Arnica
Rest of world Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Arnica, Inc. · www.arnica.io
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Arnica at a glance
- Vendor
- Arnica, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in the United States source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Arnica 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Arnica is a pipelineless application security platform that scans every code push for code vulnerabilities, dependency and licence risks, infrastructure-as-code misconfigurations and hardcoded secrets, and surfaces findings in pull requests, chat and ticketing tools. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Arnica is a pipelineless application security platform that scans every code push for code vulnerabilities, dependency and licence risks, infrastructure-as-code misconfigurations and hardcoded secrets, and surfaces findings in pull requests, chat and ticketing tools. It is strongest on integration and admin, scored a flat 6, with GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket support, a Swagger-documented API and Jira, Azure DevOps Boards and Linear ticketing. Developer workflow follows at 5–6, with dependencies and secrets at 4–6: a failing status check blocks merges until medium-and-above risks are addressed, and validated secrets are automatically mitigated and removed from git history. Sovereignty is weakest at a flat 3 — Arnica, Inc. is a Delaware corporation under Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, hosting is on AWS with no region stated, and we found no public information on a European entity or subprocessor locations. Code analysis sits at 3–4, with no public information on languages or a rule catalogue. Pricing transparency spans 5–7: judges crediting the published tier prices and counting rule sit high, those pointing to unpriced add-ons and AI Credits lower.
Speaks for it
- A failing pull-request status check blocks merges until medium-and-above risks are addressed.
- Validated secrets at medium severity and above are automatically mitigated and removed from git history.
- GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket are supported, alongside a Swagger-documented API and Jira, Azure DevOps Boards and Linear ticketing.
- Per-identity tier prices are published — Free $0, Business $300, Enterprise $600 per identity per year — with an explicit identity counting rule and a roughly 17% annual pre-paid discount.
- SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 are stated, with annual third-party examination and Drata continuous monitoring.
Held against it
- The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation governed by Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, hosted on AWS with no region stated.
- We found no public information on EU hosting, a European entity or representative, or the names and locations of subprocessors.
- We found no public information on the languages analysed, the rule catalogue, or OWASP and CWE mappings for the static analysis.
- The API, role-based access control with SAML, issue management, on-premises deployment and bring-your-own AI are add-ons without public prices, and AI Credits are priced in the applicable Proposal.
- The captured pages give different figures for availability: a 99.9% uptime claim on the security page and commercially reasonable efforts without a numeric SLA in the terms.
Best for
- You want findings delivered inside developers' own tools — pull-request annotations, private Slack messages and auto-generated Jira or Azure DevOps tickets — with merges blocked until risks are addressed.
- Hardcoded secrets are your immediate worry, since validated medium-and-above secrets are auto-mitigated and removed from git history.
- You run GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps or Bitbucket and prefer checks embedded in source control over CI steps, starting from published per-identity prices with a $0 tier and a 14-day trial.
Avoid if
- You must evidence a European processing chain for source code and findings — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You need the full annual cost computed before committing — the add-ons and AI Credits carry no public prices, subscription-term fees are nonrefundable and non-cancelable, and neither party may terminate for convenience.
- Your enforcement points are CI/CD pipeline steps on self-managed runners — this product embeds its checks in the source-control system instead, and we found no public information on a Jenkins or GitLab CI step.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 2 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 3 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 3 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 2.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1.5 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 3 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
Static analysis runs on every code push with infrastructure-as-code checks and a described false-positive approach (context awareness, reachability analysis, prioritisation, rule tuning). But no languages or frameworks are named, no rule catalogue mapped to OWASP or CWE is published, and quality metrics and custom rules are not described, so I cannot tell from these pages whether my Laravel or TypeScript stacks are covered at any depth. 2 4 6
The Application Security Engineer
Static analysis, infrastructure-as-code checks and reachability analysis with rule tuning for false-positive reduction are documented, and risks above medium severity are flagged on every push. We found no public information on supported languages, taint or data-flow analysis, rule sets mapped to OWASP or CWE, custom rule authoring, or quality metrics, so the analysis depth cannot be judged from the pages. 2 4 6
The Engineering Manager
SAST, infrastructure-as-code checks, AI-code risk detection and reachability-based false-positive reduction are documented, with every push scanned from medium severity up. But I found no public information on supported languages and frameworks, the rule catalogue or its OWASP and CWE mapping, or on the quality and maintainability side I actually need — complexity, duplication, coverage import, technical debt and code-health trends per team and hotspot. 2 4 6
The Platform Engineer
Static analysis, infrastructure-as-code checks and secret detection are named as core modules, and false positives are said to be reduced through context awareness, reachability analysis and rule tuning, but we found no public information on supported languages, a published rule catalogue mapped to OWASP or CWE, data-flow depth, or quality measures like complexity and duplication. That is a named SAST capability without the depth a Java-heavy estate needs to be judged by. 2 4 6
The Product Security Officer
The pipelineless approach identifies every code risk at medium severity and above on each push, with false positives reduced through context awareness, reachability analysis, prioritization logic and rule tuning. For a regulated codebase I found no public information on the languages and frameworks covered, the rule sets or their mapping to OWASP and CWE, data-flow or taint analysis depth, quality metrics such as complexity or coverage import, or published false-positive rates and benchmarks. 2 4 6
The Skeptic
Static analysis is on the menu: code risks from medium severity up on every push, IaC misconfigurations, and named false-positive reduction methods like reachability analysis and rule tuning. But we found no public information on which languages are analysed, the rule list, any CWE or OWASP mapping, data-flow or taint depth, or quality measures such as duplication and complexity — so I cannot tell deep analysis from a well-marketed linter, and I score accordingly. 2 4 6
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
SCA with third-party package licences and package reputation, an always-up-to-date SBOM, container image mapping and scanning, and secrets that are validated and automatically mitigated including removal from git history. The supported ecosystems, lockfiles, SBOM format, transitive depth and the vulnerability database behind it are not described. 2 3 4 6
The Application Security Engineer
Secrets handling is the strongest part: validated secrets at medium severity and above are automatically mitigated and removed from git history, and the pull-request status check blocks merges until risks are addressed. Software composition analysis with licence detection, package reputation, container image scanning and SBOM are all listed, but we found no public information on supported ecosystems, transitive dependency handling, the vulnerability database and its sources, SBOM formats, or upgrade pull requests. 2 3 4 6
The Engineering Manager
Software composition analysis with licence detection and package reputation, an always-up-to-date SBOM, container image mapping and scanning, and validated secret detection with automatic mitigation including removal from git history are all documented. The depth thins out where I would probe: ecosystems and lockfiles, transitive dependencies, the SBOM format, the vulnerability database behind it, end-of-life components and push protection are not described on the captured pages. 2 3 4 6
The Platform Engineer
Software composition analysis with third-party package licence and reputation checks, an always-up-to-date SBOM, container image scanning, and secrets that are validated, automatically mitigated and removed from git history are all described. We found no public information on the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database behind the alerts, the SBOM format, or the number of secret detectors, so the picture stays mid-level. 2 3 4 6
The Product Security Officer
Software composition analysis with third-party package licences and package reputation is documented, an always up-to-date SBOM is offered, and validated secrets above medium severity are automatically mitigated and removed from git history, which is genuinely useful for post-shipping duty. However, I found no public information on the SBOM's standard format, the ecosystems and lockfiles covered, the vulnerability database and its update latency, reachability of vulnerable code, or end-of-life components, so my CRA release file cannot be completed from these pages. 2 3 4 6
The Skeptic
SCA with licence detection, package reputation, container image scanning and an always-up-to-date SBOM are documented, and secrets get more than a pattern match: validated secrets at medium severity and above are auto-mitigated and removed from git history. We found no public information on the ecosystems and lockfiles covered, transitive dependency handling, the SBOM format, upgrade pull requests, or the vulnerability database and its sources, so I cannot credit full documented supply-chain coverage. 2 3 4 6
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
This is what I ask for in a merge request: findings annotated in the pull request, a status check that fails so code cannot be merged until medium-and-above risks are addressed, alerts with context and remediation advice, and dismissals routed to stakeholders for review. We found no public information on IDE plugins for VS Code or PhpStorm, pre-commit hooks, or the model provider behind the AI-assisted mitigation, and no scan-time figures. 2 3 4 6
The Application Security Engineer
Findings reach developers where they work: pull-request annotations that fail the status check and block merging, private Slack messages, auto-generated Jira and Azure DevOps tickets, and dismissal workflows routed to stakeholders with immediate developer notification. We found no public information on IDE plugins, per-branch gate configuration, the model behind the AI-assisted mitigation, or measured scan times. 2 3 4 6
The Engineering Manager
The pull-request story is real: risks are annotated in the pull request, the status check fails, and code cannot be merged until medium-plus risks are addressed, running pipelineless in the background with minimal latency. Alerts with context and remediation advice reach GitHub, Slack, Teams and Jira, dismissals are routed to stakeholders for review, tickets auto-generate in Jira and Azure DevOps Boards, and AI-assisted mitigation is a named module; I found no public information on IDE plugins, the model behind the fixes, or documented scan times. 2 3 6
The Platform Engineer
Findings land where developers work: pull-request annotations with a failed status check that blocks the merge on GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket, private Slack or Teams messages, auto-generated Jira tickets, and dismissals routed to stakeholders for review. The product is deliberately pipelineless, and we found no public information on a Jenkins or GitLab CI step, IDE plugins, or a new-code baseline — for 300 developers on self-managed Jenkins that positioning is a real constraint. 2 3 4 6
The Product Security Officer
Findings reach developers in pull requests, chat and ticketing on GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket, the status check fails and code cannot be merged until risks are addressed, dismissals are routed to stakeholders for review, and tickets are auto-generated in Jira or Azure DevOps Boards. I found no public information on IDE plugins, a new-code baseline, pre-commit checks, deduplication, or the model behind the AI-assisted mitigation. 2 3 4 6
The Skeptic
Findings land where developers work: pull request annotations that fail the status check and block the merge until risks are addressed, private Slack messages, auto-generated Jira or Azure DevOps tickets, dismissals routed to stakeholders for review, and context and remediation advice attached to each alert while scanning runs in the background without slowing commits. We found no public information on IDE plugins, a new-code baseline, configurable gate settings, or the model behind the AI-assisted mitigation, and the product is deliberately pipelineless rather than a CI step. 2 3 4 6
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket are supported, the API is documented with a Swagger reference, Jira/Azure DevOps Boards/Linear ticketing exists, SAML with role-based access control comes as an add-on, and an on-prem deployment is listed for the Enterprise tier. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks, or export of findings in a standard format such as SARIF. 2 4 5 8
The Application Security Engineer
All four major code hosts are supported (GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket), with a documented API and Swagger reference, Jira/Azure Boards/Linear ticketing, SAML with role-based access as a paid add-on, and an on-premises deployment listed as an enterprise add-on. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks for findings, or SARIF import and export. 2 4 5 8
The Engineering Manager
All four code hosts — GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket — are supported, with an API documented in a Swagger reference, ticketing into Jira, Azure DevOps Boards and Linear, advanced role-based access control with SAML, an on-premises deployment option on the Enterprise tier and downloadable results. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, administrator audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories, SARIF export or webhooks — the multi-team administration layer I run six teams on. 2 4 5 8
The Platform Engineer
All four major source-control platforms are supported alongside a documented REST API with Swagger, Jira and Azure DevOps Boards ticketing, advanced role-based access control with SAML on the Enterprise tier, and an on-prem deployment offered as a priced add-on. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, SARIF export, webhooks, or whether the on-prem option keeps source code inside my network — the first question I would ask before pointing it at 900 repositories. 2 4 5 8
The Product Security Officer
Four code hosts, a Swagger-documented API, Jira, Azure DevOps Boards and Linear ticketing, role-based access with SAML, and an on-premises deployment offered as an Enterprise add-on are documented, and results can be downloaded. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks for findings, portfolio reports, or export formats such as SARIF, and the download format is not named. 2 4 5 8
The Skeptic
All four major code hosts are supported (GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket), with a documented API and Swagger reference, Jira, Azure DevOps Boards and Linear ticketing, advanced RBAC and SAML as paid add-ons, an on-prem deployment option on the enterprise tier, and results that can be downloaded. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks, portfolio reporting, or the format findings export in, which keeps this short of the administration level a multi-team buyer needs. 2 4 5 8
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 are stated with annual third-party examination and Drata monitoring, AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2/1.3 in transit, a data processing agreement, 72-hour incident notice, and customer ownership of results and data. Code retention periods, a statement on whether customer code trains the AI features and a public status page are not described, and the terms offer 24x7 commercially reasonable efforts while the security page states 99.9% uptime. 5 6 8
The Application Security Engineer
SOC 2 Type 2 with annual third-party examination, ISO 27001, AES-256 and TLS encryption with logical tenant separation are stated, and the terms grant 72-hour security-incident notice with customer ownership of data and results. We found no public information on code retention periods, whether code trains AI models, a public status page, or reports mapped to PCI DSS, OWASP or CWE; the captured pages also give different signals on availability, with 99.9% uptime on the security page and commercially reasonable efforts without a numeric SLA in the terms. 5 6 8
The Engineering Manager
SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 with annual third-party audits and Drata monitoring, AES-256 at rest and TLS in transit, logical tenant separation, a published data processing addendum and subprocessor list, a 72-hour incident notice and a 99.9 percent uptime claim give a credible security posture. But I found no public information on how long code and findings are retained, whether customer code is used to train AI models and how to opt out, a public status page, or reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act — a bring-your-own AI add-on is listed but without a model provider or opt-out terms. 5 6 8
The Platform Engineer
SOC 2 Type 2 with an annual third-party examination, ISO 27001, Drata continuous monitoring, TLS 1.2/1.3 and AES-256 encryption, a 99.9% uptime claim, 72-hour incident notification and a published data processing agreement give a solid trust base. We found no public information on code retention periods, whether our code trains AI models, a public status page, or reports mapped to OWASP, CWE or PCI DSS. 5 6 8
The Product Security Officer
SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 are stated with annual third-party examination and Drata monitoring, encryption in transit and at rest and multi-site disaster recovery are specified, a data processing addendum and sub-processor list URL are published, customer data and results remain ours, and a 72-hour incident notice is contracted. Critical for an audit file, I found no public information on how long source code and findings are retained, whether code is used to train AI models and any opt-out, a public status page, or compliance reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act. 5 6 8
The Skeptic
Encryption in transit and at rest with logical tenant separation, SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 claims monitored through Drata, a published data processing agreement, a subprocessor list URL, 72-hour security incident notice, and customer ownership of data and results are all on the record. We found no public information on code retention periods, whether source code trains AI models (the terms only grant Arnica a right to create anonymized aggregate statistics from Results), a status page, or reports mapped to OWASP, CWE or PCI DSS; and the security page claims 99.9% uptime while the terms commit to commercially reasonable efforts with no numeric SLA. 5 6 8
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation with Georgia governing law and AAA arbitration in Atlanta, hosting is on AWS with no region stated, and the terms point to a data processing agreement and a maintained subprocessor list. We found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity or an EU representative, so for my Cologne shop the whole chain sits outside Europe on these pages. 6 8
The Application Security Engineer
The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation governed by Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, and hosting is on AWS with no region stated in the captured pages. A data processing agreement is published and incorporated into the terms and a subprocessor-list URL exists, but no subprocessors or their locations are named, so nothing evidences a European processing chain. 6 8
The Engineering Manager
The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation with offices in Georgia, USA, governed by Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, hosting on AWS with no region stated, alongside a published data processing addendum and subprocessor list. I found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity or an EU representative, so nothing on the captured pages evidences a European option for where our source code and findings sit. 6 8
The Platform Engineer
The contracting entity is a Delaware corporation under Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, and the platform is hosted on AWS with no region stated; a sub-processor list is published at a URL, but the captured pages show no names or locations. There is no European hosting option or EU entity on these pages, and the on-prem add-on is a pricing line with no documentation that code and findings stay on my own servers. 5 6 8
The Product Security Officer
The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation with offices in Georgia, USA, under Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, hosting is on AWS with no region stated, and a data processing addendum exists, which is the situation a German machine builder would need to assess under GDPR transfer rules. A sub-processor list URL is published but the captured pages show no names or locations, and I found no public information on EU hosting or a European entity or representative. 6 8
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is Arnica, Inc., a Delaware corporation governed by Georgia law with AAA arbitration in Atlanta, and hosting is on AWS with the region unstated on every page we read. A data processing agreement and a subprocessor list URL are published, but we found no public information on who the subprocessors are or where they run, and the on-prem deployment add-on is named on the pricing page without any documentation of what stays on the customer's own servers — nothing here evidences a European chain. 5 6 8
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
All three tiers are priced per identity per year ($0, $300, $600) with the counting rule spelled out — anyone who committed code or had pull-request activity in the last 90 days, duplicates removed — plus a free tier, 14-day trial, roughly 17% annual pre-pay discount, VAT-exclusive pricing and an explicit true-up when identities grow, which means every active freelancer in a rolling quarter becomes billable. But the add-ons (API, issue management, RBAC and SAML, on-prem, bring-your-own AI) and the AI credits carry no figures, and limits on repositories or scans are not stated. 5 8
The Application Security Engineer
Per-identity prices are public and the counting rule is unusually clear — anyone who committed code or had pull-request activity in the last 90 days — with a free tier, a roughly 17% annual pre-paid discount, true-up terms and prices stated exclusive of taxes. The add-ons a regulated buyer needs are listed without prices, though: on-premises deployment, SAML and role-based access, the API and AI credits are all unpriced, and AI credit fees are set per proposal. 5 8
The Engineering Manager
The three tiers are publicly priced at $0, $300 and $600 per identity per year, and the counting rule is unusually clear — anyone who committed code or had pull-request activity in the last 90 days, duplicates removed — with a fourteen-day trial, true-up on growth, taxes excluded and cancel-anytime terms. But the pieces my organisation needs are unpriced add-ons — role-based access control with SAML, Jira issue management, the API on the Business tier, on-premises deployment and AI Credits, whose price is not stated — so I cannot compute the real annual cost from public pages alone. 5 8
The Platform Engineer
Three tiers are priced per identity — Free at $0, Business at $300, Enterprise at $600 per identity per year — with the counting rule spelled out (anyone who committed code or had pull-request activity in the last 90 days, duplicates removed), a roughly 17% annual pre-paid discount, a true-up for growth, and VAT-exclusive pricing stated in the terms. The API, SAML, on-prem and AI add-ons carry no prices on the pricing page and AI Credits are set per Proposal, so the real annual bill for 300 developers is only partly computable. 5 8
The Product Security Officer
The tiers are public — Free $0 PER IDENTITY / YEAR, Business $300 PER IDENTITY / YEAR, Enterprise $600 PER IDENTITY / YEAR — with identities defined as contributors with code or PR activity in the last 90 days, a roughly 17% annual pre-payment discount, a 14-day trial without credit card, and true-up invoicing for added identities. The add-ons such as the API, SAML role-based access, automated issue management and on-premises deployment are named but not priced, and AI Credits are a fee component without a published rate, so the real annual cost for my controller team is not computable from public pages alone. 5 8
The Skeptic
This page answers my first question: identities are defined as anyone who committed code or had PR activity in the last 90 days with duplicates removed, and Free at $0, Business at $300 per identity per year and Enterprise at $600 per identity per year are printed alongside a roughly 17% annual pre-paid discount, a 14-day trial ending in the free tier, true-up invoicing, taxes excluded, and renewal terms with 30-day non-renewal notice and 60-day increase notice. But API access, RBAC and SAML, Jira issue management, on-prem deployment and bring-your-own AI are listed only as add-ons without public figures, and AI Credits are priced solely in the applicable Proposal — so the real annual cost, and the second year, are not computable from public pages. 5 8
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in US | 0/2 pts | 8 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Not determined
unverified
Why unverified?Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured. |
— | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Arnica
Is Arnica European?
No. whats-best.ai classifies Arnica as Rest of world. Its vendor, Arnica, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Where does Arnica store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.
Does Arnica have a free plan?
Yes. Arnica has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Arnica?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Arnica alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 6 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 66 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 subprocessors fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- We read 8 of the 21 pages we planned to read for this product; the others could not be captured yet. Everything on this page rests on the pages we read. Know more? Tell us
Sources (8)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Features page (pipelineless scanning) www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Features page (developer workflows) www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Documentation docs.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Pricing page www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Security / trust page www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 About page www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Terms of service www.arnica.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →