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Password Management

BeyondTrust Password Safe

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Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by BeyondTrust Corporation · beyondtrust.com

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BeyondTrust Password Safe: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai BeyondTrust Password Safe: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai (dark)

Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds. The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.

BeyondTrust Password Safe at a glance

Vendor
BeyondTrust Corporation
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates BeyondTrust Password Safe 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. BeyondTrust Password Safe scores highest on identity integration and deployment and portability, where scores cluster at 5 to 6. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 3 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 3 Nov 2026. all sources

BeyondTrust Password Safe alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The DevOps Engineer

Weighted verdict

Would rather run the vault in the company's own data centre than trust another SaaS with root credentials. Wants a documented self-hosted deployment with backup and high availability, open-source code to read, a CLI and API for pipelines, and an export that loses nothing.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The DevOps Engineer

Panel median The DevOps Engineer This judge’s scores over the panel median. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median The DevOps Engineer
Encryption model & independent audits 2 of 5 2 of 5
Sharing, roles & recovery 2.5 of 5 2 of 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning 3 of 5 3 of 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting 3 of 5 3 of 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export 3 of 5 3 of 5
European sovereignty 1.5 of 5 1.5 of 5

Encryption model & independent audits

How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.

3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.

5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.

8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

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The DevOps Engineer

The cloud security page names real examinations — SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 for the environment — plus third-party penetration tests, source-code review, and a customer's right to run their own penetration test once a calendar year with notice. The cryptography story stops at transport and appliance storage: TLS 1.2 with older versions disableable, and an encryption page managing session recordings behind a secret store. We found no public information on the algorithm or key derivation protecting stored vault credentials, published audit reports, or open-source clients I could review myself. 1 2 10

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Sharing, roles & recovery

How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.

3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.

8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

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The DevOps Engineer

Access to shared vault accounts is governed by exactly two permissions — full administration and report viewing at three levels — with no credential access granted by default, LDAP and SCIM groups mapped to group policies, and access revoked immediately when a user is removed from the identity provider. Default-deny plus group-driven policy is the right shape, but two coarse permissions is thin for a company vault, with no middle ground between administering everything and seeing only your own report events. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing, emergency access, admin recovery, or what happens to a leaver's personal vault accounts. 1 3 4 5

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SSO, directory sync & provisioning

How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.

3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

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The DevOps Engineer

Single sign-on via SAML with Microsoft Entra ID named, RADIUS multi-factor authentication, Active Directory and LDAP directory sources, and SCIM 2.0 provisioning whose groups drive vault group policies with access revoked immediately when a user is removed from the identity provider — a directory story I could wire into existing pipelines. The Entra integration carries a documented constraint worth budgeting: vault management works only with Entra ID Domain Services domain controllers and requires both an Entra ID licence and an Entra ID Domain Services licence. We found no public information on hardware security keys, passkeys, or how the vault key is derived or released behind a single sign-on unlock. 1 5 6

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Audit logs, policies & reporting

How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.

3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

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The DevOps Engineer

Every session is logged as an uneditable text log held for up to 90 days, authentication and configuration changes generate syslog events, sessions can be recorded and monitored in real time, and a Windows integration client exports session logs, recordings and backups on a defined schedule — syslog is the export path my pipeline needs. Compliance reporting provides detailed records of system and user activity, though the Compliance tab ships disabled and requires a support request to enable. We found no public information on password-health or breach-monitoring reports, enforceable master-password policies, or log retention beyond the 90-day session maximum. 1 7

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Hosting choice, offline access & export

How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.

3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

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The DevOps Engineer

The on-premises path is documented the way I want it: a physical or virtual appliance with network placement options, ports, certificate requirements and a licensing package, with failover and backup appliances mentioned in passing for multi-node environments. Cloud deployments run as a single-tenant EC2 instance in Amazon Web Services with a customer-designated region among six Tier 3 or higher data centres, an API is available for automation, and a Windows integration client exports session logs, recordings and backups to a file system or SQL Server on a schedule. We found no public information on documented backup and high-availability procedures, offline vault access during an outage, or a full-fidelity export of vault items, and cloud upgrades take the appliance offline briefly inside a three-hour maintenance window. 1 7 9 10

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.

3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

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The DevOps Engineer

The one sovereignty lever these pages prove is the on-premises appliance, which keeps the vault inside my own network; the cloud offering runs on a single-tenant EC2 instance in Amazon Web Services with a region selectable among six data centres, and the vendor cites Data Privacy Framework compliance for European data privacy. We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, subprocessor locations, or a data-processing agreement. Sovereignty here is something I would have to build myself by self-hosting, not something the vendor documents end to end. 1 9 10

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.

5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

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The DevOps Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing: none of the captured documentation pages mentions a per-user price, tier structure, seat minimum, add-on price or minimum term. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 1 9 10

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined ⚠ unverified — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about BeyondTrust Password Safe

Is BeyondTrust Password Safe European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where BeyondTrust Password Safe is based.

Where does BeyondTrust Password Safe store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.

Does BeyondTrust Password Safe have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to BeyondTrust Password Safe?

As of 3 Nov 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Bitwarden (3.5/5) and Proton Pass (3.5/5) highest among the other 23 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: BeyondTrust Password Safe alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

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Sources (10)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap docs.beyondtrust.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →