Whistleblowing Portals
Whistleblower Software by Formalize
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 3 of 4 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Whistleblower Software ApS · whistleblowersoftware.com
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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
No written verdict for this product
The panel scored Whistleblower Software by Formalize, but the summary our synthesizer wrote did not survive our own contradiction check — twice. Rather than print a paragraph we cannot stand behind, we print none. Every score, rationale and source below is unaffected; read them and draw the conclusion yourself.
The scores
Reporting channels & reporter experience
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How this is scored
The intake side: how a reporter actually submits — web form, anonymous dialog, phone/voice, languages, accessibility — and whether anonymity survives first contact.
0 — A web form that is an email in disguise: no anonymous route, no way to reach the reporter afterwards.
3 — An anonymous form exists but the dialogue ends there — no secured mailbox for follow-up questions, few languages, desktop-only.
5 — Anonymous two-way dialog via a protected mailbox, a usable set of languages, mobile-friendly; voice or phone intake missing or an add-on.
8 — Multiple channels (web, voice message or hotline, QR entry points), broad language coverage with translation support, accessibility considered, and the anonymous dialog is first-class rather than bolted on.
10 — Intake engineered around the frightened reporter: every channel anonymous-capable, dozens of languages, WCAG-conscious, no app install or account required, and the vendor documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself.
The Compliance Officer
Anonymous and confidential reporting with two-way follow-up dialog is first-class, and 80+ system languages plus an audited WCAG 2.1 AA rating beat the mid anchor comfortably. What holds it below 8: no evidence anywhere of phone/voice intake, hotline, or alternative entry channels for the frightened reporter. 1 4
The Reporter's Advocate
The anonymous two-way dialog is first-class — E2EE means not even the vendor can read case data, 80+ languages dwarf the usual offering, and WCAG 2.1 AA was actually audited by TÜV. But the evidence shows not one non-web intake channel: no hotline, no voice message, no QR entry for the night-shift worker with only a phone, and the one metadata statement I can find retains IPs up to 14 months rather than promising the reporter's trail is invisible. 1 4 6
The SME Operator
Anonymous and confidential reporting with two-way follow-up communication, 80+ system languages and an audited WCAG 2.1 AA rating from TÜV mean a frightened employee can actually file and keep a dialog going. No voice message, hotline or QR entry appears anywhere in the evidence, so it lands short of the top anchor. 1 4 6
The Group Counsel
Anonymous and confidential intake with two-way follow-up plus an 80+ language system and a TÜV-audited WCAG 2.1 AA certificate clear the two-way bar comfortably. But the evidence evidences exactly one web channel — no phone, voice message or QR intake anywhere — and nothing documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself. 1 4
The Security Auditor
Anonymous and confidential reporting with two-way post-submission dialog is confirmed, and 80+ system languages plus an actually audited WCAG 2.1 AA (TÜV, Sep 2023) beat the median offering. But there is zero evidence of voice or hotline intake, QR entry, or any documented answer to how the reporter's identity stays out of the channel metadata — the anchor-8 channel diversity is simply absent. 1 4 6
The Skeptic
Anonymous/confidential intake with two-way follow-up is claimed, and 80+ system languages plus a TÜV-audited WCAG 2.1 AA certificate are real paper — but there is no voice, phone or QR intake channel anywhere in the evidence, and the only IP statement on file retains IP addresses up to 14 months with nothing documenting that the reporting channel itself is log-free. Good dialog; unproven channel anonymity. 1 4 5
Case management & deadline discipline
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How this is scored
The case worker's side: triage, statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback), role separation, audit-proof documentation.
0 — Reports land in an inbox; deadlines, roles and history live in a spreadsheet next door.
3 — A case list with status fields, but deadlines are manual, permissions are all-or-nothing, and the record of who did what is thin.
5 — Deadline tracking with reminders for the statutory clocks, case notes and attachments, basic role separation between case handlers; reporting on the caseload is limited.
8 — Automated statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest handling (excluding implicated case handlers), complete tamper-evident case history, retention and deletion rules applied per case, and management reporting.
10 — A case system an external investigator can rely on: enforced workflows, full audit trail, legally aware retention/deletion automation, evidence handling, and statistics that survive a regulator's questions.
The Compliance Officer
Case-level and category-level access control, a 4-eye principle and pseudonymization for multi-handler cases show genuine role separation — better than the all-or-nothing anchor at 3. But 'advanced case management' is a plan bullet with nothing behind it in this sheet: no statutory clocks, no deadline reminders for the 7-day/3-month duties, no tamper-evident history, no caseload reporting, and deadlines are precisely what I answer for. 4 1 6
The Reporter's Advocate
Case-level and category-level access, the 4-eye principle, and anonymize/pseudonymize for multi-handler cases are real separation. But the evidence is completely silent on the statutory clocks — no 7-day acknowledgment tracking, no 3-month feedback reminders, no tamper-evident history, no per-case retention — and 'Advanced case management' is a marketing word with nothing behind it here. 1 4 6
The SME Operator
Case-level and category-level access control plus the 4-eye principle and redaction is genuine role separation, and 'unlimited cases' covers the volume. But the evidence shows zero evidence of the 7-day acknowledgment or 3-month feedback clocks, a tamper-proof case history, or per-case retention — 'Advanced case management' is a label, not a feature — so the deadline discipline lands on my desk. 1 4 6
The Group Counsel
Case-level and category-level access control and the 4-eye principle are genuine separation primitives, better than all-or-nothing. But 'Advanced case management' is a bare bullet, and the evidence is completely silent on statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest exclusion, tamper-evident history and caseload reporting — the deadline discipline I am contractually on the hook for is unevidenced. 1 4 6
The Security Auditor
Case-level and category-level access control plus handler-side anonymize/pseudonymize are real, checkable controls. But 'Advanced case management' is an adjective with nothing behind it, and the evidence is completely silent on statutory clocks, tamper-evident history, and per-case retention — silence on deadlines is the score. 4 6 1
The Skeptic
Case-level and category-level access control and a 4-eye principle are genuinely granular permissions, better than all-or-nothing — but 'Advanced case management' is a label, not a feature list: no statutory 7-day/3-month clocks, no conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, no tamper-evident history, no retention automation and no caseload reporting appear anywhere in evidence. 1 4 6
Legal compliance alignment
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How this is scored
How specifically the product implements EU Directive 2019/1937 and national transpositions (HinSchG et al.) — not whether the marketing mentions them.
0 — Generic feedback software wearing a whistleblowing label; no reference to the legal obligations it claims to satisfy.
3 — The directive is invoked in marketing but the mapping is vague; deadline rules, documentation duties and retention periods are the customer's problem.
5 — The statutory duties are implemented as product features — acknowledgment and feedback clocks, documentation, deletion after the retention period — for at least one national law, with guidance for the rest.
8 — Multiple national transpositions supported with their differing details, legal templates and process guidance maintained by named counsel or documented review, and updates when the law moves.
10 — The product is a legal instrument: per-country rule sets kept current, documented legal review, guidance for edge cases (group-wide channels, external ombudsman setups), and the vendor shows its homework in public.
The Compliance Officer
The EU Directive 2019/1937 is named, alongside SOX 301, UK FCA and Loi Sapin II, but it is a list on a security page — no acknowledgment or feedback clocks as features, no retention implementation for case data, no transposition-specific rules, no named counsel. The mapping to actual duties is left as the customer's problem, which is exactly the anchor at 3. 4 3
The Reporter's Advocate
A law list on the security page invokes the Directive, SOX 301, FCA, the German Code and Sapin II, and the marketing promises EU whistleblowing compliance — that is naming, not implementing. Nothing evidences deadline automation, documentation duties, retention periods per law, per-country rule sets, or any named counsel; the legal homework looks like the customer's problem. 1 3 4
The SME Operator
The security page name-drops the EU Directive, Sapin II and a German corporate code and the parent page says it 'helps comply with EU whistleblowing laws' — that is a marketing mapping, not implementation: no acknowledgment/feedback clocks, no documentation duties, no case retention periods (the only retention rules in cover marketing contacts and technical logs), no named counsel. The legal homework stays with me. 3 4 5
The Group Counsel
The Directive and several national frameworks are named on a page — EU 2019/1937, Loi Sapin II, a German governance code — plus 'comply with EU whistleblowing laws' marketing, but naming is not implementing: no acknowledgment or feedback clocks, no per-country retention, no HinSchG specifics, no named counsel review anywhere. The legal mapping remains the customer's problem. 3 4
The Security Auditor
Five regimes are name-dropped — Directive 2019/1937, SOX 301, FCA, German Code, Loi Sapin II — with no mapping to product behavior beyond a 4-eye principle, and the citation itself is botched ('2019/19378'), which tells you the level of legal care. No acknowledgment or feedback clocks, no documented duty implementation anywhere; deadlines are the customer's problem. 4 1 3
The Skeptic
The security page name-drops the directive — mistyped as '2019/19378' — alongside SOX 301, FCA, the German Corporate Governance Code and Loi Sapin II, which is law-collecting, not implementation; no acknowledgment/feedback deadline features, no national transposition details (HinSchG, Danish act), no named counsel and no legal-update commitment exist in the evidence. 'Helps comply with EU whistleblowing laws' is exactly the vague mapping rubric level 3 describes. 3 4
Security & anonymity assurance
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How this is scored
Whether the confidentiality promise is engineered and evidenced: encryption, metadata handling, penetration tests, certifications.
0 — Security is a paragraph of adjectives; no certificates, no test reports, no statement on metadata.
3 — TLS and encryption at rest asserted, but nothing audited: no ISO 27001 or equivalent, no published pentest, silence on IP and metadata logging.
5 — A current ISO 27001 (or equivalent) certificate for vendor or hosting, end-to-end encryption of report content claimed with some technical detail, an explicit no-IP-logging statement.
8 — Certified ISMS covering the product, regular third-party penetration tests attested, documented end-to-end encryption architecture, metadata minimization explained, security contact and disclosure policy published.
10 — Assurance a hostile auditor accepts: current certificates with visible scope, recurring pentest summaries public, cryptographic architecture documented, anonymity analysed against the operator itself — the vendor can answer "how would you unmask a reporter?" with "we cannot, and here is why".
The Compliance Officer
Current ISO 27001:2022 (Intertek, Nov 2024), annual ISAE 3000 Type 2, back-to-back Truesec pentests and ENS High, plus E2EE where the vendor states its own staff cannot read case data — that is real, attested assurance. It misses 8 because there is no metadata minimization story (IP retained up to 14 months), no published security contact or disclosure policy, no cryptographic architecture, and no 'how would you unmask a reporter' analysis. 4 1 5
The Reporter's Advocate
The assurance stack is real and dated — ISO/IEC 27001:2022 by Intertek, annual ISAE 3000 Type 2, ENS High, recurring Truesec pentests in 2023 and 2024 — and the claim that only the key holder can view case data is the right shape for operator-proof anonymity. But metadata minimization is unexplained, there is no security contact or disclosure policy, and the only IP statement I can find keeps IPs up to 14 months; nobody here answers 'how would you unmask a reporter?' 1 4 5
The SME Operator
Current ISO/IEC 27001:2022 via Intertek, an annual ISAE 3000 Type 2, and TrueSec pentests in 2023 and 2024 is a stack I could hand a client, and E2EE where even the vendor's own staff cannot read case data is the right claim. It stops short of 8: no no-IP-logging statement for the report channel (the privacy policy actually logs IP for up to 14 months on the website), no documented encryption architecture, and no published security contact or disclosure policy. 1 4 5
The Group Counsel
The certificate stack is genuinely strong — ISO/IEC 27001:2022 by Intertek, annual ISAE 3000 Type 2, Truesec pentests in both 2023 and 2024, ENS High — and the E2EE claim that 'not even employees' can see case data is architectural, not adjectival. Held below 8 because the ISMS scope is not visible, no security disclosure policy or contact is evidenced, and the privacy policy discloses IP retention for up to 14 months where anonymity assurance wants a no-IP-logging statement and metadata minimization. 1 4 5
The Security Auditor
The certificate wall is genuinely good: ISO 27001:2022 by Intertek (Nov 2024), annual ISAE 3000 Type 2 by Beierholm, pentests by Truesec in 2023 and 2024, plus a zero-knowledge E2EE claim that even vendor staff can't read case data. But scope of the ISO cert is unstated, the last pentest on record is over two years stale at capture, the privacy policy admits IP retention for 14 months with no no-IP-logging statement for the channel, and there is no cryptographic architecture document or security contact/disclosure policy — I cannot verify 'how would you unmask a reporter?' from this sheet. 4 1 5
The Skeptic
Unusually real certification trail — ISO/IEC 27001:2022 by Intertek, annual ISAE 3000 Type 2 by Beierholm, Truesec pentests in 2023 and 2024, E2EE with a key-holder claim — but no pentest summaries are published, there is no security contact or disclosure policy, no metadata-minimization statement, and a 14-month IP retention clause sits next to the anonymity pitch, with SMS offered as the example MFA. Certified, yes; auditor-hostile, no. 1 4 5
Group & multi-entity capability
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How this is scored
Whether one contract can serve a corporate group: separate channels per legal entity, central oversight, ombudsman access, white-labeling.
0 — One company, one channel; a group buys and administers N separate instances.
3 — Multiple channels under one account, but no separation of case access per entity and no consolidated view.
5 — Per-entity channels with separated case handlers and a group-level overview; branding per entity is basic; external counsel access possible.
8 — Real multi-tenant group structure: per-entity channels, languages and branding, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles, group reporting that respects entity boundaries.
10 — Group compliance as architecture: hundreds of entities manageable centrally, per-country legal rule assignment per entity, white-label reporting pages, and access separation strong enough to satisfy each subsidiary's works council.
The Compliance Officer
Unlimited channels, users and languages with case-level access separation and a claimed 5,000,000+ employee footprint gesture at scale, but nothing evidences per-legal-entity channel structure, a group-level consolidated view, external counsel/ombudsman access, delegated administration, or per-entity branding. A corporate group here buys promises, not architecture. 1 4 3
The Reporter's Advocate
'Unlimited channels' with case-level access control gives a one-account-many-channels shape with genuine access granularity, and the vendor claims 5M+ employees covered. But nothing evidences per-entity channel separation, group-level oversight, external ombudsman roles, delegated administration or white-labeling — the group architecture this criterion asks about is simply not on the evidence. 1 3 4
The SME Operator
Unlimited channels with case-level access and pseudonymization across multiple handlers would let me split duties, but that is the ceiling of what's evidenced. Nothing on per-entity branding, a group-level overview, delegated administration or ombudsman roles — adequate for my single entity, thin for a group. 1 4
The Group Counsel
'Unlimited cases, users, languages and channels' and individual case-level access plus SAML/SCIM provisioning are raw material for per-entity separation, but nothing ties access to legal entities: no group-level overview, no delegated administration, no external ombudsman role, no per-entity branding. Rolling this to 25 subsidiaries would be 25 unproven assumptions, not one system. 1 4 6
The Security Auditor
Unlimited channels combined with case-level and category-level access grants give real separation between handler populations, and SAML/SCIM ease provisioning. Nothing evidences a consolidated group view, per-entity branding, delegated administration, or ombudsman roles — a group would be buying the structure on trust, and the 5M-employee claim is coverage marketing, not group architecture. 1 4 6
The Skeptic
'Unlimited channels, users' plus case-level access separation buys multiple channels with fine-grained permissions, but nothing evidences per-legal-entity channel structure, a consolidated group view, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles or per-entity branding. A group can technically share one account; whether that satisfies each subsidiary's separation demands is undemonstrated. 1 4
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Where reports about people actually live and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. In this category the data is by definition the most sensitive a company holds.
0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for whistleblowing data.
3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.
5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.
8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.
10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors for report content and metadata, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.
The Compliance Officer
Danish controller (Formalize ApS, Aarhus), all data and backups on AWS in Frankfurt, intra-group transfers confined to Denmark, Spain and Italy, and Schrems II acknowledged — that clears the mid anchor. Below 8 because the subprocessor list is only available on request, Google Analytics and other US-reach services appear in the chain, no public DPA/TOMs are evidenced, and the host itself (AWS) sits within US CLOUD Act reach. 5 4 6
The Reporter's Advocate
The confirmed parts are good: a Danish controller, Formalize ApS in Aarhus, all data and backups in AWS Frankfurt with EEA-only intra-group transfers. But the subprocessor list is available only on request rather than published, AWS Frankfurt sits under a US parent's CLOUD Act reach, and the evidence itself flags residency, ownership and subprocessor exposure as unverified — 'unknown' is not where the most sensitive data a company holds should live. 4 5 6
The SME Operator
Danish controller (Formalize ApS, Aarhus), all data and backups with AWS in Frankfurt, and group transfers only between Denmark, Spain and Italy — the sensitive material plausibly never leaves the EEA. But the subprocessor list is only available on request rather than published, Google Analytics sits among subprocessor categories, and AWS itself remains within US CLOUD Act reach, so the chain is not proven clean end to end. 4 5
The Group Counsel
EU hosting is the default and named — AWS Frankfurt with backups in EU availability zones — under a Danish controller entity with EEA-only intra-group transfers and a Schrems II nod, which beats 'EU on request'. But the subprocessor list is unpublished (request-only) with Google Analytics sitting in the categories, AWS remains a US-parent critical processor, and no DPA or TOMs appear in the evidence — for the most sensitive data a group holds, that chain is not clean enough. 4 5 6
The Security Auditor
The basics are clean: Danish controller in Aarhus, data and backups on AWS in Frankfurt with the region named, and intra-group transfers confined to Denmark, Spain and Italy. But the subprocessor list exists only on request — with Google Analytics and marketing automation named as categories and no statement of whether any touch the reporting path — and AWS itself sits under US CLOUD Act reach, so the chain is neither published nor jurisdictionally closed. 5 4 1
The Skeptic
Danish controller, all data and backups on AWS in Frankfurt with the region named, EEA-only intra-group transfers — but AWS is a US-parent critical processor, the subprocessor list is request-only rather than published (with Google Analytics sitting in the disclosed categories), and no DPA or TOMs appear in the evidence. That is the anchor-5 profile exactly: EU hosting default with non-EU jurisdictional reach on the critical processor. 1 4 5
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether an obligated company can compute the real invoice — per entity, per employee band, per year — from public pages alone.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — An entry price exists, but the tiers most obligated companies need are unpriced, or the maths is obscured by employee bands, per-report fees or mandatory setup charges.
5 — Most tiers carry real numbers with billing period and VAT treatment stated, but at least one commonly needed capability — extra entities, extra languages, phone intake — hides in an unpriced add-on.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with employee-band boundaries, entity rules and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.
10 — Complete price computability: every tier, band, add-on and renewal rule public, so the invoice for a 60-employee company and a 5-entity group is a two-minute exercise.
The Compliance Officer
For my 600 employees the invoice is a two-minute exercise: 500-999 band at €349/€529 per month, billed annually in EUR, with a 14-day trial and clean band boundaries on two named tiers. Held below 8 because VAT treatment is unstated, setup fees are never mentioned, the multi-entity rule is unspecified, and 1,000+ employees drops to 'contact sales'. 6 1
The Reporter's Advocate
Both tiers carry real per-band numbers up to 999 employees with 'billed annually' stated, so a mid-sized obligated company can roughly compute the invoice. But VAT treatment, setup fees and any entity or add-on pricing are absent, the 1000+ band is a sales conversation, and the generic 'unlimited channels' does not tell me what a second legal entity costs. 1 6
The SME Operator
Both tiers carry real numbers for every band up to 999 employees with 'billed annually' stated — at 60 staff that's Core at €149/month, roughly €1,788 a year — and unlimited cases, users, languages and channels means no per-report fees, the exact model I refuse on principle; the 20-minute setup and 14-day trial seal it. Not an 8 because VAT treatment, setup fees and what an extra entity costs are never stated, so the invoice is computable for me but not for a 5-entity group. 1 6
The Group Counsel
Both tiers carry a full employee-band ladder in real euros with annual billing stated, and 'unlimited languages and channels' suggests no per-language gouging. But the evidence never says whether one subscription covers one entity or a corporate group — the exact question a 25-subsidiary buyer needs answered — VAT treatment is unstated, and 1000+ employees is 'contact sales', so the group invoice is not computable from public pages. 1 6
The Security Auditor
Two complete public tier tables with employee-band boundaries and annual billing stated let a 60-employee company compute its invoice in a minute, and 'unlimited cases, users, languages and channels' eliminates the usual per-entity and per-language add-on fog. VAT treatment and any setup fees are unstated and the 1000+ band is a sales conversation — deductions, not disqualifiers. 6 1
The Skeptic
Two plans carry real numbers with explicit employee-band boundaries and an asterisked 'billed annually' disclosure — the monthly-figure-for-annual-commitment optics are at least admitted. But VAT treatment is silent, setup fees are silent, everything above 999 employees is 'Contact sales', and per-entity terms rest on nothing more than a homepage 'unlimited channels' claim. 1 6
European sovereignty — proven facts
3 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in DK ⚠ unverified | 3/3 pts | 5 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | EU only ⚠ unverified | 3/3 pts | 4 Report an error |
| Subprocessors | US CLOUD Act reach ⚠ unverified | 0/2 pts | 4 Report an error |
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 15 Sep 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The country appears only in a privacy-policy address for the data controller Formalize ApS, with no imprint or commercial register excerpt, and the site footer names a differently worded entity, Whistleblower Software ApS.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency. The placement statement sits on the vendor's own security page, and backups are only said to lie in unnamed 'different availability zones', so the contractual default is not confirmed.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. AWS is a US-headquartered provider subject to the US CLOUD Act even though the servers are in Frankfurt, and no EU contracting entity of the US parent is named, though the vendor claims E2EE prevents cross-Atlantic government access.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 1 legal fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 pricing fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
- The panel’s written verdict is withheld: our own re-read found claims in it that the evidence does not carry, and a second synthesis did not fix them. The scores and the material below are unaffected. Know more? Tell us
Sources (6)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Product homepage whistleblowersoftware.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 2 About page whistleblowersoftware.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 3 Parent brand Formalize about page formalize.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 4 Security page whistleblowersoftware.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 5 Privacy policy whistleblowersoftware.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
- 6 Pricing page whistleblowersoftware.com Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →