Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Qlty Software Inc. · qlty.sh
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Qlty at a glance
- Vendor
- Qlty Software Inc.
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in the United States source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Qlty 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Qlty, a cloud code health platform from Qlty Software Inc., is strongest on pricing transparency at 8-9: Free at $0, Pro at $20 per contributor per month and Enterprise at $30, a rolling 30-day seat rule that counts bots, $0.01 overage per analysis minute, volume discounts and two months free on annual plans. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Qlty, a cloud code health platform from Qlty Software Inc., is strongest on pricing transparency at 8-9: Free at $0, Pro at $20 per contributor per month and Enterprise at $30, a rolling 30-day seat rule that counts bots, $0.01 overage per analysis minute, volume discounts and two months free on annual plans. Developer workflow and code analysis follow at 5-6, on fourteen fully supported languages, go/no-go quality gates, self-updating pull-request comments, a new-code baseline and AI suggestions for 90% of issues. Sovereignty is the floor at a flat 2 — New York governing law, US headquarters, AWS hosting with no region stated, and we found no public information on EU hosting, a data processing agreement or a self-hosted edition — with dependencies and secrets close behind at 3-4, where we found no public information on licence detection, SBOM export or reachability analysis. Judges split by a single point on several criteria — most consequentially trust and compliance at 4-5, a concrete security page weighed against retention stated only as long as necessary and no OWASP/CWE mapping — and the flagged splits list came back empty.
Speaks for it
- Pricing transparency scores 8-9: three public tiers — Free at $0, Pro at $20 and Enterprise at $30 per contributor per month — with $0.01-per-analysis-minute overage, published volume discounts and two months free on annual plans.
- Code analysis scores 5-6 on fourteen fully supported languages, a documented cognitive complexity metric and coverage import across 14+ formats.
- Developer workflow scores 5-6: pass-fail statuses and self-updating comments on every pull request, configurable go/no-go quality gates, a new-code baseline and AI suggestions for 90% of issues.
- The security page is concrete: SOC 2 Type II, annual third-party penetration testing, analysis in sandboxed Fargate containers destroyed after each run, and no stored clones of analyzed repositories.
- Secrets scanning through Gitleaks and Trufflehog includes a block mode that stops a merge when a new secret is detected.
Held against it
- Sovereignty scores a flat 2: a US entity under New York law, AWS hosting with no region stated, and we found no public information on EU hosting, a data processing agreement or a self-hosted edition of the cloud product.
- Dependencies and secrets scores 3-4, and we found no public information on licence detection, SBOM export, reachability analysis or malicious-package detection.
- Integration and admin scores a flat 4: the documented code host is GitHub, the REST API is early access without versioning, and we found no public information on GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps, SAML single sign-on, SCIM or audit logs.
- Security scanning rides bundled engines such as Semgrep and OSV Scanner, with no public information on cross-file taint analysis or rules mapped to OWASP and CWE, and the sub-5% false-positive figure is a stated goal, not a published rate.
- Retention is stated only as keeping personal information as long as necessary with anonymized data kept indefinitely, and we found no public information on whether source code trains the AI models.
Best for
- Your repositories live on GitHub and you want linting, duplication, complexity, coverage and secrets feedback delivered on every pull request from one cloud service.
- You need a publicly computable bill before signing — three priced tiers, a stated rolling 30-day seat definition, and published overage, discount and annual terms.
- You want a zero-cost start: the Free plan carries 1,000 analysis minutes and 100 AI autofixes per month with unlimited private and public contributors.
Avoid if
- Your contracts require EU data residency or self-hosting — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You must produce SBOMs or licence policies for a supply-chain review — the bench's dependencies and secrets scoring of 3-4 comes from exactly these findings.
- Your teams work in GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps — the documented code host is GitHub alone, connected through a GitHub App, with permissions mirroring GitHub repository roles.
- Your audit needs findings mapped to OWASP or CWE — we found no public information on any such rule mapping, and SAST arrives through a bundled Semgrep plugin.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 3 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 2 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 2 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 2.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 4 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
PHP, TypeScript, Go, Python and the rest of what my teams write are on the fully supported list, with linting, defects, duplication, a well-documented cognitive complexity metric, coverage import and infrastructure-as-code scanning for Terraform, Docker, Kubernetes and more. Security scanning rides on Semgrep plus their own plugin framework, and they publish a false-positive goal of below 5 percent. The pages do not show cross-file taint analysis, a rule list mapped to OWASP or CWE, or a rule language we could write ourselves, and that caps it for me. 1 8 9 14 15
The Application Security Engineer
Language coverage is published in tiers with fourteen fully supported languages, cognitive complexity and duplication are documented in real depth, coverage import handles 14+ formats, and infrastructure-as-code checks, code-health trends and AI fix suggestions for 90% of issues are all evidenced. For my priorities, though, the security side is documented as orchestration of existing engines — 70+ linters with Semgrep for application code and Trivy, Checkov, Hadolint and ShellCheck for infrastructure — and I found no public information on cross-file taint analysis, OWASP or CWE mapping of findings, a customer rule language, or a measured false-positive rate (only a stated goal of under 5%). 1 8 9 14 15
The Engineering Manager
Fourteen languages are listed with complete support including Java, Kotlin and Scala, the cognitive-complexity metric and its code smells are documented in real depth, infrastructure-as-code scanning arrives via Trivy, Checkov, Hadolint and ShellCheck, and a false-positive goal below 5 percent is stated. We found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis, on a published rule list mapped to OWASP and CWE, or on measured false-positive rates, and rule customization is documented at the level of enabling plugins and pinning linter versions. 8 9 14 15 1
The Platform Engineer
Full support is documented for fourteen languages plus lint-only formats, with deeply documented cognitive complexity, duplication, code smells and coverage import, custom linter extensions, and security scanning through named engines such as Semgrep, Trivy, Checkov and ShellCheck across Terraform, Kubernetes and Docker files. It stops short of the top for us because we found no public information on a rule list mapped to OWASP or CWE, on cross-file taint analysis, or on measured false-positive rates — the sub-5% figure is stated as a goal, not a published result. 1 8 9 14 15
The Product Security Officer
The quality side is thoroughly documented — fourteen languages with full support, duplication, a cognitive complexity metric with its method published, coverage import, and configurable linter plugins — and infrastructure-as-code checks plus a stated goal of a false positive rate below 5% go further. What I could not find for an audit file is depth on the security side: we found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis or on rules mapped to OWASP and CWE; SAST arrives as a bundled Semgrep plugin. 1 8 9 14 15
The Skeptic
Fourteen fully supported languages plus additional lint-only ones, duplication, a thoroughly documented cognitive complexity metric, coverage import in 14+ formats and custom plugin configuration put this in the solid middle. But security scanning rides a Semgrep plugin, we found no public information on data-flow or taint analysis or on any rule set mapped to OWASP and CWE, and the sub-5% false-positive figure is a stated goal rather than a published rate. 1 4 8 9 14 15
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
Dependency scanning runs OSV Scanner, secrets get both Gitleaks and Trufflehog, and there is a block mode that stops a merge when a newly detected secret appears — the right instinct. But we found no public information on transitive dependency handling, licence detection and policies, SBOM export, malicious-package detection or upgrade pull requests, so I could not run a supply-chain audit on this alone. 14 15 4
The Application Security Engineer
Dependency scanning is documented through OSV Scanner and secrets scanning through Gitleaks and Trufflehog, with a block mode in which newly detected secrets stop a merge — the closest thing I see to push protection, though at merge rather than push time. I found no public information on reachability analysis for vulnerable code, licence detection and policies, SBOM export, malicious-package or end-of-life detection, automated upgrade pull requests, or secret validity checks and full git-history coverage, which is most of what my dependency backlog process needs. 5 14 15
The Engineering Manager
Dependency vulnerabilities come through OSV Scanner in monitor mode, secrets through both Gitleaks and Trufflehog with a block mode that can stop a merge on a newly detected secret, and the analysis runs continuously. We found no public information on reachability of transitive dependencies, licence detection and policies, SBOM export, upgrade pull requests, or scanning across the full git history. 14 15 5
The Platform Engineer
Composition analysis runs through OSV Scanner and secret detection through Gitleaks and Trufflehog, including a block mode that stops newly detected secrets from being merged, which is genuinely useful. We found no public information on licence detection and policies, SBOM export, reachability analysis, malicious-package detection or upgrade pull requests, so this sits well below what a supply-chain review at our insurer would require. 4 14 15
The Product Security Officer
Dependency vulnerabilities come through the OSV Scanner plugin and secrets through Gitleaks and Trufflehog, with a documented block mode that stops merging when a new secret is detected. But we found no public information on licence detection, SBOM export in CycloneDX or SPDX, reachability analysis, malicious-package detection or end-of-life components — exactly the pieces a regulated software maker must file, which keeps this low for me. 4 14 15
The Skeptic
Dependency vulnerabilities come via OSV Scanner, secrets via Gitleaks and Trufflehog with a block mode that stops a merge on a newly detected secret, and containers and infrastructure via Trivy and Checkov. We found no public information on licence detection and policies, SBOM export, reachability analysis, or which ecosystems and lockfiles are covered, so this stays below the mid anchor. 4 5 14 15
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Merge requests get comments that update themselves, commit statuses, configurable go/no-go quality gates, a click-through override for urgent merges, ignore and triage by path, rule and category, focus on newly introduced issues against a baseline, and AI autofix claimed for 90 percent of issues — that is the shape I want. What holds it back: everything documented is GitHub, we found no public information on GitLab merge requests or IDE plugins for VS Code and PhpStorm, and the model behind the autofix is not stated. 1 2 10 11 15
The Application Security Engineer
Pull requests on GitHub get commit statuses, optional comments that update themselves on new commits and coverage uploads, configurable go/no-go quality gates, a new-code baseline with pre-existing issues browsable, triage and ignore paths, a one-click override, and AI fix suggestions for 90% of issues. I found no public information on IDE plugins, the model behind autofix, or platforms beyond GitHub — the coverage integrations named are a GitHub Action and a CircleCI Orb — and documented scan times are only "within minutes". 1 2 10 11
The Engineering Manager
Pass-fail statuses on every pull request, configurable go/no-go quality gates and coverage gates organization-wide or per project, a new-issue focus against a baseline, triage and ignore rules, a one-click override for urgent merges, and AI suggestions covering 90 percent of issues, with commit statuses enforcing coverage before merging. The workflow documentation covers GitHub exclusively, and we found no public information on GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps integration, on IDE plugins, or on the AI model behind the autofix. 1 2 10 11 15 4
The Platform Engineer
Pull request comments with automatic updates, commit statuses, go/no-go quality gates, a new-code baseline, triage rules with a one-click override, and AI suggestions for 90% of issues are all documented, though the model behind the autofixes is not named. Coverage integrations are shown for GitHub Actions and CircleCI only, and we found no public information on IDE plugins or pre-commit checks — nor on GitLab CI or Jenkins steps, which is where our 300 developers actually work. 1 2 10 11
The Product Security Officer
Developers get automated comments and pass-fail statuses on every GitHub pull request, a focus on newly introduced issues against a baseline, configurable quality gates and coverage gates, one-click override approvals, ignore and triage rules, and AI suggestions for 90% of issues. We found no public information on IDE plugins, on pull request workflows outside GitHub, or on the model behind the AI autofix. 1 2 4 10 11 15
The Skeptic
Commit statuses and optional pull request comments, configurable go/no-go quality gates, a new-code baseline, triage rules, ignoring with reasons and a one-click merge override are all documented, and AI autofix covers 90% of issues with tiered monthly quotas. The model behind the autofix is not stated, we found no public information on IDE plugins, and every captured workflow page shows GitHub alone. 1 2 4 10 11 15
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
The API documentation is genuinely good — bearer tokens, rate limits with headers, pagination, JSON, NDJSON and CSV output, and resources for workspaces, projects, issues and coverage — and permissions simply mirror GitHub roles, though the API itself sits behind the paid tiers. Only GitHub is documented as a code host, sign-on is GitHub only, and we found no public information on GitLab or Bitbucket support, a self-hosted edition, SCIM provisioning, audit logs or SARIF export. 3 4 12 13 5
The Application Security Engineer
What is documented is GitHub only: projects are GitHub repositories, permissions derive from GitHub roles, custom permissions and cross-project trends arrive on the Enterprise tier, and there is a REST API with token auth, pagination and rate limits — though in early access, subject to change without warning, with no versioning. I found no public information on GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps, a Jira integration, SAML or OIDC single sign-on beyond GitHub identity, SCIM, audit logs, webhooks for findings, or a self-hosted edition of the cloud product; the open Rust CLI does run on the customer's own machines without Docker. 4 12 13
The Engineering Manager
There is a documented REST API with tokens, rate limits and JSON, newline-delimited JSON and CSV responses, a permission model that follows GitHub repository roles, trends and hotspots at the higher tiers, and custom permissions at Enterprise. Everything is anchored to GitHub, authentication is GitHub single sign-on only, and we found no public information on Jira integration, SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, webhooks, or a self-hosted edition. 12 13 4 5 3
The Platform Engineer
Everything routes through a GitHub App with GitHub OAuth, workspaces are GitHub organizations and permissions are inherited from GitHub roles; the REST API is documented with tokens, pagination and rate limits, but is explicitly early access, "subject to change without warning" and has no versioning scheme — a deal-breaker for rolling settings out to 900 repositories with stable pipelines. We found no public information on a self-hosted or in-network edition, SAML or SCIM from our identity provider, audit logs, SARIF export, webhooks or Jira integration. 3 4 5 12 13
The Product Security Officer
There is a documented REST API with bearer-token authentication, pagination and rate limits, findings export in JSON and CSV, and permissions modelled on GitHub repository roles, with custom permissions and trends reserved for Enterprise. Everything routes through GitHub — we found no public information on GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps support, Jira integration, single sign-on beyond GitHub, a self-hosted edition, SCIM or audit logs. 3 4 12 13
The Skeptic
The REST API is documented down to tokens, pagination and per-workspace rate limits, and roles per workspace and project are defined through GitHub repository roles. Only one code host is evidenced, the API is early access without versioning, and we found no public information on Jira integration, SCIM, audit logs, webhooks, SARIF export or a self-hosted edition. 3 4 5 12 13
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
The security page is concrete rather than fluffy: SOC 2 Type II, TLS with an A+ grade, disk-level and envelope encryption with AWS KMS, analysis in sandboxed Fargate containers destroyed after each run, no clones of analysed repositories stored, and annual third-party penetration tests. We found no public information on whether our code trains their AI models, a public status page, a stated retention period for findings, or customer-facing reports mapped to OWASP, CWE or other standards, and the privacy policy keeps personal data only as long as necessary. 5 7 4
The Application Security Engineer
The security page is concrete: SOC 2 Type II, annual third-party penetration tests, TLS and HSTS with an SSL Labs A+, at-rest encryption with AWS KMS envelope encryption, sandboxed Fargate containers destroyed after each run, and a statement that clones of analysed repositories are not stored. For an audit under PCI DSS, I found no public information on code or findings retention periods beyond "as long as necessary" with anonymised data kept indefinitely, no statement on whether code trains AI models or which model powers autofix, no status page or published SLA, and no compliance reports mapped to OWASP, CWE or PCI DSS — the PCI mention on the page concerns Stripe payment processing. 5 6 7
The Engineering Manager
Analysis runs in sandboxed containers destroyed after each run, no repository clones are stored, encryption in transit and at rest with AWS KMS is described, SOC 2 Type II is stated, and third-party penetration testing happens at least annually. Retention is described only as retaining personal information as long as necessary with anonymized data kept indefinitely, and we found no public information on published SLA terms, on whether source code trains AI models, on a public status page, or on reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act. 5 7 6 4
The Platform Engineer
The security page is solid: SOC 2 Type II, encryption in transit and at rest with AWS KMS, annual third-party penetration tests, analysis in sandboxed Fargate containers destroyed after each run, and a statement that clones of analyzed repositories are not stored. But the privacy policy retains personal information "for as long as necessary" with anonymized data kept indefinitely, and we found no public information on a service status page, on whether code or findings train the AI behind the autofixes, or on reports mapped to OWASP, CWE or PCI DSS — all of which our auditors will demand. 1 5 6 7
The Product Security Officer
The security page gives an auditor real substance: SOC 2 Type II, encryption at rest with envelope encryption and AWS KMS, annual third-party penetration testing, analysis in sandboxed Fargate containers destroyed after each run, and an explicit statement that clones of analyzed repositories are not stored. Against that, retention is only "as long as necessary" with anonymized data kept indefinitely, and we found no public information on whether source code or findings are used to train AI models, on a public status page, or on compliance reports mapped to standards such as PCI DSS or the EU Cyber Resilience Act. 5 7
The Skeptic
SOC 2 Type II, PCI Service Provider Level 1 through Stripe, analysis in sandboxed containers destroyed after each run, no stored repository clones, encryption in transit and at rest, and annual third-party penetration testing are real, inspectable claims. What an auditor will ask next is missing: no statement on whether code is used to train AI models or how to opt out, no public status page, no published availability SLA, no retention period for code or findings, and no mapping of findings to OWASP, CWE or other standards. 4 5 7
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
Qlty Software Inc. is a US company under New York law, production data sits on AWS with no region stated, personal information may be transferred to and accessed from the United States, and the safeguards for European transfers are asserted but not named. Several processors are visible in passing — Stripe, Sentry, Google Analytics, Mintlify — but we found no public information on EU hosting, an EU contracting entity, or a data processing agreement, so for a German client contract this is a hard conversation. 7 5 6 4
The Application Security Engineer
The contracting entity is US-based under New York law, production runs on AWS with the region not stated, personal information may be transferred to and accessed from the United States, and Google Analytics and Sentry sit in the chain. The privacy policy names a controller for European users and says European transfers rest on safeguards without naming them; I found no public information on an EU hosting option, a data processing agreement, or a self-hosted edition of the cloud product, and the locally running CLI does not change where findings and reporting live. 5 6 7
The Engineering Manager
The contracting entity is Qlty Software Inc. in New York under New York governing law and courts, production data is hosted on Amazon Web Services with no region stated, and the privacy policy says personal information may be transferred to and accessed from the United States based on safeguards it does not name. We found no public information on an EU hosting option, a data processing agreement, or a self-hosted edition that would keep code and findings on our own servers. 7 6 5
The Platform Engineer
Qlty Software Inc. is a US company under New York law and New York courts, production data sits on AWS, and personal information is stated to be transferred to and accessed from the United States; Sentry, Stripe, Vanta and Google Analytics appear as service providers across the pages, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list, a data processing agreement or EU hosting. The free Fair Source CLI runs locally, but the platform itself is a cloud service and we found no public information on a self-hosted edition that would keep our code and findings inside the company network. 1 5 6 7
The Product Security Officer
The chain as documented is American end to end: Qlty Software Inc. of New York under New York law, headquarters in the United States, production data on AWS with no region named, and the US company as controller for individual users; visible service providers include Stripe, Sentry, Google Analytics, Vanta and Mintlify. The privacy policy does state that transfers out of Europe rely on safeguards, but we found no public information on EU data residency, a European contracting entity, a data processing agreement, or a self-hosted edition that would keep our controller code and findings on our own servers. 5 6 7
The Skeptic
A US company headquartered in New York, governed by New York law, hosting production data on AWS with no region stated, and with US providers such as Google Analytics, Sentry, Stripe and Vanta appearing only incidentally rather than as a listed subprocessor chain. The privacy policy does acknowledge European transfer safeguards, and we found no public information on a data processing agreement, an EU hosting option, or a self-hosted edition that would keep code and findings in the customer's own network. 5 6 7
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
I can actually compute the annual bill from public pages: Free at $0, Pro at $20 / contributor / month, Enterprise at $30 / contributor / month with annual plans priced with two months free, extra analysis minutes at $0.01 per analysis minute, and both the counting rule (unique user or bot that pushed a commit, uploaded coverage or logged in within a rolling 30-day window) and the analysis-minute rule (2-core runner, larger runners counted multiple times, rounding up, each coverage report one minute) spelled out. Volume discounts from 100 seats, nonprofit and education terms, tax treatment, cancellation notice and the $40k+ entry for custom Enterprise terms are all published; the only thing I cannot price is an Enterprise contract below that floor. 4 6 1
The Application Security Engineer
Every plan is public with its per-contributor price — Free at $0/month, Pro at $20 per contributor per month, Enterprise at $30 per contributor per month — the counting rule is spelled out (any user or bot that pushes an analysed commit, uploads coverage or logs in within a rolling 30-day period, including bots that open pull requests), annual plans come with two months free, overage is $0.01 per analysis minute with the analysis-minute definition published, and volume discounts, free-tier limits, refund and notice terms, and tax treatment (prices exclude tax, sales tax added) are all stated. What keeps annual cost from being fully computable: the Enterprise tier also offers "Custom terms - Available at $40k+", the support SLA contents are not published, I found no public information on data-export terms, and the terms of use reference an Essentials plan that does not appear on the pricing page. 1 4 6
The Engineering Manager
All three plans carry public prices per contributor per month, and the counting rule is explicit: a unique user or bot active in a rolling thirty-day window, with bots counted if they open pull requests; analysis minutes per plan, an overage at $0.01 per analysis minute, annual plans priced with two months free, volume discounts, and sales tax added where applicable are all published. The remaining estimation work is the usage-based analysis minutes counted on a 2-core-runner basis with one minute per coverage report, and we found no public information on data-export terms at cancellation beyond the non-renewal notice. 4 6 1
The Platform Engineer
Three public tiers at $0, $20 and $30 per contributor per month, a rolling 30-day seat definition that counts bots which open pull requests, per-tier analysis-minute and AI-autofix quotas with a $0.01 overage rate per analysis minute, unlimited repositories, annual plans with two months free, volume discounts from 100 seats, invoicing from $10k, custom terms from $40k, and a clear statement that sales tax is added. It falls short of full computability only because pricing above 300 seats turns negotiable and we found no public information on data-export terms at the end of a subscription. 4 6
The Product Security Officer
A buyer can compute the real annual cost: Free at $0, Pro at $20 per contributor per month and Enterprise at $30, each with analysis minutes and AI autofix quotas stated; contributors are defined as unique users or bots active in a rolling 30-day window, overage minutes cost $0.01 with the minute itself defined on a 2-core runner basis, volume discounts are published, annual plans come with two months free, and sales tax treatment is stated. Only the edges remain open — the terms of use reference an Essentials plan the pricing page does not show, and we found no public information on data-export terms on cancellation. 4 6
The Skeptic
A buyer can compute the bill: three publicly priced tiers, an explicit counting rule (a unique user or bot that pushes an analyzed commit, uploads coverage or logs in within a rolling 30 days, with bots that open pull requests counted), analysis-minute quotas with a $0.01 overage rate and a precise definition of an analysis minute, annual terms with two months free, published volume discounts, tax treatment, refunds and notice periods. The only piece I could not find is the cost of AI autofixes beyond the monthly quota. 4 6
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity |
Incorporated in US
unverified
Why unverified?The privacy policy states a US headquarters rather than a register or place of incorporation, and no imprint page was captured; the terms only name 'Qlty Software Inc.' and choose New York law. |
0/2 pts | 7 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Self-hostable
unverified
Why unverified?Only the free CLI runs on the customer's own machines; the cloud service itself is SaaS ('Analysis runs on our cloud') and no self-hosted deployment of Qlty Cloud is offered. |
1/1 pts | 1 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Qlty
Is Qlty European?
No. whats-best.ai classifies Qlty as Rest of world. Its vendor, Qlty Software Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
Where does Qlty store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.
Does Qlty have a free plan?
Yes. Qlty has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Qlty?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Qlty alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 6 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity. The privacy policy states a US headquarters rather than a register or place of incorporation, and no imprint page was captured; the terms only name 'Qlty Software Inc.' and choose New York law.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Only the free CLI runs on the customer's own machines; the cloud service itself is SaaS ('Analysis runs on our cloud') and no self-hosted deployment of Qlty Cloud is offered.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 4 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 legal fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (15)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Features page docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 API documentation docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Pricing page qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Security / trust page docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Terms of service qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Privacy policy qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 13 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 14 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 15 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap docs.qlty.sh Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →