Password Management
Password Depot
EU-Made Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by AceBIT GmbH · www.password-depot.de
Report an error on this page Is this your product? →
Link to this page
Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds.
The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where
that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.
Password Depot at a glance
- Vendor
- AceBIT GmbH
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Password Depot 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Password Depot Business, developed by AceBIT GmbH in Darmstadt since 1998, is strongest on deployment and portability, scoring 7-8, and on sharing and access control at 6-8: databases run on-premises, in your own Azure tenant or fully local with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, and server-side permissions reach from whole databases down to individual entries with approval-gated seals and time-limited access. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Password Depot Business, developed by AceBIT GmbH in Darmstadt since 1998, is strongest on deployment and portability, scoring 7-8, and on sharing and access control at 6-8: databases run on-premises, in your own Azure tenant or fully local with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, and server-side permissions reach from whole databases down to individual entries with approval-gated seals and time-limited access. Identity integration and audit and policy each landed at 7 with no spread. The judges split on security architecture, 4-6: the cryptography is published in detail — AES-256 in the AES-GCM default mode, Argon2id parameters, PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations, TLS 1.3 — while the SySS penetration test is named without a date or published report, and the judges weighed these facts differently. Sovereignty clusters at 6-7: German development and support are documented, but independently collected facts on legal entity, ownership, residency and subprocessors came back unknown, and no certification such as ISO 27001 or BSI C5 is published. Weighted totals span 6.2 to 7.0; no price is public — ordering ends in an individual quote by email.
Speaks for it
- Databases run on-premises, in your own Azure tenant or fully local with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, and mirror servers and automated backups are documented
- Server-side permissions reach from whole databases down to individual entries and folders, with time-limited access dates, approval-gated sealed entries and link sharing over HTTPS
- Cryptography is published in detail: AES-256 in the AES-GCM default mode, Argon2id parameters, PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations and TLS 1.3
- Directory integration spans Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID sync, Kerberos and OpenID Connect sign-on, SCIM provisioning and FIDO2/WebAuthn MFA, with the server documented as never storing directory passwords
- Export covers XML, CSV, TXT, HTML and an encrypted PSWE database format behind master-password authentication, and the web client's source is public
Held against it
- The SySS penetration test is named without a date or published report, and only the web client's source is public
- No certification such as ISO 27001, SOC 2 or BSI C5 is published, and independently collected facts on ownership, residency and subprocessors came back unknown
- We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period, or on an administrator recovery mechanism and its key model
- We found no stated log-retention period, and the available reports cover users, databases, groups and members rather than compliance mappings to ISO 27001 or NIS2
- No price figure is public — ordering runs through an individual, non-binding quote by email and a DocuSign signature
Best for
- You need the vault on infrastructure you control — an on-premises Enterprise Server, your own Azure tenant or fully local databases — with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust
- Your team runs on Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID and wants SCIM provisioning, Kerberos or OpenID Connect sign-on and FIDO2 hardware keys
- You need approval-gated access to critical credentials, time-limited sharing and audit logs exported to your SIEM over syslog per RFC 5424
- You want a web client you can build and host yourself, with export in XML, CSV, TXT, HTML and encrypted PSWE formats to reduce lock-in
Avoid if
- You require verified assurance before signing — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- Your rollout depends on a documented administrator recovery path or emergency access with a waiting period; we found no public information on either
- Your auditors need compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2 with a stated log-retention period; the published reports cover users, databases, groups and members
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 4 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 3.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
Algorithms and key derivation are documented down to Argon2id parameters and PBKDF2 iteration counts, and a penetration test by SySS is named — but with no date, no published report or summary, and no bug bounty, vulnerability disclosure policy or documented incident history anywhere in the captured pages. We also found no public information on which fields remain unencrypted, including URLs and metadata, so I cannot verify what a server compromise would expose; only the web client's source is public, not the cryptography of the desktop clients. 1 6 7 14
The Identity Engineer
The published security documentation is specific — AES-256 with AES-GCM as the default mode via Windows CNG, Argon2id and PBKDF2 with 600,000 iterations as key derivation, TLS 1.3 in transit, and the master password never stored in plain text — and a penetration test by SySS is named on the homepage. I found no public information on a dated test report or a certification such as ISO 27001, on a bug bounty or disclosure policy, or on which fields of an entry stay unencrypted. 1 6 7
The Compliance Auditor
Algorithms, encryption modes and key derivation are published in unusual detail — AES-GCM via Windows CNG with Argon2id parameters and PBKDF2 iteration counts, TLS 1.3 in transit — and SySS is named as the penetration tester, while the web client's source is public on GitHub. We found no date or published result for the SySS test, no statement of which fields such as URLs or metadata stay unencrypted, and no public information on a bug bounty, ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification, or disclosed incident history. 1 6 7 14
The SME Owner
The security-standard page names real building blocks — AES-GCM databases with Argon2id or PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations, TLS 1.3, and the master password never held in plain text — and a SySS penetration test plus a public web-client repository are mentioned. But I found no dates, reports or results for that test, no certification like ISO 27001, no bug bounty or incident history, and no statement of which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not. 1 6 7 14
The DevOps Engineer
The security-standard page and the version 19 FAQ publish a real cryptographic model — AES-GCM via Windows CNG for new databases, Argon2id defaults given down to memory and parallelism, PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations, TLS 1.3 in transit, and a statement that the master password is never stored in plain text — which is documentation I can actually review before putting the server in our racks. A SySS penetration test is named, but I found no date, no published report, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and no public information on a bug bounty or past incidents. 1 6 7
The Skeptic
The security-standard page names AES-256 with an authenticated GCM default, exact Argon2id and PBKDF2 parameters, TLS 1.3, and states the master password is cryptographically derived rather than stored — real architecture, not adjectives. But the SySS penetration test is a single undated name with no published report, and we found no public information on a bug bounty, a vulnerability disclosure policy, incident history, or which fields stay unencrypted; only the web client's source is public. 1 6 7 14
Sharing, roles & recovery
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Permissions run to fourteen discrete rights at database level and eight per entry, with time-limited access by valid-from and valid-to dates, approval-gated sealed entries with delegated seal administrators, four-eyes release of critical credentials, and Active Directory deletions that can disable or remove the affected server accounts. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on an administrator recovery mechanism and its key model, which is the documentation I look for first when a vault holds every credential the company owns. 1 8 9 11 13
The Identity Engineer
Rights run from whole databases down to individual folders and entries — fourteen permissions at database level including export, printing and browser-extension autofill — plus a seal workflow where opening a secret waits for an authorized person's approval and every broken seal stays visible. Database access can be bounded with Valid from and Valid to dates, links are time-limited, and a user deleted in the directory can be disabled or removed on the server. I found no public information on admin account recovery with its key model, emergency access with a waiting period, or periodic access reviews. 1 8 9 11
The Compliance Auditor
Permissions are enforced server-side down to single entries, with separate grants for reading, autocomplete, autofill from browser add-ons, printing, exporting and sealing, plus time-limited database access via valid-from/valid-to dates, time-limited link sharing, approval workflows whose seal states record an access as broken, and Active Directory deleted-object handling that can disable or delete leavers. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on admin account recovery and its key model. 1 8 9 11
The SME Owner
Permissions go genuinely deep — database, folder and single-entry level, groups, time-limited access windows, sealed entries that need a second person's approval, and link sharing — which is more than enough structure to kill the Excel file, and when someone leaves, deleted Active Directory objects can be disabled or removed. But I found no public information on an admin recovery path when a user forgets the master password, and nothing on emergency access with a waiting period — the exact scenario I need an answer for before migrating forty people. 1 8 9 11
The DevOps Engineer
The Enterprise Server help documents permissions at database, folder and single-entry level with separate rights for reading, autofill via browser add-ons, printing, exporting and sharing, plus time-limited access windows, sealed entries with an explicit request-and-approval workflow, and link sharing to external parties over HTTPS; deleted Active Directory objects can be disabled or removed on the server, which covers leavers. I found no public information on an admin account recovery mechanism with its key model, or on emergency access with a waiting period. 1 8 9 11 13
The Skeptic
Server-side permissions run from whole databases down to individual entries and folders, with time-limited access dates, seal states that require an authorized person's approval before an entry opens, link sharing with anyone over HTTPS, and Active Directory deleted-object handling that disables or removes leavers. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period, on one-time shares, or on the key model behind admin account recovery, which keeps this short of provable governance. 1 8 9 11
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SSO via Kerberos and OpenID Connect with Active Directory and Entra ID, SCIM provisioning, individual and automatic directory synchronization, and hardware-backed MFA with FIDO2 and Windows Hello are all documented, and the server is stated not to know or store directory passwords. The captured pages never state how the vault key is derived or released under an SSO login, and we found no public information on conditional access or device policies or on passkeys stored and used across platforms. 1 10 11 14
The Identity Engineer
This is close to what I run: SCIM automates creating, changing and removing users, Active Directory and Entra ID sync covers users and nested groups, and objects deleted in the directory are detected and can be disabled on the Enterprise Server. Entra users sign in with their Microsoft credentials over OpenID Connect with per-user switching between AD and Entra, and FIDO2/WebAuthn and Windows Hello serve as second factors. The key model behind an SSO unlock is only partly documented — the server reportedly never knows or stores directory passwords — and I found no public information on conditional access or device policies, or on passkeys stored as an item type. 1 6 10 11
The Compliance Auditor
Entra ID and Active Directory synchronisation with SCIM provisioning, Kerberos and OpenID Connect single sign-on, and MFA with FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware keys, TOTP and Windows Hello are documented, with a stated design in which the server never knows or stores directory passwords, and imported users sign on with their Microsoft credentials. We found no public information on conditional access or device policies, passkey storage, or a published statement of how the vault key is derived or released at single sign-on. 1 10 11 14
The SME Owner
Directory work is clearly their home turf: users and groups from Active Directory and Entra ID, Kerberos and OpenID Connect single sign-on, SCIM for automated create, change and remove, and multi-factor authentication with FIDO2/WebAuthn, TOTP or Windows Hello, with the server documented as never storing the Active Directory passwords. What I couldn't find is a plain statement of how the vault key is derived or released at an SSO login, nor passkeys stored as items or conditional access policies. 1 6 10 11
The DevOps Engineer
Directory integration is thorough — users and groups from Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, Kerberos and OpenID Connect single sign-on, SCIM for creating, changing and removing users, group permissions driving vault access, and MFA with FIDO2 keys, TOTP or Windows Hello — and the documentation states the server never knows or stores the synchronised users' passwords. I found no public information on conditional access or device policies, or on passkeys stored as vault items, and the SSO-to-vault-decryption key model is only partially spelled out. 1 6 10 11
The Skeptic
Entra ID and Active Directory sync with configurable automation, Kerberos and OpenID Connect SSO, SCIM, FIDO2 hardware keys, and the explicit statement that the server never knows or stores user passwords — a solid directory story. We found no public information on conditional access or device policies, on passkeys stored as vault items, or on any independent review of the SSO key model. 1 10 11
Audit logs, policies & reporting
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
A tamper-evident audit trail covering logins, changes, admin actions and grants exports to SIEM systems via syslog per RFC 5424, and server policies enforce password rules plus sharing and export rights down to browser add-on behaviour. Log retention is not stated, we found no public information on compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and breach checking appears as a client-side Have I Been Pwned check rather than an administrator-visible password health report; the published reports cover users, databases, groups and members. 1 6 9 12 13
The Identity Engineer
Logins, changes, admin actions and shares are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail exportable to syslog per RFC 5424, and server-side policies cover password quality, export and browser-extension behaviour, binding even the super administrator. Passwords are checked against known breaches with a k-anonymity query, and reports exist for users, databases, groups and members. I found no public information on a stated log retention period, compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, or alerting on anomalous access. 1 6 9 12 13
The Compliance Auditor
A tamper-evident audit trail covering logins, changes, admin actions, accesses and grants exports to SIEM systems via syslog per RFC 5424, password policies (length, character types, dictionary checks) are enforced server-side, the export right is globally disableable, and breach checks run against known data leaks with k-anonymity. Log retention is not stated anywhere we could see, the available reports cover users, databases, groups and members rather than compliance mappings, and we found no public information on ISO 27001 or NIS2-aligned reporting, anomalous-access alerting, or an auditor role that reads logs without touching secrets. 1 6 9 12 13
The SME Owner
Logins, changes, admin actions and grants are documented as landing in a tamper-evident audit trail exportable by syslog (RFC 5424) to SIEM systems; server-side policies enforce password length and dictionary checks, export and sharing can be switched off globally, and there is a Have-I-Been-Pwned check. The reports I saw are user, database, group and member listings — useful for me, not for an ISO 27001 auditor — and I found no stated log retention and no alerting on anomalous access. 1 6 9 12 13
The DevOps Engineer
Logins, changes, admin actions and sharing land in a tamper-evident audit trail that can be shipped to a SIEM over syslog per RFC 5424, server-side password policies enforce length, character types and dictionary checks, and individual permissions such as export, printing and browser add-on behaviour can be denied globally for everyone including the super administrator. I found no stated log retention period and no compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2 — the published reports are administrative lists of users, groups, databases and members, alongside a breach check against Have I Been Pwned. 1 6 9 12 13
The Skeptic
Logins, changes, admin actions and grants are recorded in a claimed tamper-evident audit trail exportable per RFC 5424 to syslog, server policies can disable export, printing and browser add-on behaviour, and reports exist for users, databases, groups and members. We found no public information on log retention, named SIEM targets, or compliance mappings to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and the breach check is a Have I Been Pwned lookup rather than a password-health report. 1 6 12 13
Hosting choice, offline access & export
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Deployment is documented as on-premises with mirror servers and automated backups, in the customer's own Azure tenant, or fully local on clients and removable media with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, clients exist for every major platform, and export covers XML, CSV, HTML, text and an encrypted full-database format authenticated by master password. Local and offline operation means access survives any vendor outage; we found no public information on a status page with incident history, on import from named competitors, or on whether attachments survive export. 1 6 13 14 15
The Identity Engineer
Deployment is on-premises, in the customer's own Azure tenant, on local clients or removable media — with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust — with mirror servers and automated backups documented for the Enterprise Server and a web client whose source can be built and hosted yourself. Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the web, offline databases are a configured mode, and export offers XML, CSV, TXT, HTML and an encrypted database-format file behind master-password authentication. I found no public information on a status page with incident history or an import path from named competitors. 1 2 6 13 14 15
The Compliance Auditor
Deployment is on the customer's own premises, own Azure tenant, local clients or removable media with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, mirror servers and automated backups are documented for high availability, and clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and a web interface, with encrypted PSWE export preceded by master-password authentication across five formats. We found no public information on a status page with incident history, import from named competitors, or whether exports carry attachments alongside the thirteen CSV fields. 1 6 13 15
The SME Owner
This is the strongest part for a company my size: databases live locally, on my own Enterprise Server or in my own Azure tenant with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, mirror servers and automated backups are documented, and clients exist for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android plus a self-hostable web client. Export comes in XML, CSV, TXT, HTML and an encrypted PSWE database format behind master-password authentication, with thirteen configurable fields and scope choices. I found no status page with incident history, no import path from named competitors, and whether exports carry attachments or permissions is not shown. 1 6 14 15
The DevOps Engineer
This is the deployment model I want to run: the Enterprise Server installs in our own data centre or our own Azure tenant with the vendor stating that no vendor cloud sits in the chain of trust, mirror servers and automated backups are named for failover and recovery, and the web client is static files with source on GitHub talking to the server over REST API 2.0, which also gives pipelines a documented path to secrets. Export covers XML, CSV with up to thirteen assignable fields including folder paths, text, HTML and the encrypted PSWE database format behind master-password authentication, and perpetual licences with security updates available for at least ten years after release soften the exit risk. I found no public information on a command-line client, a status page with incident history, import from named competitors, or a stated end-of-service access procedure. 1 2 5 6 14 15
The Skeptic
On-premises, hybrid, the customer's own Azure tenant or purely local databases, with mirror servers, automated backups, clients for every major platform, a self-deployable web client whose source is public, and an encrypted full-database export in the vendor's own format authenticated by the master password. We found no public information on a status page with incident history, on import from named competitors, or on a documented procedure if the vendor ends the service. 1 6 14 15
European sovereignty
panel opinion
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The vendor is German — developed and supported in Darmstadt since 1998 with no outsourced support — the website is hosted in Munich under a data-processing agreement with DomainFactory, and databases reside locally, on the customer's own Enterprise Server or in the customer's own Azure tenant. That architecture is the right answer to compelled disclosure, but we found no public information on ownership, on certifications such as ISO 27001 or BSI C5, or on a published subprocessor list with locations, and the independently sourced residency and ownership attributes all came back unknown. 1 2 3 6
The Identity Engineer
AceBIT GmbH builds this in Darmstadt, supports it from Darmstadt with stated no outsourcing, and hosts its website in Munich under a data-processing contract with the named provider DomainFactory. The decisive fact is architectural: databases reside locally, on your own Enterprise Server or in your own Azure tenant, with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust. I found no public information on ownership structure, on subprocessors beyond the website hoster, or on certifications such as ISO 27001 or BSI C5, and only the web client's source is public. 1 3 6 14
The Compliance Auditor
The vendor presents as German end to end — developed and supported in Darmstadt since 1998 with no outsourced support, website hosted by DomainFactory in Munich under an Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag — and vault data, metadata and logs remain on infrastructure the customer controls, with no vendor cloud in the chain. We found no public information on the ownership structure, on published certifications such as ISO 27001 or BSI C5, or on any subprocessor list beyond the named website host. 1 2 3 6
The SME Owner
Development and support sit in Darmstadt since 1998 with no outsourcing, "Made in Germany" is on the pricing page, and with self-hosting there is no vendor cloud at all — the only subcontractor in view is the website host DomainFactory in Munich under a data-processing agreement. However, the independently collected facts on legal entity, ownership and subprocessors came back unconfirmed, and I found no subprocessor list for the product chain and no published certification such as ISO 27001 or C5. 1 2 3 6
The DevOps Engineer
AceBIT develops in Darmstadt, support is German-language from Darmstadt with remote sessions and explicitly no outsourcing, the website runs on DomainFactory in Munich under a data-processing agreement, and in the self-hosted model the vendor leaves the data path entirely — my preferred answer to the sovereignty question. I found no published certifications such as ISO 27001 or C5, no independently verified ownership structure, and only the web client source public, so the Windows client's update channel remains a trust decision. 1 2 3 6 14
The Skeptic
A German developer since 1998 with support in Darmstadt, no forced cloud, and databases that can stay entirely on the customer's own infrastructure, so the vendor can be removed from the vault data path altogether. But the captured pages leave the contracting entity and ownership resting on the vendor's own claims, contracting runs through DocuSign and support through TeamViewer remote sessions, and we found no published subprocessor list with locations, no certifications, and no verifiable builds for the desktop clients. 1 2 3 5 6
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pricing page describes configuring a licence and receiving an individual, non-binding quote by email within one working day, with the contract then signed via DocuSign, and no price figure appears anywhere in the captured pages — so a buyer cannot compute the annual cost at all. The five-user minimum, the named-user unlimited-device model and the twelve-month auto-renewing maintenance terms with a thirty-day notice period are at least published, but every price is a sales conversation. 1 2 5
The Identity Engineer
Business licences start at five named users with unlimited devices, but the price arrives as an individual, non-binding quote by email within one working day, signed through DocuSign — no per-user price appears on the captured pages. Terms around the invoice are visible: a twelve-month software maintenance term renewing automatically with thirty days' notice, and free security updates for at least ten years. I found no public information on the per-user price itself or any add-on pricing, so the annual cost cannot be computed before a sales conversation. 1 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
No price figures are public at all: the Business licence is configured online and quoted individually by email within one working day, signed via DocuSign, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from the captured pages. Published commercial structure — the five-user minimum, named-user licensing with unlimited devices, and the twelve-month maintenance auto-renewal with thirty-day notice and free security updates — keeps this just above the floor. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
This is where they lose me: I found no per-user price on the captured pricing pages — the flow is to configure a licence and receive an individual, non-binding quote within one working day, with signing via DocuSign. The five-user floor, named-user unlimited-device licensing and the 12-month maintenance contract that auto-renews with 30 days' notice are public, but the actual invoice is unknowable without a sales conversation, and I have no way to see where single sign-on or SCIM sit in the price. 1 2 5
The DevOps Engineer
Ordering is a licence configurator that ends in an individual, non-binding quote by email within one working day and a DocuSign signature, and I found no public per-user price on any page, so the real annual invoice is not computable without a sales conversation. The structural terms are public — business use from five user licences up to fifty thousand users, one named user on unlimited devices, a twelve-month maintenance term renewing automatically with thirty days' notice and notification sixty days before renewal. 1 2 5
The Skeptic
Business ordering is an individual quote by email signed through DocuSign; beyond a five-user minimum, a named-user unlimited-device model, and published maintenance renewal terms with a thirty-day notice period, we found no public price figures, so the annual invoice cannot be computed from the captured pages. 1 2 5
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Password Depot
Is Password Depot European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Password Depot as EU-Made.
Where does Password Depot store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does Password Depot have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Password Depot?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Keeper (3/5), Passbolt (3/5) and 1Password (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Password Depot alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 20 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 12 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 data facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (15)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Legal notice www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Terms of service www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 14 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 15 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →