Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by DeepSource, Corp. · deepsource.com

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DeepSource at a glance

Vendor
DeepSource, Corp.
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates DeepSource 1.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. DeepSource is a SAST/SCA code security and quality product from DeepSource, Corp., a Delaware corporation per its terms; its site says it has joined Harness. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources

DeepSource alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

DeepSource is a SAST/SCA code security and quality product from DeepSource, Corp., a Delaware corporation per its terms; its site says it has joined Harness. It is strongest on developer workflow and integration and administration, where scores sit at 4 with no spread: the pages document pull-request analysis against a repository baseline, Autofix, a CLI with AI agents, onboarding across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, and team invites by link or email. Code analysis and dependencies and secrets cluster at 3 to 4 — language auto-detection, dependency vulnerability scanning and open-source licence policy enforcement are confirmed, while we found no public information on covered languages, rule sets, OWASP or CWE mapping, SBOM export or secret detection. Weakest are pricing transparency at 0 to 2, since the captured pricing page confirmed no plan prices or counting rules, and sovereignty at 0 to 2, with no public information on data residency, subprocessors or a data processing agreement; trust and compliance spans 1 to 3. The bench's flagged splits show no splits, so these ranges reflect evidence limits, not judge disagreement.

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Speaks for it

  • Runs analysis on pull requests and creates a repository baseline
  • Fixes issues manually or with Autofix, auto-formats pull requests, and provides a CLI usable with AI agents
  • Auto-detects repository languages and suggests analyzers you can add or remove, while tracking code coverage
  • Scans dependencies for vulnerabilities and enforces open-source licence policies across a team
  • Supports GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, with team invites by link or email

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Held against it

  • The captured pricing page confirmed no plan prices, counting rules or free-tier limits, so an annual cost cannot be computed from public pages
  • We found no public information on where source code and findings are stored or processed, on subprocessors, or on a published data processing agreement
  • We found no public information on rule sets mapped to OWASP or CWE, data-flow or taint depth, or false-positive handling
  • We found no public information on SBOM export, transitive dependencies, secret detection or upgrade pull requests
  • We found no public information on code retention, whether code trains AI models and how to opt out, or certifications with their scope

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Best for

  • You host code on GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps and want pull-request analysis that creates a repository baseline before merging
  • You need documented dependency vulnerability scanning and team-wide open-source licence policy enforcement
  • Your developers live in pull requests and work with AI agents, and want analysis, fixes and formatting to happen in that flow

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Avoid if

  • You must prove a European processing chain before signing — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
  • You need public per-developer prices to budget before talking to the vendor — the captured pricing page confirmed no plan prices, counting rules or free-tier limits
  • You need findings to block a merge — the documented workflow is analysis and fixes on pull requests, and we found no public information on a build-failing quality gate

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

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How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

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The Lead Developer

Language analyzers are auto-detected per repository, code coverage is tracked, issues can be fixed with Autofix, and the vendor runs dedicated pages for static security, infrastructure-as-code and coverage. But we found no public information on rule sets mapped to OWASP or CWE, data-flow or taint depth, quality metrics, or how false positives are handled — exactly the depth I need before trusting a SAST on client code. 3 6 12 13

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The Application Security Engineer

Static analysis with auto-detected language analyzers, coverage tracking, and manual or Autofix issue resolution are documented, with analysis running on pull requests against a repository baseline. We found no public information on cross-file taint analysis, rules mapped to OWASP or CWE, complexity or duplication metrics, or how false positives are handled — the depth a PCI-scoped codebase needs before we trust findings. 2 3 6 13

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The Engineering Manager

The getting-started documentation confirms analyzers that auto-detect repository languages and can be added or removed, coverage tracking, and code formatters, so the product does analyse source code. We found no public information on which languages and frameworks are covered and at what depth — as a Java and Kotlin shop I cannot confirm my stack — or on rule sets mapped to OWASP and CWE, complexity and technical-debt metrics, duplication, or false-positive handling. 6

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The Platform Engineer

The onboarding documentation confirms static analysis with automatic language detection and per-language analyzers, coverage tracking, code formatters, and manual or Autofix fixes. Beyond that the captured pages describe no rule sets, OWASP or CWE mapping, data-flow depth or false-positive handling, so I cannot place this above just past the basic level. 1 6

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The Product Security Officer

Analyzers are auto-suggested for the detected languages in a repository, code coverage is tracked, formatters run on pull requests, and analysis builds a repository baseline, with dedicated pages listed for SAST, code quality, infrastructure-as-code security and coverage. We found no public information on the rule sets and their OWASP or CWE mapping, data-flow or taint analysis depth, quality metrics, or how false positives are measured and kept down. 2 3 6 12 13

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The Skeptic

The documentation confirms per-repository language auto-detection with addable analyzers, code-coverage tracking and an Autofix feature, and dedicated pages exist for static analysis, infrastructure-as-code and code coverage. But no captured page names the languages covered, the rule sets, data-flow or taint depth, or how false positives are measured — I cannot tell from this evidence whether I would get real analysis or glorified grepping. 2 3 6 12 13

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Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

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How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

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The Lead Developer

Dependency vulnerability scanning and team-level enforcement of open-source licence policies are both confirmed, with a dedicated composition-analysis page. We found no public information on transitive dependencies, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, malicious-package checks or secret detection, so I cannot judge how deep the package checks go for our Laravel and React stacks. 4 6

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The Application Security Engineer

Dependency vulnerability scanning and enforcement of open-source licence policies across a team are documented. We found no public information on supported ecosystems, transitive dependencies, reachability, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, or secret detection of any kind — git-history scanning, validity checks and push protection included — which is the biggest gap for a payments shop like ours. 4 6

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The Engineering Manager

Two one-line facts are all this reaches: scanning for vulnerabilities in dependencies and enforcing open-source licence policies across the team. We found no public information on the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, transitive dependencies, reachability, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, malicious-package detection, end-of-life components, or secret detection in code and git history. 6

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The Platform Engineer

Vulnerability scanning for dependencies and team-wide open-source licence policy enforcement are both documented. Ecosystem coverage, transitive dependencies, SBOM export and any secret detection are not described in what I captured, which keeps this between the basic and mid level. 6

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The Product Security Officer

Vulnerability scanning of dependencies and enforcement of open-source licence policies are both documented, alongside a dedicated composition-analysis page. We found no public information on SBOM export in CycloneDX or SPDX, transitive dependency coverage, secret detection, upgrade pull requests, or the vulnerability database and its update speed — and a standard-format SBOM per release is the first artefact our Cyber Resilience Act audits demand. 4 6

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The Skeptic

Dependency vulnerability scanning and team-level open-source licence policy enforcement are confirmed, with a dedicated composition-analysis page captured. On ecosystems, transitive depth, SBOM export, upgrade automation and secret detection in commits and git history we found no public information, and I will not credit capabilities nobody documented. 4 6

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Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

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How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

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The Lead Developer

Analysis on pull requests with a repository baseline, Autofix, auto-formatting of pull requests and a CLI with AI agents are all confirmed across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps — that is the merge-request-first model I want. But we found no public information on quality gates that block a merge, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, or triage and false-positive suppression. 5 6

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The Application Security Engineer

Analysis runs on pull requests and builds a repository baseline, Autofix and auto-formatting of pull requests are documented, and a CLI usable with AI agents exists, across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps. We found no public information on merge-blocking quality gates, IDE plugins, triage and suppression with reasons, or the model behind Autofix. 5 6

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The Engineering Manager

Analysis on pull requests that creates a repository baseline, fixes applied manually or with Autofix, a CLI usable with AI agents, and auto-formatting of pull requests are documented. We found no public information on a quality gate that blocks a merge, IDE plugins, CI pipeline integrations, triage and suppression, the model behind the AI fixes, or scan times — and the gate on new code is exactly what my six teams would live or die by. 6

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The Platform Engineer

Analysis runs on pull requests and builds a repository baseline, onboarding covers GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, and a CLI usable with AI agents plus pull-request auto-formatting are documented. Quality gates that fail a build, IDE plugins, triage and suppression rules and scan times are not described in what I captured. 6

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The Product Security Officer

Analysis runs on pull requests and creates a repository baseline, issues can be fixed manually or with Autofix, and a CLI for AI agents is offered, across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps accounts. We found no public information on merge-blocking quality gates, IDE plugins, triage and ignore rules with reasons, or the model behind the autofix suggestions. 5 6

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The Skeptic

Pull-request analysis with a repository baseline is confirmed across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, alongside a CLI, pull-request auto-formatting and Autofix. Nothing captured describes a quality gate that can fail a build, IDE plugins, suppression or false-positive triage, or which model powers the AI review and autofix — and an autofix with an unnamed model is exactly how code ends up somewhere unexamined. 5 6

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Platforms, deployment & administration

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How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

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The Lead Developer

All four major code hosts are supported and team members can be invited by link or email, which covers our GitHub and GitLab client projects. We found no public information on a REST API, single sign-on, roles per project, portfolio reports, audit logs, export formats or self-hosting. 6

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The Application Security Engineer

All four major code hosts — GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps — are supported, and team members can be invited by link or email. We found no public information on a REST API, webhooks, single sign-on, SCIM, per-project roles, audit logs, self-hosted deployment, cross-repository reporting or finding export, so for a 120-developer organisation the administrative picture is unproven. 6

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The Engineering Manager

All four code hosts — GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps — are documented, with team invitations by link or email, which is more platform breadth than a single-host tool. We found no public information on a documented REST API, Jira integration, single sign-on, roles per project, cross-repository portfolio reports with trends, audit logs, findings export, or a self-hosted edition — precisely the administration my teams, the Jira routing and the board trend report would depend on. 6

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The Platform Engineer

Four code hosts are supported and teams are built by invite link or email, which is past the single-host level. Everything I actually administer — a self-hosted or in-network edition, SAML and SCIM from Entra ID, a REST API to roll settings out to our 900 repositories, audit logs and SARIF export — is not described in the captured pages. 6

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The Product Security Officer

All four major code hosts — GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps — are supported for onboarding, and team members join via invite link or email. We found no public information on a documented REST API, single sign-on and SCIM provisioning, roles and permissions per team, portfolio reports, audit logs, or a self-hosted edition, which for our segregated controller network would be the decisive deployment question. 6

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The Skeptic

All four major code hosts are supported and team members are invited by link or email, which clears a single-host dashboard. We found no public information on a documented REST API, single sign-on, roles per project, portfolio reports or audit logs — nor on the question I always ask: whether findings export in a standard format when the contract ends. 6

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Source-code handling, security & compliance

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How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

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The Lead Developer

A trust centre, terms and a privacy policy exist, privacy requests run through the Harness Privacy Request Center, and an EU representative in Ireland is named in the privacy policy. We found no public information on certifications with scope, code retention, whether code trains AI models, a status page, or reports mapped to standards. 8 10 11

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The Application Security Engineer

The captured terms route privacy requests through the Harness Privacy Request Center, and a trust-centre page exists. We found no public information on source-code retention periods, encryption, whether code is used to train AI models, certifications with their scope, or reports mapped to standards such as OWASP or PCI DSS — the latter being what our auditors ask for first. 8 10 11

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The Engineering Manager

The only captured statement on how customer data is handled routes privacy requests to the Harness Privacy Request Center, and the captured trust-centre page carried no certifications or audit reports in what we read. We found no public information on whether source code is stored and for how long, encryption, whether code or findings train AI models and any opt-out, an SLA or public status page, or compliance reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS or the EU Cyber Resilience Act. 8 10

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The Platform Engineer

The only data-practice fact I could confirm is that privacy rights are exercised through the Harness Privacy Request Center following the join-up with Harness. Nothing captured describes how source code is stored or retained, whether code trains AI models, certifications, an SLA or a status page, so this sits at the bottom of what I can evidence. 8 10 11

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The Product Security Officer

A trust-centre page exists, privacy requests are routed through the Harness Privacy Request Center, and the privacy policy names an EU representative in Ireland. We found no public information on where and for how long source code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, certification scope, or a status page and SLA. 8 10 11

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The Skeptic

A trust centre, terms and privacy policy were captured, and privacy requests route to the Harness Privacy Request Center while the site announces DeepSource has joined Harness. We found no public information on code retention, whether code trains the AI features and how one opts out, certifications with their scope, or a stated availability or service-level commitment — an auditor leaves these pages empty-handed. 1 8 10 11

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European sovereignty panel opinion

n/r n/r Show reasoning
How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The Lead Developer

The contracting entity is a Delaware corporation that has joined Harness, softened only by an EU representative in Ireland. We found no public information on where source code and findings are hosted, which subprocessors touch them, or a published data processing agreement — so I could not tell a German client where their code ends up. 1 10 11

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The Application Security Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information establishing the contracting entity and parent, where source code and findings are stored, or which subprocessors process them; those dimensions remain unknown to us rather than shown to be European. We read the about, terms, privacy-policy and trust-centre pages and could not establish the chain beyond privacy requests being handled via Harness. 8 9 10 11

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The Engineering Manager

The vendor side of the chain is documented as a Delaware corporation, with the site announcing DeepSource has joined Harness and the privacy policy naming an EU representative in Ireland. We found no public information on where code, findings, SBOMs and account data are stored and processed, who the subprocessors including any AI models are, or whether a data processing agreement is published — for a Munich buyer that leaves the whole processing chain unproven. 9 10 11

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The Platform Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on where code and findings are hosted, which subprocessors process them, the contracting entity's jurisdiction or a data processing agreement; every sovereignty attribute came back unknown, and the captured terms and privacy pages confirmed only that privacy requests run through a Harness privacy centre. 8 10 11

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The Product Security Officer

The captured terms show a Delaware corporation as the contracting entity, the privacy policy names only an EU representative in Ireland, and the site states DeepSource has joined Harness, with privacy requests handled at a Harness centre. We found no public information on hosting location or data residency for code and findings, on any named subprocessor, or on a data processing agreement. 1 9 10 11

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The Skeptic

No captured page states where source code, findings or account data are stored or processed, and we found no public information on hosting options, subprocessors or a data processing agreement. The only chain signals are a Delaware corporation per the terms, privacy requests routed to the Harness Privacy Request Center, and the site's announcement that DeepSource has joined Harness — code would flow into a chain the buyer cannot inspect from these pages. 1 10 11

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Pricing transparency

n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

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The Lead Developer

A pricing page exists in the captures, but the documented facts contain no price figures, no counting rule for developers or contributors, no plan inclusions and no priced add-ons. With a bench that grows and shrinks with freelancers, I can compute nothing about the annual bill from what is documented. 7

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The Application Security Engineer not rated — no public information

We read the pricing page and found no public information confirming any plan price, how developers or contributors are counted, what individual scanners or enterprise features cost, or free-tier limits and terms. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from the captured information. 7

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The Engineering Manager not rated — no public information

We found no public information on pricing: a pricing page was captured, but no price per developer or per lines of code, plan inclusions, how contributors are counted, repository or scan limits, free tier, monthly versus annual terms or VAT treatment appears in what we read, so an annual cost for six teams cannot be computed from public pages. 7

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The Platform Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public information on prices: no per-developer rate, counting rule, tier inclusions or free-tier limits was confirmed from the captured pricing page, so an annual cost for 300 developers cannot be computed from public pages. 7

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The Product Security Officer not rated — no public information

The captured pricing page yielded no confirmed figures, so we found no public information on per-developer or per-plan prices, counting rules, free-tier limits, add-on costs, or monthly versus annual terms. 7

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The Skeptic not rated — no public information

We read the captured pricing page and could confirm no price from it: no plan prices, no rule for how developers or contributors are counted, no free-tier limits, no monthly-versus-annual terms, no VAT treatment. From this evidence a buyer can compute neither the first year's cost nor — the number that always surprises — the second. 7

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about DeepSource

Is DeepSource European?

No. whats-best.ai classifies DeepSource as Rest of world.

Where does DeepSource store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.

Does DeepSource have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to DeepSource?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: DeepSource alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (13)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Features page (code quality) deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Features page (SAST) deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Features page (SCA) deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Features page (AI review and autofix) deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Documentation docs.deepsource.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
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