GitGuardian

EU-Made Report an error

Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 3 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by GitGuardian SAS · www.gitguardian.com

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GitGuardian at a glance

Vendor
GitGuardian SAS
Headquarters
Incorporated in France source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
Free plan
Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates GitGuardian 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. Judged on its own pages, GitGuardian is a secrets-detection platform rather than a broad code analyser. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources

GitGuardian alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Judged on its own pages, GitGuardian is a secrets-detection platform rather than a broad code analyser. Code analysis scored a flat 0: the pages brand "a native SAST for GitHub" but document only hardcoded-credential detection, with no public information on data-flow or taint analysis or OWASP/CWE rule sets. The strengths sit elsewhere. Sovereignty scored a flat 8: the contracting entity is GitGuardian SAS of Paris, EU customers are hosted on AWS eu-central-1 in Frankfurt, a Data Processing Addendum and a subprocessors page are published, and a self-hosted edition keeps code and findings on your own infrastructure — though subprocessor locations are not shown on the captured pages and no migration from the US platform is supported. Integration and administration scored 7-8 and dependencies and secrets 6-8: 550+ specific detectors, a published 91% true-positive rate and merge-blocking status checks, against no public information on dependency analysis or SBOM export. Pricing transparency sits at 4 — free Starter limits published, Growth contact sales. No criterion registered a genuine disagreement; the widest spread, 6 to 8, is on dependencies and secrets.

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Speaks for it

  • Secrets detection documented in depth: 550+ specific detectors plus generic high-entropy patterns, full-history scans across all branches, and a published 91% true-positive rate.
  • Leak prevention built into the workflow, with pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive hooks plus required status checks that block merges.
  • A self-hosted edition on Helm or KOTS keeps code and findings on your own infrastructure.
  • Data handling stated concretely: only patches with detected secrets are collected, and all customer data is removed at the end of the relationship.
  • SOC 2 Type II maintained since 2022 with annual independent audits by Prescient Assurance.

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Held against it

  • Code analysis scored 0: we found no public information on taint or data-flow analysis, OWASP or CWE rule sets, or complexity and duplication metrics.
  • We found no public information on dependency vulnerability analysis, licence policies or SBOM export.
  • We found no published service-level agreement, and no public statement on whether customer code trains AI models or which provider runs the AI risk scoring.
  • We found no public information on SARIF or CSV export of findings.
  • Above the free Starter plan, the Growth and Enterprise tiers are contact sales with no public per-developer price.

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Best for

  • Your primary exposure is leaked credentials in code, git history and collaboration tools such as Slack, Jira and Confluence.
  • You want secrets scanning enforced inside existing CI on GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps, including self-managed variants such as GitHub Enterprise and Bitbucket Data Center.
  • You must keep code and findings on your own infrastructure and can run the self-hosted edition on your own Kubernetes.
  • You are an EU buyer who wants the EU region on AWS eu-central-1 in Frankfurt and a French contracting entity, with Standard Contractual Clauses covering US transfers.

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Avoid if

  • You need taint or data-flow analysis, OWASP/CWE-mapped vulnerability rules or code-quality metrics — code analysis scored 0 and the bench judged the product a secrets detector.
  • You need dependency composition, licence policies or SBOM export from the same platform — the judges' conclusion is that supply-chain composition would still need a second tool.
  • You must compute an annual cost from public pages — above the free Starter plan the tiers are contact sales.

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

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How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

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The Lead Developer

Every captured page frames this as a hardcoded-credentials and secrets detector — even its "native SAST for GitHub" wording is explicitly about detecting credentials in real time, and the SAST/DAST mention in the security policy describes the vendor's own development process rather than a product capability. I found no public information on bug or injection finding, data-flow or taint analysis, OWASP or CWE rule sets, complexity and duplication metrics, or coverage import. That makes it a secret scanner for the purposes of this criterion, which sits at the bottom of the scale. 15 16 24

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The Application Security Engineer

The captured pages describe a credentials and secrets platform — "Find every credential. Stop the next breach." — whose SAST-labelled offering for GitHub detects hardcoded credentials in real time and lets us build custom detectors for secrets unique to the organisation. I found no public information on taint or data-flow analysis, language-specific vulnerability rules, OWASP or CWE mapping, or quality measures such as complexity, duplication or coverage import; as an analyser of source-code vulnerabilities this is a different kind of tool. 1 15 17

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The Engineering Manager

The captured pages market a "native SAST for GitHub" but define it as detecting hardcoded credentials in real time, which is secrets detection rather than source-code analysis; we found no public information on taint or data-flow analysis, rule sets mapped to OWASP or CWE, per-language depth, or complexity, duplication and technical-debt metrics. For my Java and Kotlin teams this tool would tell me about leaked credentials, nothing about code health per team and hotspot. 1 15 16

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The Platform Engineer

Everything captured describes a secrets-detection engine — 550+ specific detectors, generic high-entropy patterns, four billion commits analysed — and the page titled SAST for GitHub defines itself as detecting hardcoded credentials in real time. We found no public information on taint or data-flow analysis, rule sets mapped to OWASP or CWE, or quality measures such as complexity, duplication and technical debt, so on this criterion the product is a different kind of tool. 1 15 16

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The Product Security Officer

The captured pages present this as a secrets-detection platform: the solutions pages labelled SAST describe detecting hardcoded credentials in real time, and we found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis, OWASP or CWE rule sets, or duplication, complexity and maintainability metrics for the customer's own code. 1 15 16 7

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The Skeptic

The captured pages brand it "a native SAST for GitHub", but everything documented under that label is hardcoded-credential detection — 550+ secret detectors, Paranoïd mode, honeytokens. We found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis, per-language depth, OWASP or CWE rule sets, quality metrics or coverage import; as evidenced, the analysis performed is secrets detection. 15 16 1 7

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Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

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How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

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The Lead Developer

The secrets half is the strongest I have seen documented: 550+ specific detectors plus generic high-entropy patterns, validity checks against the host, full git history, custom detectors, a published 91% true positive rate, blocking at pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive, and coverage outside git in Slack, Jira, Confluence, containers and registries with revoke-and-rotate guidance. But we found no public information on dependency vulnerability analysis, transitive dependencies, licence policies, SBOM export or malicious-package detection, which is the half I need for vulnerable packages in merge requests. 3 4 6 15 17

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The Application Security Engineer

The secrets half is exactly what I demand before an auditor visit: 550+ specific detectors plus generic ones, validity checks through non-intrusive calls to the host, full git-history scans across all branches, push-time blocking via pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive hooks plus required status checks, and secrets hunted beyond git in Slack, Jira, Confluence, containers and file storage with revoke-and-rotate guidance. What holds it down is the other half of the criterion: I found no public information on dependency vulnerability analysis, reachability of vulnerable code, licence detection, SBOM export or malicious-package detection. 3 4 6 16 19 20

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The Engineering Manager

Secret detection is the core and is documented in depth: 550+ specific detectors plus generic high-entropy patterns, validity checks through non-intrusive HTTP calls, a published 91 percent true positive rate refined against a four-billion-commit dataset, scans across the full git history, and push-time protection via pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive hooks. Secrets are also found outside git in Slack, Jira, Confluence, documents and container registries, with rotation and revocation guidance and secrets-manager sync. We found no public information on dependency analysis, licence detection or SBOM export, so for supply-chain composition I would still need a second tool. 1 3 4 6 17

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The Platform Engineer

On the secrets side this is as deep as it gets: 550+ detectors plus generic and custom ones, scans across the entire git history, validity checks with non-intrusive HTTP calls, pre-commit and pre-receive blocking, a stated 91% true-positive rate, and secrets hunted in Slack, Jira, Confluence, containers and on developer laptops with rotate-and-revoke guidance. We found no public information on dependency composition analysis, licence policies or SBOM export, so the criterion as a whole cannot reach the top levels. 1 3 4 6 16 19

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The Product Security Officer

Secrets coverage is first-rate: more than 550 specific detectors plus generic high-entropy patterns, validity checks against the host, scans across the whole git history, and hunts for secrets outside git in Jira, Slack, Confluence, container registries and file storage, with revoke-and-rotate guidance. What I cannot file per release is the composition half: we found no public information on dependency vulnerability analysis, licence policies or SBOM export in CycloneDX or SPDX. 3 4 16 6 19 1

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The Skeptic

Secrets detection is top of the class: 550+ specific detectors plus generic ones, full-history scans across all branches collecting only patches with secrets, validity checks against the host, a published 91% true-positive rate, and secrets hunted beyond git in Slack, Jira, Confluence, containers and on developer laptops with revoke-and-rotate guidance. We found no public information on dependency vulnerability analysis, reachability, licence policies or SBOM export. 16 17 23 4 6 3 19 20

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Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

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How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

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The Lead Developer

The workflow evidence is solid where it counts for my team: hooks at pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive, a documented GitHub Action that fails the workflow on leaks and can be a required status check to block merges, check runs scanning every pull request commit, CI recipes for Jenkins, GitLab CI/CD, GitHub Actions, Azure, Bitbucket, Circle, Drone and Travis, plus triage, saved views and Jira routing. What holds it back is that local scanning is described only as "CLI or IDE" with no VS Code or PhpStorm plugins documented, and we found no public information on per-branch gate settings, deduplication, autofix with a stated model, or scan times. 3 6 19 20

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The Application Security Engineer

Developers meet the findings where they work: CI integrations documented for Jenkins, GitHub Actions, GitLab, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket, Circle, Drone and Travis, check runs on every pull-request commit that can be made a required status check to block merges, CLI hooks before commit and push, and triage with severity, Jira routing and developer feedback links, with leak-to-developer notification under a minute. I found no public information on ignore or suppression rules with recorded reasons, deduplication across tools, or AI-assisted fixes with the model provider named. 3 4 19 20

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The Engineering Manager

Developers meet findings where they work: GitHub check runs on every pull-request commit, scans that can be set as a required status check to block merges, workflows that fail on leaks, CI integrations for Jenkins, GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines, Circle, Drone and Travis, and git hooks at pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive. We found no public information on IDE plugins, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication across tools, or AI autofix with the model behind it stated. 3 19 20

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The Platform Engineer

ggshield slots into our world exactly: pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive hooks plus eight CI systems including Jenkins, GitLab CI/CD and GitHub Actions, with the scan addable as a required status check that blocks a merge and fails the workflow on a leak. Triage with severity scoring, saved views, Jira and ChatOps routing, developer feedback links and a 91% true-positive rate address the noise question; we found no public information on documented scan times, per-branch gate thresholds, or suppression rules with reasons. 3 4 6 19 20

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The Product Security Officer

The CLI runs at pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive hooks, integrates with eight CI systems including Jenkins, GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Azure, Bitbucket, Circle, Drone and Travis, can be made a required status check that stops a pull request with security issues from merging, and supports triage with severity, saved views and Jira. We found no public information on typical scan times or on the model behind the paid plan's AI risk scoring and false-positive filtering. 19 20 3 6 8

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The Skeptic

Developers are met where they work: hooks at pre-commit, pre-push and pre-receive, a GitHub Action that fails the workflow on a leak and can be a required status check to block merges, eight CI platforms, Jira triage and per-incident feedback links. We found no public information on suppression rules with reasons, deduplication, IDE parity with server rules, scan times, or an AI fix with its model stated — the AI here is risk scoring and false-positive filtering. 6 20 19 3 5 8

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Platforms, deployment & administration

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How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

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The Lead Developer

All four code hosts plus GitHub Enterprise and Bitbucket Data Center are supported, there is a documented REST API that also works against a self-hosted base URL, SAML 2.0 SSO with setup guides for Okta, Microsoft Entra, Keycloak and others, SCIM with just-in-time provisioning, Admin, Member and Restricted roles, audit logs over dashboard and API actions, a self-hosted edition via Helm or KOTS, and SIEM, ITSM and webhook destinations. I found no public information on SARIF or CSV export of findings, partner or multi-organisation accounts, or whether every setting is reachable through the API. 3 6 8 21 22

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The Application Security Engineer

Administration is credible for a 120-developer organisation: native GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps integrations including self-managed variants such as GitHub Enterprise and Bitbucket Data Center, SAML 2.0 single sign-on that can be enforced with SCIM provisioning and just-in-time onboarding, Admin, Member and Restricted roles with team-level permissions, audit logs of every dashboard and API action, webhooks plus SIEM, ITSM and Jira routing, and a documented REST API. A self-hosted edition on Helm or KOTS is documented for running inside our network; I found no public information on SARIF import or export of findings. 3 4 6 8 21 22

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The Engineering Manager

This covers most of what I need to run it across six teams: native support for GitHub, GitHub Enterprise, GitLab, Bitbucket Cloud and Data Center and Azure DevOps, a documented REST API with reference, Jira Cloud and Jira Data Center plus ServiceNow for triage, SAML 2.0 single sign-on that can be enforced with SCIM provisioning and team-default permissions, audit logs, and a self-hosted edition on Helm or KOTS including our existing Kubernetes. Incident trends over up to three years and per-developer analytics give portfolio views; we found no public information on SARIF or CSV export of findings. 3 6 7 21 22

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The Platform Engineer

The self-hosted edition is properly documented — Helm or KOTS onto bare metal, private cloud or our own Kubernetes cluster, with self-hosted API base URLs spelled out — which is my non-negotiable for keeping source code inside the company network. SAML2 single sign-on has step-by-step setup for Microsoft Entra ID, SCIM provisioning with just-in-time onboarding and deprovisioning, forced SSO, audit logs over dashboard and API actions, and a documented REST API including a scan route; we found no public information on SARIF export, which I would need to roll results across 900 repositories. 3 4 7 8 21 22

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The Product Security Officer

All four code hosts are supported including self-managed GitHub Enterprise and Bitbucket Data Center editions, the REST API is documented with a self-hosted base URL, and administration reaches a self-hosted edition via Helm or KOTS, SAML single sign-on with an enforcement option, SCIM, audit logs, granular team permissions, SIEM and webhook destinations, and a public status page. Export of findings in a standard interchange format such as SARIF is not shown on the captured pages. 6 8 22 21 4 5 10

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The Skeptic

GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps including self-managed flavours, a documented REST API that also serves a self-hosted base URL, webhooks, Jira Cloud and Data Center, enforceable SAML SSO with SCIM provisioning, audit logs of dashboard and API actions, and a self-hosted edition on Helm, KOTS, bare metal or your own Kubernetes. We found no public information on SARIF import or export or multi-organisation accounts. 6 21 22 3 8 4 10

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Source-code handling, security & compliance

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How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

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The Lead Developer

The data-handling documentation is unusually concrete: only patches of commits with detected secrets are collected together with repository metadata, historical scans keep only secret-bearing patches, and a self-hosted edition is offered for complete data isolation, backed by TLS 1.2+ and AES-256 encryption, SOC 2 Type II maintained since 2022 with a named auditor, a public status page, a 48-hour incident notification commitment, and a framework list spanning PCI DSS, ISO 27001, NIS2 and DORA. I found no public information on whether customer code trains AI models and how to opt out, or on a published SLA. 1 3 10 23 24

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The Application Security Engineer

The data-handling documentation is unusually concrete: only patches of commits with detected secrets are collected and other commits are not, repository metadata fields are enumerated, logs are kept 365 days, customer data is removed at end of the relationship, encryption is TLS 1.2 or greater with AES-256, SOC 2 Type II has been maintained since 2022 with annual independent audits, and a self-hosted option keeps data completely isolated — while PCI DSS and DORA appear in the supported-frameworks list, which matters to us. Gaps an auditor would probe: I found no public information on whether code or findings train AI models, no opt-out for the AI risk-scoring feature, and no published service-level agreement. 1 3 10 23 24

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The Engineering Manager

Code handling is documented concretely: only patches of commits with detected secrets are collected, the EU SaaS stores data in Frankfurt, and a self-hosted edition can keep code and findings on our own network. SOC 2 Type II has been maintained since 2022 with the auditor named, encryption in transit and at rest is stated, logs are kept 365 days, all customer data is removed at the end of the relationship, supported frameworks include PCI DSS, ISO 27001, NIS2, DORA and SOX, and the status page shows the EU platform at 100 percent uptime. We found no public information on a published SLA, on whether customer code trains AI models, or on the model provider behind the AI risk-scoring features. 1 10 23 24

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The Platform Engineer

The data-handling pages are concrete enough for an audit conversation: only the patches of commits with detected secrets are collected, retention periods are stated, all customer data is removed at the end of the service relationship, encryption is TLS 1.2 or greater and AES-256-CBC or greater, and SOC 2 Type II has been maintained since 2022 with annual audits by Prescient Assurance. A public status page, 48-hour incident notification and a compliance framework list including PCI DSS and ISO 27001 are there; we found no public information on a published SLA, or on the model provider behind the AI features and any opt-out. 10 14 23 24

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The Product Security Officer

The vendor states precisely what it collects — only the patches of commits where secrets were detected, plus push metadata and repository fields — offers a self-hosted edition for complete data isolation, and backs it with SOC 2 Type II since 2022 audited by Prescient Assurance, encryption standards, GDPR with CNIL as lead authority, Frankfurt storage, a public status page and a frameworks list covering PCI DSS, NIS2, DORA and ISO 27001. Two gaps keep it off the top level for my audit file: we found no public information on a service-level agreement, nor on whether customer code is used to train AI models or on the provider and opt-out behind the AI features. 23 24 1 3 14 10

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The Skeptic

Code handling is stated plainly: only patches with detected secrets are collected, all customer data is removed at the end of the relationship, logs are kept 365 days, encryption is TLS 1.2 or greater in transit and AES-256-CBC or greater at rest, and a self-hosted edition offers full isolation; SOC 2 Type II has been maintained since 2022 with Prescient Assurance as auditor, beside a public status page. We found no published SLA, no statement on whether code trains AI models or which provider runs the AI risk scoring, and no detail on certification scope. 23 24 1 10 8

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The Lead Developer

The chain is European where it counts for us: GitGuardian SAS in Paris is the contracting entity, EU hosting runs in AWS eu-central-1 Frankfurt as a separate EU platform, a data processing addendum and a subprocessors page are published, and a self-hosted edition on bare metal or your own Kubernetes keeps code and findings on your own servers, with SOC 2 stated on top. The captured pages do not show each subprocessor's location, and a US affiliate and an optional US region exist alongside the EU offering. 3 8 10 12 13 14

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The Application Security Engineer

Contracting runs through GitGuardian SAS of Paris under French law with CNIL as lead supervisory authority, the EU SaaS region is hosted in AWS Frankfurt, Standard Contractual Clauses cover US transfers, a data processing agreement and a subprocessors page are published, and SOC 2 Type II is stated; on top of that a self-hosted edition on Helm, KOTS, bare metal or our own Kubernetes is documented to keep code and findings entirely on our servers, which is the chain I prefer under DORA. I found no public information on parent ownership or the location of each individual subprocessor, including any AI models. 3 10 12 13 14 23 24

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The Engineering Manager

The contracting entity is GitGuardian SAS of Paris, the EU SaaS runs in AWS Frankfurt as a named region, a data processing addendum and a subprocessors page are published, and SOC 2 is stated — and the documented self-hosted edition on our own Kubernetes keeps code and findings entirely in our chain. The subprocessors' own locations and any AI models used are not shown in the captures, and US hosting is a separate platform with no migration between regions, so the chain is strong but not evidenced end to end. 3 10 13 24

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The Platform Engineer

Contracting is with GitGuardian SAS at 54 rue de Seine in Paris under French law with the CNIL as lead supervisory authority, the EU SaaS runs in Frankfurt on AWS eu-central-1, a data processing addendum and a subprocessors page are published, and the self-hosted edition keeps code and findings on our own servers — which is the deployment I would run. A US region and a US affiliate exist, with Standard Contractual Clauses covering the transfers; the captured pages do not show each subprocessor with its location. 3 10 12 13 14 23 24

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The Product Security Officer

The contracting entity is GitGuardian SAS at 54 rue de Seine in Paris, the EU software-as-a-service runs on AWS in Frankfurt (eu-central-1) with a US alternative on the East Coast, a data processing addendum and a subprocessors page are published, US transfers use standard contractual clauses, and a self-hosted edition on Helm or KOTS keeps code and findings on our own servers — the chain I would rely on. Subprocessor locations are not shown on the captured pages, so I stop short of full end-to-end evidence. 13 14 3 10 8 23

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity is GitGuardian SAS of 54 rue de Seine, Paris; EU customers are hosted on AWS eu-central-1 in Frankfurt with data stored and processed in the EU; a Data Processing Addendum and a subprocessors page are published; SOC 2 is stated; and the self-hosted edition keeps code and findings on the customer's own infrastructure. The subprocessor list's contents and locations were not captured, no AI model provider is named, transfers to the US affiliate rest on Standard Contractual Clauses, and no migration from the US platform to the EU platform is supported. 13 14 10 23 3 12 24

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

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How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

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The Lead Developer

The free tier is well documented — up to 25 developers, unlimited real-time scanning, 500 historical scan detections and 10K API calls a month — and the seat-counting rule is public: read access to VCS members to compute seats for billing, which at least tells me how a freelancer lands on the bill. But beyond free everything goes opaque: the Growth plan is "Contact sales", and we found no public price per developer, no monthly versus annual terms, no VAT treatment and no prices for add-ons such as extra endpoints. 8 17 23

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The Application Security Engineer

The free tier is fully specified — up to 25 devs, unlimited real-time scanning, up to 500 historical scan detections, 10K API calls per month — and seat counting is explained, since read access to VCS members is used to compute billed seats. Beyond that nothing is computable: Growth and Enterprise are contact-sales with no public per-seat price, the extra-endpoint add-on for developer endpoint protection is unpriced, and I found no public information on monthly versus annual terms or VAT treatment. 8 20 23

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The Engineering Manager

The Starter free plan is published with real limits — up to 25 developers, unlimited real-time scanning, up to 500 historical scan detections and 10K API calls per month — and seat counting is explained through read access to VCS members for billing purposes. Beyond that the Growth and Enterprise plans are contact sales, and we found no public information on per-developer prices for the paid tiers, monthly versus annual terms, or VAT treatment, so I cannot compute an annual cost from the public pages. 8 23

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The Platform Engineer

The Starter free plan is documented down to its limits — up to 25 devs, unlimited real-time scanning, up to 500 historical-scan detections, 10K API calls per month — and the seat basis is explained as read access to VCS members for billing. Above that we found no public information on prices: Growth is 'Contact sales', and there is no public figure from which an annual cost for 300 developers could be computed. 1 8 23

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The Product Security Officer

The free Starter plan is fully specified — up to 25 developers, unlimited real-time scanning, up to 500 historical scan detections and 10K API calls per month — and seats are counted from read-access to VCS members, which is a stated counting rule. But the paid tiers are shown only as contact sales: we found no public euro or dollar price per developer, so a buyer cannot compute the real annual cost from these pages. 8 1 17 23

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The Skeptic

The Starter plan is free with real limits spelled out — up to 25 devs, 500 historical-scan detections and 10K API calls per month — and the pages do say seat counts are computed from read access to your VCS members for billing purposes. The Growth plan is "contact sales", the endpoint-protection add-on carries no price, and we found no public information on per-developer prices, monthly versus annual terms or VAT treatment. 8 23 20

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European sovereignty — proven facts

3 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined unverified
Why unverified?

Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.

— uncited Report an error
Hosting options Self-hostable unverified
Why unverified?

Pricing lists self-hosted deployment only under the Enterprise plan ("Self-hosted deployment + GitGuardian Bridge"), so it is not available on Starter or Growth.

1/1 pts 8 Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Published, self-serve unverified
Why unverified?

Only the link title on the legal index page is shown; the excerpt does not contain the agreement text or an online acceptance flow.

1/1 pts 12 Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about GitGuardian

Is GitGuardian European?

Yes. whats-best.ai classifies GitGuardian as EU-Made. Its vendor, GitGuardian SAS, is incorporated in France, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.

Where does GitGuardian store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.

Does GitGuardian have a free plan?

Yes. GitGuardian has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to GitGuardian?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: GitGuardian alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (24)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Features page (secrets scanning) www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Features page (internal repositories) www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Features page (public GitHub monitoring) www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Features page (code security) www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Integrations page www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Documentation docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Pricing page www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Trust centre trust.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Public status page status.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 About page www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Legal documents www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  13. 13 Terms of service www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  14. 14 Privacy policy www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  15. 15 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  16. 16 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  17. 17 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  18. 18 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  19. 19 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  20. 20 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  21. 21 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  22. 22 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  23. 23 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
  24. 24 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.gitguardian.com Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →