Kiuwan Code Security
Provenance unknown Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Optimyth Software, S.L. (Kiuwan) · www.kiuwan.com
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Kiuwan Code Security at a glance
- Vendor
- Optimyth Software, S.L. (Kiuwan)
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Kiuwan Code Security 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Kiuwan Code Security (Optimyth Software, S.L.) is a SAST/SCA product strongest at static analysis: code analysis scores a uniform 6, crediting data-flow analysis, more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, customisable rules and a code-quality module — though the "almost 100% of true positives" OWASP claim is self-reported and the pages give different figures for supported languages (30+ versus 10+). how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 19 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Kiuwan Code Security (Optimyth Software, S.L.) is a SAST/SCA product strongest at static analysis: code analysis scores a uniform 6, crediting data-flow analysis, more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, customisable rules and a code-quality module — though the "almost 100% of true positives" OWASP claim is self-reported and the pages give different figures for supported languages (30+ versus 10+). Dependencies and secrets score 4-5: transitive dependency management, licence policy enforcement, NIST NVD scanning and SBOM generation are documented, with no public information on secret detection, SBOM format or reachability. Weakest are sovereignty — the only captured address is Houston, Texas, cloud and local analysis report to a unified cloud dashboard, and we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement — and trust and compliance, with no public information on retention, encryption or certifications. Developer workflow and integration and admin range 4-6: the lead developer scored 4 on each, citing dashboard-centric findings and missing gate, triage and integration detail. Pricing states no figures; entry is a free trial or live demo.
Speaks for it
- Static analysis with data-flow analysis and more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP Top 10, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, plus customisable rules and a code-quality module
- Local pre-commit analysis, real-time IDE feedback with fix guidance, pull-request and merge-pipeline integration, and CI/CD automation for Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps are documented
- Composition analysis documents transitive dependency management, licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications, continuous scanning against the NIST National Vulnerability Database and SBOM generation
- Audit-ready reports are generated continuously and mapped to ISO 25000, OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and HIPAA
- SARIF 2.1 export through a REST API and a Governance module with portfolio analytics, trends and grouping by business value, provider and technology
Held against it
- Sovereignty scored 1-2: the only captured address is in Houston, Texas, cloud and local analysis report to a unified cloud dashboard, and we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement
- We found no public information on code retention, encryption, ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, an SLA, a status page, or whether customer code trains the Sembi IQ AI engine
- We found no public information on secret detection in code or git history, the SBOM export format, reachability analysis, malicious-package detection or upgrade pull requests
- We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, roles and permissions, audit logs, Jira integration or webhooks, and GitHub and GitLab appear only as platforms consuming SARIF output
- The captured pages give different figures for supported languages (30+ versus 10+), and the "almost 100% of true positives" OWASP benchmark claim is self-reported with no stated methodology
Best for
- You need a SAST core for a polyglot estate, with data-flow analysis and rules mapped to OWASP, CWE and PCI-DSS for audit evidence
- Your developers work in the IDE and at pre-commit, with CI/CD on Git, Jenkins or Azure DevOps and quality gates driven by SARIF 2.1
- You need open-source inventory, transitive dependency management, licence policy enforcement and SBOM generation against the NIST National Vulnerability Database
- You manage a portfolio of applications and want governance-level analytics, trends and grouping by business value, provider and technology
Avoid if
- You must keep source code and findings entirely inside your own network — the captured pages state that cloud and local analysis report to a unified cloud dashboard, and we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement
- You need secret detection, reachability analysis or malicious-package detection — the documented dependency features are open-source inventory, transitive dependencies, licences, obsolescence notifications and NIST NVD scanning, and we found no public information on the rest
- Your developers need findings surfaced as merge-request comments under strict new-code gates — the documented workflow is IDE feedback, pre-commit analysis and a dashboard with remediation tips, and we found no public information on comment decoration or a new-code baseline
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 3 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 2.5 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 2.5 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
More than 4,300 rules across their claimed language coverage, mapped to OWASP, CWE and PCI, with a dedicated code quality module and rule customization to keep false positives down — that is the depth I want for our Laravel and TypeScript repos. It stays short of the top band: the data-flow description on their static analysis page reads as general category text, there is nothing on complexity and duplication metrics, coverage import or per-finding data-flow explanations, the OWASP benchmark claim of almost 100% true positives is self-reported, and the captured pages give different figures for supported languages (30+ versus 10+). 1 2 3 4 7
The Application Security Engineer
Static analysis is clearly the core product, with data flow analysis described, more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP, CWE and PCI-DSS across over 30 languages, customisable rules to minimise false positives, a code-quality module with remediation plans, and a vendor page claiming almost 100% true positives on the OWASP benchmark. The captured pages give different figures for language count (30+ on the home page, 10+ on the Insights page), and we found no public information on cross-file taint analysis, infrastructure-as-code checks, per-language framework coverage, or a rule language I could encode our in-house frameworks in. 1 2 3 4 7
The Engineering Manager
The captured pages document static security testing with more than 4,300 rules across 30-plus languages, mapped to OWASP Top 10, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, with data-flow analysis, customizable rules to tune false positives, severity-prioritized findings, remediation guidance and a code-quality module — enough for my Java and Kotlin estate. For the debt questions I care about, we found no public information on duplication or complexity metrics, coverage import, or per-team and per-hotspot code-health trends. The captured pages also give different figures for language count (30-plus on one, 10-plus on another), and the near-100-percent true-positive claim on the OWASP page carries no methodology. 1 2 3 4 7
The Platform Engineer
SAST with data-flow analysis, more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP Top 10, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, customisable rules and a separate code-quality module are all documented, and the vendor publishes a claim of "almost 100%" true positives on an OWASP benchmark. For a polyglot estate I would want per-language depth, framework-level taint analysis and a rule language we can write ourselves; the captured pages give different figures for supported languages (30+ on some pages, 10+ on another), and we found no public information on duplication, complexity or coverage metrics. 1 2 3 4 7
The Product Security Officer
Static application security testing with data-flow analysis, more than 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP Top 10, CWE/SANS-25 and PCI-DSS, customizable rules to tune false positives, and a self-reported OWASP benchmark figure of detecting almost 100% of true positives give me a solid SAST picture with remediation guidance. The captured pages give different figures for the number of programming languages supported (10+ versus 30+), and we found no public information on cross-file taint depth, per-language framework lists, coverage import or infrastructure-as-code checks. 1 2 3 7
The Skeptic
SAST over 30+ languages with 4,300 rules mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI-DSS, CERT and SANS is published, data-flow analysis is described, custom rules are offered to cut false positives, and the vendor claims "almost 100% of true positives" on the OWASP benchmark. What we found no public information on: per-language analysis depth, supported frameworks, cross-file taint tracking, or a precision figure to set against that self-reported recall claim. 1 2 3 4 7
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
Transitive dependency management, licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications and SBOM generation are documented, backed by the NIST National Vulnerability Database for known CVEs. We found no public information on secret detection of any kind, on reachability analysis, malicious-package detection or upgrade pull requests, and the SBOM export format is not named even though SARIF 2.1 is. 4 5 6 7
The Application Security Engineer
Composition analysis is well documented: transitive dependency management, on-demand or continuous scanning against the NIST vulnerability database, licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications and SBOM generation. For the other half of my checklist — secret detectors, full git-history scans, validity checks and push protection — we found no public information, and the same goes for reachability analysis and malicious-package detection, so I could not tell whether the backlog would hold only code that is actually called. 4 5 7
The Engineering Manager
Transitive dependency management, automatic open-source inventory, licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications, SBOM generation and continuous scanning against the NIST NVD give me the supply-chain baseline my auditors ask about. We found no public information on secret detection, reachability analysis, malicious-package detection, upgrade pull requests, container scanning, or which SBOM format is produced. 1 4 5 7
The Platform Engineer
Software composition analysis is documented with transitive dependency management, automatic licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications, a named vulnerability source (the NIST National Vulnerability Database) and SBOM export alongside SARIF. We found no public information on secret detection in code or git history, the SBOM format, the ecosystems or lockfiles covered, reachability analysis, malicious-package detection or upgrade pull requests. 4 5 6 7
The Product Security Officer
For my CRA obligations, transitive dependency management, licence identification with policy enforcement, obsolescence notifications, continuous monitoring against the NIST vulnerability database and SBOM generation are all documented, which covers inventory and post-shipping alerting. However no standard SBOM format such as CycloneDX or SPDX is named for the export, and we found no public information on secret detection of any kind, reachability analysis or malicious-package checks. 4 5 7
The Skeptic
Transitive dependency management, licence identification with policy enforcement, SBOM generation, obsolescence notifications and continuous scanning against the NIST vulnerability database are all documented. We found no public information on the ecosystems or lockfiles supported, the SBOM format (CycloneDX or SPDX), upgrade pull requests, malicious-package or reachability analysis, or any secret detection in code and git history. 4 5 7
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Local pre-commit analysis, real-time IDE feedback on every save with fix guidance, and CI/CD integration with Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps fit how my developers work, and the pages do mention pull request and merge pipeline integration for code review. We found no public information on merge request comment decoration, quality gate thresholds, a new-code baseline, triage or suppression rules, or scan times — findings are presented in a dashboard with remediation tips, which is exactly the workflow I try to avoid. 2 3 4 6
The Application Security Engineer
Local pre-commit analysis, real-time IDE feedback with inline fix guidance, pull-request and merge-pipeline integration that keeps flawed or non-compliant code out of the main branch, and quality gates automated in CI/CD are all described, with Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps named as integrations. We found no public information on a new-code baseline, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, AI autofix or typical scan times. 2 3 4 6
The Engineering Manager
Developers are met where they work: real-time IDE analysis on every save with inline fix guidance, local pre-commit analysis, CI/CD automation with Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps, pull-request and merge-pipeline integration, and quality-gate automation mentioned on the SARIF page. We found no public information on a new-code baseline for the gate, marking findings as false positives or ignoring them, deduplication, AI autofix, or scan times — the noise-control details a large team lives or dies by. 2 3 4 6 7
The Platform Engineer
Local pre-commit analysis, integration into pull requests and merge pipelines, real-time IDE feedback on every save with fix guidance, CI/CD automation covering Jenkins and Azure DevOps, and SARIF-driven quality gates in the pipeline are all documented. We found no public information on triage and suppression with reasons, AI autofix as a reviewable change (the AI engine Sembi IQ is named but not described for this), typical scan times, or a new-code baseline — the details that decide whether 300 developers accept a gate. 2 3 4 6 7
The Product Security Officer
Developers get real-time IDE analysis on every save with inline fix guidance, local pre-commit analysis, integration into pull requests and merge pipelines that prevents flawed or non-compliant code from entering the main branch, and CI/CD automation with Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps including SARIF-driven quality gates. We found no public information on a new-code baseline, suppression and triage with recorded reasons, AI autofix with its model, or typical scan times. 2 3 4 6
The Skeptic
Local pre-commit analysis, real-time IDE feedback on every save with fix guidance, integration into pull requests and merge pipelines, and CI support for Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps are documented, with SARIF exports to drive quality gates. We found no public information on triage and suppression with recorded reasons, gate configuration per severity or branch, deduplication across tools, AI autofix mechanics behind the Sembi IQ name, or scan times. 2 3 4 6 7
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
On-premise or cloud deployment with a local analyzer, SARIF 2.1 export through a REST API, and portfolio-level governance reporting with grouping and predictive analytics are documented. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM, roles and permissions, audit logs, Jira or webhooks, and GitHub and GitLab appear only as platforms that can consume SARIF output rather than as documented host integrations; the local analyzer also reports into a unified cloud dashboard, which limits how far it counts as an in-network setup. 1 4 5 6
The Application Security Engineer
A REST API with SARIF 2.1 export, portfolio analytics and trends across the application estate, Git/Jenkins/Azure DevOps integration, and a choice of cloud, hybrid or a local analyzer are documented, which fits my Frankfurt deployment model on the analysis side. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, roles and permissions, audit logs, Jira or webhooks — the administration layer a 120-developer organisation would need. 1 4 5 6
The Engineering Manager
What I need for six teams is half there: portfolio analytics with trends and grouping by business value, provider and technology, SARIF 2.1 export through a REST API, CI tooling for Git, Jenkins and Azure DevOps, and an on-premise or cloud deployment choice. We found no public information on routing findings to Jira, single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, roles per team, audit logs or webhooks — the administration my security officer would ask about. 4 5 6 7
The Platform Engineer
An on-premise option and a local analyzer are documented, SARIF 2.1 export is available through a REST API, and the Governance module groups portfolio results with trends and forecasting across projects, which suits a 900-repository estate. We found no public information on single sign-on (SAML or OIDC), SCIM provisioning, audit logs, roles and permissions, webhooks or Jira integration; GitLab appears only as a SARIF-consuming platform rather than a documented host integration, and we found no public information on whether the dashboard itself can run inside our network. 1 4 5 6
The Product Security Officer
A web-based platform with cloud and on-premise deployment options, a REST API, SARIF 2.1 exports consumable by GitHub Advanced Security, Azure DevOps, GitLab and Jenkins, and a Governance portfolio with analytics, trends and grouping across applications are documented. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, role and permission models, Jira integration, audit logs or webhooks for findings. 4 5 6 7
The Skeptic
On-premise deployment with a local analyzer, a REST API with SARIF 2.1 export consumable by GitHub Advanced Security, Azure DevOps and 100+ tools, and a governance portfolio with analytics and trends grouped by business value, provider and technology are documented. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, role permissions per project, audit logs, Jira integration or webhooks — the administration layer a multi-team buyer will ask for. 1 4 5 6
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
Audit-ready reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 25000 and HIPAA, plus a local analyzer option for analysis inside our environment, are clearly documented. We found no public information on code retention, encryption, the vendor's own certifications, whether code trains the Sembi IQ AI engine, a status page or an SLA, so the audit story rests on rule mappings alone. 1 2 4 5 7
The Application Security Engineer
Audit-ready reports mapped to ISO 25000, OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and HIPAA are stated, with CERT and SANS added on the security pages, and an on-premise or local analysis option is described — the PCI mapping is exactly what my auditors would ask for. We found no public information on code retention periods, encryption, the vendor's own ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, a status page, an SLA, or whether customer code trains the Sembi IQ AI engine. 1 2 4 5 7
The Engineering Manager
Audit-ready reporting is the strength: findings mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 25000 and HIPAA with continuously generated audit-ready reports, plus an OWASP page claiming near-100-percent true positives. On how my source code is handled we found no public information on retention periods, encryption, vendor certifications such as ISO 27001 or SOC 2, a public status page, or whether code trains the Sembi IQ AI engine. A local analyzer and on-premise deployment are offered, which is the closest the pages come to keeping code inside my network. 1 2 5 7
The Platform Engineer
Audit-ready reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 25000 are documented, which our audit file can use. We found no public information on code retention, encryption, ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, a status page or SLA, or a statement on whether customer code is used to train the vendor's AI engine — not enough for an insurer's source code. 1 2 7
The Product Security Officer
Audit-ready reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 25000 and HIPAA, plus a local analyzer for running analysis inside our network, are documented and would help file secure-development evidence. But we found no public information on where source code and findings are stored and for how long, encryption, ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications with scope, an SLA or status page, or whether customer code trains the Sembi IQ AI engine — questions I cannot leave open in a Cyber Resilience Act audit. 1 2 5 7
The Skeptic
Audit-ready reports mapped to ISO 25000, OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS and HIPAA are documented, and a local analyzer allows analysis to run on-premise. We found no public information on code retention periods, encryption, ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, an SLA or status page, or the handling of code by the Sembi IQ AI engine — its model provider and any opt-out are not stated. 1 2 5 7
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
The vendor page shows a Houston, Texas address while saying nothing about where source code or findings are hosted, naming no subprocessors, and offering no data processing agreement we could find. A local analyzer exists, but the captured pages indicate both cloud and local analysis report to a unified dashboard, so what leaves our network remains unclear — a real problem for our German client contracts. 1 5 7
The Application Security Engineer
The only chain-of-custody evidence is a local analyzer and an on-premise analysis option, described as a hybrid-cloud setup, which would let the scanning run inside my network but the pages do not show where results are held. We found no public information on where code, findings, SBOMs and account data are stored, the contracting entity's jurisdiction, subprocessors, or a data processing agreement; the legal data lists a Houston, Texas address. 1 5 7
The Engineering Manager
The only hard facts are a Houston, Texas address for the vendor and an on-premise or cloud deployment choice, and the hosting note that cloud and local analysis report into a unified dashboard makes the on-premise option look partial rather than a sovereign chain. Where code and findings are hosted, the contracting entity's jurisdiction, the subprocessors and any data processing agreement are unknown from the captured pages — thin ground for a Munich buyer with GDPR questions. 1 5 7
The Platform Engineer
The only captured legal address is in Houston, Texas, and we found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement. On-premise deployment and a local analyzer are documented, but the offering is presented as hybrid-cloud, and we found no public information confirming that code and findings can remain entirely on our own servers — for source code that may not leave our network, that gap is decisive. 1 5 7
The Product Security Officer
The vendor is Optimyth Software, S.L. and an on-premise or local analyzer option is documented, but the captured hosting notes state that cloud and local analysis both report to a unified cloud dashboard whose location is not given. The only address the pages publish is in Houston, Texas, and we found no public information on where code and findings are hosted, on the subprocessors, or on a data processing agreement. 1 5 7
The Skeptic
The only company address captured is in Houston, Texas, hosting location for the service is not stated, subprocessors are not listed, and we found no data processing agreement. A local analyzer is documented, but the captured material indicates both cloud and local analysis feed a unified cloud dashboard, so the customer's chain still ends in a hosting location the pages do not name. 5 7
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
A pricing section headed 'Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs' states no figures, and beyond a free trial and a 'Book a Live Demo' invitation we found no public prices, no counting rule for developers or contributors, and no plan limits. For a fourteen-person team that brings freelancers on and off projects, I cannot compute an annual cost from these pages at all. 3 6 7
The Application Security Engineer
The pricing section reads "Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs" with no specific prices stated, and the only public commercial entry points are a free trial and a booked live demo. We found no public information on per-developer or per-line-of-code prices, how contributors are counted, plan inclusions, scanner add-ons, seat minimums, monthly versus annual terms or VAT, so I could not compute a budget for 120 developers from these pages. 1 3 7
The Engineering Manager
The pricing page headlines "Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs" with no specific prices stated on any captured page, and the path offered is a free trial or a booked live demo. With no per-developer or per-line-of-code figure, no plan inclusions, no counting rule and no add-on costs, I cannot even roughly compute an annual cost for my teams. 1 3 6 7
The Platform Engineer
A pricing section titled "Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs" exists, and free trials and live demos are offered, but no specific prices, plans or counting rules are stated on any page we captured. An annual cost for 300 developers is not computable from this; the purchase path runs through a trial or a demo booking. 1 3 7
The Product Security Officer
The pages show a pricing section titled "Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs" but state no prices, alongside a free trial and a live-demo offer. We found no public price per developer or per plan and no counting rule, so a real annual cost is not computable from public pages alone. 1 3
The Skeptic
The pricing page says "Flexible Pricing to Fit Your Needs" and states no figures; the offered entry points are a free trial and a live demo. We found no public information on price per developer or line of code, how contributors are counted, plan inclusions, add-on costs for SSO or self-hosting, seat minimums, or what the second year costs — a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 1 3 7
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Self-hostable
unverified
Why unverified?S1 says both cloud and local analysis report to a unified (cloud) dashboard, so full self-hosting may only be partial. |
1/1 pts | 5 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Kiuwan Code Security
Is Kiuwan Code Security European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Kiuwan Code Security is based.
Where does Kiuwan Code Security store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
Does Kiuwan Code Security have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Kiuwan Code Security?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Kiuwan Code Security alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 17 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. S1 says both cloud and local analysis report to a unified (cloud) dashboard, so full self-hosting may only be partial.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
Sources (7)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.kiuwan.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →