Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Mend.io (formerly WhiteSource) · www.mend.io

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Mend.io at a glance

Vendor
Mend.io (formerly WhiteSource)
Headquarters
Incorporated in Israel source, captured 17 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Mend.io 3/5, the mean of 6 judges. Mend.io is an application-security platform from White Source Ltd. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 19 Nov 2026. all sources

Mend.io alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Mend.io is an application-security platform from White Source Ltd. of Givatayim, Israel, with a US subsidiary, covering SAST, SCA, Renovate dependency updates and an LLM-based triage of SAST findings. The bench scores it highest on trust and compliance, 7 from minimum to maximum: judges point to ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 controls reviewed externally every year, a Schellman-audited SOC 2 Type II report available on request, and findings mapped to PCI DSS, OWASP and the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Code analysis follows at 6-7 on a published CWE table with per-language coverage and findings consolidated by taint sink. The weakest counted area is sovereignty, 2-4: the contracting entity sits in Israel, personal data may be processed in the US, Israel, the UK and other jurisdictions, and the self-hosted option covers only the repository integration, not the platform. Technical scores cluster between 5 and 7 with no flagged disagreements. A pricing page exists; no figures are published.

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Speaks for it

  • Published CWE rule table with per-language coverage mapped to OWASP Top 10, CAPEC, PCI DSS and SANS TOP 25
  • ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 controls reviewed externally every year, plus a Schellman-audited SOC 2 Type II report available on request
  • Developers are notified only when a pull request introduces new findings, and automation workflows can fail builds on policy violations
  • Source snippets reach Mend.io's AI model only under a signed AI addendum, and disabling the option stops all code sharing
  • Repository integrations for GitHub Enterprise, GitLab and Bitbucket run as self-hosted containers on a monthly release cadence supported for six months

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Held against it

  • Secret detection is pattern-based, disabled by default, always rated Medium, and detected secrets are not anonymized
  • The self-hosted statement covers only the repository integration, while the Mend AppSec Platform itself is Mend-hosted
  • The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Givatayim, Israel, and the only named subprocessor is ZoomInfo for the website chatbot
  • We found no public information on per-team roles, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories, or export of findings in a standard format
  • We found no public information on the provider behind the AI model, a published SLA, a status page, encryption specifics or code-retention periods

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Best for

  • You need a SAST rule set your auditors can trace, with CWEs mapped to OWASP Top 10, PCI DSS, CAPEC and SANS TOP 25
  • You want the repository scanning containers under your own control, as the GitHub Enterprise, GitLab and Bitbucket integration runs self-hosted
  • You want AI triage under explicit consent, as snippets are shared only after a signed addendum and turning the feature off stops sharing entirely
  • You must file compliance evidence, with an integrated ISO 27001/27017/27701 management system reviewed externally every year and a SOC 2 Type II report through the account team

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Avoid if

  • Your procurement requires a European contracting entity or a named subprocessor chain, as you would contract with White Source Ltd. in Givatayim, Israel, whose US subsidiary sits in Boston
  • You need secret scanning active by default, as it ships disabled, is pattern-based across two weakness categories, always rated Medium, and detected secrets are not anonymized
  • You want the entire platform on your own infrastructure, as the self-hosted option covers only the repository integration and the AppSec Platform is otherwise hosted by Mend

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Code analysis (SAST & code quality)

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How this is scored

What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.

0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.

3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.

5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.

8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.

10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.

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The Lead Developer

Mend SAST publishes a CWE rule table mapped to OWASP Top 10, CAPEC and PCI DSS, with SQL injection, command injection, path traversal and hard-coded credentials covered for the PHP and TypeScript stacks my team builds in, plus an IaC module in the GitHub Enterprise app. Findings are consolidated by taint sink, carry risk factors for confidence and data-flow characteristics, default to high confidence to cut noise, and an AI triage explains the sanitizer, control-flow coverage and exploitation path — genuinely aimed at false positives. A custom rule language, published false-positive benchmarks, per-language framework depth and code-quality metrics like duplication or complexity are not described on the captured pages. 3 4 7 8 10

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The Application Security Engineer

The CWE list is published with per-rule language coverage — SQL injection alone spans more than two dozen languages from Java to Cobol — and every rule maps to OWASP Top 10, PCI DSS and other standards, a rule set my auditors can trace. Findings consolidate by taint sink, carry data-flow characteristics, sanitizers and exploitation paths, and infrastructure-as-code scanning sits alongside the SAST engine. We found no public information on cross-file analysis depth, a custom rule language for in-house frameworks, published false-positive benchmarks, or quality metrics such as complexity and coverage. 3 4 7 8 10

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The Engineering Manager

Mend SAST is well documented for security: a published CWE table mapped to OWASP Top 10, CAPEC, PCI DSS and others, with per-language coverage that includes my Java and Kotlin code, findings consolidated by taint sink, explanations naming the vulnerable location, sanitizer, control-flow coverage and remediation, and an AI triage that labels true and false positives with an exploitation path. I found no public information on the code-health half of my job — code smells, duplication, complexity, technical debt, coverage import, custom rule authoring or false-positive benchmarks — so I treat it as a deep security scanner rather than a code-quality platform. 1 3 4 7 8

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The Platform Engineer

Mend SAST publishes a per-CWE table showing which of a long language list each weakness covers, mapped to OWASP Top 10, CAPEC and PCI DSS, with taint analysis that consolidates flows by sink, findings explained via the vulnerable location, sanitizers and control-flow coverage, IaC scanning and per-finding Secure Code Warrior training. A high-confidence default and LLM-backed triage with plain-language reasoning address false positives. We found no public information on duplication, complexity or maintainability metrics, coverage import, a customer-writable rule language, or measured false-positive rates. 3 4 7 8 10

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The Product Security Officer

The CWE catalogue is published per weakness with the supported languages listed per rule and mapped to OWASP Top 10, CAPEC, PCI DSS and SANS TOP 25, covering SQL injection through hard-coded credentials across a wide language set including C/C++ (marked Beta) and Cobol, which matters for our controller code. Findings are described with taint sinks, consolidated data flows, sanitizers and exploitation paths, and an AI triage returns a structured explanation with CWE relevance; we found no public information on a customer-writable rule language, quality metrics such as complexity or duplication, or published false-positive benchmarks. 3 4 7 8

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The Skeptic

The rule set is published as a CWE table with per-language coverage and mappings to OWASP Top 10, PCI DSS and more, findings are consolidated by taint sink with data-flow-based risk factors and a high-confidence default, and infrastructure-as-code scanning is documented for the GitHub Enterprise integration — that is real data-flow analysis on a wide language set, not pattern matching. We found no public information on quality measures such as duplication, complexity or coverage import, on a rule language customers could write in, or on published false-positive rates. 3 4 8 10

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Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets

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How this is scored

What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.

0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.

3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.

5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.

8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.

10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.

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The Lead Developer

Malicious package detection is documented in depth — npm, RubyGems and PyPI, threat types from info stealers to malware droppers, augmented by a security research team — and Renovate delivers automated dependency update pull requests at scale, with licence compliance, SBOM and container scanning listed as modules. Secret scanning is thinner: pattern-based over source and config files, disabled by default unless the CLI flag is passed, always medium severity, and Mend states detected secrets are not anonymized. Transitive dependency handling, the vulnerability database's sources, the SBOM format and git-history or push-protection secret handling are not described on the captured pages. 1 5 6 10

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The Application Security Engineer

Composition analysis covers dependencies with licence violation alerts, automated dependency update pull requests, SBOM output, container scanning and malicious-package detection with named threat types across npm, RubyGems and PyPI, augmented by a security research team. Secret scanning is pattern-based across source and configuration files, off by default, never anonymized, and automation workflows can fail builds on a detected secret. We found no public information on reachability analysis, full git-history scanning, secret validity checks or push protection. 1 5 6 10

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The Engineering Manager

The dependency story has real substance: malicious package detection is built into SCA scans with a threat taxonomy and a security research team behind it, Renovate provides automated dependency updates at scale, container scanning, licence compliance and end-of-life support appear on the module list, and an SBOM is claimed. The depth I would need to file is thin in the pages read — transitive dependency handling, the SBOM format and the vulnerability database's sources are not described, and secret scanning is pattern-based over source and configuration files with two weakness categories, disabled by default, with nothing on git history, validity checks or push protection. 1 5 6 10

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The Platform Engineer

SCA covers licence-violation alerting and outdated libraries, end-of-life support is a listed module, Renovate provides automated dependency updates at scale, SBOM output is continuous, and malicious-package detection names its threat types, supported registries and security-research augmentation. Secret detection is pattern-based over source and configuration files for two credential weaknesses, always rated Medium and off by default. We found no public information on transitive-dependency handling, the SBOM format, library reachability analysis, git-history secret scanning, validity checks or push protection. 1 5 6 10

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The Product Security Officer

SCA covers open-source components with licence-violation detection, outdated-library alerts, an end-of-life module, container scanning and Renovate's automated dependency updates at scale, and malicious-package detection with named threat types is built into SCA scans and augmented by a security research team. A continuously updated SBOM and AI-BOM is offered, but we found no public information on the SBOM's export format such as CycloneDX or SPDX, on transitive-dependency handling or reachability analysis, and secret detection is documented only as pattern-based scanning of source and configuration files — we found no public information on git-history scanning, validity checks or push protection. 1 5 6 10

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The Skeptic

SCA with licence compliance, continuously updated SBOM and AI-BOM, Renovate automated dependency updates, container scanning, end-of-life support and malicious-package detection across npm, RubyGems and PyPi — eight threat types, augmented by a security research team — are all documented. Secret detection is pattern-based, always rated Medium, disabled by default and not anonymized, and we found no public information on validity checks, git-history scanning, push protection, the SBOM export format, or how transitive dependencies are resolved. 1 5 6 10

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Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes

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How this is scored

Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.

0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.

3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.

5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.

8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.

10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.

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The Lead Developer

The differential-results story is exactly what my fourteen developers need — they are notified only when a pull request introduces new findings — and automation workflows can fail builds, while triage is rich: suppressions carry reasons with a suppression report to catch hasty ones, findings can be marked reviewed, severity changed, and Jira issues raised in bulk. Agentic Triage returns true/false-positive assessments with exploitation paths across the SCM integrations, with results appearing in Azure DevOps Repos, Bitbucket Cloud and GitHub.com. IDE integrations are named without evidence that editor rules match the server, pre-commit hooks, typical scan times and the AI model provider are not stated, and the AI outcomes are advisory only. 3 5 7 8 10

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The Application Security Engineer

Developers are notified only when a pull request introduces new findings, automation workflows can fail builds, and triage supports suppression with a documented reason plus a report listing every suppression — the audit trail I want from my security champions. The AI triage classifies findings as true or false positive with structured reasoning including sanitizers and control-flow coverage, but it is advisory, covers SAST findings only, and requires a signed AI addendum. We found no public information on IDE parity with server rules, pre-commit or push-time checks, or typical scan times. 3 5 7 8 10

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The Engineering Manager

My must-haves are mostly present: developers are notified only when a pull request introduces new findings, automation workflows can fail builds on policy violations including secrets, findings route to Jira with bulk actions, suppression requires a reason and is reportable, and an LLM triage explains true and false positives across the SCM platforms behind a signed AI addendum with a clean off switch. I found no public information on gate limits per severity or branch, pre-commit or push-time checks, IDE-to-server rule parity or typical scan times, and the AI model is described only as Mend's own. 3 5 7 8 10

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The Platform Engineer

Differential results notify developers only when a pull request introduces new findings, automation workflows can fail builds on policy violations, and triage is well covered: suppression with reasons and a suppressions report, bulk actions, reviewed flags, Jira creation, and an LLM triage returning true/false-positive calls with exploitation paths and structured evidence. Remediation is automated and IDE integrations exist. We found no public information on pre-commit hooks, IDE-versus-server rule parity, typical scan times, suppression expiry, or the model provider behind the AI triage. 3 5 7 8 10

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The Product Security Officer

Developers are notified only when a pull request introduces new findings across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, automation workflows can fail builds on policy violations, and there is a full triage bench — suppression with reason and date, reviewed flags, severity changes, bulk actions and a suppressions report — which is exactly the audited-suppression trail I want on file. AI triage classifies findings as true or false positives with explanations and an exploitation path, though the model provider behind it is not named; we found no public information on pre-commit checks, IDE-to-server rule parity, or typical scan times. 3 5 7 8 10

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The Skeptic

Differential results notify developers only when a pull request introduces new findings, automation workflows can trigger policy violations and fail builds, triage with suppression reasons and a suppressions report is documented, and an LLM-based triage returns true/false-positive assessments with an exploitation path — running only under a signed AI addendum that can be disabled, stopping code sharing entirely. We found no public information on IDE-versus-server rule parity, pre-commit checks, typical scan times, or the provider behind what the pages call Mend.io's AI model. 3 5 7 8 10

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Platforms, deployment & administration

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How this is scored

How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.

0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.

3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.

5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.

8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.

10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.

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The Lead Developer

Mend for GitHub Enterprise runs as self-hosted containers covering GitHub Enterprise, GitLab and Bitbucket on a monthly release cadence with six-month support, findings deep-link to the full source file on GitHub, Bitbucket, GitLab or Azure DevOps, and API 3.0, Jira integration and SSO setup are documented. The role model, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories and SARIF/CSV export are not described on the captured pages, and the webhook endpoints documented are internal scan-queue statistics rather than finding webhooks. Note the self-hosted statement covers the repository integration, while the AppSec Platform itself is Mend-hosted. 3 8 9 10

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The Application Security Engineer

Repository integrations cover GitHub, GitHub Enterprise, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, with Jira ticket creation, single sign-on, a Mend API 3.0 and container health-check endpoints, and the GitHub Enterprise integration runs self-hosted in the customer's network. That self-hosted statement covers only the repository integration, not the platform itself. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio dashboards across repositories, SARIF import and export, or granular role models per team. 3 7 8 9 10

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The Engineering Manager

GitHub Enterprise, GitLab and Bitbucket integrations ship as self-hosted containers we would run ourselves on a monthly release cadence, and the platform documents API version 3.0, SSO setup, Jira integration and findings linking back to source in GitHub, Bitbucket, GitLab or Azure DevOps. The administration my auditors would ask about is not evidenced — per-team roles, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories and SARIF export appear nowhere in the pages read, and the self-hosting statement covers only the repository integration, not the full platform. 3 7 8 9 10

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The Platform Engineer

A REST API (version 3.0), SSO setup, Jira integration and a self-hosted integration for GitHub Enterprise, GitLab and Bitbucket — running as versioned containers with health checks and a monthly release cadence with six-month support — cover the backbone of what my pipelines need. A global configuration for the GitHub Enterprise integration helps roll settings out across repositories. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, SARIF export, per-team roles or portfolio trend reports, which for 300 developers behind Entra ID are the make-or-break items. 3 8 9 10

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The Product Security Officer

GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps are supported, and the repository integration edition is documented as self-hosted with container health checks, scan-queue APIs and a monthly release cadence supported for six months — a deployment I could run inside our own network for that integration. A platform API, single sign-on and Jira integration are documented; we found no public information on role models per project, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories, or export of findings in a standard format. 3 7 9 10

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The Skeptic

GitHub.com, GitHub Enterprise, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps are supported, a Mend API 3.0 is documented, Jira ticket creation and single sign-on exist, and the GitHub Enterprise integration runs self-hosted on the customer's own containers — though that statement covers only this integration, not the full platform. We found no public information on role-based permissions per team, audit logs, portfolio reports across repositories, SCIM, or export of findings in a standard format, which is the question I ask before signing anything. 3 6 7 8 9 10

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Source-code handling, security & compliance

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How this is scored

What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.

3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.

5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.

8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.

10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.

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The Lead Developer

This is the strongest area: an integrated ISMS covering ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 reviewed externally every year, SOC 2 Type II audited by Schellman and available on request, and CWEs mapped to OWASP, PCI DSS, CAPEC, HIPAA and more, with EU AI Act and EU Cyber Resilience Act on the compliance page. The AI handling is honest — enabling Agentic Triage shares source snippets and finding details with Mend's AI model only after a signed AI addendum, and disabling it stops all sharing and turns the feature off — though the model provider is not named. Source-code retention periods, encryption specifics, a published SLA and a status page are not on the captured pages. 2 4 7 11 12

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The Application Security Engineer

The trust page names ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 controls reviewed externally every year plus a SOC 2 Type II audited by Schellman and available through the account team, and findings map to PCI DSS, OWASP and the EU Cyber Resilience Act — evidence I can put in front of my QSA. Sharing source snippets with the AI model is gated behind a signed addendum and can be switched off entirely, which turns the feature off with it. We found no public information on source-code retention periods, a published SLA or status page, the AI model provider, or encryption in transit and at rest. 2 4 7 11 12

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The Engineering Manager

This is the strongest area: an integrated ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 management system reviewed externally every year, a SOC 2 Type II report from Schellman available through the account team, mappings to PCI DSS, the EU Cyber Resilience Act, ISO 27001 and more, customer data hosted in the US or EU by customer preference, Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers, and AI code sharing that is explicit, contractually consented and switchable off. I found no public information on a status page, a published SLA, specific encryption detail, the AI model provider or code retention periods. 2 7 11 12

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The Platform Engineer

SOC 2 Type II audited by Schellman with the report available on request, an ISMS covering ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 externally reviewed annually, findings mapped to OWASP, CWE and PCI DSS, and customer data hosted in the EU by preference give me most of what an auditor asks for. The AI triage documentation is candid that enabling it shares source-code snippets with Mend's AI model, gated by a signed addendum. We found no public information on an SLA, a public status page, encryption specifics, or the AI model's provider. 2 4 7 11 12

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The Product Security Officer

Certifications are documented with substance: SOC 2 Type II audited by Schellman with the reporting period stated and the report available on request, plus an ISO 27001/27017/27701 management system reviewed externally every year — evidence an auditor can file. Customer data can be stored in the EU at the customer's preference, source-code snippets reach the AI model only after a signed AI addendum and a toggle stops sharing entirely, and findings map to OWASP, PCI DSS and the EU Cyber Resilience Act. We found no public information on a public status page, a published SLA, encryption specifics or the AI model provider, and retention is covered only by a referenced data-retention page whose contents were not captured. 2 4 7 11 12

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The Skeptic

ISO 27001, 27017 and 27701 with annual external review plus a Schellman-audited SOC 2 Type II available on request are stated, findings map to PCI DSS, the EU Cyber Resilience Act, the EU AI Act and more, and the AI triage shares code snippets with Mend.io's AI model only under a signed consent addendum that can be turned off, stopping the sharing — the right shape of consent. We found no public information on encryption specifics, a published SLA, a status page, or concrete retention periods for code and findings beyond a general retention policy page. 2 7 11 12

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.

0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.

3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.

5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.

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The Lead Developer

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Givatayim, Israel, with a US subsidiary at a Boston address and no EU entity or representative shown, and personal data may be processed in the US, Israel, the UK and other jurisdictions — customers can choose EU hosting by preference, and Israel claims adequacy for EU personal data. Subprocessors are not listed with locations beyond a ZoomInfo chatbot mention, and the self-hosted option covers only the repository integration containers, not the AppSec Platform. Standard Contractual Clauses and affiliate data protection agreements are cited, but we found no published data processing agreement on the captured pages. 2 10 11 12

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The Application Security Engineer

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Givatayim, Israel, with a US subsidiary in Boston, and personal data may be processed in the US, Israel, the UK and other jurisdictions; customers can choose EU hosting, with standard contractual clauses and an Israel adequacy position covering other transfers. The only self-hosted piece we saw is the repository integration, and the subprocessor picture is thin — ZoomInfo for the website chatbot and a group-companies page. We found no public information on a customer data processing agreement, or on named AI model and hosting subprocessors with their locations. 2 10 11

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The Engineering Manager

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Israel with a US subsidiary, and personal data is processed in the US, Israel, the UK and the EU under Standard Contractual Clauses and an Israeli adequacy claim; customers can choose EU hosting for their data, which is the one European element I can point to. Beyond a chatbot provider the subprocessor chain is unnamed, no published data processing agreement is evidenced, and the self-hosted option covers only the repository integration while the platform itself is Mend-hosted. 2 10 11

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The Platform Engineer

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Israel with a US subsidiary, and personal data may be processed in the US, Israel and the UK; EU hosting is available by customer preference and SCCs cover transfers, with ISO 27001-series certifications stated. The self-hosted repository integration keeps the scanning containers on our own infrastructure, which helps, but the platform itself is Mend-hosted and the AI model that receives code snippets is unnamed. We found no public information on an EU contracting entity or EU representative or a full subprocessor list with locations, so parts of the processing chain sit outside Europe. 2 7 10 11

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The Product Security Officer

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Givatayim, Israel, with a US subsidiary and a Boston address — an Israeli vendor that points to Israel's adequacy decision, not a European one. Customer data may be stored in the US or the EU based on the customer's location and preference, transfers outside the EEA rely on standard contractual clauses, and the self-hosting statement covers only the repository integration rather than the full platform. We found no published subprocessor list beyond a named chatbot provider, no European contracting entity or representative, and no published data processing agreement. 2 10 11 12

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity is White Source Ltd. in Israel with a US subsidiary in Boston, customers may choose US or EU hosting for their data, and personal data is processed in the US, Israel, the UK and the EU under standard contractual clauses and a claimed Israeli adequacy. Subprocessors beyond a ZoomInfo chatbot and a group-companies page are not listed, we found no public information on a published data processing agreement, and the self-hosted option covers only the GitHub Enterprise integration rather than the platform. 2 10 11

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

Show reasoning
How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.

0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.

3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.

5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".

8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.

10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.

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The Lead Developer

A pricing link exists on the site, but we found no public price per developer, no plan tiers, no counting rule for contributors or lines of code, no free-tier limits and no add-on pricing in the captured pages. As an agency whose freelancer count changes month to month, I cannot compute an annual cost from this, and nothing states how occasional committers are billed. 1

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The Application Security Engineer not rated — no public information

We found no public pricing information on the pages we read: the homepage carries a pricing link, but no plan prices, per-developer counting rules, free tier, seat minimums, monthly and annual terms or VAT treatment were documented in the captured pages. 1

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The Engineering Manager

The captured pages show a Pricing entry in the site navigation but contain no figures — no rate per developer or per line of code, no plan inclusions, no counting rules and no add-on prices. From this evidence I cannot compute even a rough annual cost for six teams. 1

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The Platform Engineer

The captured pages show that a pricing page exists, but no price per developer or per code volume, plan inclusions, counting rules, add-on or self-hosting licence costs appear in anything we read. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from the public information we found — for my 300 developers it would come down to a sales conversation. 1

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The Product Security Officer

The vendor's site links a pricing page, but we found no public information on plan prices, how developers or contributors are counted, scanner or add-on costs, free-tier limits, seat minimums or monthly versus annual terms. From the captured pages alone an annual cost cannot be computed. 1

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The Skeptic

The only pricing evidence captured is that a pricing page exists; no plan prices, counting rule for developers or contributors, free tier, add-on or scanner pricing, or VAT treatment were captured on the pages we read. Until those numbers are public, the second-year cost is a negotiation, not a computation. 1

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European sovereignty — proven facts

2 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Self-hostable unverified
Why unverified?

The self-hosted statement covers only the Mend for GitHub Enterprise repository integration, not the full Mend AppSec Platform, which is otherwise hosted by Mend (though S1 §3.2 also indicates an EU hosting choice by customer preference).

1/1 pts 10 Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Mend.io

Is Mend.io European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Mend.io is based. Its vendor, Mend.io (formerly WhiteSource), is incorporated in Israel, per the vendor’s page captured 17 Nov 2026.

Where does Mend.io store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

Does Mend.io have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Mend.io?

As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Mend.io alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (12)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Privacy policy — found from the homepage www.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.mend.io Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →