Encryption model & independent audits
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The Identity Engineer
The cloud security page names ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 for the hosting environment, third parties are contracted for source-code review and penetration testing, and customers may run their own test once per calendar year with advance notice — but I found no named algorithms, key derivation or client-side encryption model for stored vault contents. What is documented is TLS in transit and, on-premises, encryption of session data with keys held in an appliance-managed secret store; on Azure or EC2 deployments the storage-encryption settings are hidden because the platform provides that encryption. I found no published audit reports with dates, no bug bounty or disclosure policy, and no incident history. 1 2 10