Xygeni
EU-Made Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Xygeni Security SL · xygeni.io
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Xygeni at a glance
- Vendor
- Xygeni Security SL
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 6 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Xygeni 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Xygeni is an all-in-one AppSec platform — SAST, SCA, secrets detection, CI/CD security — from Xygeni Security SL, registered in Madrid, Spain, under Spanish law. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 6 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 6 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Xygeni is an all-in-one AppSec platform — SAST, SCA, secrets detection, CI/CD security — from Xygeni Security SL, registered in Madrid, Spain, under Spanish law. Its strongest area is dependencies and secrets, scoring 7: SCA with reachability-based prioritisation, one-click SBOM export in SPDX or CycloneDX, malicious-package quarantine with daily zero-day analysis, secrets scanned across entire Git histories with validity-aware severity, and auto-revocation playbooks for AWS, Slack and GitLab. Its weakest are code analysis and sovereignty at 4: the captured pages give no public information on which languages are analysed, a rule catalogue or data-flow analysis, and the no-false-positives claim stands without published measurement; where uploaded results are hosted, the named subprocessors and their locations, and any certification are unevidenced. Scores diverge most on trust and compliance, spanning 4 to 6: some credit the stated local-scan handling — no source code uploaded, only results — while others point to no public information on certifications, an SLA, encryption and AI training. Pricing transparency spans 6 to 7 on public prices such as Team at "€ 3.300/ year incl. 10 contributors".
Speaks for it
- Dependencies and secrets earns the table's highest mark, 7, on reachability-based prioritisation, one-click SBOM export in SPDX or CycloneDX, malicious-package quarantine, and auto-revocation playbooks for AWS, Slack and GitLab
- Scans run locally in the customer's network with no source code uploaded to Xygeni servers — only results — and any file uploaded for auto-remediation is removed immediately after the change
- Pricing is public and concrete: a free tier of 10 repos and 200 scans a month without a credit card, Team at "€ 3.300/ year incl. 10 contributors" with up to 100 repos, and Business at "€ 5.900/ year incl. 10 contributors" with up to 300 repos
- The contributor counting rule is published in plain words — anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository within the past 90 days — so the billing basis is checkable
- Developer-facing tooling is evidenced: an IDE plugin with real-time detection and in-IDE fix suggestions, pre-commit and pre-push hooks that can block commits, and one-click AI autofix as reviewable pull requests
Held against it
- Code analysis sits at the table's lowest mark, 4, with no public information on which languages are analysed, a rule catalogue, or data-flow and taint analysis, and the no-false-positives claim stands without published measurement
- Sovereignty scores 4 because where uploaded results are hosted, the named subprocessors with their locations, and any certification are unevidenced on the captured pages
- SAML and Okta single sign-on, the rich API, anomaly detection and the on-premise edition are Enterprise-plan only, so a Team or Business buyer gets none of them
- We found no public information on certifications, an SLA, a status page, encryption, retention of findings, or whether code or findings train the AI models
- Public prices stop at the included ten contributors, with rates beyond that, AI credit prices, the DAST, Code Quality and API Security modules, VAT treatment and the Enterprise tier beyond a custom quote all unpriced
Best for
- You need supply-chain and secrets coverage first — SBOM export, malicious-package detection and Git-history secret scanning with auto-revocation — the area the bench scored highest
- Your policy forbids uploading source code to a vendor: the scan runs inside your network and only results leave it
- You want to trial with real limits before buying: the free tier covers 10 repos and 200 scans a month without a credit card and with no time limits
- You run a small contributor base: Team and Business each include 10 contributors, counted as anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository within 90 days
Avoid if
- You must judge SAST depth before committing — the captured pages give no public information on supported languages, the rule set or data-flow analysis, and code analysis scored 4
- Your procurement requires public evidence of certifications, an SLA or a status page — trust and compliance scores span 4 to 6
- You need single sign-on, the rich API or on-premise deployment below the Enterprise tier — all are Enterprise-only at a custom quote
- You must compute your full annual cost from public pages — contributors beyond the included ten, AI credits and VAT treatment are unpriced
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Code analysis (SAST & code quality) | 2 of 5 |
| Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets | 3.5 of 5 |
| Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes | 3 of 5 |
| Platforms, deployment & administration | 3 of 5 |
| Source-code handling, security & compliance | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 3 of 5 |
Code analysis (SAST & code quality)
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How this is scored
What the tool finds in the company's own code: static application security testing with data-flow and taint analysis across functions and files, the languages and frameworks covered and at what depth, the rule sets (OWASP Top 10, CWE, custom rules), bugs and code smells, duplication, cyclomatic and cognitive complexity, maintainability and technical-debt measures, test coverage import, infrastructure-as-code checks, and how false positives are measured and kept down.
0 — Does not analyse source code; a dependency, secret or runtime scanner only, or a different kind of product.
3 — Pattern-based rules or linters for a handful of languages; data-flow analysis, the rule list, quality metrics and false-positive handling are basic or not described.
5 — SAST for the common languages (Java, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, C#, Go, PHP) with the rule list published and mapped to OWASP and CWE, bugs and code smells, duplication and complexity metrics, coverage import, and custom rules or rule configuration documented.
8 — Cross-file taint analysis with the supported frameworks listed per language, a rule language customers can write in, infrastructure-as-code checks, maintainability or code-health scores over time, false-positive rates or benchmarks published, and each finding explained with its data flow and a fix.
10 — Analysis a large polyglot codebase relies on: deep interprocedural analysis across many languages with the depth stated per language, independent benchmark results, quality and security trends per team and hotspot, and every rule documented with examples and its precision.
The Lead Developer
The advanced SAST is documented as detecting security flaws, embedded backdoors and trojans, with malware logic aligned to CWE-506, IaC checks across Terraform, CloudFormation, ARM/Bicep and Ansible, plus AI SAST autofix and an IDE plugin. We found no public information on which programming languages are covered, the rule catalogue, data-flow or taint analysis, or quality metrics — code quality is an optional Enterprise module whose contents are not described — and the zero-false-positives claim is a marketing promise rather than a measured rate. 1 2 7
The Application Security Engineer
A SAST product is documented — security-flaw and embedded-malware detection in custom code with a specific CWE alignment for malicious logic, plus infrastructure-as-code checks for Terraform, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep and Ansible. We found no public information on supported languages, taint or data-flow analysis, a published rule set, custom rules or measured false-positive rates, and code quality appears only as an optional enterprise module. 1 2 3 7
The Engineering Manager
SAST itself is evidenced — advanced SAST for security flaws and embedded threats, custom-code malware inspection aligned to CWE-506, and IaC checks across Terraform, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep and Ansible — but there is no supported-language list or depth statement for our Java and Kotlin, no published rule set, no data-flow or taint analysis, and no complexity, duplication or technical-debt measures (code quality is only a separate optional Enterprise module). False positives are addressed solely by a marketing claim of no false positives, not by any published rate or method. 1 2 7
The Platform Engineer
SAST is a core module and the captures describe detection of embedded threats such as backdoors and obfuscated logic, flagged against CWE-506, with a real-time IDE plugin and AI autofix. But we found no public information on supported languages, a published rule set mapped to OWASP, data-flow or taint analysis, or quality metrics — code quality appears only as an undescribed optional Enterprise module — so I cannot judge depth for a polyglot estate from these pages. 1 2 7
The Product Security Officer
Advanced SAST is described at capability level: security flaws, embedded backdoors and obfuscated logic in custom code, findings flagged against CWE-506, infrastructure-as-code checks across Terraform, CloudFormation, ARM/Bicep and Ansible, and real-time IDE detection. We found no public information on which languages are analysed, a published rule list, data-flow analysis, quality metrics or false-positive benchmarks; code quality is a separate enterprise module and the no-false-positives claim stands without published measurement. 1 2 7
The Skeptic
A scan does analyse source: it bundles SAST, IaC checks with five named frameworks and platforms, and malware-pattern detection aligned to CWE-506. But we found no public information on which languages are analysed, whether taint or data-flow analysis runs across files, the published rule catalogue, code-quality metrics, or how false positives are measured — the homepage promises both "No false positives" and a cut of security noise by up to 90%, with no methodology behind either figure. 1 2 7
Dependencies (SCA), licences & secrets
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How this is scored
What comes from outside or should never be committed: software composition analysis of direct and transitive dependencies with the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and how quickly it is updated, reachability analysis, licence detection and policies, SBOM export (CycloneDX, SPDX), malicious and typosquatted package detection, end-of-life components, automatic upgrade pull requests, container image scanning, and secret detection in code and git history with the number of detectors, validity checks and revocation guidance.
0 — No dependency or secret scanning of any kind.
3 — Known-vulnerability alerts for dependencies in one or two ecosystems or a basic secret pattern check; transitive dependencies, licences, SBOMs and git history are basic or not described.
5 — SCA for the main ecosystems including transitive dependencies, licence detection with policies, SBOM export in a standard format, upgrade suggestions or pull requests, and secret detection in commits with the detector list described.
8 — Reachability analysis that shows whether vulnerable code is called, malicious-package detection, the vulnerability database and its sources documented, end-of-life components flagged, secrets checked for validity and scanned across the full git history, and push protection that stops a secret before it lands.
10 — Supply-chain coverage a regulated software maker can file: every ecosystem the company builds with, reachability for each, SBOM and VEX output for customers, licence obligations explained per licence, secrets found outside git (tickets, chat, containers) with automated revocation, and the database's coverage and latency evidenced.
The Lead Developer
SCA covers security, maintenance and licensing issues with reachability-based prioritisation, one-click SBOM and VDR export in SPDX and CycloneDX, automatic upgrade pull requests, quarantine of suspicious packages and daily analysis of thousands of new packages for zero-day malware; secrets get validity-aware severity, full git history and differential scans, pre-commit blocking, and automated revocation playbooks for AWS, Slack and GitLab. We found no public information on which package ecosystems are supported, the vulnerability database and its sources, or how many secret detectors exist. 3 4 7
The Application Security Engineer
Reachability is named as a prioritization factor, malicious packages get quarantine and daily analysis of new packages, secrets are scanned across entire git histories with validity among severity factors, pre-commit and pre-push hooks can block commits, and auto-revocation playbooks exist for AWS, Slack and GitLab, with one-click SBOM export in SPDX or CycloneDX. We found no public information on supported ecosystems or lockfiles, the vulnerability database and its sources, or end-of-life flagging. 3 4 7
The Engineering Manager
The supply-chain side is the strongest: SCA with reachability and autofix, licence visibility per code change, one-click SBOM export in SPDX and CycloneDX, intelligent upgrade pull requests, and real-time malicious-package detection with quarantine; secrets are found across files, configurations, container images and full Git history, with validity-based severity, pre-commit and pre-push hooks that can block commits, and automated revocation for AWS, Slack and GitLab. The ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database and its sources, and the number of secret detectors are not described, which keeps this short of full marks. 3 4 7
The Platform Engineer
The open-source page shows reachability- and exploitability-based prioritization, licence visibility per change, one-click SBOM export in SPDX and CycloneDX, automatic upgrade pull requests with breaking-change visibility, and daily malware analysis of new packages with quarantine; secrets get full git-history scanning, validity-aware severity, auto-revocation playbooks for AWS, Slack and GitLab, and blocking pre-commit hooks. We found no public information on the ecosystems and lockfiles supported, the vulnerability database behind the findings, or end-of-life flagging. 3 4 7
The Product Security Officer
One-click SBOM export in SPDX or CycloneDX with vulnerabilities annotated, reachability-based prioritisation, licence visibility per code change, malicious-package detection with quarantine and daily zero-day analysis, and automatic upgrade pull requests. Secrets are scanned across entire Git histories with validity checks, auto-revocation playbooks for AWS, Slack and GitLab, and pre-commit hooks that can block commits; we found no public information on supported ecosystems and lockfiles, the vulnerability database's sources, or VEX output. 3 4 7
The Skeptic
This is the strongest area: SCA with reachability prioritisation, malicious-package detection with quarantine, licence risk per code change, one-click SBOM in SPDX or CycloneDX with VDR, automatic upgrade pull requests, plus secrets scored by validity, scanned across full git history, blockable at pre-commit and auto-revoked on AWS, Slack and GitLab. We found no public information on which ecosystems and lockfiles are supported, the vulnerability database's sources and update latency, or end-of-life flagging. 3 4 7
Developer workflow, quality gates & fixes
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How this is scored
Whether developers see and act on the findings where they work: pull and merge request comments and status checks, quality gates that block a merge on new issues, a focus on new code against a baseline, IDE plugins with the same rules as the server, CLI and CI integrations (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines), pre-commit hooks, triage, suppression and ignore rules with reasons, deduplication, fix suggestions and AI autofix with the model behind it, and scan times.
0 — Findings only in a separate report; no pull request, IDE or CI integration.
3 — A CI step or a dashboard of findings; pull request comments, gates, IDE plugins and triage are basic or not described.
5 — Pull or merge request comments and status checks on the common platforms, a configurable quality gate that can fail a build, a new-code baseline, IDE plugins for the common editors, CI integrations documented, and findings that can be ignored or marked as false positives.
8 — IDE results that match the server rules, gates per branch or project with thresholds per severity, pre-commit or push-time checks, deduplicated findings across tools, fix suggestions or AI autofix as a reviewable change with the model provider stated, and typical scan times documented.
10 — A workflow that keeps noise low on a large team: findings routed to the owning team, every suppression audited with a reason and expiry, autofix with its acceptance rates published, and the gate's behaviour on every supported platform documented with its limits.
The Lead Developer
Even the free plan ships an IDE plugin with real-time detection and in-IDE fix suggestions, DevAI works before CI, pre-commit and pre-push hooks can block or flag commits with secrets, guardrails stop risky patterns merging to main, autofix arrives as safe ready-to-merge PRs, and AI triage runs with the option to bring your own LLM. We found no public information on inline merge-request comments with findings, per-branch gate thresholds, a new-code baseline, suppression rules with reasons, or typical scan times. 1 2 4 7
The Application Security Engineer
Autofix is well evidenced with one-click fix pull requests via the bot, in-IDE suggestions, a pre-CI agent, merge-blocking policies, pre-commit hooks, and Jira and Slack alerting. We found no public information on pull-request comments and status checks per platform, new-code baselines, suppression with audited reasons, scan times, or the model behind autofix, though bringing your own LLM is offered. 1 2 4 5 7
The Engineering Manager
Developer-facing coverage is real: in-IDE real-time detection with fix suggestions, a DevAI agent that works before CI, one-click autofix pull requests ready to merge, guardrails that block risky code from the main branch, pre-commit and pre-push hooks, and assignment and tracking in Jira, across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure Repos. I found no public information on a quality gate on new code with per-severity behaviour, suppression auditing, deduplication or typical scan times, and the model behind autofix is not named — only a bring-your-own-LLM option that consumes no credits. 1 2 4 7
The Platform Engineer
Developers are met where they work: a DevAI IDE plugin with in-editor fixes, a pre-CI agent, one-click autofix pull requests from the Xygeni Bot, pre-commit and pre-push hooks that can block commits carrying secrets, merge-blocking guardrails, Jira tracking and Slack or email alerts. We found no public information on merge-request inline comments on GitLab, a new-code baseline, suppression or ignore rules, typical scan times, or the model behind the hosted autofix. 1 2 4 7
The Product Security Officer
Developers get an IDE plugin with real-time detection and in-IDE fix suggestions, policy guardrails that block risky code from merging to the main branch, pre-commit and pre-push hooks, one-click AI autofix as reviewable PRs, Jira tracking and AI triage. We found no public information on pull-request comments and status checks per platform, new-code baselines, suppression rules, scan times, or the model behind the hosted AI, though customers can bring their own LLM. 1 2 4 7
The Skeptic
An IDE plugin with real-time detection and in-IDE fix suggestions, pre-commit and pre-push hooks that can block commits, merge-blocking guardrails, AI autofix delivered as one-click merge-ready pull requests, and a bring-your-own-LLM option that stops the credit meter. We found no public information on pull-request comments and status checks, gate thresholds per severity, new-code baselines, suppression with documented reasons, scan times, or which model runs AI autofix when you do not bring your own. 1 2 4 7
Platforms, deployment & administration
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How this is scored
How the tool fits the company: the code hosts supported (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps) cloud and self-managed, a self-hosted or on-premise edition or a scanner that runs inside the customer's network, a documented REST API and webhooks, issue tracker integrations (Jira), single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) and SCIM, roles and permissions per project and team, portfolio reports across repositories, audit logs, export of findings (SARIF, CSV), and partner or multi-organisation accounts.
0 — One repository at a time with no integrations and no administration.
3 — A web dashboard and one code host; the API, roles, SSO and self-hosted options are basic or not described.
5 — GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket or Azure DevOps supported, a documented REST API, Jira integration, roles per organisation and project, single sign-on, reports across repositories, and export of findings in a standard format.
8 — Self-managed code hosts supported, a self-hosted edition or an in-network scanner documented, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, granular roles per team, portfolio dashboards with trends, SARIF import and export, and webhooks for findings.
10 — Administration that scales across many teams and business units: every setting reachable by API with parity stated, an air-gapped deployment documented, SSO enforced with SCIM, audit logs exportable to a SIEM, and multi-organisation or partner management.
The Lead Developer
All the hosts my teams use are named — GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure Repos — with multi-SCM support, Jira tracking, a rich API on Enterprise, SAML and Okta single sign-on, a fully configurable on-premise edition, and a scanner that runs over a local folder or inside our own network. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, audit logs, roles per team, webhooks, or export formats such as SARIF. 4 7
The Application Security Engineer
GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure Repos are supported, SAML SSO and an on-premise edition exist at the enterprise tier, the scanner can run over a local folder, and Jira tracking is documented. The rich API is enterprise-only, and we found no public information on roles per team, SCIM, audit logs, SARIF export or webhooks. 4 7
The Engineering Manager
Multi-SCM support, Jira tracking, SSO via SAML and Okta, a rich API (the latter two Enterprise-only), an on-premise Enterprise edition, and a scanner that runs inside our network with only results uploaded give the essentials. I found no public information on roles and permissions per team or project, SCIM provisioning, audit logs, findings export in a standard format, or portfolio dashboards — the trends shown are secrets-exposure and team performance only. 4 7
The Platform Engineer
The pieces my estate needs exist but thinly: an on-premise Enterprise option described only as fully configurable, a scanner that runs locally in our network with only results uploaded and works from a plain folder, multi-SCM support for GitLab, GitHub, Bitbucket and Azure Repos, SAML single sign-on and a rich API — though SSO, the API and third-party ingestion are Enterprise-plan only. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, SARIF export, webhooks, per-project roles or exportable audit logs; the sign-on list names SAML and Okta, not Entra ID. 1 4 7
The Product Security Officer
GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Azure Repos are supported, Jira integrates, SAML and Okta single sign-on and a rich API come with the Enterprise plan, and an on-premise edition exists. The scanner runs inside the customer's network and works over a local folder with only results uploaded, which suits our factory network; we found no public information on roles and permissions, SCIM, audit logs, webhooks or SARIF export. 1 4 7
The Skeptic
Four code hosts are supported and an on-premise edition exists, but the REST API, SAML/Okta single sign-on, anomaly detection and build-security capabilities are Enterprise-plan only — a Team or Business buyer gets none of them. Jira tracking and third-party findings ingested through ASPM are documented; we found no public information on roles and permissions, audit logs, webhooks, SCIM provisioning, or SARIF/CSV export of findings. 4 7 1
Source-code handling, security & compliance
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How this is scored
What the vendor does with the customer's source code and how it holds up in an audit: whether code leaves the customer's network or only results do, where and how long code and findings are stored, whether code or findings are used to train AI models and how to opt out, encryption, the vendor's own certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with their scope, a stated availability or SLA and a public status page, audit logs, and reports mapped to OWASP, CWE, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 or the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
0 — Nothing on how source code is handled, secured or retained.
3 — A security page with general claims; code retention, AI training, certifications and the status page are basic or not described.
5 — How source code is accessed and whether it is stored is described, encryption in transit and at rest, SOC 2 or ISO 27001 stated, a public status page, a statement on whether code trains AI models, and compliance reports mapped to OWASP or CWE.
8 — Code retention periods stated, an option where code never leaves the customer's network, AI features documented with their model provider and an opt-out, certifications with scope and reports available on request, an SLA published, and reports mapped to several standards including PCI DSS or the Cyber Resilience Act.
10 — Source-code handling evidenced end to end: a data-flow diagram of what is sent where, zero retention options, independent audits published with scope, AI processing that can run on the customer's own models, and compliance evidence an auditor can export without asking the vendor.
The Lead Developer
The pricing page states scans execute locally in our infrastructure with no source code uploaded to Xygeni servers — only results — and any file uploaded for auto-remediation is removed immediately after the change, which is exactly the assurance I want for client repositories. Beyond that we found no public information on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, a status page, an SLA, encryption, how long results are retained, or a statement on whether code trains AI models. 7 8
The Application Security Engineer
The source-handling story is unusually explicit: scans run locally in the customer's network, no source code is uploaded and only results leave, and a file uploaded for auto-remediation is removed immediately after the change; automated audit evidence and CIS, OpenSSF and OWASP CI/CD mappings are claimed. We found no public information on certifications with scope, an SLA, a status page, encryption, or whether code or findings train AI models — the pieces a PCI DSS auditor asks for. 1 2 5 7 8
The Engineering Manager
Source-code handling is stated plainly: the scan executes locally in our network, no source code is uploaded, only results, and any file uploaded for auto-remediation is removed immediately after the change; a DPA and a subprocessors page are published. Encryption, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, a status page or SLA, and any statement on whether code or findings train AI models are not described, and the mappings on view are CWE-506 and the OWASP CI/CD Top 10 plus CIS and OpenSSF rather than audit-report mappings. 2 5 7 8
The Platform Engineer
The pricing page states plainly that source code is never uploaded — the scan runs locally in our network and only results are sent, and auto-remediation files are removed immediately after the change — which is exactly our constraint. A data processing agreement and subprocessors page are published, and findings map to CWE-506, the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD risks and CIS/OpenSSF supply-chain checks. We found no public information on certifications, encryption, an SLA or status page, or whether code is used to train the AI models. 1 2 5 7 8
The Product Security Officer
The captured pages answer my central question directly: no source code is uploaded, scans run locally in the customer's infrastructure with only results going to the servers, and the file touched by auto-remediation is removed immediately after the change. A DPA and subprocessors page are published, automated audit evidence and continuous audit readiness are product features, and mappings exist to OWASP Top 10 CI/CD, CWE-506 and CIS/OpenSSF; we found no public information on certifications, encryption, retention of results, an SLA or status page, or whether code or findings train AI models. 1 5 7 8
The Skeptic
The headline fact for an audit: the scan runs locally in your network, only results are uploaded, and an auto-remediation file upload is removed immediately after the change. A DPA and subprocessors page are published and findings map to CWE-506, OWASP CI/CD Top 10, CIS and OpenSSF; we found no public information on ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certifications, encryption, a status page, an SLA, retention periods for findings, or whether customer code or findings are used to train AI models. 7 8 1 5
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where source code, findings, SBOMs, account and usage data are stored and processed, and who the subprocessors are (hosting, AI models used for autofix and triage, vulnerability data sources, email delivery, support and payment tools). Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline. Public vulnerability databases and package registries the scanner queries are part of what the product does and are not counted against it; where the customer's code and findings are stored and who processes them is. A self-hosted edition the customer runs on its own European servers counts as the customer's chain, whatever the vendor's seat.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, subprocessors unnamed, and no data processing agreement offered.
3 — A privacy policy and a data processing agreement exist, but hosting location is unstated or non-EU and the subprocessors are not listed.
5 — EU hosting available and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, but parts of the chain (AI models, support, payment) run through non-EU providers without a stated safeguard.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessors listed with their locations, a data processing agreement published, and security certifications (ISO 27001, SOC 2) stated — or a self-hosted edition documented that keeps code and findings on the customer's own servers.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor including the AI models, or a self-hosted edition with no call home, data export and deletion documented, and certifications published with their scope rather than implied.
The Lead Developer
The company is registered in Madrid, Spain under Spanish law per its legal notice, and the about page links subprocessor and data processing agreement pages; the local-scan architecture and the on-premise edition keep our code on our own side of the chain, with only results going to the vendor. We found no public information on where those results are hosted, which subprocessors process them and from where, or any certifications. 7 8
The Application Security Engineer
The legal notice places the company in Madrid under Spanish law, a data processing agreement and a subprocessors page are published, and scans run inside the customer's network with an on-premise edition at the enterprise tier. Where results and account data are hosted, and who the subprocessors are with their locations, is unknown on the captured pages, so the chain cannot be credited beyond the contracting entity. 7 8
The Engineering Manager
The vendor is a Spanish company, Xygeni Security SL, registered in Madrid under Spanish law, with a published DPA and subprocessors page, and the locally-executed scan keeps source code out of their servers. Where findings and account data are hosted, which subprocessors process them and from where, and any certifications are not shown on the captured pages, so the chain beyond the EU contracting entity remains unproven. 7 8
The Platform Engineer
The local scanner plus the on-premise option keep source code on our own servers, which counts as our own chain, and a data processing agreement and subprocessors page are published. But the captured pages themselves give no hosting location and no subprocessor names or locations, and no certifications are stated, so the data path cannot be confirmed from what was captured; the about page also names an investor and markets in Europe and the USA without locations. 2 7 8
The Product Security Officer
The contracting entity is European, registered in Madrid, Spain, under Spanish law per the legal notice, with a published DPA and a subprocessors page, and the on-premise edition plus in-network scanning keep code on the customer's chain. The captured pages leave hosting of results, the named subprocessors with their locations, and any certification unevidenced, so the chain is only partly proven. 2 7 8
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is European — Xygeni Security SL, registered office in Madrid under Spanish law — and a data processing agreement and subprocessors page are published. But where the uploaded scan results are hosted is not confirmed on the captured pages, and we found no public information on subprocessor locations, including the AI model provider; the on-premise edition could break that dependency, yet its data handling is not described. 7 8
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per developer, contributor, committer or line of code and per plan, how contributors are counted, what the free tier and open-source plan include, which scanners (SAST, SCA, secrets, containers) and features (SSO, self-hosting, AI autofix, compliance reports) cost extra, limits on repositories, scans or lines of code, minimum seats, monthly versus annual terms, and VAT.
0 — No public prices at all; every customer is a sales call.
3 — A starting price exists, but how developers or lines of code are counted and what the add-ons cost is unclear.
5 — Plans are public with their price per developer or per lines of code and main inclusions, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, self-hosting, an extra scanner, AI autofix or the enterprise tier) is unpriced or "contact sales".
8 — Every plan priced publicly with its counting rule (active contributors, lines of code) explained, scanners and add-ons priced, limits on repositories and scans stated, a free or open-source tier with its limits, and monthly and annual terms and VAT treatment stated.
10 — Complete price computability: annual cost derivable for a given number of developers, repositories and lines of code, with every scanner, add-on, self-hosted licence and support level priced and the cancellation and data-export terms published.
The Lead Developer
The contributor counting rule is published in plain words — anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository in the past 90 days counts — which is precisely how a one-off freelancer push could bump the bill, and plans state repository and scan limits alongside a genuinely free tier with no card and no time limit. AI operations are metered in credits with no per-credit price shown, and we found no public information on contributor rates beyond the ten included, monthly figures behind the billing toggle, VAT treatment, or Enterprise beyond a custom quote. 7
The Application Security Engineer
Team is quoted at "€ 3.300/ year incl. 10 contributors" with 100 repos and Business at "€ 5.900/ year incl. 10 contributors" with 300 repos, both with unlimited scans, plus a free tier of 10 repos and 200 scans a month, a clear 90-day-commit contributor counting rule, annual and monthly billing options and stated cancellation terms. The enterprise tier with SSO, on-premise and the optional DAST, Code Quality and API Security modules is a custom quote, AI-credit prices are not stated, and we found no public information on VAT or the cost of contributors beyond the included ten. 7
The Engineering Manager
Plans are public with real figures — Free (10 repos, 200 scans/month, no credit card), Team at €3.300/year including 10 contributors, Business at €5.900/year including 10 contributors — with repo limits of 100 and 300, unlimited scans, annual and monthly billing, a clear counting rule (a contributor is anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository in the past 90 days), usage-based AI credits, a bring-your-own-LLM option and published cancellation terms. But the cost of contributors beyond the included ten, the credit price, the monthly figures, VAT treatment and the Enterprise tier are not stated, so I cannot compute the annual cost for six teams from public pages alone. 7
The Platform Engineer
Prices are unusually concrete: a Free tier of 10 repos and 200 scans a month without a credit card, Team at € 3.300/year including 10 contributors and up to 100 repos, Business at € 5.900/year including 10 contributors and up to 300 repos, a stated counting rule of at least one commit to a scanned repository within 90 days, usage-based AI credits with a bring-your-own-LLM escape, and published cancellation terms. But Enterprise — where single sign-on, on-premise and the DAST, Code Quality and API Security modules live — is a custom quote, contributors beyond ten are unpriced, and we found no public information on VAT treatment. 7
The Product Security Officer
Prices are public with a counting rule: Team at "€ 3.300/ year incl. 10 contributors" with up to 100 repos, Business at "€ 5.900/ year incl. 10 contributors" with up to 300 repos, a contributor being anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository in the past 90 days, plus a free tier of 10 repos and 200 scans/mo without a credit card. AI is priced by usage credits with a bring-your-own-LLM exemption, and cancellation and upgrade terms are stated; the Enterprise tier is a custom quote, the DAST, Code Quality and API Security modules and additional contributors are unpriced, and we found no public information on monthly figures or VAT treatment. 7
The Skeptic
Rare honesty on the counting rule: a contributor is anyone with at least one commit to a scanned repository within the past 90 days, and the free tier's 10 repos and 200 scans a month, the Team and Business repo caps, cancellation and upgrade terms, the AI credit system and the bring-your-own-LLM escape from it are all public. What stops a full computation is what is missing: we found no public information on per-contributor pricing beyond the ten included, the monthly figures, per-credit prices, VAT treatment, or the Enterprise tier beyond "Custom". 7
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Not determined
unverified
Why unverified?Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured. |
— | uncited Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Xygeni
Is Xygeni European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Xygeni as EU-Made.
Where does Xygeni store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 6 Nov 2026.
Does Xygeni have a free plan?
Yes. Xygeni has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 6 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Xygeni?
As of 19 Nov 2026, the panel rates SonarQube (3.5/5), Aikido Security (3.5/5) and Endor Labs (3.5/5) highest among the other 18 Code Security & Quality (SAST/SCA) products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is SonarQube (EU origin, foreign-owned, Switzerland). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Xygeni alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 6 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 12 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 integrations facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 legal fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 pricing fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- We read 8 of the 23 pages we planned to read for this product; the others could not be captured yet. Everything on this page rests on the pages we read. Know more? Tell us
Sources (8)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Features page (SAST) xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Features page (SCA and malicious packages) xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Features page (secrets) xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Features page (CI/CD security) xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Documentation docs.xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Pricing page xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 About page xygeni.io Checked 6 Nov 2026 Details →