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Password Management

Password Depot

EU-Made Report an error

Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by AceBIT GmbH · www.password-depot.de

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Password Depot: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai Password Depot: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai (dark)

Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds. The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.

Password Depot at a glance

Vendor
AceBIT GmbH
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Password Depot 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Password Depot Business, developed by AceBIT GmbH in Darmstadt since 1998, is strongest on deployment and portability, scoring 7-8, and on sharing and access control at 6-8: databases run on-premises, in your own Azure tenant or fully local with no vendor cloud in the chain of trust, and server-side permissions reach from whole databases down to individual entries with approval-gated seals and time-limited access. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources

Password Depot alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The DevOps Engineer

Weighted verdict

Would rather run the vault in the company's own data centre than trust another SaaS with root credentials. Wants a documented self-hosted deployment with backup and high availability, open-source code to read, a CLI and API for pipelines, and an export that loses nothing.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The DevOps Engineer

Panel median The DevOps Engineer This judge’s scores over the panel median. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median The DevOps Engineer
Encryption model & independent audits 2 of 5 2 of 5
Sharing, roles & recovery 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export 4 of 5 4 of 5
European sovereignty 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5

Encryption model & independent audits

How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.

3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.

5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.

8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

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The DevOps Engineer

The security-standard page and the version 19 FAQ publish a real cryptographic model — AES-GCM via Windows CNG for new databases, Argon2id defaults given down to memory and parallelism, PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations, TLS 1.3 in transit, and a statement that the master password is never stored in plain text — which is documentation I can actually review before putting the server in our racks. A SySS penetration test is named, but I found no date, no published report, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and no public information on a bug bounty or past incidents. 1 6 7

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Sharing, roles & recovery

How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.

3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.

8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

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The DevOps Engineer

The Enterprise Server help documents permissions at database, folder and single-entry level with separate rights for reading, autofill via browser add-ons, printing, exporting and sharing, plus time-limited access windows, sealed entries with an explicit request-and-approval workflow, and link sharing to external parties over HTTPS; deleted Active Directory objects can be disabled or removed on the server, which covers leavers. I found no public information on an admin account recovery mechanism with its key model, or on emergency access with a waiting period. 1 8 9 11 13

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SSO, directory sync & provisioning

How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.

3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

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The DevOps Engineer

Directory integration is thorough — users and groups from Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, Kerberos and OpenID Connect single sign-on, SCIM for creating, changing and removing users, group permissions driving vault access, and MFA with FIDO2 keys, TOTP or Windows Hello — and the documentation states the server never knows or stores the synchronised users' passwords. I found no public information on conditional access or device policies, or on passkeys stored as vault items, and the SSO-to-vault-decryption key model is only partially spelled out. 1 6 10 11

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Audit logs, policies & reporting

How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.

3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

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The DevOps Engineer

Logins, changes, admin actions and sharing land in a tamper-evident audit trail that can be shipped to a SIEM over syslog per RFC 5424, server-side password policies enforce length, character types and dictionary checks, and individual permissions such as export, printing and browser add-on behaviour can be denied globally for everyone including the super administrator. I found no stated log retention period and no compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2 — the published reports are administrative lists of users, groups, databases and members, alongside a breach check against Have I Been Pwned. 1 6 9 12 13

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Hosting choice, offline access & export

How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.

3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.

5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

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The DevOps Engineer

This is the deployment model I want to run: the Enterprise Server installs in our own data centre or our own Azure tenant with the vendor stating that no vendor cloud sits in the chain of trust, mirror servers and automated backups are named for failover and recovery, and the web client is static files with source on GitHub talking to the server over REST API 2.0, which also gives pipelines a documented path to secrets. Export covers XML, CSV with up to thirteen assignable fields including folder paths, text, HTML and the encrypted PSWE database format behind master-password authentication, and perpetual licences with security updates available for at least ten years after release soften the exit risk. I found no public information on a command-line client, a status page with incident history, import from named competitors, or a stated end-of-service access procedure. 1 2 5 6 14 15

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.

3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

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The DevOps Engineer

AceBIT develops in Darmstadt, support is German-language from Darmstadt with remote sessions and explicitly no outsourcing, the website runs on DomainFactory in Munich under a data-processing agreement, and in the self-hosted model the vendor leaves the data path entirely — my preferred answer to the sovereignty question. I found no published certifications such as ISO 27001 or C5, no independently verified ownership structure, and only the web client source public, so the Windows client's update channel remains a trust decision. 1 2 3 6 14

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.

5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

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The DevOps Engineer

Ordering is a licence configurator that ends in an individual, non-binding quote by email within one working day and a DocuSign signature, and I found no public per-user price on any page, so the real annual invoice is not computable without a sales conversation. The structural terms are public — business use from five user licences up to fifty thousand users, one named user on unlimited devices, a twelve-month maintenance term renewing automatically with thirty days' notice and notification sixty days before renewal. 1 2 5

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 4 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Ownership Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data residency Not determined — uncited Report an error
Subprocessors Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Password Depot

Is Password Depot European?

Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Password Depot as EU-Made.

Where does Password Depot store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.

Does Password Depot have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Password Depot?

As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Keeper (3/5), Passbolt (3/5) and 1Password (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Password Depot alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Do you know more about Password Depot? Tell us Report an error on this page

Sources (15)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Pricing page www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Privacy policy www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Legal notice www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Terms of service www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  10. 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  11. 11 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  13. 13 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  14. 14 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
  15. 15 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.password-depot.de Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →