SonarQube
EU origin, foreign-owned Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 3 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by SonarSource Sàrl · www.sonarsource.com
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SonarQube at a glance
- Vendor
- SonarSource Sàrl
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in Switzerland source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- In the EU by default source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates SonarQube 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. SonarQube — SonarSource Sàrl's code security and quality platform, in cloud, self-managed or IDE editions — takes top marks, 8, on code analysis, trust and compliance, and sovereignty. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
SonarQube — SonarSource Sàrl's code security and quality platform, in cloud, self-managed or IDE editions — takes top marks, 8, on code analysis, trust and compliance, and sovereignty. Judges credit taint analysis tracked from source to sink with configurable sources, sanitizers and sinks; stated retention (most recent scans only, up to one year), AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.2 minimum; ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II; EU hosting by default on AWS Frankfurt; and a self-managed, air-gapped server edition. Pricing transparency is the weak mark at 5 to 6 — the higher marks crediting the published counting rule — with the cloud Team plan public at $34 per month but Enterprise "custom, contact sales", Advanced Security an additional subscription with no public price, and server tiers publishing no figures. Dependencies and secrets plus integration and admin sit at 7; developer workflow spans 7 to 8, the higher mark valuing a triage loop security champions can run; no significant disagreement was flagged. Judges found no public information on the vulnerability database, the model behind the AI fixes, or SAST precision beyond the under-5-percent secrets rate.
Speaks for it
- Taint analysis documented from source to sink, with sources, sanitizers, validators and sinks configurable for in-house frameworks and rules mapped to OWASP Top 10 and CWE Top 25
- Retention and encryption stated concretely — only the most recent scans' code stored, snapshots held up to one year, customer-controlled deletion at any time, AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.2 minimum
- Compliance evidence published — ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II with named scope, annual penetration-test summaries, a published SLA for the cloud service, and mappings to PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act
- Dependency analysis with reachability for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET, SBOM export in CycloneDX and SPDX, and git hooks that block commits or pushes carrying secrets
- Findings reach developers where they work — pull-request decoration, quality gates that fail the pipeline, free IDE plugins in connected mode, and pre-commit hooks
Held against it
- The only published false-positive figure — under 5 percent — covers secrets detection, and we found no public information on independent benchmarks for the SAST engine
- Enterprise is "custom, contact sales", Advanced Security has no public price and server tiers publish no figures, so an annual cost cannot be computed from public pages
- We found no public information naming the model behind AI CodeFix and the remediation agent, or on opting out of AI training
- The parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, and the captured pages do not show where the listed subprocessors are located
- We found no public information on the vulnerability database behind the CVEs, on audit logs, on SARIF export of findings, or on granular per-team roles
Best for
- You must keep code and findings inside your own perimeter — the self-managed server edition is documented for air-gapped operation
- Your stack is Java, Kotlin, Python or C#/.NET and you want reachability analysis to focus on dependencies your code actually calls
- You build conformity files for the EU Cyber Resilience Act or PCI DSS and need quality gates, SBOM exports and dependency-risk reports mapped to them
- You want findings in the pull request and IDE, with a gate that fails the pipeline on new issues
Avoid if
- You must compute a full annual cost from published prices alone — Enterprise pricing is custom through sales and Advanced Security carries no public price
- You require a fully European ownership chain — the parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, per the vendor's privacy notice
- Your languages sit outside Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET and reachability analysis is central to how you triage dependency risk
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 4 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 3.5 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3.5 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 3.5 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 4 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 4 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 2.5 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
Taint analysis is documented down to the rule level — SQL injection tracked from untrusted input to sink with up to twenty flows shown, CWE and OWASP Top 10 mappings published, and I can even configure my own sources, sanitizers and sinks for in-house frameworks. Forty-plus languages including PHP, TypeScript and C#, infrastructure-as-code checks for Terraform and Kubernetes, coverage and duplication reporting, custom rules and technical-debt measures cover everything my Laravel and React Native teams need. The only false-positive number I found published is the under five percent rate for secrets detection, so I stopped short of full marks. 2 3 4 5 6 21
The Application Security Engineer
Taint analysis is documented at the depth I need — untrusted input tracked from source to sink, up to twenty flows per injection finding, and sources, sanitizers, validators and sinks configurable for our in-house frameworks — alongside IaC checks for Terraform, CloudFormation and Kubernetes, custom rules, technical-debt and maintainability measures, and rules mapped to OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25 and PCI DSS. The published false-positive figure (under 5%) covers secrets detection only, and we found no public information on independent benchmark results for the SAST engine. 2 3 21 29
The Engineering Manager
Taint analysis with configurable sources, sanitizers and sinks — extensible to our in-house Kotlin frameworks — per-finding injection flows, technical-debt and maintainability review across 45+ languages, coverage import, duplication and IaC checks for Terraform and Kubernetes, with OWASP 2025 and CWE Top 25 mappings, and Java sits in the deeper Advanced SAST and reachability set. AI-generated code is explicitly held to the same standards, which answers my main question. The only false-positive figure published covers secrets rather than SAST, and we found no public information on independent benchmark results or quality trends split per team, so it stops short of the top. 2 3 5 6 21
The Platform Engineer
Taint analysis is real and documented: SQL injection tracked from source to sink with up to twenty flows shown, deeper taint analysis for Java and C#, and custom sources, sanitizers, validators and sinks configurable for our in-house frameworks, alongside custom rule development, IaC scanning for Terraform, Kubernetes and Ansible, and mappings to OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25, PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Quality measures include bugs, code smells, duplication, coverage and technical debt, and findings come with fix suggestions. Precision is only quantified for secrets detection (under 5% false positives), not for the SAST engine itself. 2 3 4 5 21
The Product Security Officer
Taint analysis that tracks untrusted input from source to sink, displays up to 20 flows per injection vulnerability, and can be extended with custom sources, sanitizers, validators and sinks for in-house frameworks is documented, alongside infrastructure-as-code checks for Terraform, CloudFormation, Azure Resource Manager, Kubernetes and Ansible, coverage, duplication and technical-debt reporting across a broad language set, and rules mapped to OWASP Top 10 and CWE Top 25 with custom rule development described. We found no published false-positive benchmark for the static analysis itself — a rate under 5 percent is published only for secrets detection — and no per-language framework list or independent benchmark results. 2 3 5 6 8 21
The Skeptic
The taint engine is real and documented: security-injection rules track untrusted input from source to sink, findings display their flows, and you can configure your own sources, sanitizers, validators and sinks for homemade frameworks, with OWASP Top 10 (2025/2021/2017), CWE Top 25, ASVS and other standards coverage listed per language and IaC checks for Terraform, CloudFormation, ARM, Kubernetes and Ansible. What I want and do not get is independent proof of precision: the only published false-positive figure I can find is under five percent for secrets detection, while the SAST engine itself gets "high precision" language, and per-language depth is stated only for Advanced SAST (Java, C#) and reachability analysis (Java/Kotlin, Python, C#/VB.NET). 2 3 4 8 21 29
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
The composition analysis reads dependency manifests and lock files, reports vulnerabilities, malware and prohibited licences, exports SBOMs in CycloneDX and SPDX, and reachability analysis for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET shows whether vulnerable code is actually called — exactly what I want on every merge request before review. Secrets detection runs locally with git hooks that block a commit or push outright. We found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources and update speed, on end-of-life components, or on validity checks for found secrets, so I stayed below the top. 5 22 23
The Application Security Engineer
Reachability analysis for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET keeps the backlog to vulnerable code actually called, and malicious-package detection, licence policies with SPDX identifiers, SBOM export in CycloneDX and SPDX, and a git hook that blocks commits or pushes carrying secrets are all documented. We found no public information on secrets validated for liveness, scanning of the full git history, the vulnerability database's sources and update speed, or end-of-life components; container scanning is in open beta on the cloud service, with server support stated as planned. 3 5 22 23
The Engineering Manager
SCA reads manifests and lock files across every supported package manager, reports vulnerabilities, malware and prohibited licences, exports SBOMs in CycloneDX and SPDX, and reachability shows which vulnerable functions our code actually calls — for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#, which happens to cover us. Secret detection runs locally, covers AWS, GCP, GitHub and Stripe patterns with a false-positive rate of less than 5%, and git hooks block a commit or push before the secret lands. We found no public information on the vulnerability database behind the CVEs, end-of-life component flags, validity checks for secrets or full git-history scans, and container scanning is still an open beta on the cloud product only, which holds it below the top band. 4 5 22 23 29
The Platform Engineer
SCA reads manifests and lock files across every supported package manager and reports CVEs, malware and prohibited licences, with reachability analysis for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET and SBOM export in both CycloneDX and SPDX; secrets detection runs locally with pre-commit and pre-push hooks that block a secret before it lands, an allowlist, and custom secret rules on the Server edition. I found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources and update cadence, end-of-life component flagging, validity checks for secrets, or scanning of the full git history. 3 5 22 23
The Product Security Officer
Software composition analysis reads manifests and lock files across the supported package managers, reports vulnerabilities, malware and prohibited licences with SPDX identifiers and release licence expressions, offers reachability analysis for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/.NET, recommends upgrade or removal actions, and exports SBOMs in CycloneDX and SPDX at release time to file with the release records — the core of what my conformity file needs. Secret detection blocks commits and pushes locally before they land, with provider patterns, entropy and test-file filters and a published false-positive rate under 5 percent. We found no public information on the vulnerability database and its sources, end-of-life component flagging, VEX output, or secret scanning across the full git history. 4 5 22 23 29
The Skeptic
Reachability is stated for Java/Kotlin, Python and C#/VB.NET, malware and prohibited licences sit alongside CVEs as risk types, SBOMs export in both CycloneDX and SPDX, and secrets get named provider patterns (AWS, GCP, GitHub, Stripe), entropy and fake-credential filters, and a git hook that blocks commits and pushes before a secret lands. We found no public information on the vulnerability database behind the CVEs and its update latency, on end-of-life component flagging, on validity checks for found secrets, or on scanning the full git history — prevention before history is documented, cleanup after is not. 4 5 22 23 29
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Pull request decoration puts comments in the merge request, the quality gate can be set to wait and fail the pipeline, GitLab CI auto-detects branches and merge requests, a pre-commit hook is one command, and the free IDE extension for VS Code, IntelliJ and others in connected mode pulls the same injection rules from the server — my whole checklist. Triage statuses, a severity filter from BLOCKER to INFO, and AI CodeFix with a remediation agent whose fixes are verified before reaching a developer round it out. We found no public information on deduplication of findings across tools or the model provider behind the AI fixes. 6 10 21 22 23 24
The Application Security Engineer
Pull-request decoration, quality gates that fail the pipeline on new code by severity, free IDE plugins in connected mode sharing the server's rules, CI integrations for Jenkins, GitLab, GitHub Actions, Bitbucket and Azure Pipelines, pre-commit and pre-push hooks, and triage statuses with an allowlist that requires a human at an interactive terminal give my security champions a workflow they can actually run. We found no public information on deduplicating findings across tools or the model behind the AI fix suggestions, and scan times appear only as a claim of no noticeable impact for the secrets scan. 6 22 23 24 29
The Engineering Manager
Pull-request decoration, a quality gate that fails the pipeline, blocking on new findings from medium severity up, pre-commit and pre-push hooks, and free IDE extensions in connected mode running the server's rules give my teams the loop I need, with triage statuses and a reviewed-safe allowlist. AI CodeFix and a remediation agent prepare fixes, and the CLI plugs into Claude Code, Copilot CLI and Cursor. We found no public information naming the model behind the AI fixes, on typical scan times, or on deduplicating findings across tools, so it sits just under the top. 6 8 22 23 24 29
The Platform Engineer
This maps to my pipelines: GitLab CI/CD and Jenkins integration are documented concretely (branch and merge-request auto-detection from the Developer edition, quality-gate wait and timeout parameters that fail the pipeline, a Jenkins extension showing the gate as a badge and widget on the job page), merge-request decoration is supported, IDE plugins run in connected mode with the same engine as the server, pre-commit hooks exist, and issues can be accepted or marked safe with justification. I found no public information on deduplication of findings across tools, the model behind the AI fixes, or typical scan times. 6 8 9 22 24 25
The Product Security Officer
Pull-request decoration and quality gates that fail the pipeline (with wait and timeout configuration) are documented on the five major DevOps platforms plus Jenkins, CircleCI, TravisCI and Codemagic, and a free IDE extension in connected mode mirrors server-side analysis including injection vulnerabilities, with pre-commit and pre-push hooks blocking new dependency risks at a configurable severity. Dependency risks carry statuses, justifications and reports usable as evidence, and AI CodeFix plus a remediation agent prepare fixes. We found no public information on the model provider behind the AI fixes, cross-tool deduplication of findings, or typical scan times beyond a ten-minute first-analysis figure. 6 8 9 21 23 24
The Skeptic
Findings arrive where developers work: pull request decoration, a quality gate that fails the pipeline with a configurable wait, IDE connected mode that pulls the server's injection findings into the editor, pre-commit and pre-push hooks, and CI across GitHub Actions, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure, Jenkins and more, with accept/safe statuses and justifications on dependency risks. The AI CodeFix and Remediation Agent are documented as preparing fixes for eligible issues, but the model behind them is never named — "zero data retention and BYOK with LLMs" is a hint, not a provider — and we found no public information on typical scan times or on deduplication of findings across tools. 6 9 21 22 23 24
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
SonarQube Server runs self-managed, air-gapped if needed, on our own infrastructure, the platform integrates with GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps plus a Jenkins extension with build badge and quality gate status, and webhooks are documented at project and global level with HMAC-SHA256 protection. Jira Cloud and Slack integrations, portfolios across repositories, SARIF import, and SSO with SCIM on the Enterprise plan cover the administration side. We found no public information on customer-side audit logs, SARIF export, or granular roles per team, which keeps it off the top mark. 2 6 8 9 26 27 29
The Application Security Engineer
All five major DevOps platforms are supported, a self-managed edition including air-gapped operation is documented, webhooks are specified down to HMAC-SHA256 signing and payload fields, Jira Cloud and Slack integrate, SSO and SCIM sit on the Enterprise plan, and portfolios give cross-repository reporting with trends. We found no public information on customer-facing audit logs, granular per-team roles, or SARIF export — only import is documented — and those gaps matter when I collect PCI DSS evidence. 2 6 9 26 27 29
The Engineering Manager
The self-managed server edition runs on our own infrastructure, air-gapped if required, Jenkins and GitLab CI integration is documented in detail, Jira Cloud, Slack and HMAC-signed webhooks are listed, and enterprise plans add SSO with SCIM plus portfolios for cross-repository trends — most of what a six-team setup needs. The captured pages document importing external findings through SARIF, but we found no public information on exporting findings, on audit logs, or on granular roles per team beyond a single analysis permission, which is what keeps it from the top. 2 6 9 26 27 29
The Platform Engineer
The self-managed Server edition documented for operation inside my perimeter, including air-gapped, plus SSO and SCIM in the enterprise tier, webhooks at project and global level with HMAC-SHA256 verification, Jira Cloud, portfolios, and SARIF import cover most of my checklist. I found no public information on audit logs, SARIF export of findings, granular roles per team, or whether every scan setting is reachable by API for rollout to 900 repositories — the last two are what I would need proven before signing. 2 6 9 24 25 26 27 29
The Product Security Officer
SonarQube Server runs self-managed inside the customer's perimeter including air-gapped, which for a machine builder is the decisive option, while the Cloud is SaaS with EU or US regions; GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps and CodeCatalyst are supported, with webhooks at global and project level secured by HMAC plus Jira Cloud and Slack. Enterprise features add SSO and SCIM, portfolios, exportable governance reports with historical trends, and SARIF import of external findings. We found no public information on audit logs of administrative actions, granular per-team roles, or SARIF export of findings. 2 4 6 9 26 27 29
The Skeptic
Five DevOps platforms plus Jenkins, a self-managed and air-gapped Server edition, SSO and SCIM on the enterprise plan, webhooks at global and project level with HMAC protection, Jira Cloud and Slack integrations, portfolios and SARIF import give a solid administrative base. We found no public information on audit logs, on export of findings in SARIF or CSV, on self-managed code hosts, or on per-team role granularity — the web API surfaces only as a passing mention of "Web Server API calls" secured by revocable user tokens. 2 6 9 11 26 27 29
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
Retention is stated plainly — only the most recent scan's code is stored, snapshot retention runs up to one year, and customers can delete projects and issue reports at any time — encryption is AES-256 at rest with TLS 1.2 minimum, ISO 27001:2022 covers all products, the SOC 2 Type II scope is spelled out, an SLA is published, and there is a full mapping to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act including a CRA-specific report. A zero-retention option and bring-your-own-key with LLMs exist on the Enterprise plan, and the self-hosted edition keeps code inside our perimeter entirely. We found no public information on the model provider behind the AI features or a statement on opting out of AI training on code. 2 9 11 16 21 28 29
The Application Security Engineer
Retention is explicit — only the most recent scans' source is stored, up to one year in snapshots, with customer-controlled deletion — encryption is AES-256 at rest with TLS 1.2 minimum, ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are stated with scope naming Server, Cloud and IDE, a public status page and SLA reference exist, audit reports are provided annually, pentest summaries are published, and security reports map to PCI DSS, the EU Cyber Resilience Act, OWASP and CWE, with a DORA annex in the legal documents. The AI fix features name no model provider, though the Enterprise plan lists a zero-retention option and bring-your-own-key with LLMs. 9 11 12 13 15 19 21 28 29
The Engineering Manager
The trust centre states that only source code from the most recent scans is stored, held up to one year in snapshots, encrypted AES-256 at rest with TLS 1.2 minimum, that customers can delete projects and their data at any time, and an enterprise zero-retention option exists. ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are stated with their scope, annual external penetration test summaries are published, an SLA is published for the cloud service, and findings map to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and the Cyber Resilience Act — an auditor's shortlist. An AI annex is listed among the legal documents but its content was not captured, so we found no public information on the model provider behind the AI features or how to opt out. 11 16 19 21 28 29
The Platform Engineer
Retention is stated (only the code of the most recent scans is stored, snapshots kept up to one year, customer-controlled deletion at any time), encryption in transit (TLS 1.2 minimum) and at rest (AES-256) are documented, ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are held with scope covering Server, Cloud and IDE, penetration tests run annually with executive summaries published, and findings map to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act. With the self-hosted edition my code never leaves the network at all. I found no public information on the model provider behind the AI features or an opt-out regarding AI training. 2 11 16 19 21 28 29
The Product Security Officer
This is what I can hand an auditor: a dedicated EU Cyber Resilience Act mapping explains how SCA, SBOM export in CycloneDX and SPDX, dependency-risk review with justifications, quality gates and a CRA-specific security report provide conformity evidence, while ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are stated for all products with scope, penetration-test executive summaries are published, and a service level agreement and public status page exist. Source-code handling is documented concretely: only the most recent scan's code is stored, snapshots retained up to one year, customer-initiated deletion at any time, AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2 in transit. We found no public information on whether customer code or findings train AI models, on the model provider behind AI features, or on an AI opt-out beyond a zero-data-retention and bring-your-own-key LLM option. 9 11 12 13 16 21 28 29
The Skeptic
They state the specifics a buyer needs: only the source code of the most recent scans is stored, snapshot retention runs up to one year, deletion is under customer control at any time, AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2 minimum, ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II with scope named and reports on request, published penetration test summaries, a referenced SLA, a status page with 90-day history, and mappings to PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act. The AI leg is the soft spot: zero data retention and BYOK with LLMs appear as enterprise features and an AI Annex sits in the legal document list, but the model provider behind the fix features is not named in anything captured here. 2 9 11 12 15 16 21 29
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
SonarQube Cloud defaults to EU hosting in AWS Frankfurt with EU backups in eu-west-1, the contracting entity SonarSource Sàrl sits in Switzerland with a published data processing agreement and a subprocessor list in the Trust Center under fourteen days' notice, and standard contractual clauses are named as transfer safeguards. The self-hosted Server edition, air-gapped even, keeps code and findings on our own servers, which is the chain that matters to me in Cologne. The parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, and we found no public information on subprocessor locations or which AI models process customer material. 2 11 18 19
The Application Security Engineer
A self-hosted edition documented to keep code and findings inside the customer's perimeter, including air-gapped operation, lets me keep the chain entirely ours, and the cloud service defaults to EU hosting on named infrastructure — AWS Frankfurt (eu-central-1) — with a published data processing agreement, a subprocessor list with fourteen days' notice before access, and SCCs with supplementary measures for transfers. The principal operating entity is Swiss with a US-domiciled parent holding company, and we found no public information on where the subprocessors, including any AI models, are located. 2 11 18 19
The Engineering Manager
Cloud customers get EU hosting by default on named infrastructure — AWS Frankfurt — the contracting entity is SonarSource Sàrl in Switzerland with a parent holding company domiciled in the United States, and a data processing agreement plus a subprocessor list are published alongside ISO 27001 and SOC 2. The self-managed server edition is documented to keep code and findings inside our perimeter, air-gapped if we choose, which is the sovereign path I would run for Munich. The captured pages name no locations for the listed subprocessors, and the US parent keeps this short of a fully European chain. 2 11 18 19
The Platform Engineer
For my deployment the decisive fact is the self-hosted, air-gapped Server edition that keeps code and findings on our own servers; for the cloud, Frankfurt on AWS is the default region with EU backups, the contracting entity SonarSource Sàrl sits in Switzerland with a group parent domiciled in the United States, a data processing agreement is published with a subprocessor list and fourteen days' notice of changes, and standard contractual clauses are in place. The captured pages do not show each subprocessor's location. 2 11 15 18 19
The Product Security Officer
The self-hosted Server edition is documented to keep code and findings in-house down to air-gapped operation, so a fully customer-controlled European chain is available, and the SaaS defaults to AWS Frankfurt with EU backups — a data processing agreement and a subprocessor list are published and ISO 27001 and SOC 2 are stated. Against that, the principal contracting entity is Swiss with the parent holding company domiciled in the United States, and the captured pages show subprocessor categories but not their names or locations. 2 11 18 19
The Skeptic
EU hosting is the default — Frankfurt on AWS eu-central-1, with EU backups in eu-west-1 — under SonarSource Sàrl in Switzerland as principal operating entity, with a published data processing agreement, a subprocessor list in the Trust Center and fourteen days' notice before a new subprocessor touches data; the self-hosted, air-gapped Server edition keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers entirely. Against that, the parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, Standard Contractual Clauses and Swiss Addenda are invoked as transfer safeguards, and the captured pages do not show where each subprocessor — including any AI model provider — is located. 2 11 15 18 19
Pricing transparency
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
The Cloud Team plan starts at $34 per month with a free tier for private projects up to 50k LOC and free analysis for public OSI-licensed repositories, secrets detection is included at no additional cost, and the Server line is priced per instance per year based on lines of code counted on the largest branch — a counting rule I can actually explain to finance, and freelancers pushing commits do not add seats. But the Enterprise tier is contact sales, the Advanced Security subscription that bundles the composition analysis, container scanning and SBOM export carries no visible price, and we found no public information on VAT treatment, so the real annual bill is not fully computable from public pages. 4 9 10 17
The Application Security Engineer
The cloud Team plan starts at $34 per month with a free tier up to 50k lines of code and no card required, the server product is priced per instance per year on lines of code with the counting rule explained — the largest branch analyzed, not cumulative — and secrets detection is included at no additional cost. The Enterprise tier is contact sales, Advanced Security requires an additional subscription with no stated price, and VAT treatment is not stated, so a complete annual cost for a 120-developer organisation is not computable from public pages. 4 9 10 17
The Engineering Manager
The cloud Team plan starts at $34 per month for under 50 developers, the free private tier runs to 50k lines of code, public OSI-licensed repositories are free, and the server terms explain the counting rule — lines of code of the largest branch, not cumulative. But the server editions state only a model of per instance, per year, based on lines of code with no figures, the enterprise tier is contact sales, and Advanced Security is an additional subscription without a public price; we also found no public information on VAT treatment. I cannot compute the real annual cost for six teams from these pages alone. 4 9 10 17
The Platform Engineer
The cloud Team plan starts at $34 per month with a free tier for private projects up to 50k lines of code, the open-source tier is free, and the Server counting rule (largest branch analysed, not cumulative on re-analysis) is published. But the Server plan prices, the Enterprise tier (custom, contact sales) and the Advanced Security subscription my Jenkins pipelines would need are unpriced, and VAT treatment is not stated — I cannot compute an annual cost for my estate from the public pages. 1 9 10 17
The Product Security Officer
The Cloud Team plan is published at $34 per month (previously listed at $65) with a 14-day trial, the free tier for private projects is capped at 50,000 lines of code, public OSI-licensed repositories are free, Gitar is $20 per user per month billed annually, secrets detection is included at no additional cost, and the lines-of-code counting rule — largest branch analysed, not cumulative — is spelled out in the terms. The Enterprise plan is custom pricing through sales, Advanced Security is called out as needing an additional subscription without a price, and we found no public information on Server edition prices per plan, seat minimums or VAT treatment. 1 4 9 10 17
The Skeptic
The cloud Team plan is public at "$34 per month (previously listed at $65)" with a 14-day trial, private projects are free up to 50k lines of code, OSI-licensed public repositories are free, Gitar is "$20 /user/mo, billed annually", and the Server counting rule is spelled out — lines of code of the largest branch analyzed, not cumulative on re-analysis. But the Enterprise plan is "custom, contact sales", Advanced Security is an additional subscription with no public price, the captured Server pricing page shows tiers and lines-of-code recommendations without price figures, and the basis of the monthly figure plus VAT treatment go unexplained, so a real annual cost for a large estate cannot be computed from these pages. 4 9 10 17
European sovereignty — proven facts
3 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity |
Incorporated in CH
unverified
Why unverified?The parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, and the excerpts give no Swiss commercial register or registered address. |
2/2 pts | 18 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location |
EU by default
unverified
Why unverified?US-based hosting (AWS us-east-1) exists for some customers, and the privacy notice says personal data may be stored and processed in the US and other non-EU jurisdictions; the statement covers SonarQube Cloud only, not self-hosted SonarQube Server. |
2/4 pts | 11 Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Self-hostable
unverified
Why unverified?Self-hosting applies to the SonarQube Server product only; SonarQube Cloud itself is a SaaS solution (hosted in AWS with EU hosting by default), and both self-hosted and EU-region options coexist, with self-hosting taking precedence. |
1/1 pts | 10 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about SonarQube
Is SonarQube European?
Partly. whats-best.ai classifies SonarQube as EU origin, foreign-owned. Its vendor, SonarSource Sàrl, is incorporated in Switzerland, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Where does SonarQube store data?
SonarQube stores customer data in the EU by default, though not exclusively, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Does SonarQube have a free plan?
Yes. SonarQube has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to SonarQube?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates Aikido Security (3.5/5), Endor Labs (3.5/5) and Qodana (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Aikido Security (EU-Made, Belgium). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: SonarQube alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 6 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The parent holding company is domiciled in the United States, and the excerpts give no Swiss commercial register or registered address.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting location. US-based hosting (AWS us-east-1) exists for some customers, and the privacy notice says personal data may be stored and processed in the US and other non-EU jurisdictions; the statement covers SonarQube Cloud only, not self-hosted SonarQube Server.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Self-hosting applies to the SonarQube Server product only; SonarQube Cloud itself is a SaaS solution (hosted in AWS with EU hosting by default), and both self-hosted and EU-region options coexist, with self-hosting taking precedence.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 17 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 13 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 data fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 pricing fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (29)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Features page (SonarQube) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Features page (code security) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Features page (secrets detection) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Features page (SCA) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Integrations page www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Documentation (SonarQube Server) docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Documentation (SonarQube Cloud) docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Pricing page www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Pricing page (SonarQube Server) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Security / trust page www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Trust centre trust.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 13 Public status page status.sonarqube.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 14 About page www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 15 Legal documents www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 16 Terms of service (SonarQube Cloud) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 17 Terms of service (SonarQube Server) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 18 Privacy policy www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 19 Data processing agreement (dpa) www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 20 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 21 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 22 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 23 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 24 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 25 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 26 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 27 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 28 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 29 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.sonarsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →