Password Management
TeamPassword
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by TeamPassword, Inc. · teampassword.com
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TeamPassword at a glance
- Vendor
- TeamPassword, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates TeamPassword 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. TeamPassword, Inc. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 3 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 3 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
TeamPassword, Inc. is a browser-based team password manager with a Chrome extension for digital marketing agencies, software design and development teams, creative agencies and tech startups. Its strongest scored area is sharing and access control, a uniform 6: four roles (Read-only, Member, Admin, Owner), group-based sharing by role, department or project, instant revocation when someone leaves, and one-time secret links valid for 24 hours. Security architecture scores a uniform 4: SOC 2 certification is claimed, passkey private keys are documented as AES-encrypted, wrapped with a personal public key and decrypted locally, with no public information on the vault's own cipher, key derivation or any audit report. Audit and policy scores a uniform 3, and sovereignty 0, with jurisdiction, residency, hosting, open-source status, DPA and transfer-impact assessment all unknown from the captured pages. Divergence is confined to identity integration (4 to 5 — higher scores credit documented Entra ID single sign-on; lower ones cite no public information on SCIM, directory sync or hardware-key MFA), deployment and portability (3 to 4) and pricing transparency (1 to 2), with no published prices.
Speaks for it
- Four documented roles (Read-only, Member, Admin, Owner) with a read-only tier that cannot reveal passwords in the application
- Instant revocation when someone leaves, combined with easy password rotation
- One-time secret links valid for 24 hours, enabled through a security setting
- Passkey private keys AES-encrypted, wrapped with a personal public key and decrypted locally, so the backend never sees a plaintext key
- Enterprise single sign-on with Microsoft Entra ID documented in setup detail, including the FusionAuth redirect and one-to-one email matching
Held against it
- Judges found no public information on the vault's own encryption algorithms, key derivation, field-level scope, audit reports or a bug bounty
- The organization export is a plain-text CSV the vendor itself warns gives anyone holding it control of all records
- Audit evidence stops at admins reviewing account activity, with no public information on exportable logs, retention, SIEM integration or enforceable master-password and MFA policies
- We found no public information on SCIM or directory sync, and the only offboarding path shown is an admin revoking access instantly
- Every sovereignty attribute — legal entity jurisdiction, data residency, hosting options, open source, DPA, transfer-impact assessment — is unknown from the captured pages
Best for
- You run an agency or startup that shares credentials by role, department or project and needs read-only access for non-technical teammates
- You want a leaver's access revoked instantly without an IT department
- You use Microsoft Entra ID and an Enterprise plan, and want single sign-on plus website passkeys stored with local signing
- Your team is browser-first and migrating credentials in through CSV import, including credit cards
Avoid if
- You must hand an ISO 27001 or NIS2 auditor exportable logs, retention periods and enforceable master-password or MFA policies — the documented evidence stops at admins reviewing account activity
- You need self-hosting, native desktop or mobile apps, or offline access — the product is browser-based and passkey authentication requires the service to be reachable online
- You need automated joiner-leaver provisioning — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- Your procurement requires a documented sovereignty chain — the computed sovereignty score is 0, with jurisdiction, data residency, hosting options, open-source status, DPA and transfer-impact assessment all unknown from the captured pages
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 1.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 1.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The passkey key model is documented to a standard I can actually question: private keys AES-encrypted, wrapped to the user's personal public key, decrypted only inside the extension, with the vendor stating the backend never sees a plaintext key. Beyond that, the captured pages claim an encrypted vault and SOC 2 certification without naming the vault cipher, the key derivation, an auditing firm, a bug bounty or any incident history, and the organization export is a plain-text CSV — so the scope of what is protected is never laid out field by field. 1 6 7
The Identity Engineer
SOC 2 certification is stated on the site and the passkey article documents a genuinely local key model: private keys AES-encrypted, wrapped with a personal public key, unwrapped only inside the extension, with the backend never seeing plaintext. For the vault itself, encryption is asserted without named algorithms or key derivation, and we found no public information on published audit reports, a bug bounty, or incident history. 1 6
The Compliance Auditor
The homepage carries a SOC 2 certification claim, and passkey signing keys are documented as AES-encrypted, wrapped with a personal public key and decrypted locally so the backend never sees plaintext. The captured pages give no algorithm, key derivation or field-level scope for the stored credentials themselves, and no audit report, penetration test or vulnerability disclosure; the organization export is documented as a plain text CSV that hands every record to whoever opens the file. 1 6 7
The SME Owner
The pages state credentials are encrypted and the company is SOC 2-certified, and describe passkey private keys as AES-encrypted, wrapped with personal public-key encryption and decrypted locally so the backend never sees a plaintext key. We found no public information on key derivation for the vault itself, the scope of what is encrypted, published audit reports, or a bug bounty, so this sits between described-with-algorithms and a full security-page-plus-certification picture. 1 6
The DevOps Engineer
AES encryption with local decryption and a backend that never sees a plaintext key is documented for passkey private keys, and SOC 2 certification is claimed by name, but I found no public information on key derivation for the vault itself, on which fields are or are not encrypted, or on published audit reports, penetration tests or a bug bounty. For a store holding root credentials I want cryptography I can read and audits I can download; this is a certification claim plus a good client-side description of one feature. 1 6
The Skeptic
The homepage claims an "encrypted vault" and SOC 2 certification, and the passkey documentation names AES with keys wrapped and decrypted locally in the extension, but that model is documented for passkey signing keys only — we found no public information naming the vault's encryption algorithms, key derivation, which fields are and are not encrypted, any audit or penetration test report, a bug bounty, or incident history. 1 6
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Roles are written down — read-only, member, admin and owner — with group-based sharing, role changes restricted to admins and owners, instant revocation when someone leaves, read-only users barred from revealing passwords, and one-time secret links valid for 24 hours behind a security setting. The vendor also states it cannot manually escalate a member's permissions, which removes silent vendor-side recovery as a bail-out. Emergency access, approval workflows and delegated administration are not documented on the captured pages. 1 3 4 5
The Identity Engineer
Four roles from read-only to owner are documented with hard boundaries — read-only users cannot even reveal a password in the app — plus group-based sharing by role, department or project, instant revocation when someone leaves, and one-time secret links valid for 24 hours. Recovery is the weak spot for my world: the help centre states the vendor cannot manually escalate a member's permissions if an owner or admin loses access, and we found no public information on admin account recovery or emergency access. 1 3 4 5
The Compliance Auditor
Four roles with group-based sharing, instant revocation when someone leaves, read-only users who cannot reveal passwords in the application, and one-time secret links valid for 24 hours give a company real permission governance. We found no public information on the key model behind recovery or offboarding, emergency access, delegated administration or approval workflows; the pages state the vendor cannot manually escalate a member's permissions, which constrains who could reach the admin password but leaves owner recovery to a manual ownership transfer. 1 3 4 5
The SME Owner
This is the product's strength for a company like mine: group-based sharing with four roles from read-only to owner, instant revocation when someone leaves, one-time secret links valid for 24 hours, and a read-only role that hides passwords inside the application. The vendor itself states it cannot manually escalate a member's permission if the owner leaves or an admin loses access, and we found no public information on emergency access, approval workflows, or delegated administration. 1 3 4 5
The DevOps Engineer
Four roles with documented permissions, group-based sharing by role or department, instant revocation when someone leaves, one-time secret links valid for 24 hours, and a read-only role that can use shared records without revealing the password are all shown in the help pages. The captured pages give no public information on admin account recovery, emergency access, or the key model behind sharing, and the vendor states it cannot manually escalate a member's permissions. 1 3 4 5
The Skeptic
Four roles are documented, including a read-only role that cannot reveal passwords, alongside group-based sharing, instant revocation when someone leaves, and 24-hour one-time secret links — more than basic permission levels. We found no public information on admin account recovery, emergency access, or the key model behind sharing; the statement that the vendor cannot manually escalate a member's permissions says nothing about whether it can decrypt. 1 3 4 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Enterprise SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented in working detail — one-to-one email mapping, a FusionAuth callback, per-user enablement and support-assisted configuration — and passkeys can be saved, autofilled and removed with signing performed locally. Directory sync and provisioning automation are not documented, nor is the key model behind an SSO unlock, and the only account MFA evidence is a customer quote mentioning two-factor authentication. 1 5 6
The Identity Engineer
Enterprise SSO with Entra ID is documented, with one-to-one email mapping and a FusionAuth redirect, but it is confined to Enterprise plans, must be enabled per user with one SSO team each, and the final step is emailing support. We found no public information on SCIM or directory sync to suspend a leaver automatically — the only offboarding shown is an admin revoking access instantly — and nothing on how the vault key is derived behind an SSO unlock or on FIDO2 hardware keys. Website passkeys can be stored in the vault with a documented local key model, but we found no public information on unlocking the vault itself with a passkey. 1 3 5 6
The Compliance Auditor
Entra ID single sign-on is documented in working detail on Enterprise plans — a FusionAuth redirect, one-to-one email mapping, one sign-on team per user — and passkeys can be saved into the vault, autofilled, replay-protected and decrypted only on device. We found no public information on SCIM or directory sync, automated suspension on deprovisioning, hardware keys for vault sign-in, or how the vault key relates to a single sign-on login; two-factor authentication appears once, in a customer quote. 1 5 6
The SME Owner
Enterprise SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented, gated to Enterprise plans, enabled per user, and finished with support involvement; sign-in with passkeys and passkey storage with replay protection are also documented. We found no public information on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on the key model behind an SSO unlock. 1 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
Enterprise SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented for Enterprise plans with concrete setup detail (FusionAuth redirect, email matching, one SSO-enabled team per user), and passkey support is genuinely documented — saving from websites, autofill, replay protection, private keys decrypted only inside the extension. I found no public information on SCIM or directory sync, on how the vault key is derived or released through SSO, or on hardware-key MFA beyond a customer quote mentioning two-factor authentication. 1 5 6
The Skeptic
Enterprise SSO with Microsoft Entra ID is documented in real detail, and passkeys can be saved, autofilled and replay-protected with keys the backend never sees in plaintext — but we found no public information on SCIM or directory sync, hardware security keys, or how an SSO login relates to the vault key; setup is support-assisted by email, provisioning is email-matched and manual, and passkey use requires the service to be reachable. 1 5 6
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
Admins can review account activity, audit logs are claimed on the vendor page, and the one-time-link feature sits behind a security setting, but that is where the captured documentation stops. I found no public information on exportable or API-accessible logs, SIEM destinations, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, log retention, or password-health and breach reports inside the admin console — nothing an ISO 27001 auditor could be handed. 1 3 5
The Identity Engineer
An encrypted vault with permissions, audit logs and admin review of account activity is claimed on the main page, and a security-settings switch governs one-time secret links. We found no public information on what events the logs record, on export or retention, on enforceable master-password or MFA policies, or on password-health and breach reporting an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit would need. 1 3 5
The Compliance Auditor
An admin can review account activity behind a headline claim of audit logs, and a security settings area gates one-time links. We found no public information on whether logs cover views, copies, sharing and admin changes, on export to a SIEM, on retention, or on enforceable master password, MFA, sharing and export policies — for an ISO 27001 or NIS2 file I could not evidence who saw a record last March. 1 3 5
The SME Owner
The marketing page mentions audit logs in one encrypted vault and admins can review account activity from the admin section, which is an admin console with an activity list. We found no public information on exportable logs, SIEM integration, enforceable master password or MFA policies, or password health and breach reports. 1 3
The DevOps Engineer
An encrypted vault with audit logs and admin review of account activity is named, and a security-settings area exists at least for enabling one-time secret links. I found no public information on exportable logs, API or SIEM integration, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, log retention, or breach reports — the free password generator and strength checker are public tools, not vault health reporting. 1 3 5
The Skeptic
Audit logs are named as a homepage feature and admins can review account activity, which is an activity list and little more; one sharing control (allowing one-time secret links) sits in security settings. We found no public information on exportable logs, SIEM integration, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, log retention, or organization-wide password health and breach reports. 1 3 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
The product runs in the browser with a Chrome extension, imports and exports records as CSV — under the vendor's own warning that the export is plain text and anyone holding it controls all records — and a status link exists on the site. I found no public information on hosting regions, self-hosting, native desktop or mobile clients, or offline vault access; passkey use is explicitly documented as requiring TeamPassword to be reachable online. 1 6 7 8
The Identity Engineer
The product runs in the browser with a Chrome extension, organization and private records can be exported to a plain-text CSV by admins or owners, and CSV import covers records and credit cards. We found no public information on native desktop or mobile clients, hosting-region choice, self-hosting, or offline access; the passkey help article states the service must be reachable to fetch encrypted key material. A status page is linked from the site. 1 6 7 8
The Compliance Auditor
The product runs in the browser with a Chrome extension, and both CSV directions are documented: organization export restricted to admins and owners as a warned-about plain text file, and CSV import including credit cards. We found no public information on desktop or mobile apps, hosting region choice, self-hosting or offline vault access; the passkey article states the service must be reachable online to fetch encrypted key material, and the linked status page is shown without incident history. 1 6 7 8
The SME Owner
The product is browser-based with a Chrome extension and a status page, and both directions of the door are documented: CSV export of organization records restricted to admins and owners, and a detailed CSV import path including credit cards, though the export is a plain text CSV and passkey sign-in requires the service to be reachable online. We found no public information on desktop or mobile apps, offline vault access, hosting regions, or a self-hosted option. 1 6 7 8
The DevOps Engineer
This is a browser product with a Chrome extension, a status page, and a documented CSV import and export — but the export is explicitly a plain-text file limited to organization admins and owners, and passkey authentication requires the service to be reachable. I found no public information on self-hosting, hosting regions, native or Linux clients, or an encrypted full-fidelity export; for someone who wants the vault in his own data centre with an export that loses nothing, this is the weakest area of the documented evidence. 1 6 7 8
The Skeptic
This is a browser product with a Chrome extension, a CSV export the vendor itself warns is plain text and restricts to admins and owners, and a CSV import with limits (three groups per record at import, shared records can never become private). We found no public information on hosting regions, self-hosting, desktop or mobile apps, or offline access — and passkey authentication explicitly requires the service to be reachable. 1 6 7 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
n/r
n/r
n/r
n/r
n/r
n/r
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO not rated — no public information
I found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where vault data and metadata are hosted, the subprocessor chain or a data-processing agreement; the captured vendor and help pages state none of it, and the sovereignty dimensions came through unknown. I report this as unevidenced rather than drawing any conclusion about where the chain runs. 1 5
The Identity Engineer not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where vault data or metadata is hosted, subprocessors, open-source clients, or a data-processing agreement; every sovereignty dimension captured is marked unknown. The pages we read — the main site, the Entra ID SSO setup guide and the export article — contain no statements on any of it. 1 5 7
The Compliance Auditor not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity and parent company, where vault data and metadata are hosted, or who the subprocessors are; the pages we read, including the homepage with its Terms and Privacy links, name none of them. An entity, a hosting location and a subprocessor list are the first things a DPA review and a NIS2 chain assessment need, so this stays open. 1
The SME Owner not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where vault data and metadata are hosted, subprocessors, or a data processing agreement on any page we read, so no dimension of the European chain can be scored. 1
The DevOps Engineer not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, data residency, hosting options, subprocessors, a data-processing agreement, or open-source code among the captured pages; every sovereignty dimension is marked unknown, so this criterion is reported but does not count toward the verdict. 1 2
The Skeptic not rated — no public information
We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, where vault data and metadata are hosted, the parent company, subprocessors, a DPA, or any transfer-impact assessment in the captured pages, including the security page. Every sovereignty dimension is unknown from what I read, and unknown is not non-European — it is simply unevidenced. 1 2
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pages place Enterprise SSO and the read-only role in the Enterprise plan and describe a self-service upgrade from Standard, but no price is published for any tier — no per-user rate, billing period or seat minimum appears anywhere. A buyer cannot begin to compute an annual cost from what is captured. 3 4 5
The Identity Engineer
The help centre names a Standard plan and Enterprise plans, places Enterprise SSO in the Enterprise tier, and offers a self-service upgrade from the billing page. We found no public price figures, seat minimums, billing periods or add-on prices on any page we read, so a real annual cost cannot be worked out from these captures. 5
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages name a Standard and an Enterprise tier, state that Enterprise SSO is available to customers subscribed to one of our Enterprise plans, and describe a self-service upgrade from the Billing page. We found no public prices, seat minimums, billing periods or minimum terms on any captured page, so a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from this. 5
The SME Owner
No price figures appear on the captured pages, so I cannot compute what forty people would cost me per year. What is visible is tier structure: Enterprise SSO and the read-only role sit in the Enterprise plan, and Standard customers upgrade from the billing page — meaning SSO is a top-tier feature, with per-user prices, seat minimums, and terms not shown in this evidence. 3 4 5
The DevOps Engineer
Tier names and feature placement are public — Enterprise SSO and the read-only role sit on the Enterprise plan, with a self-service upgrade from Standard and legacy bulk plans routed through support — but we found no public prices for any tier, no seat minimums, and no term or VAT treatment. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 3 4 5
The Skeptic
The captured pages name Standard and Enterprise tiers and place SSO and the read-only role in Enterprise, with a self-service upgrade from the billing page — some tier and feature structure is public. But we found no public prices on any page read: no per-user figure, billing period, seat minimum, add-on price or minimum term. 3 4 5
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about TeamPassword
Is TeamPassword European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where TeamPassword is based.
Where does TeamPassword store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
Does TeamPassword have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 3 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to TeamPassword?
As of 3 Nov 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Bitwarden (3.5/5) and Proton Pass (3.5/5) highest among the other 23 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: TeamPassword alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 3 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 3 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (8)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page teampassword.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap teampassword.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.teampassword.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.teampassword.com Checked 3 Nov 2026 Details →
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