Aikido Security
EU-Made Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 3 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Aikido Security BV · www.aikido.dev
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Aikido Security at a glance
- Vendor
- Aikido Security BV
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in Belgium source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Outside the EU by default source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Aikido Security 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Aikido Security is a code security and quality platform from Aikido Security BV of Ghent, Belgium. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Aikido Security is a code security and quality platform from Aikido Security BV of Ghent, Belgium. The judges scored the engineering core highest: code analysis, dependencies and secrets and developer workflow cluster at 7–8, crediting cross-file taint tracking across twelve languages (seven more within files), reachability analysis at dependency, function and runtime levels with named vulnerability sources, secrets scanned across the full git history with liveness checks, and merge gating with autofix pull requests. It is weakest on sovereignty and pricing transparency: the privacy policy names the United States and the European Union as storage locations without stating a default, and while Developer is $0 / free forever incl. 2 users and Basic, Pro and Advanced are $350, $700 and $1,050 / month each incl. 10 users, Enterprise is tailored pricing, the Aikido Max AI add-on is unpriced and the per-user cost above ten is unstated. Score spreads never exceeded a point; sovereignty split between 5s and 6s over the unstated storage default, and we found no public information on encryption, the AI model provider, or single sign-on and SCIM.
Speaks for it
- Reachability analysis documented at dependency, function and runtime levels, with vulnerability sources named one by one (NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, Amazon Linux plus Aikido's own pre-CVE feed)
- Cross-file taint tracking documented for twelve languages including Java, TypeScript, Python, C# and Go, with seven more such as Swift and Kotlin analysed within files
- Secrets scanned across the entire git history with liveness checks that verify whether a key is still active and what access it grants
- Four plans priced as flat monthly totals — Developer $0 / free forever incl. 2 users, Basic $350, Pro $700, Advanced $1,050 / month each incl. 10 users — with fair-use limits on repositories from 10 to 500
- Code handling stated plainly: git clones run in a fresh ephemeral Docker container per repository, wiped and terminated after analysis, and code is not stored
Held against it
- The privacy policy names the United States and the European Union as storage locations without stating which a customer gets, and the hosting infrastructure is unnamed
- Enterprise is tailored pricing, the Aikido Max AI add-on carries no public price, and we found no public information on the cost of users beyond the included ten
- We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or SARIF import and export
- We found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest, on the AI model provider, or on whether customer code trains AI models
- The captured pages give different figures for false-positive reduction — 90% and 99% — with no independent benchmark behind either
Best for
- You need dependency risk you can defend on paper: three-level reachability, SBOM export via the public API and a documented database of 12k+ known malicious packages across npm, PyPI, GitHub Actions and Maven
- You run a team of up to ten and want flat, published monthly totals with stated fair-use limits and a free tier rescanning every 3 days
- You gate merges by severity and type and want inline line-level comments with autofix delivered as reviewable pull requests carrying confidence scores and diffs
Avoid if
- You require EU-only data residency documented end to end — sovereignty scored 5–6, with the storage default unstated and the hosting infrastructure unnamed
- You must budget a growing team precisely before signing — pricing transparency scored 5–6, with the per-user cost above the included ten unstated and the AI add-on unpriced
- Your rollout depends on SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or SARIF export — judges could not confirm these and scored integration and admin at 6–7 accordingly
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 3.5 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 4 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3.5 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 3.5 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 3.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 2.5 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
Cross-file taint tracking is documented per language — JavaScript, TypeScript, PHP, Java, Python, Go and more, with Swift and Kotlin limited to within-file — on a customised engine, plus custom SAST rules, infrastructure-as-code checks via Checkov, code-quality findings and coverage data exposed through the API. It stops short of the top level: no framework list per language, no complexity, duplication or maintainability metrics, and the captured pages give different figures for false-positive reduction — 90 per cent on the feature pages, 99 per cent on the homepage. 1 2 6 8 17 18
The Application Security Engineer
Cross-file taint tracking is documented for twelve languages including JavaScript, TypeScript, Java,.NET/C#, Python and Go, with the scope stated per language (seven more such as Swift and Kotlin are tracked within files only), custom SAST rules are creatable via UI and API, and infrastructure-as-code runs on Terraform, CloudFormation, Docker and Pulumi. False-positive reduction is claimed at 90 percent with a published 32-second scan time, but we found no public information on independent benchmarks, per-rule precision or per-finding data-flow walkthroughs. The plain statement that SAST will not catch logic or authorization flaws matching no known pattern, with Deep Review and AI Code Analysis offered as complements, is the kind of honest scoping I need when sizing a remediation backlog. 17 2 8 6
The Engineering Manager
Cross-file taint analysis is documented per language for twelve languages including Java, with seven more analysed within files, and tainted input is tracked from top-level controllers to dangerous functions across files; custom SAST rules can be created through the UI and the API, context adjusts severities, and infrastructure-as-code checks run via their engine plus Checkov. The captured pages give different figures for false-positive reduction (90% and 99%), and we found no public information on complexity, duplication or technical-debt metrics or on independent benchmarks, which is what I would need for board-facing quality trends per team and hotspot. 17 2 8 6
The Platform Engineer
The SAST documentation is unusually concrete for a cloud-first platform: cross-file taint tracking is listed per language for twelve languages including Java,.NET/C#, Python, Go and C/C++ (with a second tier like Swift and Kotlin limited to within-file analysis), infrastructure-as-code checks run on their engine plus Checkov, and custom rules can be written and created through the API. It stops short of the top: we found no public information on maintainability or code-health scores over time, on independent benchmarks behind the claimed 90% false-positive reduction, or on complexity and duplication metrics. 17 2 8 6
The Product Security Officer
Cross-file taint tracking is documented language by language — twelve languages traced across files, seven within files — with custom SAST rules creatable through the API, infrastructure-as-code checks via Checkov, and code-coverage endpoints. We found no public information on per-language framework coverage, duplication or complexity metrics, or independent false-positive benchmarks; the captured pages give different figures for false-positive reduction (90% and 99%). 17 2 8 6 1
The Skeptic
This is the question I always ask first — which languages get real data-flow — and the answer is documented: tainted input is tracked across multiple files for twelve languages including Java, TypeScript, Python, C# and Go, and within single files only for seven more (Swift, Kotlin, Dart, Elixir and friends), with custom SAST rules, infrastructure-as-code checks via Checkov, and fixes carrying confidence scores. The captured pages give different figures for false-positive reduction — 90% on two pages, 99% on the homepage — and I found no independent benchmark or per-rule precision data behind either number. Findings adjust to context (sensitive repositories upgraded, test files downgraded), and the vendor openly states SAST will not catch logic or authorization bugs that do not match known patterns. 17 2 6 1 8 5
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
Reachability runs three levels deep — dependency, function and runtime context — the vulnerability database and its named sources (NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, Amazon Linux plus their own feed) are documented, malicious packages, end-of-life components and licence checks are covered, and secrets are scanned across full git history with live validation and risk-ranked triage. Blocking a secret before it lands is evidenced only as IDE warnings before commit, and we found no public information on which ecosystems and lockfiles are covered — for our Laravel work, Composer support stays an open question. 3 4 17 19 20
The Application Security Engineer
Reachability is documented at three levels — whether the dependency is used at all, whether our code reaches the vulnerable function, and runtime context — and the vulnerability database is documented source by source (NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, Amazon Linux, plus a pre-CVE research feed claiming malware detection within minutes). Secrets are scanned across the entire git history and Live Secret Detection checks whether a key is still active and what access it grants, downgrading expired or rotated secrets — exactly the triage I need before deciding PCI scope. We found no public information on a server-side push protection that rejects a push outright; the documented controls are IDE warnings before commit and CI blocking before merge. 3 7 20 19 17 4
The Engineering Manager
SCA covers direct and transitive dependencies at three documented depths — dependency-level, function-level reachability and runtime context — plus an AI exploitability agent, licence and end-of-life checks, SBOM export from repositories, containers and VMs, and a database of 12k+ known malicious packages across npm, PyPI, GitHub Actions and Maven. Secrets are scanned across the full git history with liveness checks that verify whether a secret is still active and what scope it grants, and the vulnerability sources are published (NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, Amazon Linux plus Aikido's own feed). We found no public information on the full ecosystem and lockfile list, the SBOM export format, or push protection that stops a secret at push time. 3 17 19 20 8
The Platform Engineer
Reachability is documented at three levels (dependency-level, function-level and runtime), the vulnerability sources are named down to NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu and Alpine feeds plus a pre-CVE research feed, and secrets are scanned across the full git history with liveness validation and severity adjusted for scope. Malicious-package detection (12k+ known packages), end-of-life flagging, SBOM export endpoints and automated dependency upgrade pull requests are all documented; we found no public information on the detector count, VEX output or revocation guidance. 3 20 17 19 4 5
The Product Security Officer
This is the coverage a CRA filing needs on paper: reachability at dependency, function and runtime levels, a documented list of upstream vulnerability databases plus a pre-CVE feed of their own, malicious-package detection, end-of-life and licence checks, SBOM export via API, and secrets validated for liveness across the full git history with pre-commit IDE warnings and merge blocking. What is not documented is the SBOM's standard format (CycloneDX or SPDX is never named), VEX output, and per-licence obligation explanations. 3 20 17 19 8 4
The Skeptic
Reachability is layered and specific — dependency-level, function-level, and contextual runtime analysis — with malicious-package detection backed by a database of 12k+ known malicious packages across npm, PyPI, GitHub Actions and Maven, and every vulnerability source named one by one (NVD, GitHub Advisory, Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, Amazon Linux plus Aikido's own pre-CVE feed). Licence handling, EOL detection, SBOM generation and export, container scanning and backported package fixes without breaking changes are all documented. Secrets are checked for liveness and scanned across the entire git history; the detector count and a push-protection mechanism in the SCM itself are the pieces I could not find on the captured pages. 3 7 20 17 4 19 5
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Inline comments for secrets, SAST and IaC on pull requests, merges blocked by severity and type, ignore requests with an approval inbox and mandatory reasons, snooze with expiry, and autofix delivered as reviewable pull requests with confidence scores, full diff preview and documented auto-merge behaviour per platform — including Bitbucket's manual-merge limitation stated openly. IDE plugins cover VS Code, PhpStorm and the whole JetBrains family with real-time scanning and one-click fixes, but the pages do not state that IDE results run the same rules as the server, and the model behind the agentic autofix is unnamed. 2 5 6 21 22 25
The Application Security Engineer
Pull request gating blocks merges by severity, type or context with inline line-level comments, auto-merge behaviour is documented for GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket including the honest limit that Bitbucket still needs a manual merge click, and IDE plugins cover VS Code, Visual Studio, the JetBrains family, Cursor, Windsurf, Kiro, Antigravity and Eclipse with real-time scanning and AutoFix in the editor. Findings deduplicate across IDE, Git, CI, containers and VMs with stable numeric issue IDs, snoozes require a reason and a period, and every ignore, snooze and severity change lands in an exportable audit trail — good hygiene for security champions. Typical figures are published (32-second scans, most SAST fixes under five seconds); we found no public information on the model provider behind the agentic fixes. 5 6 22 21 3 25
The Engineering Manager
Pull request gating blocks merges by severity, type or context with per-repository inline comments, IDE plugins cover the JetBrains family, VS Code, Visual Studio, Cursor, Windsurf and more with real-time scanning and AutoFix in the editor, and CI runs on GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, CircleCI and Jenkins. Fixes ship as reviewable pull requests with confidence scores and configurable merge rules, auto-merge is documented per platform including Bitbucket's manual-merge caveat, snoozes require a reason with an approval inbox for ignores, and findings sync to Jira and Linear. We found no public information on the model provider behind the agentic fixes or on stated parity between IDE and server rules. 6 2 21 5 22 25 8 9
The Platform Engineer
Gates block merges by severity and type with inline comments in the SCM, CI integrations are named for GitHub, GitLab, Jenkins, Bitbucket and CircleCI, IDE plugins cover VS Code, the JetBrains family and more with in-editor AutoFix, and ignore or snooze requires a reason with an approval-inbox flow and full triage history — exactly the audit trail I need on a 300-developer estate. What holds it back: we found no public information on whether IDE results match the server rule set, on the model behind the agentic autofix, or on per-branch gate configuration, and Bitbucket auto-merge still needs a manual click. 5 6 21 25 22 3
The Product Security Officer
Pull and merge request gating by severity and type with inline line-level comments, IDE plugins across many editors warning about secrets before commit, snooze and ignore with mandatory reasons and an approval inbox, deduplicated correlated findings across stages, and autofix delivered as reviewable pull requests with confidence scores and diffs. We found no public information on the model provider behind the agentic fixes or whether IDE results match the server's rules. 5 6 21 25 3 4
The Skeptic
Gates block merges by severity and type with inline line-level comments in the SCM, IDE plugins cover a long list of editors with in-editor AutoFix and secret warnings before commit, snooze and ignore require reasons with an approval inbox for requests, and deduplication reuses stable issue IDs on every rescan — auto-merge behaviour is even documented per platform including the Bitbucket manual-merge limit. My sticking point: the AI behind AutoFix, Deep Review and AI pentests is never named — no model provider, no statement of where it runs — and we found no public information on a new-code baseline or on autofix acceptance rates. A vendor that wants my repository for its agent has to say whose model sees the code. 2 6 21 24 25 22 5
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
All four major hosts plus self-managed Bitbucket Data Center with a documented read-only path, a public REST API with webhooks, Jira and Linear sync, SBOM export endpoints, per-team roles with an advanced rights layer, and an audit trail of every ignore, snooze and severity change exportable as CSV or JSON. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or SARIF support on the captured pages, which is what holds this below the top band. 2 8 23 24 25
The Application Security Engineer
All four major hosts are supported alongside Bitbucket Data Center connected on-premises over an HTTP token (read permissions suffice for scanning), a public REST API is documented across repositories, issues, SBOM, webhooks, users and teams, and local on-prem scanners plus a broker for internal apps and a private registry proxy are documented for keeping reach inside our network. Roles run to team-only scopes, a granular rights layer for ignoring, snoozing, severity changes and CSV export, and a read-only mode, with the activity log exportable as CSV or JSON. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or SARIF import and export — items I would want pinned down before a 120-developer roll-out. 2 23 8 9 24 25 10
The Engineering Manager
All four major code hosts are supported plus self-managed Bitbucket Data Center with token permissions spelled out, a public REST API reaches issues, SBOM export, users, teams, webhooks and compliance, and roles split admins, default and team-only users with a configurable rights layer covering ignore, snooze, severity change and export. The audit trail exports as CSV and JSON, reports include trends over time, and the Advanced plan adds a broker for internal apps, a private registry proxy and SIEM integration, with local on-prem scanners downloadable. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning or SARIF import and export, which I would need before rolling this across six teams. 2 23 8 24 25 9 10 11
The Platform Engineer
For my environment this is the decisive criterion: Bitbucket Data Center connects with an on-premises URL and access token, local on-prem scanners are downloadable and on-prem scanning ships in the Pro plan, the public API covers teams, custom rules, webhooks, SBOM export and user rights, and triage actions are logged and exportable as CSV or JSON. But I could not confirm two deal-breakers: we found no public information on SAML or OIDC single sign-on or SCIM provisioning from Entra ID, and none on SARIF export — findings export is documented as CSV. 23 10 9 8 24 25 2
The Product Security Officer
All four major code hosts plus self-managed Bitbucket Data Center over an HTTP token, downloadable on-prem scanners and a broker for internal apps, a granular three-role model with an additional permissions layer, audit trail exportable as CSV and JSON, webhooks and a broad public API. We found no public information on single sign-on (SAML/OIDC), SCIM provisioning, or SARIF import and export. 23 24 8 9 10 25
The Skeptic
Four code hosts plus self-managed Bitbucket Data Center, downloadable local scanners for on-prem work, a documented public API with webhooks covering issues, SBOM exports, users, teams and autofix history, Jira/Linear sync, audit trails exportable as CSV or JSON, and a role system granular down to team-only users and per-action rights. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, or SARIF export, and reporting tops out at trend and PDF reports rather than portfolio dashboards with per-team trends. The broker for internal apps and SIEM integration landing in the Advanced plan is the right shape for enterprises. 2 23 10 8 24 25 9
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
Source-code handling is explicit: clones run in fresh ephemeral Docker containers per repository, wiped and terminated after analysis, read-only scopes by default, and GitHub tokens not stored. Certifications are strong — ISO 27001, ISO 42001, SOC 2 Type II, FedRAMP Class C (Moderate) — alongside a public status page with 90-day uptime figures, annual external pentests, a bug bounty and compliance reports mapped to thirteen frameworks including PCI DSS. We found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest, or on whether customer code trains their AI models. 10 11 15 25 26
The Application Security Engineer
Code handling is unusually explicit: clones run in a fresh ephemeral Docker container per repository that is wiped and terminated after analysis, GitHub tokens are not stored so a database breach would not expose code, and integrations default to read-only scope. SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001:2022 come with stated scope (23 SOC 2 control objectives across 9 criteria, 22 Annex A controls, technical controls only), and the in-app compliance reports cover PCI DSS v4.0 and DORA alongside ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2 and GDPR, with a customer-facing Security Audit Report whose sections are configurable — a report my auditor can work with. We found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest or on an AI-training statement with an opt-out; service-data retention is stated only as the business relationship 'plus a period thereafter', and no availability commitment beyond the status page uptime is published. 26 10 25 15 11
The Engineering Manager
The vendor states code is never stored after analysis — each repository is cloned into a fresh ephemeral Docker container that is wiped and terminated — and GitHub integrations default to read-only scope with no tokens held in the database. SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, ISO 42001 and FedRAMP Class C (Moderate) are claimed with scope detail (23 SOC 2 control objectives across 9 criteria, 22 Annex A controls, organizational controls outside scope), compliance reports cover PCI DSS v4.0, NIST 800-53, DORA and more, and a public status page publishes uptime per region. We found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest or on the AI model provider and an opt-out, and service-data retention is stated only as the business relationship plus an unspecified period. 26 10 25 11 15
The Platform Engineer
Code handling is described concretely — git clones in a fresh ephemeral Docker container per repository, wiped after analysis, with no GitHub tokens stored — and the certifications come with a stated scope (technical controls only: 22 ISO 27001 Annex A controls, 23 SOC 2 objectives) alongside a public status page and compliance reports mapped to PCI DSS, NIS2 and others. For a formal audit gaps remain: we found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest, on whether code or findings train their AI models or an opt-out, or a published availability SLA. 26 10 15 25 11
The Product Security Officer
The vendor states code is never stored after analysis — clones run in a fresh ephemeral container that is wiped — GitHub tokens are not kept, certifications are stated with scope (SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, ISO 42001, FedRAMP Moderate), and findings map to PCI DSS v4.0, NIS2, DORA and more with an audit report built for customers and auditors. However, we found no public information on whether our source code trains AI models or how to opt out, no encryption statement, no published availability SLA, and no Cyber Resilience Act mapping; organizational SOC 2 controls are explicitly outside the product's evidencing scope. 26 10 25 15
The Skeptic
Source handling is stated plainly and verifiably: git clones run in a fresh ephemeral Docker container per repository, wiped and terminated after analysis, code is not stored, and for GitHub no access or refresh tokens sit in the database under read-only scope by default. SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, ISO 42001 and FedRAMP Moderate are stated with unusual honesty about scope — the uncovered SOC 2 criteria (Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy) are listed outright — and compliance reports map to thirteen frameworks including PCI DSS v4.0 and DORA, with a public status page showing real uptime. What I could not find: any statement on whether code or findings train AI models or how to opt out (an AI Penetration Testing Addendum is listed among the legal documents but its contents are not shown), the model provider, or encryption in transit and at rest. 26 10 25 11 15 18
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
The contracting entity is unambiguous — Aikido Security BV in Ghent, Belgian VAT number, Belgian governing law — with a published data processing agreement, a published subprocessor list, standard contractual clauses for EEA transfers and an on-premise scanner documented. The residency question stays open: the privacy policy names both the United States and the European Union as storage locations without stating a default, and the locations of the AI models and other chain providers are not shown. 3 6 13 15 26
The Application Security Engineer
The contracting entity is Aikido Security BV with a Belgian VAT number and registered office in Ghent, the terms put governing law and exclusive jurisdiction in Belgium, a data processing agreement is published, standard contractual clauses are cited for transfers under Article 46, and a subprocessor list is published. Storage is described only as databases located 'in the United States and the European Union' with no default stated and no documented EU-only option, and the hosting infrastructure and subprocessor locations are not named. For a DORA-regulated environment in Frankfurt this earns a middle mark: European entity and legal footing, but the data chain is not pinned to Europe. 13 15 26 6 9
The Engineering Manager
The contracting entity is Aikido Security BV, registered in Belgium with its Ghent office, Belgian governing law and exclusive Belgian jurisdiction, a data processing agreement is published, standard contractual clauses cover EEA transfers, and a subprocessor list is referenced from the privacy policy. The same policy names the United States and the European Union as storage locations without stating which is the default and the hosting infrastructure is unnamed; a local scanner option exists, but whether findings stay on the customer's own servers is not documented, so the chain is not evidenced end to end. 15 13 26 10 12
The Platform Engineer
The contracting entity is Aikido Security BV in Ghent under Belgian law and exclusive Belgian jurisdiction, with a published data processing agreement, SCCs for EEA transfers and a published subprocessor list — a solid European base. But the privacy policy names both the United States and the European Union as storage locations without saying which applies, the hosting infrastructure and subprocessor locations are unnamed, and the downloadable local scanners are documented without a statement that findings stay on our own servers. 15 13 4 10
The Product Security Officer
The contracting entity is Aikido Security BV, registered in Ghent, Belgium under Belgian law, a data processing agreement is published, a subprocessor list is referenced, and standard contractual clauses cover EEA transfers. But the privacy policy names the United States and the European Union as storage locations without saying which is the default, the hosting infrastructure is unnamed, and the on-prem scanners are documented without a data flow showing whether findings stay in our own network. 13 15 18 26 10
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is Belgian to the bone — Aikido Security BV in Ghent with VAT BE0792914919, Belgian governing law and exclusive Belgian jurisdiction — and a data processing agreement plus standard contractual clauses for EEA transfers are published. But the captured privacy policy names both the United States and the European Union as storage locations without saying which a European customer gets, the hosting infrastructure goes unnamed, and a subprocessor list is referenced without the captured pages showing the list or the subprocessors' locations. Until the default region and the chain behind the AI features are on paper, a Belgian entity alone does not make this a sovereign purchase. 15 13 3 26
Pricing transparency
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
Hard numbers on every named plan — Developer at $0 / free forever incl. 2 users, Basic at $350 / month, Pro at $700 / month, Advanced at $1,050 / month, each including 10 users — with unusually clear limits for repos from 10 to 500, cloud accounts, domains, protected requests and a 3-day rescan cadence on the free tier. What my budget planning still cannot answer from the captured pages: the price for users beyond the included ten, the cost of the AI add-on, annual versus monthly terms, VAT treatment, and Enterprise is 'tailored pricing'. 9 19
The Application Security Engineer
Four plans are priced publicly as total monthly fees including ten users — Developer at $0 free forever with 2 users, Basic at $350, Pro at $700, Advanced at $1,050 — and fair-use limits per tier are stated for repositories, cloud accounts, domains, protected requests and rescan cadence, with the free tier rescanning every three days. The Aikido Max AI add-on is described only as unlimited credits subject to fair use with no price shown, Enterprise is 'tailored pricing', and we found no public information on the cost per user beyond the included ten or on annual versus monthly terms and VAT treatment. A buyer can budget the mid tiers precisely but not the full enterprise picture. 9 19
The Engineering Manager
Four plans are priced publicly — Developer $0 / free forever including 2 users, Basic $350 / month, Pro $700 / month and Advanced $1,050 / month, each a total fee including 10 users — with per-plan fair-use limits for repositories (10 to 500), cloud accounts, domains and protected requests, and a startup discount of up to 30% with stated eligibility. The Enterprise tier is tailored pricing and the Aikido Max add-on for unlimited AI credits is unpriced beyond a fair-use policy, and we found no public information on how users beyond the included ten are counted, on annual versus monthly terms, or on VAT treatment. 9 2
The Platform Engineer
Plans are public with monthly totals — "$350 / month" Basic, "$700 / month" Pro, "$1,050 / month" Advanced, each including 10 users — plus per-plan limits on repositories, domains, cloud accounts and protected requests, a free two-user tier with 3-day rescans, and a startup discount of up to 30%. For a 300-developer estate the numbers stop there: we found no public information on the per-seat price beyond the included ten users, on annual versus monthly terms or VAT, and Enterprise is "tailored pricing" with the AI add-on subject to fair use rather than a price. 9 19
The Product Security Officer
Four tiers are priced publicly — $0 free forever incl. 2 users, $350, $700 and $1,050 per month each incl. 10 users — with tier inclusions and fair-use limits on repositories, domains, cloud accounts and protected requests. The enterprise tier is tailored pricing, the AI credits add-on carries no captured price, the per-user cost above ten is unstated, and we found no public information on monthly-versus-annual terms or VAT treatment. 9 19
The Skeptic
Prices are public and flat — Basic $350 / month, Pro $700 / month, Advanced $1,050 / month, each including 10 users, Developer at $0 / free forever including 2 users — with fair-use limits per plan for repositories (10 to 500), cloud accounts, domains and protected requests, and a stated free-tier rescan interval of every 3 days. But the enterprise tier is 'tailored pricing', the Aikido Max AI add-on carries no price at all, and we found no public information on how users beyond the included ten are counted or priced, on annual versus monthly terms, or on VAT treatment. I can price year one for a ten-person team; I cannot price the second developer added or the AI credits consumed. 9
European sovereignty — proven facts
3 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in BE | 2/2 pts | 13 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location |
Outside the EU
unverified
Why unverified?The policy names both the United States and the European Union as storage locations and is silent on which is the default. |
0/4 pts | 15 Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Self-hostable
unverified
Why unverified?Only the local scanners run on-premises; the Aikido platform itself is otherwise delivered as a cloud service. |
1/1 pts | 10 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement |
Not determined
unverified
Why unverified?Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured. |
— | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Aikido Security
Is Aikido Security European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Aikido Security as EU-Made. Its vendor, Aikido Security BV, is incorporated in Belgium, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Where does Aikido Security store data?
Aikido Security stores customer data outside the EU by default, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Does Aikido Security have a free plan?
Yes. Aikido Security has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Aikido Security?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Endor Labs (3.5/5) and Qodana (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Aikido Security alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 6 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Data processing agreement. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. The policy names both the United States and the European Union as storage locations and is silent on which is the default.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Only the local scanners run on-premises; the Aikido platform itself is otherwise delivered as a cloud service.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 91 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 14 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 7 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 data facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (26)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Features page (SAST) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Features page (SCA) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Features page (secrets detection) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Features page (AI autofix) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Features page (CI/CD gating) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Documentation help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 API documentation apidocs.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Pricing page www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Security / trust page www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Public status page status.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 About page www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 13 Terms of service www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 14 Terms of service (master subscription agreement) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 15 Privacy policy www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 16 Data processing agreement (dpa) www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 17 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 18 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 19 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 20 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 21 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 22 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 23 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 24 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 25 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap help.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 26 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.aikido.dev Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →