Video Conferencing
Wire
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Wire Swiss GmbH · wire.com
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Wire Swiss GmbH's conferencing product is strongest on encryption and access, scoring 9-10: end-to-end encryption is the default for text, voice, video and files under Messaging Layer Security, the code is on GitHub and independently audited, and the vendor states it has no access to encryption keys and uses no backdoors. It is weakest on meeting core and reach and accessibility, both at 2-3: capacity numbers are published — video conferences up to 150 participants — but judges found no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation, browser joining, telephone dial-in or live captions. Recording governance split the judges 1-4: the works council judge saw the absence of any recording feature as removing a surveillance surface, while the skeptic and educator found nothing published on who may record or how long a recording lives. Sovereignty split 4-7 over the contracting entity in Zug and differing levels of hosting detail across the captured pages. Pricing transparency held at 5: €7.45 per person/month with annual payment and €8.94 monthly are published for teams up to 100 people, with 'Custom' above that.
Speaks for it
- End-to-end encryption is the default for text, voice, video and files under Messaging Layer Security, with the code on GitHub and stated as frequently independently audited
- An on-premises deployment is offered, with MLS protection stated for every feature across cloud and on-premises versions
- Prices and limits are published: €7.45 per person/month with annual payment, €8.94 per person/month monthly, a free tier for up to 5 people, and video conferences up to 150 participants
- Servers are stated to be in Germany and Ireland, with a complete subprocessor list published including locations
- SAML single sign-on, SCIM provisioning and an open-source SDK with documentation, sample apps and webhooks are documented
Held against it
- We found no public information on meeting recording — who may record, whether participants are told, where a recording sits or how long it lives — and recording governance split 1-4
- Meeting core scored 2-3, with no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms or host moderation such as mute-all
- Reach and accessibility scored 2-3, with no public information on browser joining, telephone dial-in, live captions or an accessibility statement
- We found no public information on calendar integration or room-system support, and the marketplace is announced for late 2025 rather than shipped
- Above 100 people the price is 'Custom', the optional support tiers carry no published figures, and we found no public information on VAT treatment or minimum term
Best for
- You need end-to-end encryption by default for text, voice, video and files — encryption and access scored 9-10, the strongest area judged
- You must be able to run the platform on your own infrastructure — on-premises deployment is offered with MLS protection stated across both cloud and on-premises versions
- You are a team of up to 100 people who wants a computable per-person invoice — €7.45 per person/month with annual payment and €8.94 monthly are published
- Your developers build their own tooling — an open-source SDK with documentation, sample apps and webhooks is available
Avoid if
- You need every participant able to join without installing anything, or you need live captions — reach and accessibility scored 2-3 with no public information on browser joining, dial-in or captions
- Your works council or compliance function requires documented recording controls before rollout — nothing published answers who may record or how long a recording lives
- You chair meetings that need host moderation such as mute-all or breakout rooms — meeting core scored 2-3 with no public information on either
- You need a predictable published invoice above 100 people — above that cap the price is 'Custom'
The scores
The meeting itself
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How this is scored
Whether the call works: participant capacity, video and audio quality under load, screen sharing, breakout rooms, moderation, and what happens on a bad connection.
0 — Small meetings only, no screen sharing worth the name, no moderation controls, and the call degrades without telling anyone.
3 — Standard meetings with screen sharing and mute-all, but low participant limits, no breakout rooms and no bandwidth adaptation stated.
5 — Meetings at the scale most teams need with screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation, and documented behaviour on constrained connections.
8 — Large meetings and webinars with published capacity limits, per-participant moderation and waiting rooms, layout control, simulcast or adaptive bitrate stated, and reliable behaviour on mobile networks.
10 — Scale and control are engineering claims the vendor stands behind: capacity published per plan and per region, selective forwarding with adaptive quality documented, live streaming, hardware-room support, and diagnostics an admin can read after a bad call.
The IT Administrator
Published capacity exists — video conferences up to 150 participants, with chat groups up to 2,000 under MLS — but that is where the published meeting story ends. We found no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation controls, behaviour on a constrained connection, or diagnostics an administrator can read after a bad call. When the board meeting stutters I have nothing published to hold the vendor to. 1 2 6
The Security Officer
Instant meetings with a published limit of 150 video conference participants on the paid tier are what the captured pages show of the call itself. I found no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation such as mute-all, or how the call behaves on a constrained connection — I have to score the silence. 1 2
The Works Council Advocate
The published pages give hard numbers only for capacity — video conferences up to 150 participants and chats up to 2,000 — while we found no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms, mute-all or any host moderation, nor on what a call does on a constrained connection. For the chair of a council meeting, none of the controls that make a meeting governable are documented. 1 2
The Educator
Video conferences are published at up to 150 participants on the paid team plan, but I found no public information on breakout rooms, on mute-all or other host moderation, or on how a call behaves when someone's connection drops to one bar — the three things my classroom needs most. Screen sharing in a call is never stated outright; the sharing that is documented is file sharing, and capacity above the team tier sits behind custom pricing. 1 2 6
The Accessibility Advocate
Video conferences are stated up to 150 participants with instant meetings and file sharing, and guest links can carry passwords, but I found no public information on breakout rooms, host moderation such as mute-all, screen sharing as distinct from file sharing, or what happens to the call on a constrained connection. Workable at team scale, undemonstrated under load. 1 2
The Skeptic
The pricing page publishes a 150-participant cap for video conferences on the paid tier, and instant meetings and conferencing are named core capabilities, but that is where the public information stops. I found no public information on screen sharing, breakout rooms, host moderation controls, waiting rooms, or documented behaviour on a constrained connection — a capacity number without the meeting mechanics a buyer needs. 1 2
Encryption & meeting access
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How this is scored
What is actually encrypted and against whom, plus who can get into a meeting. Judged on documented mechanism rather than on the word "encrypted".
0 — Transport encryption only, undocumented; meetings joinable by anyone with a link and no lobby.
3 — TLS in transit and encryption at rest, with the vendor holding all keys; access control is a passcode.
5 — The above plus a lobby or waiting room, host-controlled admission, per-meeting passcodes, and a clear statement that the vendor can technically access media.
8 — Optional end-to-end encryption for meetings with the trade-offs named (which features stop working), documented key handling, SSO-gated joining, and per-meeting access policies.
10 — End-to-end encryption available without surrendering the product — its cryptography documented or open source, key management explained, identity verification for participants, and the vendor stating plainly what it can and cannot see.
The IT Administrator
End-to-end encryption covers text, voice, video and files by default, built on MLS with TreeKEM, forward secrecy and post-compromise security, with the code 100 per cent open source and independently audited. The vendor states plainly it has no access to encryption keys and uses no backdoors, device fingerprints and ID Shield verify participants, and guest links are password-gated with admin-side restriction. This is the rare product where the cryptography is a published engineering standard rather than a marketing word. 2 4 6 7 9
The Security Officer
This is the case I usually have to dig for: text, voice, video and files are end-to-end encrypted by default under MLS, with the vendor stating plainly it has no access to encryption keys and no backdoors, and the server only ever seeing encrypted data. The cryptography is open source on GitHub and independently audited, forward secrecy and post-compromise security are named, device fingerprints can be verified with new-device notification, ID-Shield ties users to your identity provider, and guest links are password-protected and admin-restrictable. Key handling is explained down to the TreeKEM mechanism, so I have little left to ask. 2 3 4 7 9
The Works Council Advocate
The strongest case in this whole category: text, voice, video and files are end-to-end encrypted under MLS by default, the code is 100 per cent open source on GitHub, and the vendor states plainly it holds no encryption keys and uses no backdoors. Participants verify each other's device fingerprints, guests join only through password-protected links, and ID Shield binds identities to our own identity provider; the pages assert frequent independent audits without naming a specific report, which alone keeps it off the top mark. 2 3 4 6 7 9
The Educator
The strongest encryption record I have judged: end-to-end encryption covers text, voice, video and files by default, the cryptography is MLS with its key management explained, the source is open and independently audited, and the vendor states plainly that it has no access to encryption keys and uses no backdoors. Participants can verify each other's device fingerprints and ID Shield checks identity against your own identity provider. I hold back a point only because a lobby or per-meeting access policy is not documented — guest access rests on password-protected links. 2 4 7 9
The Accessibility Advocate
The strongest area by far: messages, calls, video and files are end-to-end encrypted by default under Messaging Layer Security with TreeKEM, forward secrecy and post-compromise security; the code is fully open source on GitHub and independently audited; participants verify each other through device fingerprints and ID Shield ties identities to the customer's own identity provider; and the vendor states plainly it has no access to encryption keys and uses no backdoors. Guests join through password-protected links that administrators can restrict. 3 4 6 7 9
The Skeptic
This is the one criterion written in full sentences: end-to-end encryption is the default for text, voice, video and files, protected by MLS across both cloud and on-premises versions, with the cryptography open source on GitHub, frequently independently audited, and a plain vendor statement that it has no access to encryption keys and uses no backdoors. Device fingerprint verification and ID Shield checks against the customer's own identity provider are documented. I hold back one point because guest links with passwords are the only joining control evidenced — I found no public information on per-meeting access policies or admission mechanics such as a lobby. 2 4 6 7 9
Reach & accessibility
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How this is scored
Whether everyone who needs to join can: browser without an install, dial-in, low bandwidth, guests without accounts, captions and keyboard operation.
0 — A desktop client is the only way in; guests must create an account.
3 — Browser joining exists but is degraded, guests can join by link, and there is no dial-in and no accessibility statement.
5 — Full-feature browser joining without an install, guest access by link, mobile apps, and a stated accessibility posture.
8 — Telephone dial-in with numbers listed, live captions, keyboard-navigable and screen-reader-tested interface, and documented low-bandwidth behaviour.
10 — Reach is designed for: browser parity with the client, dial-in across the regions the customer operates in, live captions and translation, a published accessibility conformance report, and a usable experience on a poor mobile connection.
The IT Administrator
Guests can join by password-protected link without an account, and an account runs on up to 8 devices. We found no public information on joining from a browser, telephone dial-in, live captions, keyboard or screen-reader support, an accessibility statement, or low-bandwidth behaviour — so I cannot tell the regional manager on a train what their meeting will look like. 1 2
The Security Officer
Guests can join by password-protected link without an account, and one account syncs across up to 8 devices — that is the whole of the reach story on these pages. I found no public information on browser joining without an install, telephone dial-in, live captions, keyboard or screen-reader operation, or behaviour on a poor mobile connection. 2 3
The Works Council Advocate
Guest access by password-protected link is documented, which spares external participants an account, but we found no public information on joining from a browser without an install, on telephone dial-in, on live captions, or on any accessibility statement. For colleagues on poor connections or using screen readers, the published pages say nothing. 2
The Educator
Guests can join by link with a password, which I value, but that is where the reach story ends: I found no public information on joining from a browser without an install, on telephone dial-in, on live captions, or on an accessibility statement. For the half of my class on a phone in a dead spot, and for the ones who need captions and keyboard operation, I cannot promise them a way in from what is published. 1 2
The Accessibility Advocate
The only reach item evidenced is guest access by password-protected link; I found no public information on browser joining without an install, telephone dial-in, live captions, keyboard operation, screen-reader testing, or a published accessibility conformance report. On this evidence a deaf colleague cannot follow a Wire meeting and a screen-reader user cannot run one — silence is a marketing page, not a conformance report. 1 2
The Skeptic
Guest links with passwords let outsiders join without an account, and a free tier lets anyone test the path in. Beyond that I found no public information on browser joining without an install, telephone dial-in, live captions, keyboard or screen-reader operation, or behaviour on low bandwidth — nothing that would let me say everyone who needs to join can. 1 2
Recordings, retention & admin control
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
A recording is personal data about everyone in the room. Who may record, who is told, where it is stored, how long it lives, and what the works council can switch off.
0 — Anyone can record, storage location unstated, no retention rule, no admin policy.
3 — Host-only recording with a notification, but storage region unstated, retention manual, and no organisation-wide policy control.
5 — Admin policy over who may record, participant notification and consent prompt, stated storage region, and manual deletion that works.
8 — Automatic retention and deletion per policy, recordings encrypted at rest with access logged, transcription handled with its own retention rule, and attendance or analytics features that can be switched off for co-determination.
10 — Built for a works agreement: every recording, transcript and analytics feature independently switchable and documented, retention executed and evidenced, an audit trail of who accessed which recording, and no participant-level behavioural scoring at all.
The IT Administrator
We found no public information on meeting recording at all — who may record, whether participants are told, where recordings are stored, or how long they live. The surrounding data hygiene is real and published: logs held at most 90 days, usage data deleted after 365 days, encrypted messages deleted after delivery, and an admin console that can restrict file sharing and guest links. But for the works council question of switching recording and analytics off, I have nothing published to answer with. 2 4
The Security Officer
I found no public information on meeting recording itself — not who may record, not whether participants are told, not where a recording would sit or how long it would live. What the pages do document is retention hygiene around everything else: encrypted messages deleted after delivery, logs kept at most 90 days, usage data deleted after 365 days, servers in Germany and Ireland, self-deleting messages, and an admin console that can restrict file sharing and guest links. 2 3 4
The Works Council Advocate
The published pages show no recording, transcription, attendance-tracking or engagement-scoring feature anywhere — which from a works-council chair's view removes the surveillance surface entirely — but they also leave every governance question open: we found no public information on who may record, who is told, where a recording sits or how long it lives. What is published is retention hygiene for everything else — messages deleted after delivery, logs at most 90 days, usage data at most 365 days — and an admin console that can restrict guest links, file sharing and third-party apps. 2 4
The Educator
I found no public information on recording at all — who may record, whether participants are told, where a recording is stored, or how long it is kept. The documented retention windows cover logs and usage data rather than recordings, and the admin console's switches govern file sharing and guest links but say nothing about capture, so a works council has nothing here to read or to switch off. 2 4
The Accessibility Advocate
I found no public information on recordings at all — who may record, whether participants are told, where recordings are stored, how long they live — and nothing about recordings or transcripts appears in the admin console's policy list. General retention hygiene exists, with logs kept at most 90 days, encrypted messages deleted after delivery, and analytics self-hosted in the EU, but none of it speaks to the recording question a works council will ask. 2 4
The Skeptic
I found no public information on meeting recording at all — not who may record, not whether participants are told, not where a recording is stored or how long it lives. The deletion rules published concern messages deleted after delivery, logs kept at most 90 days, usage data 365 days and payment data 12 months after termination; none of them is a recording rule, and the admin console evidences restrictions on file sharing and guest links but no organisation-wide recording policy. 2 4
Integrations & deployment
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How this is scored
Calendar, identity and the wider stack — plus, in this category, whether the product can be run on the customer's own infrastructure at all.
0 — No calendar integration, no SSO, no API; cloud-only with no alternative.
3 — One calendar integration and basic SSO, no API worth building on, cloud-only.
5 — Calendar integration for the major suites, SAML or OIDC SSO, a documented API for scheduling, and room-system support.
8 — The above plus SCIM provisioning, embedding via SDK, webhooks for meeting events, and either a self-hosted option or a documented private-cloud deployment.
10 — Deployment is the customer's choice: a genuine on-premises or private-cloud option with the same features, open protocols or open source, embeddable SDKs, and identity integration that does not require the vendor's directory.
The IT Administrator
SAML single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, and a genuine on-premises deployment with MLS protection stated across both cloud and on-premises versions — that deployment freedom is exactly what I want. The SDK ships with documentation, sample apps and webhooks, though it runs on the JVM today with TypeScript on the roadmap, and the marketplace is dated as coming in late 2025, so parts are promised rather than shipped. We found no public information on calendar integration or hardware room-system support, which is where a board's meeting calendar actually lives. 1 2 8 9
The Security Officer
Deployment is genuinely the customer's choice: on-premises is offered with every feature MLS-protected across cloud and on-premises alike, SAML SSO and SCIM sit in the admin console, an open-source SDK on JVM with TypeScript on the way supports webhooks and in-channel apps, and federation plus ID-Shield bind identity to your own provider. The gap I cannot overlook is the calendar and the meeting room: I found no public information on any calendar integration or room-system support, so the scheduling layer of the stack is invisible here. 1 2 7 8 9
The Works Council Advocate
SAML single sign-on with SCIM provisioning is documented on the paid tiers, the apps SDK is public and open source with webhooks for things like GitHub notifications, and — decisive for co-determination — a genuine on-premises deployment is offered with MLS stated to protect every feature in both cloud and on-premises versions. We found no public information on calendar integration or meeting-room system support. 1 2 6 8
The Educator
Identity and deployment are well covered: SAML single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, an open-source SDK with sample apps and webhooks, and a genuine on-premises option with the same MLS protection as the cloud. The two staples of a working week I look for are silent — I found no public information on calendar integration or meeting-room system support — and the marketplace itself is announced as coming in late 2025, with the captured pages describing the SDK's supported languages differently. 1 2 8 9
The Accessibility Advocate
SAML single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, an open-source SDK in JavaScript, TypeScript and on the JVM, webhooks through the GitHub sample app, first-party apps and a marketplace announced for late 2025 add up to a real platform, and a genuine on-premises deployment is supported with Messaging Layer Security applying across both cloud and on-premises. I found no public information on calendar integration for the major suites or room-system support, which meeting buyers reach for first. 1 2 8 9
The Skeptic
SAML single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, webhooks via the GitHub app, and an open-source SDK with documentation and sample apps are all evidenced, alongside both on-premises and private-cloud deployment with MLS protection stated for every feature in cloud and on-premises versions. I stop short of the top because the marketplace and TypeScript SDK are announced for late 2025 rather than shipped, and I found no public information on calendar integration or room-system support. 1 2 6 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
Where media and metadata are processed, who the contracting entity is, which subprocessors carry the traffic. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; scored here as this buyer weighs it — which in this category is heavily.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, media routed through unstated regions, subprocessors unnamed.
3 — EU data residency for storage while media relays or metadata remain non-EU, or the contracting entity sits outside the EU.
5 — EU hosting and an EU contracting entity, but parts of the chain — relays, analytics, support tooling, transcription — are non-EU without an explained safeguard.
8 — Media and metadata processed in the EU on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, complete subprocessor list published, any non-EU processing named with its legal basis.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: media never leaves the EU, every subprocessor European, certification published, and an on-premises option that removes the question entirely.
The IT Administrator
Servers sit in Germany and Ireland, the subprocessor list is published with locations, and the one US processor — Stripe for payments — is named together with standard contractual clauses and adequacy safeguards. But the contracting entity is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug, outside the EU with Wire Germany GmbH designated only as Article 27 representative, and the captured pages give different levels of detail on hosting: the privacy policy's subprocessor list attributes EU hosting to AWS while the security pages give only the provider's certifications without naming it, leaving Cloud Act exposure through that provider unresolvable from public pages. 3 4 5
The Security Officer
Media and data sit in Germany and Ireland, the hosting subprocessor is named as AWS in the EU, ISO 27001 and 27701 are published, a complete subprocessor list with locations is public, transfer safeguards are stated, and the on-premises option removes the hosting question entirely. What holds this back: the contracting entity is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug, Switzerland — Wire Germany GmbH appears only as an Article 27 GDPR representative — and payment processing runs through Stripe in the USA, named as a non-EU location in the published list. 1 3 4 5 6
The Works Council Advocate
Media and metadata are stated to sit on servers in Germany and Ireland, a complete subprocessor list is published naming AWS for EU hosting, self-hosted Countly in Germany and Stripe in the USA for payments, and transfers are covered by described adequacy or standard contractual clauses; the contracting entity, however, is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug, Switzerland, with only an Article 27 representative in Berlin. The on-premises option, which would end the question outright, is what keeps this high for a buyer who weighs sovereignty heavily. 1 3 4 5
The Educator
Media and metadata sit on servers in Germany and Ireland, the subprocessor list is published with locations, analytics are self-hosted in the EU, and the one US entry — Stripe for payments — is named alongside documented transfer safeguards. I weigh the gaps heavily: the contracting entity is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug, outside the EU, with a Berlin-registered EU representative, and the identity of the hosting provider is not confirmed on the captured pages; an on-premises option exists for those who must remove the question entirely. 1 3 4 5
The Accessibility Advocate
Servers sit in Germany and Ireland, the subprocessor list is published with AWS named for EU hosting and Stripe as the single USA-located entry, and transfer safeguards are documented; the security pages state server locations without naming the hosting provider, while the privacy policy's subprocessor list names AWS. The contracting entity is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug rather than an EU entity, with Wire Germany GmbH appointed only as the GDPR Article 27 representative — close, but the anchor weight of that gap keeps this below the top band. 3 4 5 6
The Skeptic
Servers are stated to be in Germany and Ireland and a complete subprocessor list is published with locations and transfer safeguards named, which is more than most. But the contracting entity is Wire Swiss GmbH in Zug — outside the EU — with only an Article 27 representative designated, the security pages never name the hosting infrastructure, and the privacy policy lists AWS as hosting subprocessor while the security pages leave the provider unnamed, so the captured pages give different pictures on who carries the traffic; exposure through US-parented support and analytics subprocessors cannot be ruled out from the pages alone. 3 4 5 7
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the annual invoice for their host count — including the capacity, dial-in and recording storage they actually need — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A per-host headline exists, but participant caps, dial-in minutes or recording storage are unpriced or unmentioned.
5 — Per-host prices public with billing period stated and capacity limits given, but at least one commonly needed piece (webinar capacity, dial-in, storage) sits in an unpriced add-on.
8 — Every tier and add-on priced publicly with per-host maths, capacity limits, dial-in rates, storage allowances, minimum term and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: a calculator producing the annual invoice for a given host count, meeting size and recording volume, including overage and per-region dial-in.
The IT Administrator
Per-person prices are public with the billing period stated — €7.45 per person/month with annual payment, €8.94 per person/month with monthly payment, for teams up to 100 people, with video conferences capped at 150 participants and chat limits given per tier. Enterprise above 100 people is custom pricing, and we found no public information on VAT treatment or minimum term. A small buyer can roughly compute the bill; an enterprise buyer is back in a sales conversation. 2
The Security Officer
The per-person prices are public with the billing period stated: €7.45 per person/month on annual payment or €8.94 per person/month on monthly payment for teams up to 100 people, with video conferences up to 150 participants and a free tier up to 5. Above 100 people every tier is 'Custom', and I found no public information on VAT treatment, minimum term, or what the optional support levels cost, so a larger buyer cannot compute an invoice from these pages. 2
The Works Council Advocate
Most of the invoice is readable from one page: €7.45 per person/month with annual payment or €8.94 monthly for teams up to 100, a free tier for up to 5 people, and capacity limits published (video conferences up to 150 participants). Above 100 people the price becomes a conversation, the Platinum 24/7 and 4-hour support options carry no published price, and we found no public information on VAT treatment or minimum term. 2
The Educator
Per-person prices are public with the billing period stated — "€7.45" per person/month for annual payment, "€8,94 per person/month" for monthly — and limits are given for chat groups and for 150-participant video conferences. But I found no public information on dial-in rates, recording storage, VAT treatment or minimum term, and everything above 100 people moves to custom pricing, so a buyer cannot compute the annual invoice from public pages alone. 2
The Accessibility Advocate
Per-person prices are public with the billing period stated — €7.45 per person/month on annual payment or €8.94 per person/month monthly for teams up to 100 people, with video capacity published at 150 participants — but Enterprise above 100 people is custom-priced only. I found no public information on dial-in rates, recording storage, VAT treatment or minimum term, so a small buyer can compute their invoice while a larger one cannot. 2
The Skeptic
€7.45 per person/month with annual payment and €8.94 per person/month with monthly payment are published, with the free tier's five-person cap, the paid tier's 100-person cap and a 150-participant conference limit stated. But above 100 people the price is simply "Custom", the support tiers marked "Optional" carry no figures, and I found no public information on dial-in rates, recording storage allowances, minimum term or VAT treatment — so the annual invoice for a real organisation cannot be computed from public pages. 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | EU only ⚠ unverified | 3/3 pts | 3 Report an error |
| Subprocessors | US CLOUD Act reach ⚠ unverified | 0/2 pts | 4 Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 15 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency. The hosting provider is not named, so any US parentage of that provider (and Cloud Act exposure) cannot be ruled out from the page alone.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. Zendesk is the only named customer-data subprocessor; Apple Push Notification and Google's FCM are mentioned for notifications (with no message data shared) and the hosting provider is never named, so exposure may be understated.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 9 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 7 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 data fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (9)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage wire.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing wire.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Security page wire.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Privacy policy wire.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Imprint wire.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption & meeting access — found from sitemap wire.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Encryption & meeting access — found from sitemap wire.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Integrations & deployment — found from sitemap wire.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Integrations & deployment — found from sitemap wire.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →