Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Keeper Security, Inc. · www.keepersecurity.com

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Keeper at a glance

Vendor
Keeper Security, Inc.
Headquarters
Incorporated in the United States source, captured 16 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Keeper 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Keeper is an end-to-end encrypted password manager from Keeper Security, Inc. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 1 Oct 2026 to 16 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 17 Nov 2026. all sources

Keeper alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The Identity Engineer

Weighted verdict

Runs Entra ID for two thousand staff and owns the joiner-mover-leaver process. Wants SCIM that suspends a leaver's vault the moment the account is disabled, an SSO unlock whose key model is documented, and FIDO2 keys and passkeys supported for the vault itself.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The Identity Engineer

Panel median The Identity Engineer This judge’s scores over the panel median. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median The Identity Engineer
Encryption model & independent audits 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Sharing, roles & recovery 3.5 of 5 4 of 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning 4 of 5 4.5 of 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export 3 of 5 3 of 5
European sovereignty 2 of 5 2 of 5
Pricing transparency 2 of 5 2 of 5

Encryption model & independent audits

How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.

3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.

5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.

8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

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The Identity Engineer

The security pages name the algorithms (AES-256 GCM, RSA-2048), the key derivation (PBKDF2 with 1,000,000 iterations) and list what is encrypted inside a record down to URLs and custom fields, with the vendor stating it can never access vault contents; FIPS 140-3 validated modules, annual ISO 27001 audits, penetration tests by named firms including NCC Group and a Bugcrowd bug bounty are documented. The captured pages do not show which metadata stays unencrypted, published test reports with dates, incident history, or reviewable client source, which holds this below the top level. 3 5 6 12 5

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Sharing, roles & recovery

How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.

3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.

8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

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The Identity Engineer

Offboarding is documented the way I run leavers: lock the vault, transfer ownership, role policies govern who may transfer, and zero knowledge is maintained. Time-limited and self-destructing shares, one-time links to people without an account where the server never sees the token, delegated administrators scoped to a node, a request-based workflow for eligible teams and most-restrictive policy for multi-role users cover the governance I demand. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on hiding a password while still allowing autofill. 6 7 8 10 8 5

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SSO, directory sync & provisioning

How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.

3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

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The Identity Engineer

This is the stack I run: SAML 2.0 with Entra ID named, SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning with automated deprovisioning, IdP group mapping onto teams and roles, and compatibility with Entra conditional access. The SSO unlock key model is actually documented — a local ECC-256 private key decrypts the user's data key after identity-provider authentication, designed so the vendor cannot derive it — and FIDO2 WebAuthn hardware keys, passkeys stored in the vault and biometric passkey login to Keeper itself are all evidenced. What keeps it from the top is that no independent review of that key model and no stated immediate revocation with a log entry on deprovisioning appear on the captured pages. 6 9 10 12 9 5

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Audit logs, policies & reporting

How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.

3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

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The Identity Engineer

Every role assignment, policy change and vault action is logged and reportable, with logs covering authentication, credential access, sharing and administrative changes, exportable as PDF, JSON or CSV and integrable with SIEM platforms. Password health reporting, access-permission compliance reports with filters, ISO 27001-aligned control mappings and anomaly flagging are documented. The captured pages name no specific SIEM targets, state no log retention period and show no browser-extension policy, which holds this below the higher level. 8 11 12 8 12

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Hosting choice, offline access & export

How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.

3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

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The Identity Engineer

An EU region on AWS is selectable with isolation at rest and in transit, Linux is among the desktop clients, and offline mode is documented in depth — encrypted local copy, admin-controlled durations, access without internet or identity provider — so the vault stays usable when the service or the IdP is unreachable. Export exists and the vendor states it cannot decrypt the data, but the pages do not document export fidelity across item types and attachments or import from named competitors, and self-managed deployment appears in the footer menu without further description alongside the self-hosted SSO Connect component. 3 6 14 1 13 5

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.

3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

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The Identity Engineer

European elements are proven — a selectable EU hosting region on AWS and a contracting entity in Cork, Ireland with Irish governing law for that entity — but the vendor is Keeper Security, Inc. of Chicago and the privacy pages rely on the EU-US Data Privacy Framework as the primary mechanism for transfers out of the EEA. We found no public information on a customer data processing agreement or a subprocessor list with locations, so most of the chain is unstated rather than European. 3 4 6 5

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Pricing transparency

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.

5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

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The Identity Engineer

The business tier carries public figures of 48 EUR for the annual subscription offer and 400 EUR for the monthly subscription offer, with the billing period stated and SSO Connect marked as included with Keeper Enterprise. The captured pricing pages do not list per-tier feature sets, seat minimums, add-on prices or VAT treatment, so an annual invoice for two thousand users is not computable from them. 2 9 2

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European sovereignty — proven facts

2 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Hosting options EU region selectable unverified
Why unverified?

The region is an AWS region operated by Keeper ("fully-managed SaaS platform"), and the footer menu lists an undescribed "Self-Managed Keeper" product, which the excerpts do not explain as a self-hosting option.

1/1 pts 6 Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Keeper

Is Keeper European?

No. whats-best.ai classifies Keeper as Rest of world. Its vendor, Keeper Security, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 16 Nov 2026.

Where does Keeper store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026.

Does Keeper have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 16 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Keeper?

As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Keeper alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (14)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Pricing page www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 2 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Privacy policy www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Terms of service www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 2 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  9. 9 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  10. 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  13. 13 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  14. 14 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.keepersecurity.com Checked 16 Nov 2026 Details →