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Whistleblowing Portals

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Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Whistleblower Security Inc. · www.whistleblowersecurity.com

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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The Security Auditor

Weighted verdict

Pentests the anonymity promise for a living. Optimizes for evidenced security: current certificates with visible scope, published pentests, documented end-to-end encryption, metadata minimization, and hosting outside hostile jurisdictional reach. Rejects adjective security and "military-grade" anything.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The Security Auditor

Reporting channels & reporter experience

How this is scored

The intake side: how a reporter actually submits — web form, anonymous dialog, phone/voice, languages, accessibility — and whether anonymity survives first contact.

0 — A web form that is an email in disguise: no anonymous route, no way to reach the reporter afterwards.

3 — An anonymous form exists but the dialogue ends there — no secured mailbox for follow-up questions, few languages, desktop-only.

5 — Anonymous two-way dialog via a protected mailbox, a usable set of languages, mobile-friendly; voice or phone intake missing or an add-on.

8 — Multiple channels (web, voice message or hotline, QR entry points), broad language coverage with translation support, accessibility considered, and the anonymous dialog is first-class rather than bolted on.

10 — Intake engineered around the frightened reporter: every channel anonymous-capable, dozens of languages, WCAG-conscious, no app install or account required, and the vendor documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself.

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The Security Auditor

Live-answered toll-free hotlines in English, French and Spanish with interpretation into 150 further languages, a 24/7/365 web reporting system, two-way anonymous messaging, and a genuinely graded three-level anonymity scheme — the strictest mode holds no contact data and disables password resets — make the anonymous dialog first-class rather than bolted on. I found no public information on accessibility standards, QR or alternate entry points, or how a reporter's identity is kept out of the human-answered voice channel, and the strictest mode makes the reporter check in every 24–48 hours to hear back. 1 3 4 5 6

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Case management & deadline discipline

How this is scored

The case worker's side: triage, statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback), role separation, audit-proof documentation.

0 — Reports land in an inbox; deadlines, roles and history live in a spreadsheet next door.

3 — A case list with status fields, but deadlines are manual, permissions are all-or-nothing, and the record of who did what is thin.

5 — Deadline tracking with reminders for the statutory clocks, case notes and attachments, basic role separation between case handlers; reporting on the caseload is limited.

8 — Automated statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest handling (excluding implicated case handlers), complete tamper-evident case history, retention and deletion rules applied per case, and management reporting.

10 — A case system an external investigator can rely on: enforced workflows, full audit trail, legally aware retention/deletion automation, evidence handling, and statistics that survive a regulator's questions.

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The Security Auditor

Configurable permissions, restricted-manager roles, investigator assignment, an audit log, task management and layered analytics with drill-down reporting give the case worker real machinery. I found no public information on statutory deadline clocks (acknowledgment or feedback), conflict-of-interest exclusion of implicated handlers, automated retention or deletion, or tamper-evidence of the case history — the parts of this criterion an EU obligation turns on. 5 6

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Legal compliance alignment

How this is scored

How specifically the product implements EU Directive 2019/1937 and national transpositions (HinSchG et al.) — not whether the marketing mentions them.

0 — Generic feedback software wearing a whistleblowing label; no reference to the legal obligations it claims to satisfy.

3 — The directive is invoked in marketing but the mapping is vague; deadline rules, documentation duties and retention periods are the customer's problem.

5 — The statutory duties are implemented as product features — acknowledgment and feedback clocks, documentation, deletion after the retention period — for at least one national law, with guidance for the rest.

8 — Multiple national transpositions supported with their differing details, legal templates and process guidance maintained by named counsel or documented review, and updates when the law moves.

10 — The product is a legal instrument: per-country rule sets kept current, documented legal review, guidance for edge cases (group-wide channels, external ombudsman setups), and the vendor shows its homework in public.

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The Security Auditor

The word compliance appears in product names, but I found no public information mapping the product to the EU whistleblowing directive or any national transposition — no deadline rules, documentation duties, retention periods, legal templates or named counsel. The captured pages name regulation only generically ("stay compliant with regulations"), so the legal mapping would be the customer's own work from end to end. 5 6 7

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Security & anonymity assurance

How this is scored

Whether the confidentiality promise is engineered and evidenced: encryption, metadata handling, penetration tests, certifications.

0 — Security is a paragraph of adjectives; no certificates, no test reports, no statement on metadata.

3 — TLS and encryption at rest asserted, but nothing audited: no ISO 27001 or equivalent, no published pentest, silence on IP and metadata logging.

5 — A current ISO 27001 (or equivalent) certificate for vendor or hosting, end-to-end encryption of report content claimed with some technical detail, an explicit no-IP-logging statement.

8 — Certified ISMS covering the product, regular third-party penetration tests attested, documented end-to-end encryption architecture, metadata minimization explained, security contact and disclosure policy published.

10 — Assurance a hostile auditor accepts: current certificates with visible scope, recurring pentest summaries public, cryptographic architecture documented, anonymity analysed against the operator itself — the vendor can answer "how would you unmask a reporter?" with "we cannot, and here is why".

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The Security Auditor

The certifications page asserts ISO 27001 certification and an implemented ISMS, and the infrastructure detail — TLS in transit, AES-256 transparent data encryption in an MS SQL Azure database — is real technical language, though I see no certificate scope, certifying body or validity dates, and the SOC 2 and ISO coverage shown belongs to the Azure hosting, not to this product. I found no public information on penetration tests, end-to-end encryption of report content, IP or metadata logging, or a security contact and disclosure policy; "unquestionable security" on the services page is an adjective I score at zero. 5 7

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Group & multi-entity capability

How this is scored

Whether one contract can serve a corporate group: separate channels per legal entity, central oversight, ombudsman access, white-labeling.

0 — One company, one channel; a group buys and administers N separate instances.

3 — Multiple channels under one account, but no separation of case access per entity and no consolidated view.

5 — Per-entity channels with separated case handlers and a group-level overview; branding per entity is basic; external counsel access possible.

8 — Real multi-tenant group structure: per-entity channels, languages and branding, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles, group reporting that respects entity boundaries.

10 — Group compliance as architecture: hundreds of entities manageable centrally, per-country legal rule assignment per entity, white-label reporting pages, and access separation strong enough to satisfy each subsidiary's works council.

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The Security Auditor

A subsidiaries configuration lets reporters designate which legal entity a report concerns and drives portal dropdowns and report routing to match the corporate structure, backed by configurable permissions and routing rules. I found no public information on a consolidated group-level view, per-entity branding, delegated administration, or external ombudsman or counsel access. 6 8

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Where reports about people actually live and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. In this category the data is by definition the most sensitive a company holds.

0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for whistleblowing data.

3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.

5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.

8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.

10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors for report content and metadata, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.

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The Security Auditor

Every captured statement puts report content and its disaster-recovery replica in Canadian Azure data centres, run by a vendor whose agents are "right here in Canada" and whose parent is Case IQ — for a European buyer this is non-EU hosting and a non-EU vendor by default, on the most sensitive data a company holds. I found no public information on a published DPA, a subprocessor list, or any EU hosting option, which is the floor for this criterion. 4 5 7

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether an obligated company can compute the real invoice — per entity, per employee band, per year — from public pages alone.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — An entry price exists, but the tiers most obligated companies need are unpriced, or the maths is obscured by employee bands, per-report fees or mandatory setup charges.

5 — Most tiers carry real numbers with billing period and VAT treatment stated, but at least one commonly needed capability — extra entities, extra languages, phone intake — hides in an unpriced add-on.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with employee-band boundaries, entity rules and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.

10 — Complete price computability: every tier, band, add-on and renewal rule public, so the invoice for a 60-employee company and a 5-entity group is a two-minute exercise.

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The Security Auditor

The only pricing statement captured is an "all-inclusive service" offered "at a price you can afford" — words rather than figures. I found no public information on tier prices, billing periods, VAT treatment, employee bands, per-entity fees or setup charges, so an obligated company cannot compute any part of an invoice from the public pages. 4

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 4 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Ownership Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data residency Not determined — uncited Report an error
Subprocessors Not determined ⚠ unverified — uncited Report an error

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (8)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 29 Sep 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Privacy policy — found from the homepage www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Reporting channels & reporter experience — found from sitemap help.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Reporting channels & reporter experience — found from sitemap www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Case management & deadline discipline — found from sitemap www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Case management & deadline discipline — found from sitemap www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Security & anonymity assurance — found from sitemap www.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Group & multi-entity capability — found from sitemap help.whistleblowersecurity.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →