Keeper
Rest of world Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Keeper Security, Inc. · www.keepersecurity.com
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Keeper at a glance
- Vendor
- Keeper Security, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in the United States source, captured 16 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Keeper 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Keeper is an end-to-end encrypted password manager from Keeper Security, Inc. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 1 Oct 2026 to 16 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 17 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Keeper is an end-to-end encrypted password manager from Keeper Security, Inc. of Chicago; the terms also name Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Cork. Strongest is identity integration at 8–9, crediting SAML 2.0, SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning, FIDO2 hardware keys and a published SSO unlock model in which a device ECC-256 key decrypts the data key after identity-provider login. Sharing and access control follows at 7–8, with over eighty permissions across fourteen categories and offboarding under zero knowledge. Security architecture and audit and policy sit at 7 — AES-256, RSA-2048 and FIPS 140-3 validated modules named, but we found no public information on dated audit reports or reviewable client source. Deployment and portability scored 6, self-hosting reduced to an undescribed “Self-Managed Keeper” footer entry. Weakest are sovereignty and pricing transparency at 4: a US principal entity, transfers resting primarily on the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, and prices for one tier only — Keeper Business at 48 EUR annually and 400 EUR monthly. No criterion spread more than one point; higher marks accompanied judges whose scenarios those sharing and SSO pages directly serve.
Speaks for it
- Publishes the SSO unlock key model — a device ECC-256 private key decrypts the data key after identity-provider login — alongside SAML 2.0, SCIM provisioning with automated deprovisioning and FIDO2 hardware keys
- Names its cryptography concretely: AES-256 and RSA-2048 in FIPS 140-3 validated modules, PBKDF2 at 1,000,000 iterations, client-side encryption of URLs, attachments, payment data and custom fields
- Documents sharing governance end to end, from time-limited and self-destructing shares to offboarding that locks a leaver's vault and transfers ownership under zero knowledge
- Audit logs cover authentication, credential access, sharing and administrative changes, exportable as PDF, JSON or CSV and mapped to ISO 27001 controls A.5.3 through A.8.24
- Offers a customer-selected AWS region including an EU region with isolation at rest and in transit, plus encrypted offline access without internet or identity provider
Held against it
- Sovereignty scored 4: contracting rests on US-based Keeper Security, Inc. with transfers primarily under the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list or data processing agreement
- Pricing transparency scored 4, with public figures for one tier only — Keeper Business at 48 EUR annual and 400 EUR monthly — and we found no public information on seat minimums, add-on prices, self-hosted licensing, minimum terms or VAT treatment
- Audits and tests are named — SOC 2, annually audited ISO 27001, NCC Group, CyberTest — but we found no public information on published report dates, incident history or reviewable client source code
- Self-hosting appears only as an undescribed “Self-Managed Keeper” footer entry, with the SSO connector and secrets gateway the only components documented on customer infrastructure
- SIEM integration is stated without named destinations, and we found no public information on log retention periods or emergency access with a waiting period
Best for
- You run Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace or another SAML 2.0 identity provider and want SCIM provisioning with automated deprovisioning behind a documented SSO unlock model
- Your team needs governed sharing: delegated administrators scoped to a department, request-based access instead of standing privilege, and offboarding that transfers vault ownership under zero knowledge
- You answer ISO 27001 or SOC 2 audits and need an exportable audit trail mapped to ISO 27001 controls A.5.3 through A.8.24
- Your users need encrypted offline vault access that works without internet or the identity provider, with admin-controlled durations
Avoid if
- Your procurement requires a European contracting and transfer chain — the principal entity is US-based and transfers rest primarily on EU-US Data Privacy Framework self-certification
- You must compute your real annual cost from public pages before a demo — figures exist for Keeper Business only, and we found no public information on Enterprise pricing, seat minimums, add-on prices or VAT treatment
- Your security review requires dated penetration-test reports or reviewable client source code — the pages name NCC Group, CyberTest, SOC 2 and ISO 27001, and we found no public information on report dates
- You need the vault itself running on your own infrastructure — only the SSO connector and a secrets-management gateway are documented as self-hosted, while “Self-Managed Keeper” appears as an undescribed footer entry
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 3.5 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 4 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 2 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security page names the algorithms (AES-256, RSA-2048, FIPS 140-3 validated modules), the key derivation (PBKDF2 with 1,000,000 iterations) and states that record contents including URLs and custom fields are encrypted on the client device — exactly the field-level statement I ask a vault vendor for. Penetration testers are named (NCC Group, CyberTest) and a Bugcrowd-managed bug bounty with a public vulnerability disclosure program is documented, with ISO 27001 audited annually by accredited third-party assessors. We found no public information on published audit reports with dates, a documented incident history, or reviewable open-source clients. 5 6 12 5
The Identity Engineer
The security pages name the algorithms (AES-256 GCM, RSA-2048), the key derivation (PBKDF2 with 1,000,000 iterations) and list what is encrypted inside a record down to URLs and custom fields, with the vendor stating it can never access vault contents; FIPS 140-3 validated modules, annual ISO 27001 audits, penetration tests by named firms including NCC Group and a Bugcrowd bug bounty are documented. The captured pages do not show which metadata stays unencrypted, published test reports with dates, incident history, or reviewable client source, which holds this below the top level. 3 5 6 12 5
The Compliance Auditor
The security pages name the algorithms (AES-256 GCM, RSA-2048, Elliptic Curve with ECC-256 keys), the master-password key derivation (PBKDF2 at 1,000,000 iterations), and state that record-level keys generated on the client encrypt logins, file attachments, TOTP codes, payment information, URLs and custom fields, with FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic modules. Independent validation is named and recurring — NCC Group and CyberTest penetration tests, a Bugcrowd bug bounty with public vulnerability disclosure, ISO 27001 audited annually and SOC 2 certification. We found no public information on published penetration-test reports or dates, past security incidents, or reviewable client source code. 3 5 6 12 5
The SME Owner
The security pages spell out AES-256 with PBKDF2 at 1,000,000 iterations, record and folder keys generated on the device, and a stated list of encrypted fields that includes URLs and attachments, plus FIPS 140-3 validated crypto, ISO 27001 audited annually, named outside testers like NCC Group and CyberTest, and a Bugcrowd bounty. We found no public information on published test report dates, past incident disclosures, or reviewable client source code, which is what keeps me from going higher. 5 6 12 5
The DevOps Engineer
The security page names the algorithms (AES-256, RSA-2048, elliptic curve), the master-password key derivation (PBKDF2 with one million iterations) and which record contents are encrypted down to URLs, attachments and TOTP codes, backed by FIPS 140-3 validated modules, named external testers (NCC Group, CyberTest) engaged periodically, a Bugcrowd-run bounty and annual accredited ISO 27001 audits. The captured pages give me no dated penetration-test reports, no incident history and no open-source client code I could read before trusting the cryptography, and as someone who audits before deploying, that caps the score. 5 6 12 5
The Skeptic
The security pages go deeper than most: AES-256 and RSA-2048 with FIPS 140-3 validated modules, one-million-iteration PBKDF2 derivation, a transmission-key hierarchy, and a field-by-field statement that URLs, attachments, payment data and custom fields are all encrypted client-side. But the audits are named, not shown — SOC 2, annually audited ISO 27001, FedRAMP High, and NCC Group and CyberTest penetration tests all appear without a dated report or summary on the captured pages — and we found no public information on past security incidents or on reviewable client source code. 5 6 12 5 3
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Sharing is governed properly: persistent, time-limited and self-destructing shares, one-time shares to people without an account where the server never sees the access token, over eighty permissions across fourteen categories, delegated administrators per node, and offboarding that locks the leaver's vault and transfers ownership while maintaining zero knowledge. Recovery is documented with a 24-word BIP39 phrase that enterprises can disable at role level, plus workflow-based access requests that cut standing privilege. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding a password while still allowing autofill. 5 7 8 5
The Identity Engineer
Offboarding is documented the way I run leavers: lock the vault, transfer ownership, role policies govern who may transfer, and zero knowledge is maintained. Time-limited and self-destructing shares, one-time links to people without an account where the server never sees the token, delegated administrators scoped to a node, a request-based workflow for eligible teams and most-restrictive policy for multi-role users cover the governance I demand. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding a password while still allowing autofill. 6 7 8 10 8 5
The Compliance Auditor
Persistent, time-limited and self-destructing sharing plus one-time shares to non-Keeper users — where the access token stays in the URL fragment and never reaches Keeper's servers — are documented alongside delegated node administrators confined to one region or department, approval workflows and eligible-team access, and offboarding that locks the leaver's vault and transfers ownership under zero knowledge. Recovery is documented with its key model (24-word BIP39 phrase, two-factor and email verification, admin-disable at role level), and over eighty permissions across fourteen categories apply the most restrictive policy by default. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding the password while permitting autofill. 5 6 7 8 8 5
The SME Owner
This is exactly what I'm shopping for: shared folders with persistent, time-limited and self-destructing shares, one-time links to people without a Keeper account, over eighty granular permissions across fourteen categories, delegated admins per department, and request-based access with approvals. When someone forgets the master password there is a 24-word recovery phrase that admins can disable, and when someone leaves the documented process locks their vault and transfers ownership while maintaining zero knowledge. I found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding a password behind autofill. 5 7 8 8
The DevOps Engineer
Sharing governance is documented end to end: persistent, time-limited and self-destructing shares, one-time links to people without a Keeper account whose token never reaches Keeper's servers, over eighty permissions across fourteen categories, share administrators, delegated node administrators, workflow-based access requests and an offboarding that locks the leaver's vault and transfers ownership while preserving zero-knowledge. Recovery is documented with a 24-word BIP39 phrase behind 2FA and email verification, administratively disableable by role; we found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding a password while still allowing autofill. 6 7 8 5
The Skeptic
Offboarding is documented with its key model and the statement that zero knowledge is maintained through ownership transfer, sharing runs from persistent folders to time-limited and self-destructing links usable by people without an account, and delegated administrators, Share Administrators and approval workflows are all described. Recovery rests on a 24-word phrase with 2FA and email verification that administrators can disable — a sane design — but we found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period, and the count of over eighty permissions is given while the individual permissions are not listed on the captured pages. 7 8 5 8 6
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SSO works over SAML 2.0 with named providers (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace and many more), and the unlock's key model is published: a local ECC-256 private key decrypts the data key after successful identity-provider authentication, under US patents the vendor holds for SSO in a zero-knowledge vault. SCIM provisioning with automated deprovisioning, identity-provider group mapping, conditional access support, FIDO2 hardware keys, and passkeys stored, autofilled and shared across platforms are all documented, including passwordless biometric unlock of the vault itself. We found no public information on an independent review of the SSO key model or on deprovisioning revoking access immediately with a log entry. 9 10 12 5
The Identity Engineer
This is the stack I run: SAML 2.0 with Entra ID named, SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning with automated deprovisioning, IdP group mapping onto teams and roles, and compatibility with Entra conditional access. The SSO unlock key model is actually documented — a local ECC-256 private key decrypts the user's data key after identity-provider authentication, designed so the vendor cannot derive it — and FIDO2 WebAuthn hardware keys, passkeys stored in the vault and biometric passkey login to Keeper itself are all evidenced. What keeps it from the top is that no independent review of that key model and no stated immediate revocation with a log entry on deprovisioning appear on the captured pages. 6 9 10 12 9 5
The Compliance Auditor
SSO over SAML 2.0 with named providers (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, AD FS and others), SCIM provisioning with automated deprovisioning, an Active Directory/LDAP bridge, identity-provider group mapping, conditional-access compatibility and FIDO2 hardware keys are all documented. The SSO unlock key model is published — the device-encrypted data key is released only after identity-provider authentication and decrypted with a local ECC-256 private key, which the vendor cannot derive — including a self-hosted SSO Connect deployment on Windows or Linux. Passkeys are stored, autofilled and shared across platforms, and biometric passkey login can replace both master password and SSO. 6 9 10 12 9 5
The SME Owner
SSO covers Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace and any SAML 2.0 provider, and the pages actually document the unlock key model — a device-held ECC-256 private key releases the data key after identity-provider login so Keeper cannot derive it — with SCIM and an AD/LDAP bridge for joiners and leavers, FIDO2 hardware keys, and passkeys with biometric login. My one grumble as a small buyer: SSO Connect is marked as included with the Enterprise offering, not the Business one. 9 10 9 5
The DevOps Engineer
The SSO unlock is documented at the key level — the data key is decrypted locally with the device's ECC-256 private key only after the identity provider authenticates the user — with SAML 2.0 across named providers (Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace, AD FS and more), SCIM provisioning with automated deprovisioning, IdP group mapping into teams and roles, conditional-access compatibility, FIDO2 hardware keys and passkeys stored and autofilled across platforms. SSO Connect On-Prem runs self-hosted on Windows or Linux with load balancing and HSM support, which is the shape I want in my own data centre; we found no public information on independent review of the SSO key model or a logged immediate revocation on deprovisioning. 6 9 12 9 5
The Skeptic
SSO works with any SAML 2.0 provider and the unlock key model is spelled out — a device ECC-256 private key decrypts the data key after identity-provider authentication, with SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning, directory-group mapping into teams and roles, and conditional access on top. MFA includes FIDO2 hardware keys and passkeys are stored, autofilled, shared and usable to log into Keeper itself; the key model, however, is the vendor's own description, and we found no public information on an independent review of it. 9 5 9 10 6
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
The admin console logs authentication events, credential access, sharing actions and administrative changes, with reports covering password strength, reuse and hygiene plus access permissions, exportable as PDF, JSON or CSV and schedulable through the command-line tool; roles enforce two-factor authentication, platform and vault restrictions, sharing and export rules, with the most restrictive policy applied when a user holds several roles. KeeperAI flags anomalous session activity, and the audit trail is mapped to ISO 27001 controls with SOC 2, HIPAA and NIST 800-53 named. We found no public information on a stated log retention period or on native integration with named SIEM targets such as Splunk or Sentinel. 11 12 8
The Identity Engineer
Every role assignment, policy change and vault action is logged and reportable, with logs covering authentication, credential access, sharing and administrative changes, exportable as PDF, JSON or CSV and integrable with SIEM platforms. Password health reporting, access-permission compliance reports with filters, ISO 27001-aligned control mappings and anomaly flagging are documented. The captured pages name no specific SIEM targets, state no log retention period and show no browser-extension policy, which holds this below the higher level. 8 11 12 8 12
The Compliance Auditor
Every role assignment, policy change and vault action is logged and reportable, with detailed audit logs for authentication events, credential access, sharing actions and administrative changes; reports export as PDF, JSON or CSV, can be scheduled through the Commander CLI, and KeeperAI flags anomalous session activity for review. Roles enforce two-factor, platform and vault restrictions, sharing and export rules, and a dedicated ISO 27001 page maps controls A.5.3 through A.8.24, which is directly usable in my audits. What holds this back: audit logs can be 'exported or integrated with SIEM platforms' but no named SIEM target is given, and we found no public information on log retention or on logging of copies and autofills. 8 11 12 8 12
The SME Owner
Every role assignment, policy change and vault action is logged and reportable, reports export to PDF, JSON or CSV with SIEM integration, and there is a password-strength and reuse security audit plus compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, SOC 2, HIPAA and NIST 800-53, with anomalous-activity flagging. I found no public information on log retention periods, named SIEM targets, or browser-extension policies, so I cannot place this higher. 8 11 12 8
The DevOps Engineer
Audit logs cover authentication, credential access, sharing and administrative changes, with every role assignment and policy change logged and reportable, exports to PDF, JSON or CSV, compliance reports scriptable and scheduled through the Commander CLI, SIEM integration, anomaly flagging by KeeperAI and an audit trail mapped to SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA and NIST 800-53. Roles enforce MFA, platform and vault restrictions and sharing and export rules; the captured pages give no named SIEM targets, no stated log retention period and no NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz mapping. 11 12 8 12
The Skeptic
The audit trail is described as covering authentication, credential access, sharing and administrative changes, with exports to PDF, JSON and CSV, a command-line tool to schedule recurring reports, KeeperAI flagging anomalous activity, and mapping to ISO 27001 controls. SIEM integration is claimed generically without a named destination, and we found no public information on log retention, tamper-evidence, or a stated master-password policy. 12 11 12 8
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, the major browsers and mobile platforms; offline access is documented in depth with an encrypted local copy, admin-controlled durations and sync on reconnect; and hosting runs on AWS in a customer-selected region including an EU region with isolation at rest and in transit. Export is confirmed with the vendor stating it cannot decrypt the data for you, and a footer menu lists a Self-Managed Keeper product alongside self-hosted components like SSO Connect On-Prem, but the captured pages do not describe the Self-Managed product further. We found no public information on a full-fidelity encrypted export including attachments, on import from named competitors, or on a status page with incident history beyond a footer link. 3 6 14 1 13
The Identity Engineer
An EU region on AWS is selectable with isolation at rest and in transit, Linux is among the desktop clients, and offline mode is documented in depth — encrypted local copy, admin-controlled durations, access without internet or identity provider — so the vault stays usable when the service or the IdP is unreachable. Export exists and the vendor states it cannot decrypt the data, but the pages do not document export fidelity across item types and attachments or import from named competitors, and self-managed deployment appears in the footer menu without further description alongside the self-hosted SSO Connect component. 3 6 14 1 13 5
The Compliance Auditor
Customers select their AWS region (US, US GovCloud, EU, Australia, Canada, Japan) with isolation at rest and in transit, clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, the major browsers and mobile, and a well-documented offline mode (master password or biometric unlock, admin-controlled durations and session expiry, sync on reconnect) keeps the vault usable without internet or identity provider. A self-hosted SSO Connect on Windows or Linux and a secrets-management gateway installed in the customer's environment are documented, but a footer item named 'Self-Managed Keeper' is not explained on the captured pages. We found no public information on an encrypted full-fidelity export covering attachments, an import path from named competitors, or a status page with incident history beyond a footer link. 3 6 14 1 13 5
The SME Owner
There is an EU AWS region customers can select with isolation at rest and in transit, clients for Windows, Mac, Linux, the mobile platforms and five browsers, and a well-documented encrypted offline mode with admin-controlled durations. Export exists — Keeper states it cannot decrypt your data for you — but the pages do not document export completeness or import from other tools, and self-hosting appears only as an undescribed "Self-Managed Keeper" menu item. 3 6 14 1 13
The DevOps Engineer
Offline mode is thoroughly documented — vault access without internet or identity provider, master-password or biometric unlock, admin-controlled durations and per-role toggles, auto-sync on reconnect — and clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, five browsers, mobile and a CLI, with a selectable, isolated AWS EU region. My core question, where the vault itself runs, is left thin: Self-Managed Keeper appears only as an unexplained menu entry, only the SSO connector and the Secrets Manager gateway are documented as running on customer infrastructure, and while export is confirmed with Keeper unable to decrypt the data, we found no public information on export fidelity, attachments in export or import from other products. 3 6 14 1 13
The Skeptic
Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, the five major browsers and mobile, offline access is encrypted, admin-controlled per role and survives loss of both network and identity provider, and an EU AWS region is selectable with isolation at rest and in transit. The self-hosting story on the captured pages is a footer entry named "Self-Managed Keeper" with no further description, export is confirmed but its format and completeness are not, and we found no public information on a status page with incident history or an encrypted full-fidelity export covering attachments. 13 14 6 3 1
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The terms name a US parent in Chicago with regional entities for Europe (Keeper Security EMEA Limited, Cork) and Japan, each with its own governing law; hosting is on AWS in a customer-selected region including an EU region, with EU-US Data Privacy Framework certification and standard contractual clauses as fallback for transfers, and the Irish Data Protection Commission named as supervisory authority. Subprocessor agreements with vendors are stated to exist. We found no public information on a published data processing agreement, a subprocessor list with locations, or data residency beyond the selectable region. 3 4 6
The Identity Engineer
European elements are proven — a selectable EU hosting region on AWS and a contracting entity in Cork, Ireland with Irish governing law for that entity — but the vendor is Keeper Security, Inc. of Chicago and the privacy pages rely on the EU-US Data Privacy Framework as the primary mechanism for transfers out of the EEA. We found no public information on a customer data processing agreement or a subprocessor list with locations, so most of the chain is unstated rather than European. 3 4 6 5
The Compliance Auditor
The vendor is US-based (Keeper Security, Inc., Chicago, Delaware governing law) and the terms also list Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Cork with Irish governing law for Europe, though the captured pages do not state which entity contracts for business customers. An EU AWS region is customer-selectable with isolation at rest and in transit, and Keeper acts as processor for business customers, relying on Standard Contractual Clauses and DPF certifications as transfer mechanisms. We found no published subprocessor list, no DPA on the captured pages, and no public information on the support, analytics or client-update chain. 3 4 6 5
The SME Owner
The contracting company is Keeper Security, Inc. of Chicago, though the terms also name Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Cork with Irish law for Europe, and an EU AWS region is selectable. There is EU-US Data Privacy Framework certification with the Irish Data Protection Commission as supervisory authority, but we found no public information on a DPA or a published subprocessor list with locations, so the chain stays partly American. 3 4 6
The DevOps Engineer
Two European elements are proven — a selectable AWS EU region isolated at rest and in transit, and a named European contracting entity (Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Cork, Irish governing law, Irish Data Protection Commission as supervisory authority) — but the principal entity is US-based in Chicago and cross-border transfers rest on EU-US DPF certification and standard contractual clauses. We found no public information on a published subprocessor list or a data processing agreement covering metadata and logs. 3 4 6
The Skeptic
The contracting chain is American — Keeper Security, Inc. of Chicago under Delaware law — though the terms also name Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Cork under Irish law, and an EU AWS region can be selected per customer. Transfers to the US rest primarily on self-certified EU-US Data Privacy Framework participation, and we found no published subprocessor list with locations and no public information on a data processing agreement; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but the chain around it remains largely American. 4 6 3 5
Pricing transparency
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The pricing page publishes figures of 48 EUR for the Keeper Business annual subscription and 400 EUR for the Keeper Business monthly subscription in its pricing data, and a 14-day free trial is offered. A few tier boundaries appear — SSO Connect is included with Keeper Enterprise and offline-mode administration belongs to the business and enterprise plans — but the captured pages leave the rest of the cost uncomputable. We found no public information on the per-user basis, seat minimums, add-on prices such as the reporting module, self-hosted licensing, minimum terms or VAT treatment. 9 14 2
The Identity Engineer
The business tier carries public figures of 48 EUR for the annual subscription offer and 400 EUR for the monthly subscription offer, with the billing period stated and SSO Connect marked as included with Keeper Enterprise. The captured pricing pages do not list per-tier feature sets, seat minimums, add-on prices or VAT treatment, so an annual invoice for two thousand users is not computable from them. 2 9 2
The Compliance Auditor
The pricing page exposes one tier publicly — Keeper Business — as a monthly subscription at 400 EUR and an annual subscription at 48 EUR (low price 48, high price 400, currency EUR), with a 14-day free trial, and SSO Connect is noted as included with Keeper Enterprise, which itself carries no public price in the captures. We found no public information on seat minimums, add-on prices, self-hosted licensing, VAT treatment or minimum term. 8 9 2
The SME Owner
The pricing page's structured data shows Keeper Business at 48 EUR on the annual subscription and 400 EUR on the monthly, with a 14-day free trial, which is a start. But SSO Connect is flagged as included with Keeper Enterprise, and the captured pages show no price for that tier, no seat minimums and no add-on or term details, so I cannot compute my real annual cost from the public pages alone. 1 9 2
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pricing page publishes figures for one tier only: Keeper Business at 48 EUR on the annual subscription and 400 EUR on the monthly subscription, plus a 14-day free trial and a demo path. The Enterprise tier is annotated only as including SSO Connect with no price of its own, and we found no public information on seat minimums, a per-user basis, add-on prices, VAT treatment or minimum terms, so a real annual invoice is not computable from these pages. 9 9 2
The Skeptic
The captured pricing page carries structured prices for the Keeper Business tier of "48" EUR on an annual basis and "400" EUR on a monthly basis, plus a 14-day free trial, and the SSO Connect page states it is included with Keeper Enterprise. We found no public information on seat minimums, add-on prices, self-hosted licensing, minimum term or VAT treatment, and no tier-to-feature mapping beyond that single inclusion. 2 9 1
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity |
Incorporated in US
unverified
Why unverified?The terms list regional entities alongside it (Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Ireland for Europe, Keeper Security APAC KK in Japan); no excerpt explicitly designates Keeper Security, Inc. as the parent of those entities. |
0/2 pts | 4 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location |
Not determined
unverified
Why unverified?Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured. |
— | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
EU region selectable
unverified
Why unverified?The region is an AWS region operated by Keeper ("fully-managed SaaS platform"), and the footer menu lists an undescribed "Self-Managed Keeper" product, which the excerpts do not explain as a self-hosting option. |
1/1 pts | 6 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Keeper
Is Keeper European?
No. whats-best.ai classifies Keeper as Rest of world. Its vendor, Keeper Security, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 16 Nov 2026.
Where does Keeper store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026.
Does Keeper have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Keeper?
As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Keeper alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 1 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The terms list regional entities alongside it (Keeper Security EMEA Limited in Ireland for Europe, Keeper Security APAC KK in Japan); no excerpt explicitly designates Keeper Security, Inc. as the parent of those entities.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. The region is an AWS region operated by Keeper ("fully-managed SaaS platform"), and the footer menu lists an undescribed "Self-Managed Keeper" product, which the excerpts do not explain as a self-hosting option.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 48 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 21 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 13 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- The pricing here was last read more than 30 days ago. Vendors change prices without notice; the capture date is shown with every figure. Know more? Tell us
Sources (14)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 2 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 2 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 14 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →