Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Checkmarx Ltd. · checkmarx.com

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Checkmarx One at a glance

Vendor
Checkmarx Ltd.
Headquarters
Incorporated in Israel source, captured 17 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Checkmarx One 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 19 Nov 2026. all sources

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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

No written verdict for this product

The panel scored Checkmarx One, but the summary our synthesizer wrote did not survive our own contradiction check — twice. Rather than print a paragraph we cannot stand behind, we print none. Every score, rationale and source below is unaffected; read them and draw the conclusion yourself.

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

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How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

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The Lead Developer

The supported-languages documentation is deep — 25+ languages including the PHP, TypeScript, Python, Go and Kotlin my team builds with, each with its framework list (Django, Flask, gin-gonic, Ktor, Spring, Flutter) — and custom presets and queries via the Auditor tool plus published F1-score and true-positive claims address my false-positive worry. We found no public information on per-finding data-flow explanations, quality metrics like duplication or complexity, coverage import, or any OWASP/CWE rule mapping. 1 3 4 5

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The Application Security Engineer

The documented engine covers a very wide language list with per-language framework coverage — Spring Boot, Django, Flask, gin-gonic, Ktor, Flutter — and ships hundreds of preconfigured queries plus a customer-facing query editor for writing our own rules, which is exactly what I need for in-house frameworks. Infrastructure-as-code checks appear as a named module, and false-positive reduction is quantified (up to 80% fewer false positives, a 2.5x higher F1 score) though as vendor claims rather than independent benchmarks. We found no public information on the captured pages stating cross-file taint analysis, per-finding data-flow explanations, or maintainability and technical-debt measures. 1 3 4 5

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The Engineering Manager

The SAST engine is documented across 27 languages with framework-level detail that covers my stack — Spring Boot for Java, Ktor, Vert.x and Spring for Kotlin — plus hundreds of preconfigured queries, a custom query tool called Auditor, an infrastructure-as-code module, and published precision claims. We found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis, or on code-quality measures like complexity, duplication, coverage and technical debt per team and hotspot, which is the half of this criterion my six teams live on. 4 5 3 1

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The Platform Engineer

The SAST engine is documented across twenty-six languages with frameworks listed per language, including Cobol and RPG that matter to our legacy estate, and customers can write their own queries through the Auditor tool; false positives are handled through a marking workflow whose metadata persists across scans, and the vendor claims a 2.5x higher F1 score and up to 80% fewer false positives. We found no public information on cross-file taint analysis, OWASP or CWE rule mapping, or code-quality metrics such as duplication and complexity in the captured pages. 1 3 4 5

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The Product Security Officer

The SAST engine documents more than two dozen languages with frameworks spelled out per language — including C and C++ with MISRA, which our controller code needs — alongside hundreds of preconfigured queries and an Auditor tool for writing our own queries. False positives are handled as a persistent workflow and the vendor publishes its own precision claims (F1 and true-positive comparisons), but we found no public information on rule mapping to CWE or OWASP, code-quality metrics such as complexity or coverage, or independently benchmarked results. 1 3 4 5

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The Skeptic

Twenty-six languages with named frameworks per language, hundreds of preconfigured queries plus a customer-writable query language in the Auditor tool, and false-positive metadata that persists across scans — this is a real SAST, not a linter. But we found no public information on taint or data-flow depth, on complexity and duplication metrics, or on mapping to CWE and OWASP, and the precision claims ('2.5x Higher F1 Score than Average SAST Tools', 'up to 80% fewer false positives') arrive with no benchmark or methodology. Until I see the test conditions, those are banners, not evidence. 4 5 1 3

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Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

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How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

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The Lead Developer

Open-source analysis with licensing and compliance management, vulnerability alerts and policy enforcement is documented, malicious-package protection and container security exist as modules, and the free 2ms CLI detects secrets like AWS tokens and GitHub PATs across repos, Slack, Discord and Confluence. But ecosystems and lockfiles, transitive dependency analysis, SBOM export formats, upgrade pull requests and the vulnerability database's sources are all undocumented. 1 5 6

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The Application Security Engineer

SCA is documented with licensing and compliance management, vulnerability alerts and policy enforcement, and malicious-package protection is a named module — but we found no public information on reachability of vulnerable code, transitive dependency handling, SBOM export in a standard format, or end-of-life components. Secret detection is real: a platform module plus the open-source 2ms CLI, rule-based, that scans git repos, local directories and even Slack, Discord, Confluence and Paligo. We found no public information on secret validity checks, full git-history scanning or push protection. 1 5 6 7

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The Engineering Manager

Platform modules cover SCA, container security, malicious-package protection and secrets detection, open-source analysis handles licence and compliance management with policy enforcement, and the free 2ms tool scans for secrets beyond source code in Slack, Discord, Confluence and Paligo. We found no public information on supported ecosystems and lockfiles, transitive dependencies, SBOM export, reachability analysis, or upgrade pull requests. 1 5 6 7

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The Platform Engineer

Open Source Analysis brings licence and compliance management, vulnerability alerts, policy enforcement and reporting, the platform lists SCA, malicious package protection, container security and secrets detection as modules, and secret detection is also available through the open-source 2ms command-line tool with rule-based detectors for items such as AWS access tokens and GitHub PATs across git repositories, Slack, Discord and Confluence. We found no public information on supported ecosystems and lockfiles, transitive dependency handling, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, or validity checks for detected secrets. 1 5 6 7

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The Product Security Officer

Software composition analysis with licence and compliance management, policy enforcement, malicious-package protection and container scanning are documented as platform modules, and an open-source secret-detection CLI covers Git repositories, collaboration platforms and content systems with rule-based checks. For my CRA file the gap is real: we found no public information on SBOM export in a standard format such as CycloneDX or SPDX — the documented BOM capability is scoped to AI components — nor on transitive dependency reachability or the vulnerability database behind the alerts. 1 5 6 7

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The Skeptic

The platform names SCA, Secrets Detection, Container Security and Malicious Package Protection, and the docs describe 'licensing and compliance management, vulnerability alerts, policy enforcement' — but we found no public information on transitive dependency depth, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, the vulnerability database and its sources, or secret validity checks and git-history scanning in the commercial product. The free 2ms CLI (gitleaks-based, and it does scan Slack, Discord and Confluence) is a genuinely useful extra, yet it is rule-based pattern matching, not the supply-chain evidence a regulated shop files. 1 5 6 7

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Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

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How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

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The Lead Developer

IDE plugins for VS Code, IntelliJ, Eclipse and Visual Studio, CI plugins for Jenkins, TeamCity, Bamboo, GitHub Actions and GitLab, a documented Jira ticket workflow with confirm-and-open steps, merge-ready AI fix suggestions and false-positive marking cover most of what my fourteen developers need. We found no public information on merge-request comment behaviour, new-code baselines or gate thresholds, whether the IDE runs the same rules as the server, the model behind the AI fixes, or typical scan times. 1 5 7 8 9

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The Application Security Engineer

Findings reach developers where they work — IDE plugins for Eclipse, IntelliJ, Visual Studio and VS Code, a CLI, Jenkins, Bamboo and TeamCity plugins, GitHub Actions, GitLab and Bitbucket integrations, and a documented Jira workflow from confirming a result through ticket, fix and rescan. Result metadata persists across scans and false positives can be eliminated in the workflow, with remediation assist promising merge-ready fixes. We found no public information on pull-request decoration, build-blocking gates with severity thresholds, typical scan times, or the model provider behind the AI fixes. 1 5 7 8 9

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The Engineering Manager

The documentation shows versioned IDE plugins for Eclipse, IntelliJ, VS Code and Visual Studio, CI plugins for Jenkins, TeamCity, Bamboo and Maven, integrations for GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and GitHub Actions, a detailed Jira workflow from confirming a finding through rescan to closure, and merge-ready AI remediation. We found no public information on a quality gate that blocks a merge, a new-code baseline, pre-commit checks, or the model behind the AI fixes. 7 8 9 5 1

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The Platform Engineer

Versioned plugins are documented for Jenkins, TeamCity, Bamboo and Maven plus a command-line interface for Windows and Linux, IDE plugins exist for Eclipse, IntelliJ, Visual Studio and VS Code, and findings can be marked as false positives with metadata persisting across scans and pushed into a documented Jira ticket workflow with scan comparison. We found no public information on merge request comments and status checks, a quality gate that fails a build, a new-code baseline or pre-commit checks, and the model behind the advertised merge-ready fixes is not stated. 1 5 7 8 9

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The Product Security Officer

Findings reach developers through IDE plugins for Eclipse, Visual Studio, VS Code and IntelliJ, a broad CI set spanning Jenkins, TeamCity, Bamboo, Maven, GitHub Actions, GitLab and Bitbucket, and a Jira workflow that opens tickets from confirmed results, with AI-assisted merge-ready fixes advertised. We found no public information on a quality gate that fails a build, pull-request comments or status checks, a new-code baseline, or the model provider behind the assist features. 1 5 7 8 9

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The Skeptic

Findings do reach developers where they work: versioned IDE plugins for Eclipse, IntelliJ, Visual Studio and VS Code, a CLI for Windows and Linux, Jenkins, TeamCity and Bamboo, GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket, and a documented Jira flow in which a human confirms results and closes tickets by hand. We found no public information on a quality gate that fails a merge, a new-code baseline, pre-commit checks, or which model powers Triage Assist and Remediation Assist — and no typical scan times behind the 'up to 90% faster scanning' claim. 1 3 5 7 8 9

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Platforms, deployment & administration

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How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

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The Lead Developer

GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps are supported, the Jira integration is documented in detail, analytics dashboards give an AppSec overview, and an on-premises edition using the same SAST engine as the cloud platform is a real option for keeping code in our network. The REST API documentation, single sign-on, roles and permissions, findings export formats and webhooks are not described on the captured pages. 1 3 5 7 8 9

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The Application Security Engineer

All the code hosts we use are covered — GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket plus Azure DevOps and TFS — alongside Jira and ServiceNow, and decisively for us, an on-premises edition running the same SAST engine as the cloud platform is documented, with analytics dashboards and posture management giving a view across projects. We found no public information on a documented REST API, single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, granular roles, SARIF or CSV export of findings, or webhooks on the captured pages. 1 3 5 7 8

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The Engineering Manager

All four major code hosts are supported, Jira integration is documented in depth, analytics dashboards promise a view across the estate, and the on-premises edition CxSAST runs the same engine inside our network — the deployment model I would insist on from Munich. We found no public information on single sign-on, roles and permissions per team, a documented REST API, SCIM provisioning, webhooks, or export of findings in formats like SARIF or CSV. 8 5 3 9 7

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The Platform Engineer

An on-premises SAST edition is documented that uses the same engine as the cloud platform — the decisive point for keeping our source inside the network — with integrations for GitLab, GitHub, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps and TFS, a documented Jira integration and analytics dashboards for posture. We found no public information on a documented REST API, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, roles and permissions, SARIF export or webhooks, which are exactly what I would need to roll settings out to 900 repositories. 3 5 7 8 9

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The Product Security Officer

A documented on-premises edition keeps the SAST engine on our own servers — decisive for our network policy — while the cloud platform integrates GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, offers analytics dashboards across the application security posture, and publishes a status page covering five regions including Europe. We found no public information on a documented REST API, single sign-on or SCIM provisioning, a project-level role model, webhooks, or export of findings in a standard format. 1 3 5 7 8 10

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The Skeptic

GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps and TFS are covered, with plugins for ServiceNow, ThreadFix and SonarQube, and CxSAST is documented as on-premises using the same engine as the cloud — the option I always ask about first. But we found no public information on a documented REST API, single sign-on or SCIM, roles per organisation and project, or export of findings in a standard format, and the only audit logging described is the vendor's own AWS CloudTrail, not one the customer can read. 3 5 7 8 10

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Source-code handling, security & compliance

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How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

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The Lead Developer

Encryption at rest (AES-256) and in transit (TLS 1.2), SOC 2 Type II audited annually with the report on request, ISO 27001:2013 and FedRAMP Authorized are stated, alongside a public status page across five regions, deletion within seven days of a formal request, customer-controlled scan retention and the on-premises option. We found no public information on whether customer code trains AI models, the AI model provider, or compliance reports mapped to standards like OWASP, CWE or PCI DSS. 1 3 10 11

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The Application Security Engineer

Retention is concrete — daily backups kept seven days, deletion within seven days of a formal request, customer control of saved scans — and code can stay entirely on our own network through the on-premises edition, which is what an auditor under PCI DSS wants to hear. ISO 27001:2013 certification, an annual SOC 2 Type II report available on request, FedRAMP authorization, AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.2 in transit, a responsible-AI framework with ongoing audits of AI outputs, and a public status page across five regions give real audit footing. We found no public information on the AI model provider or an opt-out, and no compliance reports mapped to PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act on the captured pages. 1 3 10 11

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The Engineering Manager

Encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 Type II audited annually with the report available on request, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, FedRAMP authorization, a published SLA and a public status page covering five regions, seven-day backup and deletion windows, customer-controlled retention of saved scans, and an on-premises option where code stays in our network. We found no public information on whether customer code is used to train AI models or on compliance reports mapped to PCI DSS or the EU Cyber Resilience Act. 10 11 3 1 2

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The Platform Engineer

The trust page states AES-256 encryption at rest, TLS 1.2 in transit, daily backups kept seven days, deletion within seven days of a formal request, an annually audited SOC 2 Type II report available on request, ISO 27001:2013 certification and FedRAMP authorization, alongside a public status page across five regions, and the on-premises edition keeps code inside our network. We found no public information on whether code is used to train AI models, the model provider behind the AI features, or compliance reporting mapped to standards such as PCI DSS or the EU Cyber Resilience Act. 1 2 3 10 11

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The Product Security Officer

For the audit file this is comparatively strong: SOC 2 Type II audited annually with the report available on request, ISO/IEC 27001 certification, FedRAMP authorization, AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2 in transit, deletion within seven days of a formal request, customer-controlled scan retention, NIST SSDF alignment, and a published cloud services SLA page. Two holes for me: we found no public information on whether customer code or findings train the AI features or how to opt out, and no compliance reporting mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act. 1 2 3 10 11

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The Skeptic

SOC 2 Type II annually with the report on request, ISO 27001:2013, FedRAMP Authorized, AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.2 in transit, deletion within 7 days of a formal request, customer-controlled scan retention, a public status page across five regions, and an on-premises edition where code never leaves the network — this earns real credit. What holds it back: we found no public information on whether customer code trains the AI behind the Assist features, which model provider processes it, or how to opt out, and the certifications are stated without their scope, with the security architecture detail sitting behind an NDA. 1 2 3 10 11

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European sovereignty panel opinion

panel disagrees Show reasoning
How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The Lead Developer

The contracting entity is Checkmarx Ltd. with its registered office in Ramat Gan, Israel, hosting runs on AWS with no stated region for code and findings, and the only named subprocessors are lead-generation firms. A Europe service region, a German group company and a documented on-premises edition partially offset this, but the product's own subprocessor list and a data processing agreement are not published on the captured pages. 2 3 10

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The Application Security Engineer

The controller and contracting entity is Checkmarx Ltd. in Israel, the platform runs on AWS with the data location not stated, and the only subprocessors named are marketing-side ones (Lusha, Zoominfo) — we found no public information on processing subprocessors or a published data processing agreement. A European region exists on the status page, group entities in Germany, France and Portugal are listed, and the on-premises SAST edition keeps code on our own servers. That mixed picture sits mid-scale for a Frankfurt buyer like me. 2 3 10

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The Engineering Manager

The named controller is Checkmarx Ltd. with its registered office in Ramat Gan, Israel, cloud services run on AWS with a Europe region listed on the status page, and a German subsidiary appears among the group entities. We found no public information on a data processing agreement, the hosting region for customer code and findings, or the subprocessors in the processing chain; the documented on-premises edition is the one route that keeps code and findings on our own European servers. 2 3 10

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The Platform Engineer

The contracting entity and registered office are Checkmarx Ltd. in Ramat Gan, Israel, the cloud platform runs on AWS with a Europe region listed on the status page, and the group includes German, French and Portuguese subsidiaries. A self-hosted edition is documented that runs on our own servers, which keeps code and findings in our chain, but we found no public information on a published data processing agreement, the service subprocessors and their locations beyond lead-generation tools, or whether the on-premises edition makes no external calls. 2 3 5 10

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The Product Security Officer

The contracting entity and data controller is Checkmarx Ltd. with its registered office in Ramat Gan, Israel, the platform runs on AWS, and the status page names a Europe region without stating where code and findings are stored; group companies exist in Germany, France and Portugal but are not offered as contracting entities. The documented on-premises edition lets us keep scanning on our own servers, but for the cloud service we found no public information on the service subprocessors or a published data processing agreement. 2 3 10

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity and data controller is Checkmarx Ltd., registered in Ramat Gan, Israel; hosting runs on AWS with the customer's region unstated on these pages; and the only named subprocessors are lead generators, Lusha and Zoominfo — not the ones touching code or findings. A Europe region appears on the status page and the group lists German, French and Portuguese subsidiaries, but we found no public information on an EU contracting entity or representative, a data processing agreement, or where source code and findings are stored. The on-premises edition is the one path that lets a European buyer keep the chain in their own hands, on their own servers. 2 3 10

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

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The Lead Developer

The captured homepage shows a pricing link in the navigation but no figures of any kind — no price per developer, no plan inclusions, no counting rule, so I cannot estimate what this costs my team without a sales call. The only publicly priced item we found is the free 2ms secret-detection CLI. 1 6

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The Application Security Engineer

The captured homepage shows a pricing link in the navigation but no figures on the page, and we found no public information on per-developer or per-lines-of-code prices, plan inclusions, counting rules, add-on scanners or limits. As it stands, every cost question is a sales conversation. 1

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The Engineering Manager

The only pricing evidence on the pages we read is a navigation link with no figures beside it, and no price per developer, counting rule, plan inclusions, seat minimums or payment terms appear anywhere in the captured material. A buyer cannot begin to compute an annual cost from what is public here. 1

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The Platform Engineer

The only pricing information in the captured pages is a pricing link in the site navigation with no figures shown. We found no public prices per developer or per plan, no counting rule for contributors or lines of code, and no statement of what the scanners, single sign-on or self-hosting cost. 1

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The Product Security Officer

The site navigation carries a pricing link, but the captured page states no figures, so no plan price, counting rule, add-on cost or annual total can be derived from public pages alone; every cost question becomes a sales conversation. 1

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The Skeptic

The captured pages show a Pricing link in the navigation and no prices on it — nothing per developer, no rule for counting contributors or lines of code, no tier inclusions, no limits, no monthly versus annual terms, no VAT. With this many modules (SAST, SCA, DAST, API security, AI assist), the second-year cost is precisely what a buyer cannot compute from public pages. 1

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European sovereignty — proven facts

1 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Checkmarx One

Is Checkmarx One European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Checkmarx One is based. Its vendor, Checkmarx Ltd., is incorporated in Israel, per the vendor’s page captured 17 Nov 2026.

Where does Checkmarx One store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

Does Checkmarx One have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Checkmarx One?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Checkmarx One alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (11)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Legal notice — found from the homepage checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Self-hosting / on-premises installation docs — found from the homepage checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap checkmarx.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →