendor-built extensions rather than something a customer can audit and build on independently. 3 8 10 11
The Security Officer
More than fifty integrations, a marketplace where organization-wide installs are admin-gated while team installs are user-level, slash commands, a bot consent flow and vendor-built bots show a genuine platform, and the model-agnostic AI server with throttling named points at real extensibility. We found no public information on a documented REST API surface, outgoing webhooks, SCIM provisioning, event-subscription retries, sandboxing or concrete rate limits, which is where the platform story stays unverified. 3 8 10 11
The Works Council Advocate
Over fifty integrations with flexible APIs, slash commands, bots with widgets and consent flows, a marketplace where only org admins can install organisation-wide while users install for their team, rate limiting, and a model-agnostic MCP server exposing channels, threads, users and roles to AI clients — that is a real buildable platform with permission boundaries we can accept. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, event subscriptions with retries or documented rate-limit figures, which is what keeps it out of the top band. 3 8 10 11
The Compliance Counsel
A marketplace where organisation-wide installs are admin-only while team installs are open to users, slash commands, bots with an explicit consent flow, more than fifty integrations with flexible APIs, and directory-based identity sync give a genuine platform surface. I found no public information on documented rate limits beyond a passing mention of throttling, on event subscriptions with retries, on SCIM provisioning, or on a sandbox. 3 8 10 11
The Platform Engineer
There is a real extension platform here: a marketplace with installs scoped to the organisation or to specific teams, organisation-wide installs restricted to org admins, slash commands, and bots whose permissions a user consents to per action — exactly the auditable permission model I look for in a plugin system. The MCP server is a genuinely model-agnostic bridge layered over the data, with throttling noted. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, webhooks, a sandbox, or an API deprecation policy. 3 8 10 11
The Skeptic
Bots are real here: a marketplace where admins install for the whole organisation and users for their team, slash commands, and a per-action consent popup before a bot acts; over fifty integrations with flexible APIs are claimed. The vendor maintains its own model-agnostic MCP server exposing channels, threads, users and roles to AI clients. We found no public information on webhooks, single sign-on, or documented API rate limits and a sandbox in the captured pages. 3 8 10 11
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where the archive and its metadata live, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors touch it. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated or non-EU, subprocessors unnamed.
3 — EU data residency offered for message content while metadata, search indexes or support tooling remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.
5 — EU hosting as standard and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — notifications, AI features, analytics — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, full subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: vendor, entity, hosting and every subprocessor European, certification published, and a self-hosted option that removes the question.
The Team Lead
Legal entity, ownership, data residency and subprocessor exposure are all listed as unknown, and I found no public information on where the archive and its search index live or under which contracting entity. The only European signal is an EU support address and EU appearing among extension regions, which is a long way from named infrastructure or a published subprocessor list. 3 8 11
The Security Officer
Every sovereignty attribute — legal entity, ownership, data residency, subprocessor exposure — came back unknown: an EU-flavoured support address and an EU entry alongside US, IN, AU and CN regions hint at an EU option, but we found no public information on an EU contracting entity, hosting guarantees or a published subprocessor list. The privacy stance is real but narrow — first-party analytics tools and no ad monetization say nothing about where the archive and its metadata live. 3 6 10 11
The Works Council Advocate
The contracting entity, ownership, hosting location and subprocessors are all unknown from what was captured, and the only European signals are an EU support address and EU listed among available regions alongside the US, India, China and others. We found no public information on a published subprocessor list, hosting infrastructure or certification, so for a log of who spoke to whom at what hour, the data-protection conversation cannot even start from public material. 3 8 10
The Compliance Counsel
An EU support address and EU among the regions listed for bots hint that European processing exists somewhere in the offering, but nothing is named. I found no public information on the contracting entity, on where hosting and metadata sit, or on any subprocessor — the three things a court will ask me first. 3 8 11
The Platform Engineer
The captured pages hint at Europe — an EU support address and extensions listed as available in an EU region — but I found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where the archive and its metadata reside by default, or the subprocessors involved. For a buyer who wants the sovereignty question answered in writing rather than inferred from a support email, this is an open sales conversation, not a documented posture. 3 10 11
The Skeptic
The independently collected attributes come back unstated on legal entity, ownership, data residency and subprocessors. The only European signals in the captures are an EU support address and EU appearing in the extension region lists — a hosting region, not a contracting entity or a subprocessor list. The captured compliance page documents only first-party tracking tools, and we found no public information on certifications. 3 6 8 10
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their headcount — including the retention, compliance and guest features they actually need — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A per-user headline exists, but the tier where retention control, SSO or compliance export begins is unstated.
5 — Per-user prices public with billing period stated, but at least one commonly needed capability (unlimited history, SSO, eDiscovery) sits in an unpriced enterprise tier.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with per-user maths, history and storage limits, feature boundaries, minimum term and VAT treatment stated; self-hosted licensing priced too where offered.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given headcount and deployment choice, including guest users, storage and any per-instance licence.
The Team Lead
I found no public prices at all — no per-user figure, no billing period, no indication of which tier carries retention control, single sign-on or compliance export. The only tier information anywhere is poll-count limits naming Free, Standard, Professional and Enterprise plans, which tells me the tiers exist but not what any of them costs, so the annual invoice is a sales conversation. 10
The Security Officer
We found no public information on pricing in the captured pages — no per-user figures, billing period, VAT treatment or feature boundaries; only the plan names Free, Standard, Professional and Enterprise surface indirectly through poll limits. An annual invoice for a given headcount is not computable from anything captured. 10
The Works Council Advocate
The only plan information visible anywhere is the names Free, Standard, Professional and Enterprise, differing in poll-count limits — we found no public prices at all, no per-user figure, no billing period, and no statement of where retention, eDiscovery or compliance export begin. An annual invoice for a given headcount is not computable from these pages. 10
The Compliance Counsel
Plan tier names — Free, Standard, Professional, Enterprise — surface only through poll and vote limits; beyond that I found no public prices, billing periods, storage or history limits, and no statement of which tier carries retention and eDiscovery. Nothing in the captured pages lets a buyer compute an annual invoice for a given headcount. 10
The Platform Engineer
Plan names surface incidentally — Free, Standard, Professional and Enterprise, with a 99.9% uptime guarantee plus priority support and dedicated success resources named for the top tier — but I found no public prices, no per-user maths, no history or storage limits, and no statement of where retention, single sign-on or compliance export begin. An annual invoice is not computable from these pages; every real tier boundary is a conversation with sales. 8 10
The Skeptic
Four plan names surface only through a Poll extension limit — 1,000 polls and poll votes on Free and Standard against 10,000 on Professional and Enterprise — with no prices, billing period, VAT treatment or feature boundaries anywhere in the captures. We found no public information on per-user pricing or on which tier single sign-on, retention control or compliance export begins. A buyer cannot begin to compute an invoice from these pages. 8 10
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Zoho Cliq
Is Zoho Cliq European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Zoho Cliq is based.
Where does Zoho Cliq store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does Zoho Cliq have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Zoho Cliq?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Element (3.5/5), Mattermost (3.5/5) and Stackfield (3/5) highest among the other 19 Business Instant Messaging products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Element (UK / wider Europe). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Zoho Cliq alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 4 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 legal fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (11)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page cliq.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Channels, threads & search — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Channels, threads & search — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Encryption & access control — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption & access control — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Retention, discovery & co-determination — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Retention, discovery & co-determination — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Deployment & data custody — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Deployment & data custody — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Integrations & extensibility — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 Integrations & extensibility — found from sitemap www.zoho.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →