Password Management
Securden Password Vault for Enterprises
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Securden Inc. · securden.com
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Securden Password Vault for Enterprises at a glance
- Vendor
- Securden Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Securden Password Vault for Enterprises 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 3 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 3 Nov 2026. all sources
Securden Password Vault for Enterprises alternatives, European ones first →
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
No written verdict for this product
The panel scored Securden Password Vault for Enterprises, but the summary our synthesizer wrote did not survive our own contradiction check — twice. Rather than print a paragraph we cannot stand behind, we print none. Every score, rationale and source below is unaffected; read them and draw the conclusion yourself.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
A dedicated security-design page names AES-256, bcrypt password hashing with the hash itself encrypted, a unique random key per installation kept separate from the data and from backups, FIPS-compliant mode and Securosys HSM support for the master key. But the model is server-side: a Super Administrator can view all work-related passwords, and we found no list of which fields are or are not encrypted, no independent audit or certification with a firm name and date (a compliance certifications link appears but names nothing), no bug bounty or disclosure policy, and no documented incident history. 4 5
The Identity Engineer
The published security design page names real building blocks — AES-256 encryption, bcrypt hashing of user passwords with the hash itself encrypted, keys kept separate from data and backups, a unique key per installation, FIPS-compliant mode, and an optional Securosys HSM for the master key — but it is a server-side model, and I found no public information on client-side or end-to-end encryption, on which fields are covered, on independent audits or penetration tests, or on any named certification behind the compliance-certifications footer link. 4 3
The Compliance Auditor
A published security page names AES-256 for stored data and bcrypt for user passwords, with per-installation keys, key separation from the encrypted data, an optional Securosys HSM for the master key and a FIPS-compliant mode. The compliance certifications appear only as an unlabelled footer link, and we found no public information naming an independent audit, penetration test or certification result, on which fields are encrypted, on a bug bounty or on incident history. 4 3
The SME Owner
The security-design page names AES-256 for encryption and bcrypt for user passwords, and describes a unique key per installation kept apart from the encrypted data, FIPS-compliant mode and encrypted backups — a real step up from our Excel file. Everything described is performed at the Securden server rather than an end-to-end client-side model, and we found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests or a bug bounty beyond a footer link labelled Compliance Certifications. 3 4
The DevOps Engineer
The published security-design page names AES-256 encryption, bcrypt hashing with the hash encrypted under AES-256, a unique per-installation key held separate from the data, FIPS-compliant mode and Securosys HSM support for the master key — a server-centric design. We found no public information on independent audits or penetration tests with published reports, a bug bounty, incident history, or which fields beyond passwords are covered; the downloads page carries a compliance certifications link but names no certification. 4 3
The Skeptic
AES-256 and bcrypt are named, along with an installation-unique key, key separation for backups and a FIPS mode, but no captured page says where encryption happens, which fields stay readable, or how a user's key is derived. 'Compliance Certifications' appears only as a footer link with no certification, auditor or report named, and we found no public information on penetration tests, bug bounties or incident history. 4 3
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Four permission levels run down to launching RDP, SSH or web sessions without ever revealing the underlying password, with granular account- and folder-level sharing to groups, five predefined roles plus custom ones, time-limited encrypted sharing links to external vendors who need no account, and just-in-time access requiring administrator approval with auto-expiry and optional password reset. Offboarding is covered by an AD-synced deprovision path and a report on the passwords a leaver accessed, with mandatory account ownership so nothing is orphaned. We found no documentation of emergency access with a waiting period or of the key model behind admin recovery. 4 5 6 8 9
The Identity Engineer
Folders act as micro-vaults shared to groups with four permission levels, five predefined roles plus custom roles, grants that never reveal the underlying password while autofill keeps working, time-limited encrypted links for external vendors without an account, and just-in-time access with admin approval and auto-expiry. A leaver is handled with a report of the passwords they accessed, deprovisioning and a reset. I found no public information on the key model behind admin recovery, emergency access with a waiting period, or delegated administration per team, which keeps it short of the top band. 5 6 9
The Compliance Auditor
Five predefined roles plus custom roles, folders acting as micro-vaults, and four permission levels that include launching connections without ever revealing the underlying password are documented, alongside granular restrictions that can grant use while hiding the credential. Time-limited encrypted sharing with external parties without a Securden account, approval workflows for sensitive accounts with auto-expiry and optional password reset, and a leaver report covering which passwords a departing employee accessed cover most of what an offboarding control needs. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or on the key model behind admin account recovery. 5 6 9
The SME Owner
This is what my forty people would actually use: five predefined roles plus custom roles, folders shared as micro-vaults to groups, four permission levels including launching a connection without ever showing the underlying password, time-limited encrypted links to vendors with no account on their end, and just-in-time access requiring admin approval that auto-expires. Offboarding is documented — a report on the passwords a leaver accessed, then deprovision and reset, with every account having a defined owner — though we found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period or a documented recovery key model. 4 5 6 9
The DevOps Engineer
Folders act as micro-vaults shared to groups with four permission levels including launching connections without revealing the password, plus time-limited encrypted links for vendors who need no account, just-in-time access with approval and auto-expiry, a break-glass Super Administrator, custom roles, and an offboarding report of what a leaver accessed with deprovisioning and reset. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period, admin account recovery, or the key model behind recovery. 5 6 4 9
The Skeptic
Permissions run down to granting access without showing the underlying password, with four permission levels, custom roles, time-limited encrypted links to external parties that auto-expire, approval workflows with expiring access windows, and an offboarding report for leavers. We found no public information on admin account recovery and its key model, or on emergency access with a waiting period. 4 5 6 9 10
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SAML single sign-on with any provider, plus directory integration with Active Directory/Entra ID, LDAP and Google Workspace: continuous sync auto-onboards new AD users and reflects deletions and disables in the vault, and MFA is enforceable before vault access or credential retrieval with TOTP, Duo Security, YubiKey hardware keys and RADIUS. The captured pages do not document how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock, conditional access or device policies, or passkey support for users. 4 6 8
The Identity Engineer
The directory story is what I run daily and it is real: users and groups sync from Active Directory, Entra ID, LDAP or Google Workspace, new AD users are auto-onboarded, and when an account is deleted or disabled in AD the same is reflected in the vault — the leaver suspension I insist on — alongside SAML single sign-on, RADIUS, smartcard, and MFA including YubiKey. What I cannot verify is the key model behind the SSO unlock, and I found no public information on SCIM as such, passkeys for the vault itself, or conditional access and device policies. 8 4 6
The Compliance Auditor
Authentication is documented through SAML single sign-on with Active Directory, Entra ID, LDAP and Google Workspace, with continuous directory sync that auto-onboards new users and reflects deletions and disables immediately, and MFA enforcement for vault access and credential retrieval that includes YubiKey, Duo and TOTP. Directory group structures can be replicated to ease administration. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock, on passkey support, or on conditional access or device policies. 4 8 6
The SME Owner
Single sign-on with any SAML-based provider, authentication and continuous sync against Active Directory and Entra ID, LDAP and Google Workspace — new AD users are auto-onboarded and deletions or disables are reflected — plus MFA including YubiKey and smartcard authentication. That directory story is solid; we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind a single sign-on unlock, on passkey support, or on conditional access and device policies. 4 6 8
The DevOps Engineer
Authentication spans Active Directory and Entra ID, any SAML single sign-on, RADIUS and smartcards, with continuous sync of users and groups from AD, Entra ID, LDAP or Google Workspace that auto-onboards new AD users and reflects deletions and disables in the vault, and MFA covers TOTP, Duo, RADIUS and YubiKey hardware keys. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock, conditional access or device policies, SCIM, or passkey support. 4 6 8
The Skeptic
SAML SSO with any provider, directory sync from Active Directory, Entra ID, LDAP and Google Workspace with continuous sync that reflects deletions and disables, group replication and MFA including YubiKey and Duo are all documented. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock — the exact trust shortcut I read breach post-mortems about — nor on passkey support or conditional access and device policies. 4 6 8
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
Every password retrieval, connection launch, sharing action and permission change lands in a tamper-proof trail tied to user, timestamp and IP, tampering attempts trigger alerts, and a dedicated auditor role can read reports and trails without holding secrets — exactly what I want to hand an external auditor. Trails feed SIEM targets named as ArcSight, Splunk and any syslog-capable solution, and password-strength, reuse and compliance reports can be exported on demand or on schedule. We found no stated log retention period, no breach-monitoring report, and no compliance reporting aligned to a named framework such as ISO 27001 or NIS2. 4 5 6 9 10
The Identity Engineer
Every password retrieval, connection launch, sharing action and permission change lands in a tamper-proof trail tied to user, timestamp and IP, alerts fire on tampering attempts, and a dedicated auditor role can read the reports and trails — the shape my ISO 27001 auditors ask for. Events can be sent to Splunk, ArcSight or anything processing Syslog, reports export on demand or on a schedule, and password policy enforcement with reuse and weakness analysis is documented. I found no public information on log retention periods or reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2. 4 6 10 9 5
The Compliance Auditor
This is what I weigh first for an audit file, and it holds up: every password retrieval, connection launch, sharing action and permission change is captured in tamper-proof logs tied to user, timestamp and IP address, tampering attempts trigger alerts, and events can be sent to named SIEM targets including Splunk, ArcSight and any syslog-capable solution. An auditor role can read reports and trails without broader access, the password policy is enforced with compliance and strength reports including reuse and weakness analysis, ticket-ID enforcement can gate every password view, and administrators can restrict which users may export data for offline access. We found no stated log retention period and no reports aligned by name to ISO 27001, NIS2 or IT-Grundschutz, which is what I would still have to ask the vendor for. 4 6 9 10 12
The SME Owner
Tamper-proof trails tie every password retrieval, connection launch, sharing action and permission change to a user, timestamp and IP, with alerts on any tampering attempt, an enforced password policy with compliance reports, reuse and weakness analysis, and events shipped to Splunk, ArcSight or any syslog-capable SIEM. There is even an auditor role that sees reports and trails without password access, which my certification-minded customers will like; we found no public information on log retention periods or reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2. 4 6 9 10
The DevOps Engineer
Every retrieval, connection launch, sharing action and permission change lands in a tamper-proof trail tied to user, timestamp and IP with alerts on tampering and real-time or digest email notification, feeding ArcSight, Splunk or any syslog-capable solution; password policy is enforced with compliance and strength reports, report exports can be scheduled, an auditor role reads reports without touching secrets, and administrators can restrict who may export data for offline use. We found no public information on log retention periods, browser-extension behaviour policies, or reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz. 4 6 10 9 5 12
The Skeptic
Every retrieval, launch, sharing action and permission change is logged tamper-proof with user, timestamp and IP, tampering attempts trigger alerts, an auditor role reads trails and reports without passwords, and events ship to ArcSight, Splunk or syslog alongside password policy enforcement and reuse reports. We found no public information on log retention, breach-monitoring reports, or alignment of compliance reports to a named standard such as ISO 27001 or NIS2. 4 5 6 9 10
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Both a cloud version with data centres in the EU and USA and a fully documented on-premises deployment are offered, with hardware and OS requirements, high availability, encrypted backups with the key held separately, a choice of PostgreSQL or MS SQL Server, and browser access from any operating system. Offline access is an admin-controlled encrypted HTML export protected by a user passphrase that is not stored anywhere, deliverable on demand or by scheduled email — the pages themselves state there is no offline caching in extensions and mobile apps, which always connect to the server. We found no status page with incident history and no statement that the export preserves all item types, attachments or history. 4 11 12
The Identity Engineer
Both deployment paths I would evaluate are documented: on-premises on your own server with high availability and encrypted, key-separated backups, or SaaS with data stored in data centres in the EU and USA, plus private AWS or Azure clusters. Offline access is an encrypted HTML export with a user passphrase that opens in any browser and can be delivered on a schedule — but the security page states there is no offline caching in extensions and mobile apps, which always connect to the Securden server. I found no public information on Linux clients, a status page with incident history, or a full-fidelity export preserving structure and history. 11 4 12 6
The Compliance Auditor
On-premises installation on Windows servers, deployment on private AWS or Azure clusters, and a SaaS version storing data in data centres located in the EU and USA are all documented, reachable from any operating system through a browser with extensions for Chrome, Firefox, Edge and Safari. Offline access is handled by an admin-controlled export to an encrypted HTML file protected by a user-supplied passphrase that is not stored anywhere, deliverable on demand or on a schedule to a mailbox. We found no public information on a status page with incident history, on export covering all item types including attachments, or on import from other password managers — and the security page states there is no offline caching in the extensions and mobile apps, which always connect to the server to fetch data. 11 12 4
The SME Owner
Both models are documented — an on-premises install on our own Windows server and a SaaS version storing data in data centres in the EU and USA — with browser access from any operating system and an encrypted HTML offline export protected by a user passphrase that is not stored anywhere. The security page itself states there is no offline caching in extensions and mobile apps since they always connect to the Securden server, and we found no public information on a status page, native Linux clients or importing from other password managers. 4 11 12
The DevOps Engineer
On-premises install on physical or virtual Windows servers with stated hardware needs, bundled PostgreSQL or optional MS SQL, a single binary package, high availability with server and database separated, encrypted backups with the key held apart, private AWS or Azure clusters, and SaaS data centres in the EU and USA; offline access is an encrypted HTML export protected by a user passphrase stored nowhere, and token-authenticated APIs serve pipelines, though the vendor states extensions and mobile apps hold no offline cache. We found no public information on a status page with incident history, export fidelity for attachments and history, or a Linux build of the server. 11 4 12 5
The Skeptic
Self-hosting is documented in detail — on-premises on Windows with stated hardware requirements, bundled PostgreSQL or MS SQL, high availability, or private AWS and Azure clusters — and the offline export is an encrypted HTML file keyed to a user passphrase that is stored nowhere. The limit is stated plainly: 'There is no offline caching in extensions and mobile apps. They always connect to the Securden server', SaaS data sits in data centres 'in the EU and USA' with no region choice stated, and we found no public information on Linux clients, a status page, or a full-fidelity export of all item types. 3 4 11 12
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The contracting entity is Securden, Inc. with addresses in New Jersey and Delaware, the privacy policy states data from outside the United States may be transferred to and processed there, EEA data may be transferred outside the EEA under stated safeguards, and Google Analytics is named for web analytics. European elements do exist — data centres in the EU and a self-hosted on-premises version that takes the vendor out of the data path entirely — but we found no EU contracting entity or representative and no published data processing agreement on the captured pages. 2 8 11
The Identity Engineer
The chain is provably mixed rather than European: Securden, Inc. contracts out of New Jersey and Delaware, SaaS data sits in data centres in the EU and the USA, the privacy policy states data from outside the United States may be transferred to and processed there, and Google Analytics handles web analytics — while the on-premises edition takes the vendor out of the data path entirely. I found no public information on a published data processing agreement or a subprocessor list for the vault service itself. 11 2 10
The Compliance Auditor
The contracting entity is Securden, Inc. with addresses in New Jersey and Delaware, and the captured pages state data is stored in data centres located in the EU and USA; an on-premises self-hosted version removes the vendor from the data path. Google Analytics is named for the website, and EEA transfers are said to carry safeguards, while the privacy policy notes data may be transferred to and processed in the United States. We found no public information on an EU contracting entity or representative, on a published data processing agreement, or on a subprocessor list with locations for the hosted service, so the chain remains only partly proven. 2 11 12
The SME Owner
The contracting entity is Securden, Inc. with addresses in New Jersey and Delaware, the privacy policy says data from outside the United States may be transferred to and processed there, and Google Analytics runs on the website; the SaaS version stores data in EU and USA data centres. The genuine European lever is the on-premises version running on our own server; we found no public information on a published data-processing agreement, the wider subprocessor chain or an EU representative. 2 8 11
The DevOps Engineer
Securden, Inc. is a US company with New Jersey and Delaware addresses, the privacy policy states data may be transferred to and processed in the United States with Google Analytics named for web analytics, and SaaS data is described as encrypted and stored in data centres located in the EU and USA, though not as a customer-selectable EU region. The self-hosted edition takes the vendor out of the data path entirely. We found no public information on an EU contracting entity or representative, a published data processing agreement, or further named subprocessors with locations. 2 11 10 8
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is Securden, Inc. at New Jersey and Delaware addresses, the privacy policy says data from outside the US may be transferred to and processed in the United States, and Google Analytics is named for the website; SaaS data is stored across data centres 'in the EU and USA'. The self-hosted option is the one proven European element, removing the vendor from the data path; we found no public information on an EU entity or representative, a DPA, or a subprocessor list beyond web analytics. 2 3 11
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pages publish only trial and demo terms — a fully functional 30-day trial with no credit card required, alongside 14-day trial downloads, with the pages giving different trial figures — plus a "Book a Demo" request. We found no per-user or tier prices, seat minimums, add-on or self-hosting licence costs, billing periods or VAT treatment anywhere we read, so a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 1 3
The Identity Engineer
The only commercial terms on the captured pages are free trials — thirty days, fully functional, no credit card required on the downloads page, and a fourteen-day trial elsewhere — next to demo and download paths. We found no public information on per-user prices, tier contents, seat minimums, add-ons or minimum terms, so no annual cost can be computed from what is published. 3 12
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages give different figures for the free trial — thirty days fully functional with no credit card required on the downloads page, fourteen-day trials on the product pages — but we found no public price for any edition, no per-user figures, no seat minimums and no term conditions. Every path we could see from the homepage runs through a demo request or a trial download, so a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 1 3 10
The SME Owner
The only commercial terms I can find are free trials — the captured pages give different figures, fourteen days on the vault pages and a fully functional thirty days without a credit card on the downloads page — alongside a book-a-demo button. We found no public information on per-user prices, which tier includes single sign-on, seat minimums or contract terms, so I cannot begin to budget forty users from these pages. 1 3 6
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pages offer fully functional 14- and 30-day trials with no credit card required, but every commercial call to action is a demo booking or a trial download. We found no public information on per-user prices, which features sit in which tier, seat minimums, self-hosted licensing, minimum terms or VAT treatment, so a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 3 1 10
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Securden Password Vault for Enterprises
Is Securden Password Vault for Enterprises European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Securden Password Vault for Enterprises is based.
Where does Securden Password Vault for Enterprises store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
Does Securden Password Vault for Enterprises have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Securden Password Vault for Enterprises?
As of 3 Nov 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Bitwarden (3.5/5) and Proton Pass (3.5/5) highest among the other 23 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Securden Password Vault for Enterprises alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 3 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 25 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- The panel’s written verdict is withheld: our own re-read found claims in it that the evidence does not carry, and a second synthesis did not fix them. The scores and the material below are unaffected. Know more? Tell us
Sources (12)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Privacy policy — found from the homepage www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Self-hosting / on-premises installation docs — found from the homepage www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.securden.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →