Veracode
Provenance unknown Report an errorPanel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Veracode, Inc. · www.veracode.com
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Veracode at a glance
- Vendor
- Veracode, Inc.
- Headquarters
- Incorporated in the United States source, captured 17 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Veracode 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Veracode's strongest showing is code analysis, where scores cluster at 7: the judges credit an engine that maps every data path where untrusted data reaches critical functions, control-flow modelling across hundreds of frameworks, a Pipeline Scan language list from.NET through COBOL to Kotlin, scans of applications up to 5GB of code, and a published false-positive rate under 1.1 percent. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 19 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Veracode's strongest showing is code analysis, where scores cluster at 7: the judges credit an engine that maps every data path where untrusted data reaches critical functions, control-flow modelling across hundreds of frameworks, a Pipeline Scan language list from.NET through COBOL to Kotlin, scans of applications up to 5GB of code, and a published false-positive rate under 1.1 percent. Dependencies and secrets follow at 6-7: the judges credit a malicious-package catalogue of unusual depth — typosquatting, YARA rules, OpenSSF determinations — but the lower scores point to missing evidence on SBOM export and secrets across git history. The weak end is sovereignty at 1-2: the contracting entity is Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation under Massachusetts law, and we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement, only region-specific account domains. Pricing transparency scores sit at 0-1. The remaining splits — developer workflow at 6-7, integration and administration and trust and compliance at 5-6 — turn on evidence the pages do not show: pre-commit checks and scan times, single sign-on, code retention and AI-training questions.
Speaks for it
- Static analysis engine maps every data path where untrusted data reaches critical functions, with control-flow modelling across hundreds of frameworks
- Pipeline Scan lists over twenty languages from COBOL to Kotlin, for applications up to 5GB of code, with a published false-positive rate under 1.1 percent
- Malicious-package detection is documented in unusual depth — typosquatting, YARA rules, OpenSSF determinations — fed by a proprietary threat research feed
- Reachability analysis prioritizes vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable, and licence rules flag GPL and AGPL source-distribution obligations
- FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate over an environment implementing over 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, with audit support for SOC 2 Type II
Held against it
- Sovereignty scores sit at 1-2: the vendor is a Delaware corporation under Massachusetts law, and we found no public information on hosting locations, subprocessors or a data processing agreement
- We found no public information on SBOM export, end-of-life components, or secret scanning across full git history
- We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, or export of findings in a standard format
- We found no public information on code retention periods, encryption, or whether customer code trains AI models and how to opt out
- The terms allow changes at any time with or without notice, termination at will, and cap liability at the fees paid
Best for
- You need deep static analysis across many languages and frameworks, backed by a documented triage and mitigation-approval workflow
- Your priority is supply-chain defence — malicious-package detection, reachability and licence compliance — rather than code-quality metrics
- You build audit files against FedRAMP, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR or DORA and value an independently assessed environment
- Your teams work in GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket or Azure DevOps and want scans triggered on push and pull requests
Avoid if
- You need a European contracting or processing chain for source code — the vendor is a Delaware corporation under Massachusetts law, and we found no public information on hosting locations or subprocessors
- You need secret scanning across full git history or SBOM export for compliance filings — the documented secret scanning covers containers and infrastructure as code
- Your administration depends on single sign-on, SCIM or a self-hosted edition — we found no public information on these, so verify with the vendor before shortlisting
- You need contractual stability on standard terms — the published terms allow unilateral changes, termination at will, and cap liability at the fees paid
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 3.5 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 3.5 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 2.5 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 2.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 0.5 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
The engine evidence is deep: path analysis that maps every data path where untrusted input reaches critical functions, control-flow modelling across hundreds of frameworks, source, binary and hybrid scans up to 5GB of code, and a published false-positive rate under 1.1% — with Pipeline Scan covering PHP, TypeScript and React Native, exactly what my fourteen developers write. What the captured pages do not show is a published rule list mapped to OWASP or CWE, custom rule authoring, or any bug, code-smell, complexity or coverage measures, so it reads as a security scanner without the quality side. 3 4 1 12
The Application Security Engineer
Static analysis here is deep: the path-analysis engine maps where untrusted data interacts with critical functions, hundreds of frameworks are modelled with control-flow context, the Pipeline Scan lists over twenty languages from Java and TypeScript to Apex and COBOL, and a sub-1.1% false-positive rate is published alongside IaC and container checks. What holds it back for my teams: we found no public information on a customer-writable rule language for in-house frameworks, on quality metrics like complexity or coverage import, or on per-language depth and independent benchmarks behind the analyst recognition. 3 4 1 12
The Engineering Manager
The analysis engine maps every data path where untrusted data interacts with critical functions, with support for hundreds of frameworks and a published language list that covers Java, Kotlin, Scala and Groovy — the core of our estate — plus a stated false-positive rate under 1.1 percent with Security-Sensitive Context filtering, infrastructure-as-code and container checks. What I miss for code health: we found no public information on complexity, duplication, technical-debt or maintainability measures over time, nor on a rule language my teams could write in. 1 3 4 12
The Platform Engineer
Static analysis is documented at real depth: an engine that maps every data path where untrusted input reaches critical functions, hundreds of frameworks modelled, a pipeline-scan language list covering more than twenty languages from COBOL to Kotlin, applications up to five gigabytes, and a published false-positive rate under 1.1 percent backed by a Forrester Wave leadership claim. Infrastructure-as-code and container misconfiguration checks are also on the product pages. We found no public information on a customer-writable rule language, code-quality metrics such as duplication and complexity, or coverage import, which keeps this off the top tier. 3 4 1 12
The Product Security Officer
The static analysis engine is documented in real depth: path analysis that maps every data path where untrusted data interacts with critical functions, control-flow modelling across hundreds of frameworks, a published language list from.NET and Java through COBOL and Kotlin, binary and hybrid scanning of applications up to 5 GB of code, and a published false-positive rate under 1.1 percent with security-sensitive-context filtering to suppress irrelevant findings. We found no public information on customer-authored rule sets or maintainability and technical-debt metrics, which holds it below the top tier. 1 3 4 12
The Skeptic
The static analysis pages document path analysis that maps every data path where untrusted data reaches critical functions, control-flow modeling across hundreds of frameworks, a 20-plus language Pipeline Scan list, infrastructure-as-code checks, and a published false-positive figure under 1.1 percent. We found no public information on a rule list mapped to OWASP and CWE, a rule language customers can write, or complexity, duplication and technical-debt measures — that keeps it short of the deep end. 1 3 4 12
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
Malicious-package detection is documented in unusual depth — dozens of named checks from npm install hooks and typosquatting to YARA rules, Malware Bazaar hashes and OpenSSF listings, backed by a proprietary threat feed — plus reachability analysis, licence risk issues such as GPL source-distribution obligations, and secrets scanning in containers and infrastructure as code. I found no public information on SBOM export, transitive dependency handling, secrets across git history or validity checks, which keeps this mid-field for me. 5 6 11 12
The Application Security Engineer
Reachability that prioritizes vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable, a granular malicious-package rule set covering typosquatting, install hooks and exfiltration, licence risk checks, and a documented proprietary threat feed from the research team are exactly what I want in a payments backlog. But we found no public information on SBOM export, transitive ecosystem coverage, end-of-life components, or secret scanning across git history with validity checks and push protection; secret detection appears only for containers and infrastructure-as-code. 11 12 6 5 7
The Engineering Manager
Reachability analysis to see whether vulnerable code is actually called, an unusually detailed published catalogue of malicious-package detectors including typosquatting, OpenSSF-sourced malware checks and a Malware Bazaar hash check, licence risk rules for mismatches and copyleft obligations, and a package firewall that stops bad dependencies before they reach pipelines. We found no public information on SBOM export, end-of-life components, or secret scanning across git history with validity checks — gaps I would want closed before filing anything with auditors. 5 6 11 12
The Platform Engineer
Reachability analysis to tell whether vulnerable code is actually called, licence risk issues spelled out per licence including GPL-style source-distribution obligations, and a remarkably detailed malicious-code catalogue spanning typosquatting, dependency confusion, malware-hash lookups and OpenSSF malicious-package determinations, fed by a named in-house threat research feed. We found no public information on SBOM export in a standard format, end-of-life component flagging, or secret detection across the full git history with validity checks. 5 6 11 12
The Product Security Officer
The composition side is strong on supply-chain threats: licence policies flag GPL and AGPL source-distribution obligations and non-commercial risks, a documented malicious-package catalogue covers typosquatting, install-hook execution and OSSF and Malware Bazaar hits, reachability analysis separates vulnerabilities that are actually exploitable, a proprietary threat feed curated by their research team backs a package firewall that blocks risky dependencies before they reach pipelines, and secrets in containers and infrastructure code are scanned. For our Cyber Resilience Act file we would need SBOM output in a standard format, secret scanning across full git history and end-of-life flags — we found no public information on these. 5 6 11 12
The Skeptic
Malicious-package detection is documented to an unusual depth — dozens of named checks from typosquatting to YARA rules and OpenSSF malicious-packages determinations, fed by a proprietary threat research feed with a documented threat-feed API — and reachability analysis plus licence rules naming GPL and AGPL obligations are confirmed. We found no public information on SBOM export, end-of-life components, or secret scanning across git history with validity checks and push protection, which caps it below the top band. 5 6 11 12
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Repository scanning triggers on push and pull requests for GitHub, GitLab and Azure DevOps, findings import as issues or work items, there is a CLI and IDE scanning, and the Veracode Fix GitHub Action proposes fixes for pipeline-scan flaws; ignoring findings with stated reasons and a mitigation approval flow with comments are properly documented. But the captured pages show no inline merge-request comments, no pre-commit or push-time checks and no scan times, and the main triage happens on a separate platform page rather than in the merge request. 9 3 7 8 12
The Application Security Engineer
Scans trigger on push and pull request across GitHub, GitLab and Azure DevOps, findings become issues or work items, policy gates are enforced at the source, and triage with mitigation reasons, approver roles and automatic propagation is documented in real depth. The AI fix reaches developers through a GitHub action, but we found no public information on pre-commit hooks, typical scan times, whether IDE results match the server, or the model provider behind the AI remediation. 9 3 12 7 8 11
The Engineering Manager
Scans trigger on push and pull requests across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps with findings importable as issues or work items, a policy gate enforced at the source, an AI fix that resolves pipeline-scan flaws as a GitHub action, and a genuinely auditable triage flow where mitigations carry reasons and need a Mitigation Approver. We found no public information on a new-code baseline against a baseline, the model behind the AI fix, or typical scan times, which is exactly the gate-on-new-code behaviour I need evidence for. 7 8 9 11 12
The Platform Engineer
Scans run from the pipeline, the CLI and the IDE, the source-control integrations trigger on push or pull request and import findings as issues or work items, and findings can be ignored with reasons or pushed through a proper mitigation workflow with comments, proposals and an approver role that propagates to matched flaws. Veracode Fix lands as a GitHub action that generates remediation patches. We found no public information on pre-commit or push-time checks, gate settings per branch or severity, whether IDE results match the server rules, or typical scan times. 7 8 9 3
The Product Security Officer
Scans trigger on push and pull requests across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure DevOps, run from IDEs, CI/CD and the CLI, and the SAST policy scanner enforces policy gates at source; the AI fix arrives as a GitHub action and findings can be mitigated or ignored with recorded reasons, a dedicated approver role and automatic propagation of mitigations across sandboxes and policy scans. We found no public information on the model provider behind the AI fix, pre-commit behaviour or typical scan times. 3 7 8 9 11 12
The Skeptic
Scans trigger on push and pull requests across GitHub, GitLab and Azure DevOps, policy gates are enforced at the source, AI fixes ship as a GitHub Action, and triage is a real workflow with mitigation proposals, approver roles and stated ignore reasons such as potential false positive or accepted risk. We found no public information on a new-code baseline, typical scan times, or the model provider behind the AI remediation, so I cannot place it higher. 7 8 9 11 12
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps and Bitbucket are covered through Veracode-authored integrations plus a CLI, REST and XML APIs, and the role model is genuinely granular with predefined and custom roles created via an Identity API. I found no public information on single sign-on or SCIM, a Jira integration, audit logs, SARIF or CSV export, webhooks, or a self-hosted edition — only region-specific API domains are documented. 9 10 7 2
The Application Security Engineer
All four major code hosts are covered plus a CLI and REST and XML APIs, and role administration is unusually granular: predefined and custom roles created via the Identity API, separate UI and API roles, and task-based role guidance, with risk-manager ingestion pulling findings into portfolio views. We found no public information on single sign-on or SCIM, a Jira integration, audit logs, webhooks, SARIF or CSV export, or a self-hosted edition that would keep scanning inside our network. 9 10 7 12
The Engineering Manager
All four major code hosts are supported plus a CLI and documented REST and XML APIs, and the role model is the strongest part: predefined and custom roles created through an Identity API, separate UI and API roles, and a task-to-role mapping that tells a team lead exactly who scans, who reviews findings and who manages policy. We found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, a Jira integration by name, audit logs, export of findings in a standard format, or a self-hosted edition — several of which are non-negotiable for six teams. 2 9 10 12
The Platform Engineer
GitHub, GitLab and Azure DevOps workflow integrations plus a Bitbucket agent are documented, with a REST API family covering admin, results, mitigation, reporting and upload-and-scan, and a role system granular enough to build custom roles through the Identity API — good bones, but not what our estate needs. We found no public information on a self-hosted or in-network deployment where our code would stay inside the company network, on SAML or OIDC single sign-on, SCIM provisioning from our identity provider, audit logs, or SARIF export; we found no public information on Jenkins among the documented integrations, though a CLI exists. 9 10 12
The Product Security Officer
All four major code hosts are supported alongside a CLI, a documented REST and XML API exists, and role administration is unusually granular — predefined and custom roles created through an Identity API, separate UI and API roles, and a task-to-role mapping covering everything from scanning to user management and reporting. The platform runs on region-based domains in a FedRAMP-authorised environment; we found no public information on single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, Jira, audit logs, a self-hosted edition or export formats such as SARIF. 2 9 10 11
The Skeptic
Three code hosts plus a CLI, documented REST and XML APIs, and a genuinely granular role model with custom roles via an Identity API and task-based role guidance put this at a solid working level. We found no public information on a self-hosted edition, single sign-on or SCIM, Jira integration, webhooks, audit logs, or export of findings in a standard format — and the export question is the one I ask at every renewal. 2 9 10
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
The compliance page is substantive: a FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate on an environment implementing over 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, SOC 2 Type II audit support, and mappings to ISO 27001/27002, PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR and DORA — useful when our clients audit us. What the pages do not state is how long uploaded source is retained, whether our code trains their AI, encryption details, an SLA or a status page. 11 12 1 2
The Application Security Engineer
The compliance reporting is unusually strong for my audit file: a FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate implementing over 300 NIST 800-53 controls, and reporting mapped to PCI DSS, DORA, ISO 27001/27002, SOC 2 and HIPAA with audit-ready evidence across applications and the supply chain. What I still need before uploading payments code is absent from the captured pages: we found no public information on retention periods for code and findings, encryption in transit and at rest, whether code trains AI models, a published SLA, or a status page. 11 2 12 3
The Engineering Manager
The platform carries a FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate in an environment implementing over 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, and produces audit-ready evidence mapped to PCI DSS, ISO 27001, HIPAA, GDPR and DORA, which is a serious independently assessed posture. We found no public information on how long source code is retained, encryption specifics, whether customer code is used to train AI models, a published SLA or a status page; the terms also cap liability at the fees paid and allow termination and changes at any time, which I would flag to procurement. 1 2 11
The Platform Engineer
The compliance story is well evidenced: a FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate with over 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, a trust center, audit support for SOC 2 Type II, and reporting mapped to ISO 27001/27002, PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR and DORA. But for us the decisive questions are unanswered: we found no public information on whether source code leaves our network or how long it is retained, on encryption, on whether code trains AI models and how to opt out, or on an SLA and a status page. 11 1 2
The Product Security Officer
There is genuine audit substance: a FedRAMP Moderate authority to operate over an environment implementing more than 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, plus automated assessments mapped to ISO 27001/27002 and reporting built to support PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR, SOC 2 Type II and DORA audits. What I personally need for our machinery controllers — where source code is stored and for how long, whether any AI model trains on our code and how to opt out, encryption details and a published SLA — we found no public information on, so it sits mid-scale. 2 3 11 12
The Skeptic
The compliance page is concrete where it counts: a FedRAMP Moderate Authority to Operate with over 300 NIST SP 800-53 controls, audit support for SOC 2 Type II, and mappings to ISO 27001/27002, PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR and DORA. We found no public information on code retention periods, encryption in transit and at rest, whether customer code trains the AI models or how to opt out, or a published SLA and status page — and the terms reserve unilateral changes and termination at will, which is worth reading before trusting any of it. 1 2 11 12
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
The contracting entity is Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation under Massachusetts law with venue in Middlesex County, so from these pages this is a US vendor end to end; the API domains are region-specific but their locations are unstated. I found no public information on EU hosting, subprocessors, or a data processing agreement. 2 9
The Application Security Engineer
The contracting entity is Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation governed by Massachusetts law with venue in Middlesex County courts, and the captured pages leave hosting location, data residency, subprocessors and any data processing agreement unstated; region-specific account domains exist but no European hosting is evidenced. From a Frankfurt seat under PCI DSS and DORA, no element of a European processing chain is documented. 2 9
The Engineering Manager
Contracting is with Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation, under Massachusetts law with exclusive venue in Middlesex County, and the captured pages name account region domains without stating where any region is hosted. We found no public information on hosting locations for code and findings, on subprocessors including any AI models, or on a data processing agreement — as a Munich buyer I cannot build a European processing chain from these pages. 2 9
The Platform Engineer
The contracting entity is Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation governed by Massachusetts law, and the only hosting signal is that region-specific API domains must be allowlisted on port 443, with no locations named. We found no public information on EU hosting or an EU representative, on subprocessors and where they sit, on a data processing agreement, or on a self-hosted edition that would keep code and findings on our own servers — a hard stop for our source-code boundary. 2 9
The Product Security Officer
The contracting entity is Veracode, Inc., a Delaware corporation under Massachusetts law with exclusive venue in Middlesex County, and the captured pages state no hosting location, list no subprocessors and show no data-processing agreement — only that accounts sit on region-specific domains. For our controller firmware that is an unverified processing chain I could not defend to our data-protection officer. 2 9
The Skeptic
Veracode, Inc. is a Delaware corporation governed by Massachusetts law with venue in Middlesex County courts, and we found no public information on where code and findings are stored, who the subprocessors are, or a data processing agreement; the documentation only reveals that region-specific service domains exist. From a European buyer's chair this is an unproven chain around a US contracting entity. 2 9
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
None of the captured pages shows a price, a plan, a per-developer rate or a free tier; the terms of use point to separate negotiated agreements such as POV and master service agreements. For an agency where freelancer seats change month to month, a bill that cannot be computed from public pages is not workable for us. 1 2 12
The Application Security Engineer not rated — no public information
We found no public pricing information on the pages we read: no plan prices, per-developer or per-contributor counting rules, free tier, add-on costs, or seat minimums appear on the homepage, the terms of use, or the product and documentation pages reviewed. 1 2 3 11 12
The Engineering Manager not rated — no public information
We found no public information on pricing in the captured pages: no plan prices, no counting rule for developers or lines of code, no free tier and no add-on prices appear on the homepage or the terms of use, so I cannot compute an annual cost for my teams from these captures. 1 2
The Platform Engineer not rated — no public information
We found no public information on pricing: no per-plan or per-developer price, no counting rule, no free tier, and no add-on or scanner pricing appears anywhere on the homepage, the terms of use, or the product and documentation pages we read. 1 2 12
The Product Security Officer not rated — no public information
We found no public information on pricing in the pages we read: neither the homepage nor the terms of use state plan prices, how developers or lines of code are counted, or what any scanner or add-on costs, so a real annual cost cannot be computed from this material. 1 2
The Skeptic not rated — no public information
We found no public information on pricing in the captured pages: no price per developer or per line of code, no plan inclusions, no counting rule for contributors, no free or open-source tier, and no add-on pricing for scanners, single sign-on or the AI fixes. A buyer cannot compute the first year's cost from these pages, let alone the second. 1 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Incorporated in US | 0/2 pts | 2 Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Veracode
Is Veracode European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Veracode is based. Its vendor, Veracode, Inc., is incorporated in the United States, per the vendor’s page captured 17 Nov 2026.
Where does Veracode store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
Does Veracode have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Veracode?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Veracode alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 17 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We found no public information on pricing on the pages we read (veracode.com, veracode.com/terms-of-use, veracode.com/security/static-code-analysis, docs.veracode.com/r/Pipeline_Scan_Supported_Languages, docs.veracode.com/r/License_risk_issues, docs.veracode.com/r/Malicious_code_risk_issues and 6 more). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- 11 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (12)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page www.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Terms of service — found from the homepage www.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap www.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Code analysis (SAST & code quality) — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Platforms, deployment & administration — found from sitemap docs.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Source-code handling, security & compliance — found from sitemap www.veracode.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →