Encryption model & independent audits
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The Skeptic
The security pages go deeper than most: AES-256 and RSA-2048 with FIPS 140-3 validated modules, one-million-iteration PBKDF2 derivation, a transmission-key hierarchy, and a field-by-field statement that URLs, attachments, payment data and custom fields are all encrypted client-side. But the audits are named, not shown — SOC 2, annually audited ISO 27001, FedRAMP High, and NCC Group and CyberTest penetration tests all appear without a dated report or summary on the captured pages — and we found no public information on past security incidents or on reviewable client source code. 5 6 12 5 3