Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 4 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by JetBrains s.r.o. · www.jetbrains.com

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Qodana at a glance

Vendor
JetBrains s.r.o.
Headquarters
Incorporated in Czechia source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Free plan
Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Starting price
“Pricing starts at €5 per developer” (vendor’s words) source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Qodana 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Qodana, JetBrains' static-analysis and quality-gate platform for cloud or self-hosted deployment, is strongest on sovereignty: JetBrains s.r.o. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources

Qodana alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Qodana, JetBrains' static-analysis and quality-gate platform for cloud or self-hosted deployment, is strongest on sovereignty: JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague is the contracting party under Czech law, Qodana is hosted by Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL (Luxembourg) in Ireland, the default data location for personal data is the EU, and a self-hosted edition keeps analysis on your own servers — though judges flag US and UK AI and support providers on the published subprocessor list. Integration and admin holds at 7-7, and code analysis scores 7-8 on 2,500+ checks and taint analysis documented down to custom sources, sinks and sanitizers with published OWASP coverage matrices. The weak spot is dependencies and secrets, the widest range of any criterion: judges credit named sources, hashed package names and vulnerable-API checks, but found no public information on secret detection or malicious-package checks, and the weighting differs. Pricing transparency is capped by the Ultimate Plus tier, for which we found no public price; Ultimate is "€5.00 per active contributor/month (billed annually at €60.00, €71.40 incl. VAT)".

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Speaks for it

  • Taint analysis documented in depth — configurable sources, sinks and sanitizers, adjustable cross-file depth, Opengrep-compatible custom rules, and published OWASP Top 10 2017 and 2021 coverage matrices per language.
  • Quality gates fail the pipeline per severity, on total problems, on fresh and total coverage and on licence audit, with a baseline counting only new problems (exit code 255).
  • Dependency checks name their sources (OSV, Mend.io), send only hashed package names, and test whether vulnerable APIs are actually called, while the licence audit exports SPDX 2.3 JSON.
  • A self-hosted edition ships via CLI installer or Kubernetes Helm chart, includes all Ultimate Plus features, and taint analysis runs locally without external services.
  • The contributor counting rule is explicit — anyone who committed in the last 90 days, minimum three — with unlimited lines of code, projects and reports.

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Held against it

  • We found no public information on secret detection in code or git history, malicious-package detection, end-of-life components or automatic dependency upgrade pull requests.
  • Taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit, single sign-on and the Cloud API sit on Ultimate Plus, for which we found no public price, and the self-hosted edition is custom pricing.
  • We found no public information on false-positive rates, duplication or complexity metrics, or infrastructure-as-code checks.
  • We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks or a Jira integration.
  • We found no public information on source-code retention periods, a published availability SLA, or whether source code trains AI models.

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Best for

  • You want new-code discipline in CI: quality gates per severity, on total problems, on fresh and total coverage and on licence audit, with a baseline that counts only new problems.
  • You need analysis to stay inside your own network: a self-hosted edition via CLI installer or Kubernetes Helm chart, with taint analysis that runs locally without external services.
  • Your stack is JVM, PHP or.NET and you want security rules versioned with the code: taint configuration lives in a committed file with custom sources, sinks and sanitizers.
  • You need a licence bill of materials for releases: a transitive dependency tree with allow/prohibit rules and SPDX 2.3 JSON export.

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Avoid if

  • You must budget the annual cost of the security configuration in advance: the tier carrying taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit, single sign-on and the Cloud API is one for which we found no public price, and the self-hosted edition is custom pricing.
  • You require no US or UK providers anywhere in the chain — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
  • You need single sign-on on a standard cloud licence: it is documented on the Ultimate Plus tier and the self-hosted edition.
  • You need identical findings in the IDE and in CI: the documentation itself notes that running in IDEs and via the linters can produce different output.

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

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How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

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The Lead Developer

Taint analysis with configurable sources, sinks and sanitizers, four depth levels, a Kotlin-scripted rule file and published OWASP Top 10 coverage matrices per language, on top of 2,500+ checks across Java, Kotlin, PHP, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, C/C++ and Ruby with frameworks like Spring, Symfony, React and Django listed per tier — this covers my Laravel and TypeScript stacks properly. Custom inspections via FlexInspect, coverage import from PHPUnit and Jest, baseline and a post-quantum-crypto check round it out. We found no public information on false-positive rates, benchmarks or infrastructure-as-code checks, which is what keeps it below the top level. 1 2 6 10 11 20

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The Application Security Engineer

Taint analysis is documented at the depth I need: sources, sinks and sanitizers configurable in a file we can commit, analysis depth adjustable from the current file up to third-level cross-file references, custom Opengrep-compatible rule files, and OWASP Top 10 2017 and 2021 coverage matrices per language for C#, JavaScript and TypeScript. Custom rules also come via FlexInspect inspections built in IntelliJ IDEA, which is how I would encode our in-house framework rules, and coverage import is supported for JaCoCo, Jest, coverlet, Coverage.py and go test. We found no public information on infrastructure-as-code checks, published false-positive rates or independent benchmarks, which holds it short of the top. 6 10 11 1 2

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The Engineering Manager

The analysis is IDE-grade with 2,500+ checks across Java, Kotlin, Groovy and a dozen other languages, and the taint analysis documentation is unusually thorough — configurable cross-file analysis depth, custom sources and sinks, and a published OWASP Top 10 coverage matrix, with Spring, Jakarta EE and Ktor support fitting a JVM shop like mine. What I cannot show my board from these pages: complexity, duplication or technical-debt measures, infrastructure-as-code checks, and any published false-positive benchmarks are not described. 1 2 6 10 11 20

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The Platform Engineer

Qodana carries the JetBrains IDE inspections into CI with more than 2,500 checks across Java, Kotlin, PHP, JavaScript, TypeScript, C#, C, C++, Python, Go and Ruby, and the taint analysis is genuinely documented: configurable cross-file depths, custom source/sink rules in a Kotlin script plus Opengrep-compatible rules, bundled coverage of OWASP Top 10 with per-language matrices, and FlexInspect for writing my own inspections with coverage import from JaCoCo or Coverage.py. We found no public information on duplication or complexity metrics, infrastructure-as-code checks, or published false-positive rates, which keeps it below the top level. 1 2 4 6 20

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The Product Security Officer

Taint analysis is documented down to cross-file depth settings, custom source, sink and sanitizer rules in a Kotlin-scripted inspection file, and published OWASP Top 10 2017 and 2021 coverage matrices per language, on top of 2,500+ checks across thirteen languages, FlexInspect custom inspections and coverage import from JaCoCo, Coverage.py and others. We found no public information on infrastructure-as-code checks or published false-positive rates, which keeps this below the top band. 6 1 4 2 10

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The Skeptic

Taint analysis is documented in real depth — analysis depth out to File 3 (High), custom sources, sinks and sanitizers written in a config script, Opengrep-compatible rule files, and OWASP 2017 and 2021 coverage matrices per language — riding on JetBrains IDE linters with 2,500+ checks across thirteen listed languages and an extensive per-language framework list. But we found no public information on false-positive rates or independent benchmarks, infrastructure-as-code checks, duplication and complexity metrics, or a published mapping of the wider check set to CWE. That puts it solidly above the middle anchor without reaching the top one. 1 2 4 6 20

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Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

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How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

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The Lead Developer

The vulnerability checker draws on OSV and Mend.io for Gradle, Maven, NPM and PyPI, and the vulnerable-API inspections tell me whether risky code is actually called — that is what I want to see in a merge request. The licence audit builds a dependency tree with transitive licences across Composer, npm, Yarn, pip, NuGet and Go Modules, with an editable allow/prohibit matrix, ignores and overrides, and an SPDX 2.3 JSON export. We found no public information on secret detection, malicious-package checks, end-of-life components or automatic upgrade pull requests. 7 8

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The Application Security Engineer

The vulnerability checker draws on named sources, OSV and Mend.io, and the vulnerable-API inspections for JVM, Python, Go, JavaScript and.NET tell me whether the flagged dependency code is actually called, which is the reachability I need to keep the backlog honest; it also sends only hashed package names. Licence audit builds the dependency tree with transitive licences, allowed and prohibited rules, and SPDX 2.3 JSON export. We found no public information on secret detection of any kind, including git history scanning, validity checks and push protection, nor on malicious-package or end-of-life detection, so only the dependency half of this criterion is scored. 7 8 10

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The Engineering Manager

The vulnerability checker names its data sources (OSV and Mend.io) covering Gradle, Maven, NPM and PyPI, with per-language inspections that check whether our code actually calls vulnerable APIs, and the licence audit builds a transitive dependency tree with an overridable allowed/prohibited licence matrix, SPDX 2.3 JSON export and its own gate conditions. We found no public information on secret detection in code or git history, malicious-package detection, end-of-life components or automatic dependency upgrade pull requests, which caps this for a supply-chain view. 5 7 8

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The Platform Engineer

The vulnerability checker names its data sources (OSV and Mend.io) for Gradle, Maven, NPM and PyPI, sends only hashed package names outward, and adds call-level inspections of whether vulnerable APIs are actually used; the licence audit builds the dependency tree with transitive licences, enforces allowed and prohibited licence rules, and exports SPDX 2.3 JSON. We found no public information on secret detection in code or git history, push protection, container image scanning, or malicious-package and end-of-life detection, so the secrets side is entirely undocumented and the whole area sits behind the top licence. 7 8 11

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The Product Security Officer

The vulnerability checker draws on OSV and Mend.io for Gradle, Maven, NPM and PyPI, and per-language inspections check whether vulnerable APIs are actually used — a form of reachability — while the licence audit builds the transitive dependency tree with allow and prohibit rules and SPDX 2.3 JSON export, which is what I need for a release bill of materials. We found no public information on secret detection, malicious-package detection or end-of-life component flagging. 7 8

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The Skeptic

Vulnerability checking covers Gradle, Maven, NPM and PyPI through named sources (OSV and Mend.io), sends only hashed package names, and adds per-language checks for whether the project actually uses vulnerable APIs — the closest thing to reachability the pages show. Licence audit is genuinely strong: a transitive dependency tree, policy rules with overrides and ignores, and SPDX 2.3 JSON export. But we found no public information on secret detection of any kind, nor on malicious-package detection, end-of-life components, container image scanning, or automatic dependency upgrade pull requests. 4 7 8

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Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

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How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

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The Lead Developer

Quality gates can fail the pipeline per severity, on total problem count, on fresh and total coverage and on licence audit, with the baseline focusing the gate on new problems — exactly the merge-request discipline I run, and only hashed package names leave the build for the vulnerability check. CI support spans GitHub Actions, GitLab, TeamCity, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines and anything that runs Docker, findings surface in PhpStorm and VS Code, and quick fixes open pull requests for review. The documentation itself notes that running the analysis in an IDE and via the linter can produce different output, and we found no public information on pre-commit hooks, typical scan times or AI autofix. 1 2 4 5 20 21

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The Application Security Engineer

Quality gates are the strong suit: limits per severity, fresh and total coverage conditions and licence-audit conditions, all failing the pipeline with exit code 255, and with a baseline enabled the limit counts new problems only, so developers are judged on new code. Quick-fixes arrive as pull requests I can review, and IDE support covers JetBrains IDEs, VS Code and Visual Studio with background scans pushing reports back into the editor. The vendor itself notes that running in IDEs and via the linters can produce different output, and we found no public information on pre-commit checks, documented scan times or AI-assisted fixes. 5 1 21 20

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The Engineering Manager

The quality gate is the best-documented part of the product: per-severity limits, fresh and total coverage gates, licence gates, and with the baseline enabled the gate counts the sum of new problems — exactly the new-code discipline I want every team to keep — failing the pipeline with exit code 255. Quick-fixes can be opened as reviewable pull requests, and CI coverage spans GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins, TeamCity and anything that runs Docker. We found no public information on pre-commit or push-time checks or typical scan times, and the documentation itself notes that runs in IDEs and via the linters can produce different output. 1 3 4 5 20 21

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The Platform Engineer

Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions and any Docker-capable CI are supported on every licence, the quality gate is deeply configurable — total and per-severity problem limits, fresh and total coverage limits, licence gates — and fails the pipeline with exit code 255, with the baseline focusing the gate on new problems, which is exactly what my Jenkins jobs need. IDE plugins, background scans that push reports into the editor after a commit, and automatic pull requests with quick-fixes are documented. We found no public information on merge-request comments, per-finding suppression with reasons, pre-commit checks, AI autofix or scan times, and the documentation itself notes that IDE runs and linter runs can produce different output. 1 4 5 20 21

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The Product Security Officer

Quality gates are thoroughly documented — fail conditions per severity, total problem counts, code coverage and licence audit, with the pipeline failing on exit code 255 and the baseline calculated from new problems — and findings surface in JetBrains IDEs and VS Code, with background scans reporting back after commits and quick-fixes arriving as reviewable pull requests. The documentation itself notes that IDE runs and linter runs can produce different output, and we found no public information on pre-commit checks, deduplication or scan times. 5 1 2 21 20

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The Skeptic

The quality gate is documented to a level I rarely see: per-severity limits, total-problem limits, fresh and total coverage percentages, licence-audit gates working in incremental mode, and a documented exit code that fails the pipeline, with a baseline so only new problems count. Quick-fixes arrive as reviewable pull requests and reports land in JetBrains IDEs and VS Code after commits. We found no public information on pre-commit hooks, deduplication, scan times, or suppression with audited reasons and expiry — and the vendor itself notes IDE and CI runs can produce different output. 1 2 4 5 21

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Platforms, deployment & administration

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How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

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The Lead Developer

A self-hosted edition installs via the CLI or a Kubernetes Helm chart, integrates SAML or OIDC single sign-on, and keeps code and findings on our own infrastructure, while the Cloud API is documented down to an OpenAPI file with team, project and insights endpoints under organisation tokens. Insights dashboards aggregate across projects and teams, reports move in and out as SARIF, and any online or self-hosted version control system is accepted as a source. We found no public information on Jira integration, webhooks, SCIM provisioning or audit logs, and single sign-on in the cloud edition sits on the top licence. 1 3 9 10 11 16

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The Application Security Engineer

A self-hosted edition is documented with a CLI installer and a Kubernetes Helm chart including all Ultimate Plus features, the linters run on Linux, macOS and Windows, and any online or self-hosted version control system is accepted, which fits an environment like ours with in-house Git servers. The cloud API is properly documented with an OpenAPI file and organisation tokens for creating teams and projects, single sign-on covers SAML and OIDC on the self-hosted side, and reports read and write SARIF. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks or a Jira integration. 3 10 9 4

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The Engineering Manager

Self-hosted deployment via CLI installer or Kubernetes Helm chart on Linux, macOS and Windows, a documented REST API with an OpenAPI file that creates teams and projects, SARIF reading and writing, and Insights dashboards aggregating across teams cover most of what my organisation needs. Single sign-on is documented (SAML or OIDC group-based roles, on Ultimate Plus or self-hosted) but we found no public information on Jira integration, SCIM provisioning, audit logs or webhooks, and administrative roles are documented only as Owner and Admin. 1 3 9 10 11 16

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The Platform Engineer

A self-hosted edition is documented — CLI installer or Kubernetes Helm chart on Linux, macOS and Windows — with OAuth or OIDC single sign-on and roles from SAML groups, self-hosted repositories are explicitly supported, and reports read and write SARIF. The documented REST API (OpenAPI file and sample client included) creates projects and teams and queries insights over time, and a global configuration set once can be reused across all projects through the pipelines — the combination I would use to roll this out to hundreds of GitLab repositories. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs or webhooks, and the API, single sign-on and global configuration all sit only in the top licence, whose terms also require a Qodana Cloud account. 1 2 3 4 9 11 16

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The Product Security Officer

There is a documented Cloud API with an OpenAPI file, organization tokens, user and insights endpoints and Owner/Admin roles, alongside a self-hosted edition deployed via CLI installer or Kubernetes Helm chart, single sign-on through SAML or OIDC, SARIF import and export, and cross-project Insights dashboards for teams. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks or issue-tracker integration. 9 3 10 4 2

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The Skeptic

A self-hosted edition ships with a CLI installer and a Kubernetes Helm chart, the cloud API is documented endpoint by endpoint with an OpenAPI file and team/project creation, SARIF goes in and out, and repositories can live on self-hosted version control systems. Single sign-on via OAuth, OIDC or SAML is documented but confined to the top tier, and organisations are capped at 5,000 projects. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks, or a Jira integration. 3 4 9 11 16

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Source-code handling, security & compliance

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How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

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The Lead Developer

Customers keep ownership of their code and the vendor commits not to alter it, access purposes are enumerated in the terms, data is TLS in transit and AES-256 at rest with rotating keys, and SOC 2 Type II reports plus GDPR documents are downloadable from a Trust Center alongside a public status page and a data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses. Findings history retention is stated as 30, 180 or unlimited days by plan, and the self-hosted edition plus fully local taint analysis mean analysis need not leave our network. We found no public information on how long source code itself is retained in the cloud, whether code is used to train AI models, or a published SLA beyond a promise to respond in a reasonable time. 3 6 10 12 14 16 17

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The Application Security Engineer

The terms state the customer owns all data and source code, that code will not be altered without permission, and name the purposes for which the vendor may access project source codes; encryption is TLS in transit and AES-256 at rest with key rotation, SOC 2 Type II reports are downloadable from the Trust Center, and a public status page shows uptime history. The taint rules are mapped to OWASP Top 10 categories and analysis can run entirely locally without external services. We found no public information on source-code retention periods, a published SLA, a statement on whether code trains AI models, or PCI DSS-mapped reporting, and that last gap matters to a PCI DSS shop like mine. 16 17 14 6 11

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The Engineering Manager

The terms spell out who may access our source code and for which purposes, that we own the data and that code is not altered without permission; encryption is TLS in transit and AES-256 at rest with key rotation, SOC 2 Type II reports are downloadable from the Trust Center, and a real-time status page exists. The self-hosted edition, locally running taint analysis and hashed-only package names for vulnerability checks give credible paths to keep code inside our network, but we found no public statement on whether source code trains AI models, no published SLA, and cloud history retention varies by plan from 30 days to unlimited. 1 6 7 10 12 14 16 17

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The Platform Engineer

The terms list the purposes for which JetBrains may access project source code (running the cloud service, security, support, legal requirements) with a stated commitment not to alter it, encryption is TLS in transit and AES-256 at rest with key rotation, SOC 2 Type II with reports and penetration-test summaries sits in a Trust Center, a real-time status page with uptime history exists, and OWASP coverage matrices are published for the taint rules. The self-hosted edition and locally running taint analysis reduce code exposure, though paid licences require a Qodana Cloud account. We found no public information on code retention periods, whether code trains AI models or an opt-out, a published SLA, or PCI DSS and Cyber Resilience Act mapping. 3 11 12 14 16 17

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The Product Security Officer

The terms state why our project source may be accessed, that we own our data and that code will not be altered without permission; encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 Type II with reports, penetration-test summaries and security questionnaires in a Trust Center, a real-time status page, stated retention for detailed findings, and a self-hosted edition that can keep analysis inside our network are all documented. We found no public information on how long the source code itself is retained, on whether our code trains AI models, on a published SLA, or on report mappings to PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act — the last gap matters directly to my audits. 16 17 14 12 3 11

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The Skeptic

The terms state what the vendor may access project source code for, that the customer owns the data, that code will not be altered without permission, and that the vulnerability checker sends only hashed package names; encryption is TLS plus AES-256 with key rotation, SOC 2 Type II reports sit in a Trust Center, a data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses is downloadable, a real-time status page exists, and report history retention is stated per tier (30 days, 180 days, unlimited). We found no public information on how long source code itself is retained, whether code is used to train AI models or how to opt out, a published availability SLA, or mappings to PCI DSS or the EU Cyber Resilience Act. 1 7 12 16 17 18

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The Lead Developer

JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague is the contracting party under Czech law with GDPR directly applicable, Qodana Cloud is hosted by Amazon Web Services EMEA in Ireland, and a published subprocessor list names each provider with its location, backed by a downloadable data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses and SOC 2 attestation. A self-hosted edition documented as keeping everything on the customer's own servers gives us our own chain. The parent company is Amsterdam-based, and several listed AI and support subprocessors operate from the US or UK with safeguards but not European seats, so it stops short of an end-to-end European chain. 15 16 18 19

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The Application Security Engineer

The contracting entity is JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague under Czech law, the published subprocessor list shows Qodana hosted by Amazon Web Services EMEA in Luxembourg with the data centre in Ireland, and a data processing agreement with the standard contractual clauses is downloadable. Personal data defaults to EU locations, and the self-hosted edition with a Helm chart keeps code and findings on our own servers. The listed chain includes some non-EU support and billing providers and group headquarters sit in Amsterdam, which keeps it a notch below sovereign end to end. 19 16 18 17 3

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The Engineering Manager

The contracting entity is JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague, Qodana itself is listed as hosted by Amazon Web Services EMEA in Luxembourg with the instance in Ireland (EU), the default location for customer data is the EU, and a GDPR data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses is downloadable. The subprocessor list is published with locations and change notification, and a self-hosted edition on our own servers is documented; some support and analytics subprocessors sit with UK or US parent companies, which keeps it just short of the top mark. 10 13 16 17 18 19

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The Platform Engineer

JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague is the contracting entity, controller and governing law under Czech and EU GDPR, Qodana Cloud runs on named EU infrastructure (Amazon Web Services EMEA in Ireland) with the EU as the default data location, and a GDPR data processing agreement including standard contractual clauses is published. The subprocessor list names providers with their locations, customers are informed of changes, SOC 2 Type II is stated, and a documented self-hosted edition would keep code and findings on our own European servers. Some listed AI providers and support services run in the US or UK, with standard clauses given as the safeguard. 3 14 16 17 18 19

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The Product Security Officer

The contracting entity is JetBrains s.r.o. in the Czech Republic under directly applicable GDPR, Qodana Cloud runs on Amazon Web Services EMEA (Luxembourg) infrastructure in Ireland with the EU as the default data location and an EU-region choice for SaaS, a data processing agreement with standard contractual clauses is published, the subprocessor list names providers with their locations, SOC 2 attestation is stated, and a self-hosted edition runs on our own servers. Non-EU providers appear in the wider group chain — for example US AI model providers for JetBrains AI — though those serve the AI service rather than the analysis pipeline evidenced here. 19 17 13 18 14 3

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The Skeptic

JetBrains s.r.o. in Prague is the contracting party under Czech law, Qodana itself is hosted by Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL (Luxembourg) in Ireland, the default data location is the EU, and a subprocessor list names providers with their locations — support in Germany and Ireland, CRM in Germany — next to a published GDPR data processing agreement, with a self-hosted edition keeping linters and reports on the customer's own servers. Billing and payment subprocessors appear without stated locations, a UK firm handles technical support, and certification scope is not spelled out, which keeps this one step from the top. 3 16 18 19

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Pricing transparency

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

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The Lead Developer

Community is free, Ultimate is priced at "€5.00 per active contributor*/month (billed annually at €60.00, €71.40 incl. VAT)" with monthly billing available, and the counting rule is the clearest I have seen: an active contributor is anyone who made a commit in the last 90 days, minimum three, with unlimited lines of code, projects and reports, monthly plans explicitly not charging for overuse, and VAT treatment spelled out. The captured pages give no price for the Ultimate Plus licence — where single sign-on, taint analysis, the vulnerability checker and the Cloud API live — and the self-hosted edition is custom pricing with a contact-us option for custom plans. Annual subscriptions extend automatically for extra contributors, which is precisely the mid-term bill jump a freelancer's commits can cause, but the mechanism is stated openly. 1 10 11 16

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The Application Security Engineer

The counting rule is unusually clear: an active contributor is anyone who committed in the last ninety days, minimum three, with lines of code, projects and reports unlimited, and the Ultimate plan is published at €5.00 per active contributor per month, billed annually at €60.00 with €71.40 shown incl. VAT, alongside monthly billing, VAT treatment, a free Community tier and thirty-day trials. However, the Ultimate Plus tier, where taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit and single sign-on live, and the self-hosted edition are both custom-priced, and prices are flagged as approximate with the final figure only at checkout. I therefore cannot compute the annual cost of the configuration a regulated shop would actually buy. 10 11 16 3

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The Engineering Manager

The counting rule is unusually clear — an active contributor is anyone who committed in the last 90 days, minimum three, one licence per person per organisation — and Ultimate is published at "€5.00 per active contributor/month (billed annually at €60.00, €71.40 incl. VAT)" with monthly billing, an annual saving of two months, VAT treatment stated, unlimited projects and lines of code, and a free Community tier whose limits are listed. What blocks full computability for me: self-hosting is "Custom pricing" and we found no public price for the Ultimate Plus tier, where single sign-on, taint analysis, the vulnerability checker and the Cloud API sit, while history retention differs by plan. 1 3 10 11 16

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The Platform Engineer

Community is free and Ultimate is published at "€5.00 per active contributor/month (billed annually at €60.00, €71.40 incl. VAT)" with a clearly explained counting rule — anyone who committed in the last 90 days, minimum three contributors — plus unlimited lines, projects and reports, stated retention per tier, monthly and annual terms, overuse and refund rules, and taxes excluded with country and VAT-ID treatment explained. However the Ultimate Plus tier, which carries single sign-on, taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit and the API, and the self-hosted edition are custom pricing only, so the real annual cost for a buyer with my requirements is not computable from public pages. 1 10 11 16

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The Product Security Officer

The counting rule is unusually clear — an active contributor is anyone who committed in the last 90 days, minimum three, with unlimited projects, lines of code and reports — the Community tier is free with its limits stated, monthly and annual billing and VAT treatment are described, and Ultimate is priced at €5.00 per active contributor per month billed annually at €60.00. The Ultimate Plus tier, which is where taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit, single sign-on and the API sit, carries no price on the pages we read, and the self-hosted edition is custom pricing. 10 11 16 7 8 6

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The Skeptic

The counting rule is spelled out exactly the way I want it — an active contributor is anyone who has made a commit in the last 90 days, one licence per contributor per organisation, minimum three — and the Ultimate tier shows "€5.00 per active contributor/month" billed annually at €60.00 (€71.40 incl. VAT), with monthly billing, automatic-renewal opt-out, excess-contribution mechanics, suspension and refund terms all public and unlimited lines of code, projects and reports in every plan. But every security feature I would actually buy — taint analysis, the vulnerability checker, licence audit, single sign-on, the API — sits on Ultimate Plus, for which we found no public price, and self-hosted is "custom pricing" with a five-contributor minimum. 1 3 10 11 16

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European sovereignty — proven facts

4 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Hosting options Self-hostable unverified
Why unverified?

The self-hosted plan carries custom pricing with a minimum of 5 contributors and is obtained via demo request rather than self-service purchase.

1/1 pts 10 Report an error
Open source Proprietary unverified
Why unverified?

The Terms assert ownership of proprietary rights rather than using the words "closed source", and no page names an open-source licence for Qodana itself (the free Community licence is a JetBrains subscription licence, not an OSS licence).

0/1 pts 16 Report an error
Data processing agreement Published, self-serve unverified
Why unverified?

The addendum is company-wide (JetBrains, version 2022) rather than Qodana-specific, and the page shows only a PDF download link.

1/1 pts 18 Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Qodana

Is Qodana European?

Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Qodana as EU-Made. Its vendor, JetBrains s.r.o., is incorporated in Czechia, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.

Where does Qodana store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.

Does Qodana have a free plan?

Yes. Qodana has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Qodana?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Qodana alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (21)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage (product page) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Features page www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Features page (self-hosted) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Documentation www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Documentation (quality gate) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Documentation (taint analysis) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Documentation (vulnerability checker) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Documentation (licence audit) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 API documentation www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Pricing page www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Pricing page (documentation) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Security / trust page www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  13. 13 Data centre locations www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  14. 14 Trust centre www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  15. 15 Contact page (company addresses) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  16. 16 Terms of service (Qodana terms) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  17. 17 Privacy policy www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  18. 18 Data processing agreement (dpa) www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  19. 19 Subprocessor list www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  20. 20 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  21. 21 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap www.jetbrains.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →