Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Endor Labs Inc. · www.endorlabs.com

Report an error on this page Is this your product? →

Link to this page

Endor Labs: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai Endor Labs: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai (dark)

Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds. The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.

Endor Labs at a glance

Vendor
Endor Labs Inc.
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Outside the EU by default source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Endor Labs 3.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Endor Labs — reachability SCA, AI SAST and secrets detection — scores strongest on trust and compliance at 8-9, on a published inventory of what each scan sends — identifiers, file paths, line numbers — and the statement that function bodies and tokens never leave the build machine. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources

Endor Labs alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Endor Labs — reachability SCA, AI SAST and secrets detection — scores strongest on trust and compliance at 8-9, on a published inventory of what each scan sends — identifiers, file paths, line numbers — and the statement that function bodies and tokens never leave the build machine. Dependencies and secrets and developer workflow follow at 7-8, on function-level reachability with explicit labels and merge gating documented to exit-code and neutral-status edge cases. Pricing transparency scores sit at 2 — 2: no price figure appears on any captured page, per-Code-Contributor rates over a ninety-day window live in the Order Form with overage invoiced quarterly in arrears, and a free-forever developer tier and free trial are named. Sovereignty spreads 5-7: a dedicated EU-hosted environment — MongoDB Atlas on Azure West Europe — sits against a US contracting entity under California law and US-located subprocessors, and the captured pages give different hosting statements: the privacy policy says United States, the trust documentation describes the EU environment. Code analysis scores 6-7, and we found no public information on a rule catalogue or quality metrics.

Report an error

Speaks for it

  • Trust and compliance scores at 8-9 on a published inventory of what each scan sends, with independent audit reports available at trust.endorlabs.com
  • Reachability documented at dependency, pre-computed and function level with explicit reachable and unreachable labels, plus SBOM and VEX export cited for PCI DSS and FedRAMP
  • Merge gating documented to platform edge cases, including Azure DevOps exit code 128 and neutral-status behaviour, with suppressions carrying a reason, an expiry date and expire-if-fix-available
  • Deployment models include Outpost, an on-premises scheduler in the customer's own Kubernetes cluster, and hybrid scanning where analysis runs in the customer's CI
  • Secrets validated as live or revoked across every branch and commit of the full git history, with pre-commit blocking and custom rules with validators

Report an error

Held against it

  • Pricing transparency scores sit at 2 — 2: no price figure on any captured page, rates live in the Order Form, and AI SAST requires an Endor Code Pro license
  • Sovereignty scores spread 5-7, and the captured pages give different hosting statements: the privacy policy says United States, the trust documentation a dedicated EU-hosted environment for EU tenants
  • Code analysis scores 6-7, and we found no public information on a rule catalogue, custom SAST rules or code-quality metrics such as duplication and complexity
  • We found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources and update cadence, encryption specifics, or certification scopes
  • We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reporting across repositories or SARIF export

Report an error

Best for

  • You need reachability-based prioritization across direct and transitive dependencies, with explicit labels separating reachable from unreachable findings
  • You must show auditors what leaves your build machine — the published per-resource inventory and SOC 2, FedRAMP and ISO 42001 statements with audit reports at trust.endorlabs.com support that conversation
  • Your policy prevents exposing source code to the public cloud — Outpost runs the scheduler in your own Kubernetes cluster and hybrid scanning keeps analysis in your CI
  • You gate merges in GitHub or Azure DevOps and want suppression with reasons, expiry dates and a developer exception workflow in pull requests

Report an error

Avoid if

  • You need a cost figure before a sales conversation — rates live in the Order Form, fees are in USD on net thirty-day terms exclusive of taxes, and additional Code Contributors are invoiced quarterly in arrears
  • You require a European chain end to end — the contracting party is Endor Labs Inc. under California law with arbitration seated in San Francisco, and diagnostic logs from your own CI default to a non-EU global bucket unless Remote Logging is disabled
  • Your data falls under heightened regulatory restrictions — the terms state customers will not submit data subject to them, including Protected Health Information and US export-controlled data

Report an error

The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

Show reasoning
How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

For a PHP and TypeScript shop this is compelling on the security side: AI SAST traces user-controlled data source-to-sink across multi-file architectures, each finding carries the code location, the data flow trace, a CWE classification with context-based severity, a concrete exploit payload and a suggested fix, and agents pre-classify findings as true or false positive with a written explanation — with a rule-based engine underneath. What the captured pages do not show is a published rule catalogue mapped to OWASP, frameworks listed per language, any duplication, complexity, coverage or maintainability metrics, or independent benchmark results — the multiplier claims are the vendor's own. Deep on taint analysis and false-positive handling, thinner on the quality-metrics half of the question. 1 3 14 15

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

Two SAST modes are documented: pattern-based rules on Opengrep and LLM agents that trace user-controlled data from source to sink across multi-file architectures, each finding carrying a data-flow trace, a CWE classification, an exploit payload and a suggested fix, with agents classifying every finding true or false positive in writing. Vendor benchmarks claim up to 95% false-positive reduction, but I found no public information on a rule language for writing my own checks for in-house frameworks, infrastructure-as-code checks, code-quality metrics such as duplication or complexity, or independent benchmark results. 14 3 15 1

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

AI SAST traces user-controlled data source-to-sink across multi-file architectures and every finding carries a CWE classification, data-flow trace, attack vector and suggested fix, on top of deterministic Opengrep rule scans — real cross-file taint analysis with per-finding explanation. We found no public information on complexity, duplication, maintainability or technical-debt measures, on quality trends per team and hotspot, on a published rule catalogue mapped to OWASP, or on independently verified false-positive figures, so the security depth is visible but the code-health picture I run my teams on is not. 3 14 15 1

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

Two SAST modes are documented: rule-based pattern scanning powered by Opengrep, and LLM agents that trace user-controlled data source-to-sink across multi-file architectures, with findings carrying a data-flow trace, a CWE classification with context-based severity and a suggested fix. False-positive handling is described in depth — AI classification of every finding as true or false positive with a written explanation — and benchmark claims plus a claimed reduction of up to 95 percent are published, though they are the vendor's own. We found no public information on quality metrics such as complexity or duplication, coverage import, or a rule language customers can write SAST rules in. 1 3 14 15

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

Two documented modes — rule-based pattern scanning powered by Opengrep plus an LLM-agent AI SAST — with each finding carrying a source-to-sink data flow trace, a CWE classification, a concrete exploit payload and a suggested fix, and a per-finding true/false-positive classification with a written explanation I could put in an audit file. We found no public information on the rule catalogue, custom SAST rules, code-quality metrics such as duplication or complexity, infrastructure-as-code checks, or independent benchmarks; the accuracy figures on the marketing pages (up to 95% of false positives cut) are the vendor's own. 3 14 15

Report an error

The Skeptic

The rule-based side is pattern matching over an unnamed "curated set of rules", but the AI agents trace user-controlled data source-to-sink across multi-file architectures and every finding comes with its data flow trace, CWE classification, exploit payload and suggested fix, plus written true/false-positive/unknown classification and thumbs feedback the agent reuses — the benchmarks and the "up to 95% of false positives" figure are the vendor's own, and I found no published rule catalogue, no rule language customers can write for SAST, and no quality metrics such as duplication, complexity, coverage import or technical debt on any captured page. 3 14 15

Report an error

Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

Show reasoning
How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

The reachability story is the strongest I have seen documented: dependency-level by default for all supported languages, pre-computed from manifests alone for transitive dependencies, and function-level via call graphs on direct and transitive dependencies — plus malicious package detection with a searchable threat centre, container scanning with code-to-image reachability, SBOM and VEX export, upgrade impact analysis and automatic fix pull requests. Secrets get the full treatment: every branch and commit in git history, validation against the underlying service, pre-commit blocking, and custom rules with validators, entropy and allowlists. The vulnerability database is named but its sources and update speed are not described, and licence handling is SPDX identifiers and summaries — we found no public information on licence policies or per-licence obligations. 2 4 16 17 23

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

This is the core of what I buy for: function-level and dependency-level reachability from call-graph program analysis on direct and transitive dependencies with explicit reachable, potentially reachable and unreachable labels, secrets validated live against the issuing service, scanned across every branch and commit of the full Git history, deduplicated, and blocked at pre-commit before they reach the remote, with custom secret rules for bespoke token formats. SBOM and VEX export for PCI DSS and FedRAMP, malicious-package detection, upgrade impact analysis and automated fix pull requests are documented; I found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources and update speed, or end-of-life component flagging. 17 4 16 2 6

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

Function-level reachability across direct and transitive dependencies with explicit reachable and unreachable verdicts is documented in depth, alongside malicious-package detection, container scanning tied back to code, SBOM and VEX export, upgrade impact analysis and backported patches. Secrets are validated live, scanned across the full git history of every branch, deduplicated, and stopped at pre-commit, with a fully documented custom-rule, validator and allowlist model. The vulnerability database is named but we found no public information on its sources or update latency. 17 4 16 2 5 6

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

Reachability is the centrepiece: function-level reachability over direct and transitive dependencies via program analysis, phantom-dependency detection from source code, pre-computed and dependency-level reachability with clear labels for what is reachable or not. Malicious-package detection, a package firewall, container scanning with code-to-image reachability, Endor Scores for replacement candidates, upgrade impact analysis, and SBOM and VEX export with SPDX licence identifiers round out the supply-chain side. Secrets scanning covers every branch and commit of the full git history, validates findings as live or revoked by calling the service, deduplicates across files, supports custom rules with validators, and pre-commit hooks stop a secret before it lands; we found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources or end-of-life flagging. 1 2 4 5 16 17

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

This matches my supply-chain duties best: dependencies resolved from source code (direct, transitive and phantom), reachability at dependency, pre-computed and function level with named labels for each outcome, SBOM and VEX export cited for PCI DSS and FedRAMP, SPDX licence identifiers per project, malicious-package detection with a pre-install package firewall, minimum-fix upgrade analysis, backported patches, container scanning with code-to-image reachability, and secrets validated as live or revoked across every branch and commit with pre-commit blocking. We found no public information on the vulnerability database's sources or update cadence, or on licence obligations explained per licence. 2 4 5 17 23

Report an error

The Skeptic

Reachability is documented at three depths — dependency-level by default, function-level with call graphs, pre-computed from manifests — with honest labels for what it cannot determine, and around it sit malicious-package detection, container scanning with code-to-image reachability, SBOM and VEX export, and secrets validated against the live service across full git history with pre-commit blocking and per-rule validators. I still want to know where the vulnerability database's data comes from and how fast it updates, the end-of-life story is only an Endor Scores suggestion to replace "unmaintained" packages, and the detector list is "GitHub, GitLab, AWS, Bitbucket, Dropbox, and more" with no count. 2 4 16 17

Report an error

Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

Merge gating works the way I want it: an action policy with a Break the Build action plus a required status check, pull request comments on violations, incremental PR scans that surface only new findings against a baseline, and the gating behaviour on GitHub and Azure DevOps documented down to edge cases like neutral checks and status resets. Triage is genuinely good — ignore entries carry a reason and an expiry date, live in a file in the repo, developers can request exceptions in the PR, and thumbs-up/down feedback feeds later scans. The IDE integrations are listed but we found no public information on them running the same rules as the server-side scans, and typical scan times are not documented. 3 15 18 19 21

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

Merge gating is documented down to the edge cases I care about: action policies with Break the Build for SCA, secrets and SAST combined with required status checks, GitHub organization rulesets for fleet-wide enforcement, Azure branch policies with exit code 128, and neutral or not-applicable statuses explained, while incremental pull-request scans against a baseline surface only new findings. Suppression is auditable, with ignore entries carrying reasons from a fixed list, expiry dates and expire-if-fix-available, plus secret exceptions marked in code and automated fix pull requests; I found no public information on typical scan times or whether IDE results match the server's rules. 18 15 19 21 4

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

Merge gating is documented down to platform edge cases — required checks and organization rulesets on GitHub, branch policies on Azure DevOps, neutral and not-applicable statuses, and a thousand-file cut-off before a full rescan — and every suppression is recorded with a reason, comment, expiry date and expire-if-fix-available. Incremental pull-request scans deduplicate against a baseline so teams see only new findings, fix pull requests follow a remediation policy, and the AI model providers behind the analysis are named. We found no public information on typical scan times or on whether IDE plugins run the same rules as the server. 18 19 14 15 21 22 4

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

The gate mechanics are documented in real depth: action policies with a Break the Build action for SCA, secrets and SAST, required status checks enforced across many repositories at once through GitHub organization rulesets, Azure DevOps branch policies with the documented exit code 128 failing the pipeline job, and Jenkins listed among the supported CI platforms. Suppressions carry a reason, a comment and an expiry date with an option to expire once a fix ships, developers can request exceptions in pull requests, PR scans deduplicate against a baseline, and approval-gated remediation runs with the model providers named. We found no public information on typical scan times or whether IDE results match the server's rules. 1 3 4 14 15 18 19

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

Merge gating is documented to unusual depth: action policies that break the build on SCA, secrets or SAST findings, required checks and organisation rulesets on GitHub, Azure DevOps branch policies with exit code 128, and stated behaviour for neutral and not-applicable statuses. Pull-request scans deduplicate against a baseline so only new findings surface, ignore entries carry a reason, an expiry date and an expire-if-fix-available flag and live in a versioned file developers can request exceptions in, and fixes arrive as reviewable pull requests with the model providers named. We found no public information on typical scan times or whether the IDE integrations apply the same rules as the server. 4 15 18 19 21

Report an error

The Skeptic

Pull-request gating is documented down to the exit code, the status-check name, reset conditions and what a neutral or not-applicable status does to the merge on GitHub and Azure DevOps, and suppressions are the kind I look for: a reason from a fixed list, an expiration date, expire-if-fix-available, and a workflow for developers to request exceptions in their pull requests. AI features name their model providers and can be disabled per project or account-wide; typical scan times and whether the IDE plugins apply the same rules as the server are not documented on the captured pages. 15 18 19 22

Report an error

Platforms, deployment & administration

Show reasoning
How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

All four code hosts have SCM apps, and GitHub Enterprise Server runs through Outpost, an on-premises scheduler in our own Kubernetes cluster that keeps source code inside our network, alongside a hybrid model where analysis happens in our CI and only metadata leaves. Webhooks are documented in real depth — HMAC signing on by default, Go templates, aggregation modes, namespace propagation — with a REST API, the endorctl CLI, MCP endpoints and Jira. We found no public information on single sign-on beyond identity-provider group claims, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, per-team roles, portfolio reports across repositories or SARIF export. 9 15 20 21 22

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

All four major code hosts are supported, including a dedicated GitHub Enterprise Server app, and the deployment story suits a regulated shop: an on-premises scheduler running in the customer's own Kubernetes cluster, hybrid scanning where analysis happens in the customer's CI and only metadata reaches the hosted tenant, and webhooks with HMAC signing, custom headers and templated payloads. For enterprise administration, though, I found no public information on role and permission models, single sign-on or SCIM specifics, audit logs, SARIF export of findings, or portfolio reporting across repositories. 21 22 20 15

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps apps are supported, self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server works through Endor Outpost — an on-premises scheduler in the customer's own Kubernetes cluster — and hybrid scanning keeps analysis inside our CI with metadata flowing to the tenant. A REST API, Jira, Slack and Teams webhooks with HMAC signing, custom templates and namespace propagation, plus AWS, Azure and Google Cloud marketplaces, are documented. External identity-provider group claims are referenced, but we found no public information on SAML or OIDC specifics, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, role definitions per team, portfolio trend dashboards or SARIF export. 15 21 22 20 9 6 1

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

For my environment the deployment story is the strong part: Outpost is an on-premises scheduler that runs in my own Kubernetes cluster for customers whose policies prevent exposing source code, hybrid scanning performs the analysis on my build machines with only metadata going to the hosted tenant, and a GitHub Enterprise Server app is documented for self-managed code hosts — though the hosted tenant remains the system of record and firewall egress to Endor Labs must be allowed. GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps apps, a REST API alongside the endorctl CLI and MCP endpoints, Jira, Slack and Teams, and webhooks with HMAC signing, custom headers and Go templates are all documented. We found no public information on SAML or SCIM provisioning, audit logs, SARIF export, or the role and permission model — exactly the gaps I would have to close before rolling this out to my 900 repositories. 9 15 20 21 22 23

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

All four major code hosts are supported, including self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server via an app that requires an on-premises scheduler, and the deployment models are what my network policy needs: hybrid scanning that keeps analysis in our CI/CD, the on-premises scheduler in our own Kubernetes cluster, a dedicated EU tenant endpoint, and webhooks with HMAC signing, templating and ingress allowlisting notes. The administration layer is thinner in the captured pages: we found no public information on SCIM provisioning, roles and permissions per team, admin audit logs, portfolio reporting across repositories, or SARIF import and export. 6 20 21 22

Report an error

The Skeptic

All four major code hosts plus GitHub Enterprise Server, an on-premises scheduler that runs in the customer's own Kubernetes cluster, hybrid scanning where analysis happens inside the customer's CI, a REST API reachable through the CLI, and unusually well-specified webhooks with HMAC signing and templating. SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories, SARIF export and granular role management are absent from the captured pages, and the only export described is a thirty-day post-termination dump in an unspecified machine-readable format. 9 15 20 21 22

Report an error

Source-code handling, security & compliance

Show reasoning
How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

Unusually good transparency: a per-resource inventory of exactly what a scan sends — identifiers, file paths and line numbers, and the docs state function bodies and tokens never leave the build machine — cloud scans delete source after each scan, AI features are off by default with the model providers named and a written no-training commitment. On the audit side, SOC 2, FedRAMP and ISO 42001 are stated with audit reports at a trust centre, an SLA is published as an exhibit, findings map to PCI DSS and the Cyber Resilience Act, and customer data is deleted within ninety days of request. We found no public information on encryption in transit and at rest, a public status page, or how long findings themselves are retained. 8 9 22 23

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

Data handling is documented at a level an auditor can work with: a per-scan inventory of exactly what leaves the build machine (call-graph identifiers, file paths and line numbers, never function bodies or credentials), source code removed after each cloud scan, deletion within ninety days of request, export for thirty days, no training on customer data, LLM providers named with the relevant setting off by default, and SOC 2, ISO 42001 and FedRAMP with independent audit reports at a trust center. Use cases are mapped to PCI DSS, DORA and the Cyber Resilience Act with SBOM and VEX export; I found no public information on encryption specifics or a public status page. 23 22 9 8 2

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

The trust pages document exactly what a scan sends — call-graph identifiers, paths and line numbers, never function bodies or tokens — that cloud scans clone into ephemeral containers deleted after each scan, and that embeddings and LLM processing are off by default, run on named providers, discard segments, are excluded from model training and can be disabled per account. An SLA, a data processing agreement with standard clauses, SOC 2, FedRAMP and ISO 42001, a trust centre with audit reports, deletion within ninety days of request, and PCI DSS, DORA and Cyber Resilience Act use cases are published. We found no public information on a public status page or on encryption specifics. 22 23 9 8 2 11

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

Source-code handling is documented at a level I rarely see: a resource-by-resource account of what an SCA scan sends — call graph identifiers, file paths and line numbers, never function bodies — while source files, credentials and caches stay on the build machine, and cloud scans clone into an ephemeral container with the source removed after each scan. AI processing runs on named providers with embeddings off by default, segments discarded, no training on customer data and a tenant-wide opt-out in administrative settings; an SLA is published, independent audit reports sit behind a trust center, and outputs map to PCI DSS, the Cyber Resilience Act, DORA, FedRAMP, ISO 42001 and SOC 2. Customer data is deleted within ninety days of a written request and exportable for thirty days in a machine-readable format; we found no public information on encryption specifics or a public status page. 1 2 8 9 22 23

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

Nearly an auditor's package: source stays on the build machine with a published per-resource inventory of exactly what is sent (call-graph identifiers, package versions, contributor emails — never function bodies or tokens), cloud-scanned source is deleted after each scan with only metadata kept, deletion follows within ninety days of a written request with a thirty-day export window, and the on-premises scheduler keeps code in our network. On AI the answer is precise: no training on customer data, embeddings off by default and processed on a private Azure OpenAI deployment that is not used for training, disableable per tenant and per project, with providers named. A published service level agreement, a data processing agreement with standard data protection clauses, SOC 2, FedRAMP and ISO 42001 statements with audit reports at a trust centre, and SBOM/VEX output mapped to PCI DSS and the Cyber Resilience Act complete it; we found no public information on encryption specifics, certification scopes or a public status page. 8 9 22 23

Report an error

The Skeptic

What leaves the build machine is enumerated resource by resource — identifiers, file paths and line numbers rather than function bodies, tokens never written into scan results — cloud scanning clones into an ephemeral container that is deleted with only metadata retained, code-segment embeddings are off by default, discarded after use and not used for training, and no customer data trains models without written authorization, with a public trust center of independent audit reports, a published DPA and SLA, and SBOM/VEX output tied to PCI DSS and FedRAMP. Encryption in transit and at rest and a public status page are not described on the captured pages, and the certifications are named without their scope. 9 22 23

Report an error

European sovereignty panel opinion

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

For an EU tenant the docs name the EU infrastructure — MongoDB Atlas on Azure West Europe, BigQuery in Frankfurt — serve AI models from EU regions, publish a data processing agreement with standard clauses, and list subprocessors with locations and change notification. The contracting party is still Endor Labs Inc. under California law with arbitration in San Francisco (a Netherlands office appears on the about page, but not as the contracting entity), and support, CRM and notification subprocessors sit in the United States while diagnostic logs from our own CI land in a non-EU bucket unless remote logging is switched off. Workable for many clients, but Outpost keeps source local while scan metadata still flows to the hosted tenant, so this is not a sovereign chain end to end. 7 9 13 22

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

EU residency is real and named: EU tenants get a MongoDB Atlas database on Azure West Europe, analytics in Google BigQuery in Frankfurt and scan logs in europe-west3, with AI model serving from EU-region Azure and Vertex for those tenants, and the subprocessor list with locations plus a data processing agreement with standard clauses are published. But the contracting party is the US entity Endor Labs Inc. under California law with arbitration in San Francisco, and the support, CRM and email subprocessors such as Pylon, Salesforce and Google Workspace are US-located, so the chain stops short of sovereign end to end. 22 13 9 11

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

A dedicated EU tenant is documented down to the infrastructure — MongoDB Atlas on Azure West Europe, BigQuery in Frankfurt, AI models served from EU regions — and subprocessors are published with locations alongside a data processing agreement, but the contracting entity is a California company under California law and most listed subprocessors for support, CRM and AI sit in the United States. Even as an EU tenant, diagnostic CI logs, shared package-metadata lookups and Endor Patch requests touch US services, with stated mitigations such as secret redaction, stripped contact details and disable switches. That is a well-documented mixed chain rather than a European one. 22 13 9 11 7

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

An EU-hosted tenant is real and named: the tenant database on MongoDB Atlas in Azure West Europe, analytics in Google BigQuery in Frankfurt, EU cluster scan logs staying in europe-west3, EU tenant URL, and AI models served from EU regions — supported by a published subprocessor list with locations and a data processing agreement with standard data protection clauses. The chain is not European: the contracting party is a US company under California law with binding arbitration seated in San Francisco, diagnostic logs from scans run in my own CI default to a global non-EU bucket unless Remote Logging is turned off, EU tenants query US-held package metadata services, and the support, CRM and some AI subprocessors are listed in the United States. 7 9 11 13 20 22

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

For a US-incorporated vendor the chain is documented well beyond the norm: a dedicated EU-hosted tenant on named infrastructure (MongoDB Atlas on Azure West Europe, Google BigQuery in Frankfurt, scan logs in europe-west3), AI models for EU tenants served from EU regions, a subprocessor list with locations and change notification, and a data processing agreement with standard data protection clauses. The seat itself stays non-European — Endor Labs Inc. under California law with arbitration in San Francisco, and no EU entity or representative named — and support, CRM and notification subprocessors sit in the United States, while diagnostic logs from scans run in our own CI default to a non-EU global bucket that can be turned off. The captured pages also give different hosting statements, with the privacy policy describing United States hosting and the trust documentation describing a dedicated EU-hosted environment for EU tenants. 9 11 13 22

Report an error

The Skeptic

The contracting party is the US-incorporated Endor Labs under California law with San Francisco arbitration, and the captured pages give different pictures of hosting: the privacy policy states the services are hosted in the United States while the trust documentation describes a dedicated EU environment on named infrastructure — MongoDB Atlas on Azure West Europe, BigQuery in Frankfurt, europe-west3 logs — with AI models for EU tenants served from EU regions. Even that EU path touches the United States: endorctl CI logs go to a non-EU global bucket (disablable, secrets redacted), dependency-name lookups hit US-hosted shared services, patch requests are copied to a US service, and the published subprocessor list is dominated by US processors; the on-premises scheduler keeps source local but findings still flow to the hosted tenant. 9 11 13 22

Report an error

Pricing transparency

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

Report an error

The Lead Developer

The tiers are named — open source and code lines in core and pro, package firewall, agent governance, SBOM hub — and the counting rule is documented: seats are Code Contributors measured over ninety days, with per-seat scan credits under fair-usage limits and extra contributors invoiced quarterly in arrears at the contract rate; a free-forever developer tier and a trial exist. But we found no public price figure for any plan — every amount lives in an Order Form, in USD on net thirty terms with taxes excluded. With quarterly in-arrears overage per contributor, a freelancer who starts committing can move the bill, and I cannot precompute that from public pages. 1 5 9 22

Report an error

The Application Security Engineer

The pricing page names the product bundles and a free-forever developer tier, and the terms explain the counting rule unusually well: per Code Contributor over a ninety-day window, fair-usage scan capacity, and overage invoiced quarterly in arrears, with fees in USD on net thirty terms and exclusive of taxes. But no plan carries a price figure on any page I read, the rates live in the Order Form, and so I cannot compute a real annual cost from public information alone. 6 9 5 1

Report an error

The Engineering Manager

The pricing page names the tiers — Open Source Core and Pro, Code Core and Pro, Package Firewall, SBOM Hub — plus a free-forever developer tier, and the terms define the counting model precisely: per Code Contributor measured over ninety days, fair-usage scan credits, USD, net thirty, taxes excluded, overage invoiced quarterly in arrears. We found no public price figures for any plan, scanner or add-on, so my annual cost for six teams is not computable without a sales conversation. 6 22 9 5 1

Report an error

The Platform Engineer

The building blocks are public — subscriptions priced per Code Contributor measured over a ninety-day window with fair-usage limits, named SKUs from Open Source Core up to Code Pro with AI SAST requiring a Code Pro licence, a free-forever developer tier, and cloud marketplace procurement — but not a single price figure appears on any captured page; the rate itself lives in the order form. Terms state fees in USD on net thirty days, exclusive of taxes, with overage invoiced quarterly in arrears. For my 300 developers I cannot compute an annual cost from public pages alone. 1 5 6 9 15 22

Report an error

The Product Security Officer

We found no public prices at all: the per-Code-Contributor rate lives only in the order form, so an annual cost is not computable from public pages, even though the SKU structure (Open Source Core and Pro, Code Core and Pro, Package Firewall, SBOM Hub), the counting basis, a free-forever developer tier, a free trial and cloud-marketplace procurement are all visible. Contract terms are at least public — fees in USD on net thirty day terms, exclusive of taxes, with additional Code Contributors invoiced quarterly in arrears at the order-form rate. 1 5 9 22

Report an error

The Skeptic

Not one price figure appears on any captured page: the buyer learns the mechanics — per-seat scan-credit allocations with fair-usage limits, subscriptions priced per Code Contributor measured over a ninety-day window, overage invoiced quarterly in arrears at the Order Form rate, fees in USD on net-30 terms exclusive of taxes — and the seven product tiers plus a "free forever" developer tier are named, but no per-seat price, tier price, free-tier limits or add-on costs are public. The annual cost is not computable from public pages; it is an Order Form conversation. 5 9 22

Report an error

European sovereignty — proven facts

2 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Outside the EU unverified
Why unverified?

The Trust & Compliance documentation says the tenant region (United States or European Union) is only set at onboarding and a dedicated EU-residency environment exists, so this U.S. statement from the privacy policy does not describe EU tenants and no default region is stated there.

0/4 pts 11 Report an error
Hosting options Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Published, self-serve unverified
Why unverified?

The DPA text is published on the vendor's legal pages but it forms part of the Master Services Agreement and takes effect through the Order Form rather than an online acceptance flow, and the excerpt is truncated before signature or acceptance mechanics.

1/1 pts 12 Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Endor Labs

Is Endor Labs European?

No. whats-best.ai classifies Endor Labs as Rest of world.

Where does Endor Labs store data?

Endor Labs stores customer data outside the EU by default, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.

Does Endor Labs have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Endor Labs?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Qodana (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Endor Labs alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (23)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Features page (reachability SCA) www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Features page (SAST) www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Features page (secrets) www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Documentation docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Pricing page www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 About page www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Legal documents www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Terms of service www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Service level agreement www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Privacy policy www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Data processing agreement (dpa) www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  13. 13 Subprocessor list www.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  14. 14 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  15. 15 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  16. 16 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  17. 17 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  18. 18 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  19. 19 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  20. 20 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  21. 21 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  22. 22 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  23. 23 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.endorlabs.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →