Password Management
1Password
Rest of world Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by AgileBits Inc. · 1password.com
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1Password at a glance
- Vendor
- AgileBits Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates 1Password 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. 1Password, a password manager from AgileBits Inc., scored highest on sharing and access control and on audit and policy, both at a uniform 7, with identity integration close behind at 7 to 8. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
1Password, a password manager from AgileBits Inc., scored highest on sharing and access control and on audit and policy, both at a uniform 7, with identity integration close behind at 7 to 8. Judges credited SSO unlock over OpenID Connect with PKCE, SCIM provisioning that suspends users on deprovisioning, five Business permissions plus a Manage Vault grant, and an events feed to named SIEM targets. Sovereignty is the weak point at a uniform 3: Secure Data hosting is customer-selectable in the EU, US or Canada and item sharing is stored in the EU, but the vendor address is Toronto, support and email services are hosted primarily in the United States and Canada, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations. Deployment and portability drew the widest spread, 4 to 6, as judges weighed broad client and import coverage against an export documented as unencrypted and no public information on self-hosting or offline access. Security architecture sits at 6 to 7, with the newest dated assessment from 2020; the pricing page publishes no per-user figures.
Speaks for it
- Vault sharing runs on five Business permissions plus a Manage Vault grant that grants and revokes access without any item viewing or editing, and Business client settings can block export, printing and copy or share outside the app.
- Unlock with SSO over OpenID Connect with PKCE supports named providers, and SCIM provisioning creates users, drives group access and suspends members on deprovisioning with immediate confirmation.
- Events Reporting streams sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events to named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic and Datadog, with scoped, expiring bearer tokens.
- The published security design names AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, a 128-bit Secret Key and SRP, beside unaltered reports from ISE and Onica and a public HackerOne bounty.
- Clients cover macOS, Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, browsers and a CLI, with Secure Data hosting customer-selectable in the EU, US or Canada.
Held against it
- Sovereignty sits at a uniform 3 — the vendor address is in Toronto, support and email services are hosted primarily in the United States and Canada, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations.
- The documented export formats are an unencrypted.1pux archive and a CSV file, and we found no public information on whether attachments survive export or on offline access during a vendor outage.
- We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises deployment option.
- The newest dated assessment is from 2020 and the Onica report carries no date, and we found no public information on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification or on disclosed incident history.
- We found no public information on enforced master-password or MFA policies, on hardware-key or FIDO2 MFA options, or on a statement that the vendor cannot derive the vault key under SSO unlock.
Best for
- You run your team on a major identity provider and will use the Business plan — SSO unlock over OpenID Connect with PKCE and SCIM provisioning that confirms users without delay and suspends them on deprovisioning are documented there.
- You need governed sharing — five Business permissions, a Manage Vault grant split from viewing and editing, and client settings that block export, printing and copying outside the app.
- You need audit evidence in your SIEM — sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events stream to named targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic and Datadog, with Watchtower, breach, device and twelve-month usage reports.
- You are migrating from another password manager and want documented import from Bitwarden, KeePass, Keeper or LastPass with clients across every major platform and a CLI.
Avoid if
- Your procurement requires an EU contracting entity or a visible subprocessor chain — the vendor address is in Toronto, support and email are hosted primarily in the United States and Canada, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations.
- Your auditors require recent, dated assessments — the newest dated published assessment is from 2020 and the other named report carries no date.
- Your exit plan requires encrypted exports — the documented formats are the 1Password Unencrypted Export (.1pux) and a CSV file.
- You plan to run 1Password Teams — SSO unlock, automated provisioning, Events Reporting and the five-permission model sit on the Business plan, and Teams accounts reach most reports only through a trial.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 3 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security pages name AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation, the 128-bit Secret Key and SRP authentication, publish unaltered reports from an ISE penetration test and code review performed April to June 2020 and an Onica architecture assessment, and run a public HackerOne bug bounty since December 2024. I found no public information on which fields are encrypted and which are not, on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification, or on any documented incident history. Of the two named audits one is dated 2020 and the other carries no date, so I cannot show the board a yearly audit cadence. 5 6
The Identity Engineer
The security pages name AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation, the 128-bit Secret Key model, SRP and secure random generation, and assessments from ISE (2020, penetration test and code review) and Onica are published unaltered beside a public HackerOne bug bounty. We found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, on current-year recurring audits, or on past incident history, so the top of the scale stays out of reach. 5 6
The Compliance Auditor
The security pages name the design — AES-GCM-256 authenticated encryption, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation, a 128-bit Secret Key combined with the account password, SRP — and the assessments page publishes unaltered reports from named firms, including a dated 2020 penetration test and code review plus a public bug bounty on HackerOne. We found no public information on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification, on disclosed incident history, or on a field-by-field statement of what stays unencrypted, so the design cannot be verified end to end. 2 5 6
The SME Owner
The security page names AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation, a 128-bit Secret Key combined with the account password, and the SRP protocol, and the company publishes unaltered reports from a 2020 Independent Security Evaluators penetration test and code review plus an Onica architecture audit, with a public HackerOne bug bounty running since December 2024. We found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, any disclosed incident history, or reviewable client source code. That sits above a bare algorithm claim but short of the recurring yearly audits a higher mark would need. 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
The published security pages name real primitives — AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 key derivation, a 128-bit Secret Key combined with the account password, and SRP for authentication — and two named assessors published unaltered reports alongside a public HackerOne bounty open to all researchers. But the newest dated penetration test is from 2020, the second assessment carries no date, and I found no public information on which fields such as URLs and metadata remain unencrypted, on disclosed incident history, or on open-source clients I could review myself. 5 6
The Skeptic
Algorithms, key derivation, the 128-bit Secret Key and the SRP login design are published in plain terms, and there is a public bug bounty on HackerOne plus independent assessments from ISE (2020) and Onica with reports published unaltered. But I found no public information on which fields stay readable to the vendor, on any whitepaper stating what a server compromise would expose, or on incident history, and the newest dated assessment is from 2020 — so the zero-knowledge claim sits next to a privacy policy that promises Service Data to law enforcement. 5 6 3 2
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Vaults are shared with team members, groups or invitees under five permissions on the business plan plus a separate Manage Vault grant, granular client settings cover concealed passwords, item history, import, export, copy/share and print, and recovery is documented down to a new Secret Key and account password with access blocked until it completes, including self-recovery codes and delegated recovery groups. Access requests are listed as a feature. I found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, on emergency access with a waiting period, or on a stated process for transferring a leaver's Employee vault contents. 1 7 8
The Identity Engineer
Vault sharing reaches groups and invited people with five item permissions plus per-vault client settings that can switch off viewing concealed passwords, exporting and sharing outside 1Password, and recovery is documented in depth: new Secret Key, new account password, blocked-until-complete, bulk recovery via CLI, recovery codes and a custom recoverer permission. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time external sharing or emergency access with a waiting period, and no statement of a recovery key model in which the vendor never holds a key. 1 7 8 3
The Compliance Auditor
Business vaults carry five item permissions plus a separate Manage Vault permission, client settings let an administrator forbid viewing or copying concealed passwords and exporting or sharing outside the product, and account recovery is documented down to the key model with a new Secret Key and account password and access blocked until an authorised recoverer completes it. Access requests and access reviews appear in the feature list. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties or on an emergency-access waiting period, and administrators manage vaults by default rather than by least privilege. 1 7 8 10
The SME Owner
This is what I need day to day: shared vaults with five granular Business permissions, a Manage Vault capability deliberately split from viewing and editing, groups, and a recovery process documented down to the keys — new Secret Key and account password, two-factor reset, recovery restricted to admins, owners, or a custom group, bulk recovery via the CLI, and a recommendation to keep at least two people able to recover. Suspension happens when the identity provider deprovisions someone, and Business client settings can block export, printing, and copy/share outside the app. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or time-limited one-time sharing with outside parties, which keeps this from going higher. 7 8 10
The DevOps Engineer
Vault sharing is genuinely governed: five item-level permissions plus a Manage Vault role that grants and revokes access without being able to view items, admin defaults that can be tightened to owners only, and client settings that let me centrally forbid viewing concealed passwords, exporting to unencrypted files, copying outside the app and printing. Account recovery is documented down to issuing a new Secret Key and account password and resetting two-factor, delegable to a custom group and scriptable in bulk over the CLI. I found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, an emergency-access waiting period, or how a leaver's shared items are transferred. 7 8 3
The Skeptic
Vault permissions run five deep with a separate Manage Vault right, client settings can strip viewing concealed passwords, exporting, printing and sharing outside 1Password, and account recovery is documented in detail — new Secret Key and password, access blocked until completion, bulk recovery via CLI, and self-serve recovery codes. I found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, on emergency access with a waiting period, or on the cryptographic key model behind recovery, and the privacy policy states an administrator can recover your account and vault contents. 7 8 3
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Unlock with SSO is documented for named providers over OpenID Connect with PKCE, described as using encrypted credentials and a device key so enrolled users need no account password, and SCIM provisioning creates users and groups, grants and revokes group access and suspends users on deprovisioning, with passkeys named as a feature. I found no public statement that the vendor cannot derive the vault key under SSO unlock, and no public information on FIDO2 or hardware-key MFA, which is exactly where my trust questions would start. 1 9 10
The Identity Engineer
Unlock with SSO runs OIDC with Authorization Code Flow and PKCE against a named provider list including Microsoft Entra ID, and provisioning over SCIM creates users and groups, confirms accounts without delay and suspends a leaver the moment they are deprovisioned in the identity provider, which is exactly my joiner-mover-leaver requirement. The unlock is described as encrypted credentials plus a device key with no account password, but we found no public statement that the vendor cannot derive the vault key, and no public information on FIDO2 hardware keys; passkeys and device compliance appear only as feature mentions. 9 10 1 2
The Compliance Auditor
Unlock with SSO is documented for named providers over OpenID Connect with PKCE, built on encrypted credentials and a device key, and SCIM provisioning through Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace and others creates users, grants and revokes group access and suspends team members on deprovisioning with immediate confirmation. Device trust adds health checks with guided self-remediation and passkeys are in the feature set. We found no public statement that the vendor cannot derive the vault key under SSO unlock, which is the remaining gap at this level. 1 2 9 10
The SME Owner
Unlock with SSO runs on the Business plan over OpenID Connect with PKCE and lists Entra ID, Okta, Google and others, with the unlock described as using encrypted credentials and a device key so no account password is needed; provisioning covers named providers with automated confirmation, group access grant and revoke, and suspension on deprovisioning. We found no public information on hardware-key MFA options, and the pages do not state that the vendor cannot derive the vault key under SSO unlock. The plan gate matters for a company my size — SSO sits with Business rather than every paid seat. 1 2 9 10
The DevOps Engineer
Unlock with SSO is documented properly — OpenID Connect with PKCE, named providers from Microsoft Entra ID and Okta to Ping, decryption via encrypted credentials and a device key so members need no account password — and provisioning with the major directories creates users, drives group access and suspends on deprovisioning with immediate confirmation. A device-trust module and passkey support round it out. I found no public information stating the vendor cannot derive the vault key when SSO unlock is used, or naming hardware-key or FIDO2 options for multi-factor authentication. 9 10 1
The Skeptic
Unlock with SSO is documented down to the OIDC Authorization Code Flow with PKCE and the device-key mechanism, with named providers, SCIM provisioning, immediate confirmation and automated suspension on deprovisioning. The sentence I want is missing — nowhere do the captured pages state that 1Password cannot derive the vault key from an SSO unlock — and I found no public information on FIDO2 or hardware security keys as an MFA factor; SSO also sits only on the Business plan. 9 10 1 2
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
Events Reporting feeds named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic and Datadog with sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events, a data-retention control, custom alerts and an Events API for anything unlisted, while the reports catalog spans Watchtower, domain breach, device, adoption and twelve months of usage history. Client settings enforce export, print and copy/share behaviour, and bearer tokens carry configurable expiry and event scoping. I found no public information on enforceable master password or MFA policies, on a stated log retention period, or on compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and most of this sits only on the business plan. 7 11 12
The Identity Engineer
Events Reporting ships to named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic and Datadog, with scoped expiring bearer tokens, retention control and a custom-client path through the Events API, and the reports catalogue covers Watchtower, domain breach with user notification, device and usage history. Vault-level client settings make sharing, export, print and concealed-password viewing enforceable; we found no public information on master-password or MFA policies, on a stated retention period, or on compliance report packs for ISO 27001 or NIS2 audits. 11 12 7
The Compliance Auditor
The events feed streams sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events to named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel and Elastic, with bearer tokens that can be scoped and expired, retention control, custom alerts, and reports covering breach monitoring, devices, adoption and twelve months of usage; client settings enforce view, copy, export and share behaviour per vault. We found no public information on reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, on master-password or MFA enforcement policies, or on tamper-evident logs and an auditor role without access to secrets. 2 7 11 12
The SME Owner
Events Reporting feeds named SIEM targets — Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic, Datadog and more — with sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events, configurable retention, custom alerts, and bearer tokens scoped by event type and revocable at any time; the report suite covers Watchtower health, domain breaches that notify affected users, device versions, and usage history going back twelve months. Business client settings enforce export, import, print and copy/share behaviour. We found no public information on enforceable master-password or MFA policies or reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and most reports are Business-only — Teams accounts get them through a trial. 7 11 12
The DevOps Engineer
Events Reporting covers sign-in attempts, item usage and audit events, streams to a long list of named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel and Elastic, and exposes an events API with scoped, expiring bearer tokens so I can build my own pipeline, with data retention I control. Reporting adds Watchtower, domain breach, device and adoption reports with CSV export. Client settings enforce export, sharing and print policy, but I found no public information on an enforced master-password or MFA policy, or on ISO 27001 or NIS2 alignment an auditor could use. 11 12 7 2
The Skeptic
Events Reporting ships with named SIEM targets including Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel and Elastic, a build-your-own Events API client, configurable retention, custom alerts, and sign-in, item-usage and audit event types, while client settings enforce export, copy, share and print restrictions. The audit log and most reports are Business-plan features reached through a trial, and I found no stated default log retention period, no compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and no auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets. 11 12 7 2
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Hosting is customer-selectable across the EU, US and Canada, clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, the major browsers and a CLI, and export to 1PUX or CSV plus import from named competitors including Bitwarden, KeePass, Keeper and LastPass are documented, with a status page referenced in the terms. I found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises option, on offline access during an outage, on whether exports include attachments, or on an incident history behind the status page, and the 1PUX export is described as unencrypted. 1 3 4 13 14
The Identity Engineer
Secure Data hosting is customer-selectable in the EU, US or Canada, clients cover macOS, Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, browsers and CLI, and both export (1PUX, CSV, 1PIF via version 7) and import from named competitors such as Bitwarden, Dashlane, KeePass and LastPass are documented. We found no public information on offline access during an outage, on self-hosting, or on whether exports carry attachments, and the status page appears only as a contractual reference for scheduled interruptions. 3 1 13 14 4
The Compliance Auditor
Hosting is customer-selectable in the EU, US or Canada, clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, browsers and the CLI, and import is documented from named competitors including Bitwarden, KeePass and LastPass, with a status page named in the terms. The documented export formats are an unencrypted.1pux archive and a CSV whose published field list does not mention attachments. We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises option or on offline access during an outage of the vendor's service. 1 3 4 13 14
The SME Owner
Hosting is selectable between the EU, US and Canada, clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, the major browsers and a CLI, import paths are documented from a long list of named competitors, and the terms reference a status page. Export is documented as an unencrypted 1PUX or CSV — the CSV does include one-time passwords and notes — but we found no public information on offline access during a vendor outage. We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises option, and the export being explicitly unencrypted is what holds this at a six. 1 3 4 13 14
The DevOps Engineer
Client coverage is what I need — macOS, Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, the major browsers and a CLI — with an EU, US or Canada region selectable at signup, a status page on record, and import from Bitwarden, KeePass, LastPass and the other usual suspects. But the exit path is the 1Password Unencrypted Export or CSV, and I found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises deployment with documented backup and high availability, on offline access during a vendor outage, or on whether attachments survive export. Without a self-hosted path I run the vault on the vendor's terms, not mine. 1 3 13 14 4
The Skeptic
Hosting is customer-selectable across the EU, US and Canada with clients for every major platform, and export to 1PUX or CSV plus documented import from Bitwarden, Dashlane, LastPass and others is real. But the capture names the 1PUX format a "1Password Unencrypted Export", the 1PIF path requires 1Password 7, and we found no public information on attachment coverage in exports, on offline access, on a self-hosted option, or on incident history beyond a status-page link. 3 1 13 14 4
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The head office is in Toronto and hosting is selectable in the EU, US or Canada with item sharing stored in the EU, but support and email services are hosted in the United States and Canada, so parts of the chain stay non-EU even when data is in the EU. I found no public information on parent ownership, on a published subprocessor list with locations, on a data processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs, or on a self-hosted option that would remove the vendor from the data path. 2 3
The Identity Engineer
The vendor address is in Toronto while EU hosting is selectable for Secure Data, but the contracting entity's jurisdiction, ownership and the subprocessor chain are not confirmed on the captured pages, and support and email services are hosted primarily in the United States and Canada. A selectable EU region alongside a Canadian vendor address and no published subprocessor list with locations leaves the chain unevidenced end to end. 2 3
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages give a Toronto headquarters address and let the customer host Secure Data in the EU, US or Canada, while customer support and email services are hosted primarily in the United States and Canada and item sharing is stored in the EU. We found no public information on a published subprocessor list with locations, on a data-processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs, on a self-hosted option removing the vendor from the data path, or on a stated safeguard for a contracting entity outside the EU. 2 3
The SME Owner
The company is headquartered in Toronto with customer support and email services hosted in the United States and Canada, and while Secure Data can be hosted in a selectable EU region, we found no stated safeguard tied to the Canadian contracting entity. We found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations, so the chain behind the EU region is not visible in these pages. Item Sharing data being stored in the EU for as long as the item is shared is a narrow exception rather than a pattern. 2 3 4
The DevOps Engineer
An EU, US or Canada hosting choice exists, but the counterparty is AgileBits Inc. at Yonge Street, Toronto, with customer support and email hosted primarily in the United States and Canada, and I found no public information on a European contracting entity, the parent company, or a subprocessor list with locations. Item-sharing data landing in the EU does not change who I would be contracting with. 3 2
The Skeptic
An EU data region is selectable and item sharing is stored in the EU, but the contracting entity is AgileBits in Toronto with customer support and email hosted primarily in the United States and Canada — an EU region offered by a non-EU entity without a stated safeguard. We found no public information on the subprocessor chain, and the privacy policy commits to providing Service Data, alongside encrypted Secure Data, to law enforcement agencies. 2 3
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pricing page carries capability descriptions and a get-started-free call to action, and the terms state automatic renewal, but I found no public information on per-user prices by tier, seat minimums, add-on prices, VAT treatment or minimum term. Feature placement is partly traceable since SSO, automated provisioning, events reporting and the audit log are all named as 1Password Business, yet I cannot compute an annual invoice for a given number of users from the public pages. 2 4 9
The Identity Engineer
The captured pricing page offers a free start and feature marketing, and the support pages do map capabilities to plans such as SSO, automated provisioning and Events Reporting on 1Password Business, but we found no per-user prices on the captured pages, so an annual invoice cannot be computed from public information. The terms confirm automatic renewal; we found no public information on seat minimums, add-on prices or VAT treatment. 2 9 11 12 4
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pricing page lists capabilities and a get-started-free call to action but shows no per-user figures, seat minimums, add-on prices or VAT treatment, so an annual invoice cannot be computed from the public pages. Feature placement is clearer, with SSO, automated provisioning and the SIEM events feed all documented on the Business plan, and the terms state automatic renewal unless the parties agree otherwise. We found no public information on prices for any tier. 2 4 12
The SME Owner
This is the page I care about most and it gave me nothing to compute with: we found no public price figures in any captured page — no per-user price, no seat minimum, no term or VAT treatment — even though a pricing page was captured and a free start is offered. Feature placement is only visible indirectly, from support pages: SSO unlock, provisioning, SIEM reporting, and the richer permission set all sit with Business, while Teams has three permissions and reports only through a trial. Without a single number I cannot even estimate my forty-person invoice. 2 7 9 11 12
The DevOps Engineer
The pricing page shows feature sets per plan — the support documentation places SSO, automated provisioning, events reporting and the report suite on the Business plan — but I found no public price per user, seat minimum, term, VAT treatment or add-on pricing anywhere. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from the public pages; the number requires a conversation. 2 9 10 11
The Skeptic
The captured pricing page carries feature claims and a "Get started free" offer but we found no per-user prices, seat minimums, add-on costs or term lengths on it, and automatic renewal is the only commercial term stated anywhere in the captures. Which plan carries Unlock with SSO, automated provisioning, events reporting and the audit log must be pieced together from support documentation rather than a price list, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 2 4 9 10 11 12
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about 1Password
Is 1Password European?
No. whats-best.ai classifies 1Password as Rest of world.
Where does 1Password store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does 1Password have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to 1Password?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: 1Password alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity, Data residency, Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 24 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 7 data facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 subprocessors fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (14)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage 1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page 1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy 1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service 1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 14 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap support.1password.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →