Password Management
Passbolt
EU-Made Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Passbolt SA · www.passbolt.com
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Passbolt at a glance
- Vendor
- Passbolt SA
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Passbolt 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. Passbolt is a password manager from Passbolt SA in Luxembourg, offered self-hosted or as a cloud service on Google Cloud Platform databases located in Europe. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 14 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Passbolt is a password manager from Passbolt SA in Luxembourg, offered self-hosted or as a cloud service on Google Cloud Platform databases located in Europe. The bench scores it highest where the evidence is most verifiable: security architecture at 7-8, built on fully open-source code including the commercial edition, OpenPGP client-side encryption and a published Cure53 white-box audit of the SCIM and directory-sync components; and deployment and portability at 7-8, with installation paths from Docker, deb/rpm and Helm to air-gapped self-hosting. Sharing and access control and audit and policy hold steady at 6. The visible splits are identity integration at 4-6, where the divergence turns on the captured pages giving no description of how the vault key is derived or released after single sign-on, and sovereignty at 4-6, where higher scorers credit self-hosting that removes the vendor from the data path while jurisdiction, ownership, data residency and subprocessor exposure are marked unknown. Pricing transparency falls to 1-3 — no public per-user price — though that score is not counted here. Weighted verdicts run from 5.6 to 7.0.
Speaks for it
- Fully open-source code including the commercial edition, with a bug bounty and a published Cure53 white-box penetration test and source-code audit of the SCIM, Azure AD and directory-sync components.
- Deployment paths from Docker, deb/rpm, Helm, a turn-key installer and a VM appliance to air-gapped use, with a documented move from cloud to self-hosted.
- Permissions set at the individual password level, folder trees shareable with a user or a team, and admin-approved account recovery through escrow.
- Cloud databases on Google Cloud Platform located in Europe, with a status page, or a standalone self-hosted server that requires no third-party service by default.
- API, CLI and SDKs for automating retrieval of secrets and machine credentials in CI/CD.
Held against it
- The captured pages give no description of how the vault key is derived or released after a single sign-on.
- No public information on which fields, such as URLs and metadata, stay unencrypted.
- Contracting entity's jurisdiction, ownership, data residency and subprocessor exposure marked unknown on the captured pages.
- No public information on log retention, on offboarding a leaver's shared items, or on emergency access.
- No public price figures, seat minimums, terms or VAT treatment, so an annual invoice cannot be computed from public information.
Best for
- You want to run a password manager inside your own infrastructure, up to air-gapped behind your firewall, and review the source yourself.
- You need per-password sharing across users, groups and whole folder trees, with admin-approved recovery when a user forgets a passphrase.
- You automate secrets for CI/CD and want API, CLI and SDK access.
- You buy on verifiable security evidence: open-source code, a published independent audit and a bug bounty.
Avoid if
- You plan to unlock vaults through single sign-on and need the key-derivation model documented before pointing your directory at the product.
- Your procurement requires a confirmed contracting entity and a published subprocessor list before signature.
- You must build an ISO 27001 or NIS2 evidence file with stated log retention and logging of each view and copy of a shared credential.
- You need published per-user prices to budget before contacting the vendor.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 4 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security pages describe OpenPGP end-to-end encryption with client-side key handling and critical operations done in the browser extension, and the vendor publishes a Cure53 white-box penetration test and source-code audit of its integration components with per-vulnerability fix versions and even a won't-fix item, alongside a bug bounty and one-hundred-percent open-source code I can have my own people review. I hold the mark back from the top because the security whitepaper is described as distributed to customers rather than posted publicly, the captured pages give no date for that audit, and no page states which fields — URLs and metadata included — are encrypted on the device and which are not. 5 6 7 1
The Identity Engineer
OpenPGP is named as the cryptography, the entire product including the commercial edition is open source for review, and an independent white-box penetration test and source-code audit of the SCIM, Azure AD and directory synchronisation components is published with the fixes listed per release. A security whitepaper, a bug bounty and a stated release process of auditing new integration surfaces are all on the record. We found no public information on which fields such as URLs or metadata stay unencrypted, and no documented past security incidents with their impact. 5 6 7
The Compliance Auditor
Open-source code including the commercial edition, a maintained security whitepaper, a bug bounty, and a published independent white-box penetration test and source-code audit of the SCIM and directory-synchronisation components with fix versions give me design claims I can check myself. What the captured pages do not give me is a statement of which fields stay unencrypted (URLs and metadata), named key derivation, or audits repeated yearly with full reports, so I stop short of the higher anchors. 5 6 7
The SME Owner
Client-side OpenPGP encryption with the entire product open source — even the paid version — plus a public bug bounty and a published audit of the SCIM and directory-sync components with fixes mapped to releases is more proof than most vendors show. What I could not find is a plain statement of which fields stay readable on the server side, and the certifications quoted are Google Cloud's rather than the vendor's own. 1 5 6 7
The DevOps Engineer
A maintained security white paper, named cryptography (OpenPGP client-side with bring-your-own PGP key, AES-256 at rest including backups), a bug bounty, and a Cure53 white-box penetration test and source-code audit of the SCIM, Azure AD and directory sync components with findings and fix versions published — and the whole product is open source, commercial edition included, so I can audit it myself. I found no public information on the passphrase key derivation or on which fields such as URLs and metadata stay unencrypted, which is what keeps this short of the top. 1 5 6 7
The Skeptic
The code is fully open source even in the commercial edition, built on OpenPGP with client-side encryption and a maintained security whitepaper — that is architecture, not adjectives. A named independent firm's white-box penetration test and source-code audit of the SCIM and directory-sync components was published with fixes tracked per release, and a bug bounty runs. I found no public information on incident history with impact, on repeated audits of the core cryptography, or on which fields such as URLs and metadata stay unencrypted — that silence is what keeps this below the top band. 1 5 6 7
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Permissions are set per password, folders and subfolders can be shared with individuals or teams, role-based access control and groups are named features, account recovery runs through admin approval with escrow, and revocation is claimed to work at the cryptographic level. We found no public information on what happens to a leaver's shared items on offboarding, on emergency access, or on view-only or time-limited sharing of ordinary vault items — just-in-time access is described only for privileged account management. 1 2 5
The Identity Engineer
Permissions are set at the level of a single password or an entire folder tree, with groups, role-based control and an admin-approved account recovery through escrow. We found no public information on what happens to a departing employee's shared items, nor on one-time or time-limited sharing, emergency access with a waiting period, or hiding a password while still allowing autofill. 1 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
Permissions are set at the password and folder level with groups and role-based access control, and account recovery requires admin approval under an escrow model with organisation-wide recovery policies — a recovery design whose workings I can name in the file. We found no public information on offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items, view-only or time-limited sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
Shared folders and subfolders per team with permissions set per password, groups with role-based access, and admin-approved account recovery under an escrow model — that is exactly the forgotten-master-password answer I need. I found no public information on what happens to a leaver's shared items, or on hiding a password while allowing autofill, time-limited or external one-time sharing. 1 2 5
The DevOps Engineer
Sharing is genuinely granular: permissions set at the individual password level, items or whole folder trees shareable with a user or a team, role-based access control with users and groups, admin-approved account recovery through escrow, and instant revocation at the cryptographic level in the privileged-access module with just-in-time and least-privilege controls. We found no public information on hiding a password while allowing autofill, time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 1 2 5
The Skeptic
Sharing is genuinely fine-grained — single items or whole folder trees, permissions set at the password level, groups and role-based access control, plus an admin-approved account recovery the vendor itself labels Escrow, so the key model is at least named. Cryptographic-level instant revocation and least-privilege enforcement for privileged accounts are stated. I found no public information on hiding a password while allowing autofill, time-limited or one-time sharing, emergency access with a waiting period, or the transfer of a leaver's shared items. 1 2 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Single sign-on with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS, LDAP and SCIM provisioning, and additional factors including Yubikey hardware keys are all named features, and the directory integration code has been through an external audit. The captured pages never say how the vault key is derived or released when a user unlocks through single sign-on — the first question I would ask before pointing my directory at this product — and we found no public information on automated suspension on deprovisioning or on passkey support. 2 5 7 1
The Identity Engineer
SSO with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS, LDAP provisioning and SCIM are listed on the Pro tiers, and the SCIM and Azure AD integration code has been independently audited with results published — the kind of assurance I want in the joiner-mover-leaver chain. However, we found no public information stating that disabling a directory account immediately suspends the vault, the key model behind the SSO unlock is covered only by a general statement that the private key is never sent in cleartext, and no mention of passkeys. Hardware keys are covered through Yubikey, alongside Duo and TOTP. 1 2 5 7
The Compliance Auditor
Single sign-on with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS, LDAP provisioning and SCIM, hardware keys among the MFA options, and MFA policies cover the identity stack, and the SCIM and Azure AD integration components were independently audited before being declared stable. The captured pages do not describe how the vault key is derived or released on an SSO unlock, and we found no public information on automated suspension on deprovisioning or on passkey support. 1 2 5 7
The SME Owner
SSO with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS ships in the Pro tier — the first paid one, not buried two tiers up — alongside LDAP and SCIM provisioning and YubiKey as an extra factor, and those identity components were audited before being declared stable. I found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released when a user signs in with SSO, or on passkey support. 1 2 5 7
The DevOps Engineer
The paid editions document single sign-on with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS, LDAP and SCIM provisioning of users and groups, and additional MFA with Yubikey, Duo or TOTP on top of the by-design private-key-plus-passphrase login — and the directory sync path was audited before being declared stable and is opt-in by default, which is more care than most vendors show. The captured pages give no description of how the vault key is derived or released after an SSO sign-in, and we found no public information on passkeys or automated suspension when a user is deprovisioned. 1 2 5 7
The Skeptic
SSO with Microsoft, Google, OpenID and AD FS, LDAP and SCIM provisioning, and MFA including Yubikey hardware keys are all on the captured pages, and the directory-sync components were independently audited and ship disabled by default. But I found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released after an SSO sign-in — precisely the point where SSO unlock so often means the vendor holds half the key. That gap holds this at the middle. 1 2 5 7
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
There is an activity log of changes, action logs shipped as syslogs or log files, export of user activity to your own monitoring systems, enforceable passphrase, MFA and password-expiry policies, and a health check with breached-passphrase reuse checks — a credible administrator's toolkit. We found no public information on log retention periods, on logging of item views and copies, or on compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and the certifications quoted on the security pages belong to the hosting provider rather than the vendor itself. 2 1 5 6
The Identity Engineer
An activity log of changes, action logs delivered as syslogs or log files that can be pushed to our own monitoring, and enforceable passphrase, MFA, password and password-expiry policies are all listed, together with a check against breached passwords. We found no public information on log retention, on enforceable policies for sharing or export, or on compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2 for an external audit. 1 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
User activity can be traced and exported to my own monitoring systems, action logs are available as syslogs or log files, and enforceable policies exist for user passphrase strength, MFA and password expiry, alongside a health check and breached-password screening. For an ISO 27001 or NIS2 file the gaps remain: we found no public information on logs covering views and copies specifically, stated log retention, sharing/export/browser-extension policies, or compliance report alignment — and who could see a shared credential last March is not something these pages let me answer. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
The Pro tier delivers an activity log of changes that exports to our own monitoring via syslog or log files, enforceable passphrase, MFA and password-expiry policies, and a health check with breached-password screening. I found no public information on log retention, on whether item views and copies are recorded, or on compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2. 1 2 5
The DevOps Engineer
Administrators get an activity log of changes, action logs delivered as syslog or log files towards your own monitoring, real-time activity monitoring, enforceable passphrase, password, MFA and password-expiry policies, plus a health check and breached-passphrase screening. We found no public information on stated log retention, policies governing sharing, export or browser-extension behaviour, or compliance reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2. 1 2 5
The Skeptic
An activity log of audit changes, action logs as syslogs or log files, user activity exportable to your own monitoring systems, and enforceable password, passphrase and MFA policies, topped with breached-password checking — the expected baseline is met and exportable. I found no public information on log retention periods, named SIEM targets, policies governing sharing or export, or whether each view and copy of a shared credential is recorded. Syslog gets you to your own SIEM; nothing captured promises what an auditor will ask to see. 1 2 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Both deployment paths are documented in detail: European cloud on named Google Cloud infrastructure, and self-hosting on your own systems by package, Docker container or virtual machine, with an air-gap option, a standalone server needing no third-party service, and an offline mode in beta; export and import run in kdbx and csv, and a move from cloud to self-hosted is described. Desktop coverage is thin in the evidence — a Windows desktop app is named and we found no public information on macOS or Linux desktop apps — and the status page is described for availability with no published incident history shown. 6 1 2 5 8
The Identity Engineer
Self-hosting is first-class — packages, Helm, Docker, a VM appliance, even air-gapped or high-availability setups — alongside a European cloud on Google Cloud, a status page, and an offline mode in beta, with kdbx and csv import/export and a described path from cloud to self-hosted. We found no public information on whether export preserves attachments, permissions or history, on the status page's incident history, or on native desktop apps beyond Windows. 1 2 5 6 8
The Compliance Auditor
Both a Europe-hosted cloud on Google Cloud Platform and self-hosting are documented, from Docker, virtual machine and package installs to air-gapped use, with a status page, a Windows desktop app, iOS and Android apps, six supported browsers, and kdbx/csv import-export including a documented path from cloud to self-hosted. Offline mode is marked Beta, and we found no public information on macOS or Linux desktop clients or on export covering attachments, so full-fidelity export is unproven. 1 2 5 6 8
The SME Owner
Both a European cloud on Google Cloud Platform and a self-hosted path are documented — Docker, virtual machine, packages, even a high-availability setup — with export from cloud to self-hosted and from paid to free, plus a status page and offline mode. That offline mode is labelled beta, and we found no public information on whether the export preserves attachments or TOTP seeds. 1 2 6 8
The DevOps Engineer
This is the story I want: self-hosted by turn-key installer, Docker container, Helm, deb/rpm packages or VM appliance, usable air-gapped behind my own firewall, from a Raspberry Pi to a high-availability setup, with a CLI, API and SDKs for CI/CD, a documented move from cloud to self-hosted (and paid to free), and the cloud itself on named European GCP infrastructure with a status page. Offline mode is still marked beta on the client side, and we found no public information on whether export preserves attachments, TOTP seeds, permissions or history — that is what costs the top marks. 1 2 3 5 6 8
The Skeptic
An EU cloud on Google Cloud Platform sits alongside a self-hosted path that runs all the way to air-gapped, with Docker, VM and turn-key installs, a documented move from cloud to self-hosted, and KeePass import and export — you can run and leave this on your own terms. Offline mode is labelled Beta, and I found no public information on macOS or Linux desktop apps, on whether exports carry attachments at full fidelity, or on any incident history behind the status page. Short of the top band by a beta label and those unanswered questions. 1 2 3 5 6 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The vendor's own pages state hosting in Europe on Google Cloud Platform and Made in Europe, and self-hosting can remove the vendor from the data path entirely. But the independently sourced attributes could not confirm the contracting entity's jurisdiction, ownership or data residency on the captured pages, we found no published subprocessor list with locations — Cloudflare appears in the chain for caching and firewalling, with Aikido alongside it — and we found no public information on a data processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs. 6 5 3 2
The Identity Engineer
The captured pages place all cloud data on Google Cloud databases in Europe and claim Made in Europe, with self-hosting that can remove the vendor from the data path entirely; the provenance names Passbolt SA in Luxembourg, though the independently computed attributes mark entity jurisdiction, ownership and data residency as unconfirmed on the captured pages. Cloudflare and Aikido appear as firewall and caching providers, but we found no published subprocessor list with locations and no public information on a data processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs. 1 3 5 6
The Compliance Auditor
Cloud hosting in Europe on Google Cloud Platform is stated, the product is marketed as Made in Europe, and self-hosting as a standalone component with no third-party service required removes the vendor from the data path. For the contracting file the chain is incomplete: the contracting entity and ownership were not confirmed on the captured pages, we found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations or a data-processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs, and the named hosting provider is not a European one — the ISO 27001 certificates cited belong to the hosting provider rather than the vendor. 3 5 6
The SME Owner
Cloud data sits in Google Cloud databases located in Europe, the product presents itself as made in Europe, and self-hosting behind our own firewall takes the vendor out of the data path. The captured pages give no confirmation of the contracting entity's jurisdiction, and while Cloudflare and Aikido are named for the WAF and caching, we found no published subprocessor list with locations; the certifications listed are Google's, not the vendor's own. 1 3 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
The cloud databases run on named European infrastructure (GCP, located in Europe) under a made-in-Europe banner, and the server is a standalone open-source component that requires no third-party service by default — so self-hosting takes the vendor out of the data path entirely, which counts heavily with me. The contracting entity's jurisdiction is not confirmed on the captured pages, we found no public information on subprocessors beyond Cloudflare for website caching and firewall, and nothing on a data-processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs. 3 5 6 8
The Skeptic
The cloud runs in Europe on Google Cloud Platform, the server works standalone without third-party services, and self-hosting or air-gapping takes the vendor out of the data path entirely — 'Made in Europe' on the page is a slogan, not a contracting entity. I found no public information on the legal entity and jurisdiction, on ownership, or on a published subprocessor list with locations, while Cloudflare and Aikido handle caching and the web application firewall. The self-hosting escape hatch earns real credit; the unconfirmed chain spends most of it. 1 3 5 6
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The pricing page publishes a clear tier structure with community, Pro and Enterprise features enumerated and support SLAs of next business day and four hours in business hours, so which features sit in which tier is knowable — single sign-on, SCIM and the activity log are all shown in Pro. But we found no price figures, seat minimums, term lengths or VAT treatment on the captured pages, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from public information. 2 3
The Identity Engineer
The captured pricing page lays out community, Pro and Enterprise tiers with their feature sets and support levels, but we found no public information on any per-user price, seat minimum, term or VAT treatment. The annual invoice cannot be computed from what is published. 2
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pricing page allocates features clearly across the Community, Pro and Enterprise editions, including support SLAs and consulting services, so a buyer can see which tier carries SSO, SCIM and the activity log. We found no public prices at all — no per-user rate, seat minimum, add-on price, minimum term or VAT treatment — so an annual invoice cannot be computed from the public pages. 2
The SME Owner
The pricing page is clear about structure: a free community edition, Pro carrying SSO, SCIM, audit logs and account recovery, and Enterprise adding consulting and a four-hour SLA — so I can at least see SSO is not hidden two tiers up. But we found no public information on any per-user price, seat minimum or minimum term, so I still cannot compute what forty people would cost me per year. 2 3
The DevOps Engineer
The pricing page publishes the community, professional and enterprise feature lists with their SLAs (next business day, four hours business-hours for enterprise), and the community edition is free and open source, so the self-hosted entry cost is knowable. But no per-user prices, seat minimums, licence terms or VAT treatment for the paid tiers appear on the captured pages, so an annual invoice cannot be computed from public information alone. 2 3
The Skeptic
The captured pricing page maps features to tiers legibly — Community, Pro with SSO, audit logs and SCIM, Enterprise with high-availability consulting and a four-hour business-hours SLA — but I found no public information on any price figure: no per-user rate, seat minimum, self-hosted licence, minimum term or VAT treatment. A buyer cannot compute even a rough invoice from these pages. The tier structure is public; the cost is not. 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Passbolt
Is Passbolt European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Passbolt as EU-Made.
Where does Passbolt store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does Passbolt have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Passbolt?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and 1Password (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Passbolt alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity, Data residency, Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 7 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 7 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (8)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.passbolt.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →