Password Management
LastPass
Rest of world Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by LastPass Ireland Limited · www.lastpass.com
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LastPass at a glance
- Vendor
- LastPass Ireland Limited
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates LastPass 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. LastPass, a password manager from LastPass Ireland Limited of Dublin under a US-based group in Boston, scores best on sharing and access control, identity integration, pricing transparency and audit and policy. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 1 Oct 2026 to 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
LastPass, a password manager from LastPass Ireland Limited of Dublin under a US-based group in Boston, scores best on sharing and access control, identity integration, pricing transparency and audit and policy. Judges credit shared folders with per-user permissions, sharing that never reveals the plaintext password, emergency access with an owner-defined wait time, SCIM provisioning against Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, Ping and Google Workspace, FIDO2 passwordless unlock, and three tiers priced at €4.42, €6.50 and €10.00 per user per month billed annually. Security architecture scores sit at 4: the zero-knowledge page names AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA-256 at 600,000 iterations and a master password never stored on their servers, but the trust and compliance centers are referenced without a named auditor, dated certification or published report. The weakest ranges are deployment and portability and sovereignty (1-3, the CISO at 1): judges found no public information on a hosting region, a self-hosted option or a documented export path, and the privacy notice relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers out of the EEA.
Speaks for it
- Sharing grants access without revealing the plaintext password, with per-user permissions, revocation at any time from a sharing center, emergency access after an owner-defined wait time, and automatic revocation when an end-user leaves.
- SCIM-based real-time provisioning and deprovisioning covers Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, Ping and Google Workspace, with group sync into shared folders and policies and FIDO2 passwordless vault unlock.
- The zero-knowledge page names AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA-256 at 600,000 iterations, a separate authentication hash, and a master password that is not stored on their servers.
- Teams at €4.42 (up to 50 users), Business at €6.50 and Business Max at €10.00, all per user per month billed annually, with a feature matrix covering policy counts and single sign-on app limits.
- More than 100 configurable policies at individual, group and organization level, with SIEM export to Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel.
Held against it
- The trust and compliance centers are referenced without a named auditor, dated certification or published report.
- We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released when federated login replaces the master password, or that the vendor cannot derive it.
- We found no public information on a hosting region, a self-hosted option, or a documented product export path.
- Transfers out of the EEA rely on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses, and subprocessor details are available only on request rather than published with locations.
- We found no public information on which events the logs record, on log retention, or on who viewed or copied a shared credential.
Best for
- You need to replace ad-hoc credential sharing with shared folders whose access is revoked automatically when someone leaves the organization.
- Your identity stack already runs on Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, Ping or Google Workspace and you want SCIM provisioning and group sync driving shared folders and policies.
- You want a published per-user price to budget with: Teams at €4.42 (up to 50 users), Business at €6.50 and Business Max at €10.00 per user per month billed annually, with a free trial that requires no credit card.
- You enforce password policy centrally and centralize security reporting in Splunk or Microsoft Sentinel.
Avoid if
- You must present a wholly European data chain: the provider is LastPass Ireland Limited of Dublin, but the group is US-based in Boston, the Data Protection Officer's postal address is in Boston, and transfers out of the EEA rely on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses.
- You need a renewal invoice you can pin down before signing — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- You need a documented exit path or your own infrastructure to run the vault on — deployment and portability scored 2-4, with the captured pages stating only browser, desktop and mobile clients plus an offline mode.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 1.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1.5 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 3 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The zero-knowledge page goes beyond adjectives: AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations, salting, a separate authentication hash, and encryption on the device before upload. We found no public statement of which fields stay unencrypted, no audit by a named firm with a date, and no bug bounty terms, and we found no public information on incident history. The security pages name a trust center and a compliance center, but on the captured pages neither carries a dated certification or report; a pricing page claim of being certified to industry-leading standards names no certification. 6 7 2
The Identity Engineer
The zero-knowledge page gives a real architecture rather than adjectives: AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000 iterations, salting, a separate authentication hash, and encryption on the device before anything is uploaded. We found no public information on which fields such as URLs or metadata stay unencrypted, on a named audit or certification with its date, or on published penetration-test reports — the trust and compliance centers are linked without their contents being shown. 6 7 2 3
The Compliance Auditor
The zero-knowledge page goes beyond adjectives: AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000 iterations and salting, local encryption before upload, a separate authentication hash, and the statement that the master password is not stored on their servers. We found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, and the compliance and trust centers are referenced without a named auditor, certification date or published report; the incident history and post-mortems I would need for NIS2 documentation are not on the captured pages. 2 6 7
The SME Owner
The zero-knowledge security page gives me a real design rather than adjectives: AES-256, PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000 rounds and salting, encryption on the user's device before upload, a separate authentication hash, and the master password never stored on their servers. Beyond that, we found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, on a named independent audit or certification with its date, or on published penetration test results — only Trust Center and Compliance Center references and a general commitment to working with the security community. I can see the model, but not the receipts. 6 7 2
The DevOps Engineer
The zero-knowledge page gives me real architecture — AES-256 with PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations, salting, a separate authentication hash, and encryption on the device before anything is uploaded. What I cannot see is a list of which fields stay unencrypted, and the trust and compliance centers are pointed at without any named auditor, dated certification, or published report; we found no public information on open-source clients, penetration test reports, or disclosed incident history. Solid crypto description, unproven verification. 3 6 7
The Skeptic
The zero-knowledge page names the cipher (AES-256), the derivation (PBKDF2-SHA-256 over 600,000 rounds) and a separate authentication hash, and states the master password is never stored on their servers — more than adjectives. But "certified to meet industry-leading standards" names no auditor, certification or date; we found no published audit report or summary, no statement of which fields remain unencrypted, no bug bounty terms, and no disclosed incident history. 2 6 7
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Shared folders with permissions set per user, sharing that never reveals the plain-text password, revoke-at-any-time from a sharing center, automatic revocation when an end-user leaves, and emergency access with a wait time the owner defines are all documented. The pages stop short of governance detail: we found no public definition of read, edit and manage roles, no documented admin account-recovery mechanism with its key model, and no stated transfer of a leaver's own items as distinct from revoking their access. 8 9 2
The Identity Engineer
Shared folders with per-user permissions, groups, an admin console, sharing that never exposes the plaintext password, emergency access with a configurable wait time, and automatic revocation when an end-user leaves are all documented. We found no public information on an admin account recovery mechanism and its key model, and the permission granularity shown is which items a user may reach rather than distinct read, edit and manage roles. 8 9 10 2
The Compliance Auditor
Shared folders with per-user permission customisation, sharing that hides the plain-text password, revocation at any time from a sharing centre, and emergency access with a defined waiting period are all documented. We found no public information on an admin account recovery mechanism and its key model, on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or on approval workflows; leaver handling appears only as automatic updating and revocation of access. 8 9
The SME Owner
Shared folders with permissions customized per user, sharing that grants access without ever showing the plain-text password, revocation at any time from a sharing center, and automatic updating and revocation of access when an end-user leaves the organization — that covers most of what my forty people need to replace the Excel file. Emergency access with a wait time I define, covering passwords, accounts and secure notes, gives us a route back in when someone forgets the master password. We found no public information on an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, or on time-limited and one-time sharing with outside parties. 8 9 2
The DevOps Engineer
Shared folders with per-user permission customisation, sharing that never reveals the plaintext password, revoke-at-any-time from a sharing centre, emergency access with a wait time I can define, and automatic access revocation when an end-user leaves are all on the record. To go higher I would need admin account recovery documented with its key model, plus time-limited or one-time external sharing and approval workflows, and we found no public information on any of those. Group sync driving policies and shared folders puts this comfortably above the middle mark. 8 9 10 11
The Skeptic
Shared folders with per-user permissions, share and revoke from a sharing center, sharing that never reveals the plaintext password, emergency access with a wait time the owner defines, and automatic revocation when someone leaves are all documented. We found no public information on an admin recovery mechanism with its key model, on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or on approval workflows for sensitive items. 8 9 10 2
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Federated login is documented against named providers — Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, OneLogin, Ping — with SCIM-based real-time provisioning and deprovisioning, group sync that assigns users to shared folders and policies, and passwordless vault unlock through FIDO2-certified authenticators. The question I would have to answer on a bad day is open: the captured pages never describe how the vault encryption key is derived or released when a user arrives through SSO, so I cannot confirm the SSO path keeps the vendor out of the key. We also found no public information on conditional access or device-trust policies on the customer side. 11 10 2
The Identity Engineer
Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, OneLogin and Ping are documented with a SCIM API doing automated real-time provisioning and deprovisioning, group sync that assigns users to policies and shared folders, and FIDO2-certified authenticators for passwordless vault unlock — the leaver-suspension mechanics I run on are there. What I cannot find is any statement of how the vault key is derived or released when federated login replaces the master password, or that LastPass cannot derive it; we also found no public information on product-level conditional access or on passkeys stored as vault items. 11 2 10 3
The Compliance Auditor
Named directories (Active Directory, Entra ID, Google Workspace, OneLogin, Okta, Ping) are supported with SCIM provisioning and real-time deprovisioning, Entra ID group sync drives shared-folder and policy assignment, and FIDO2 passwordless vault unlock is offered. What I cannot document from the captured pages is how the vault key is derived or released under federated login, or any statement that the vendor cannot derive it — a gap that matters for a statement of applicability. 2 11 2
The SME Owner
Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, OneLogin and Ping all federate login, with SCIM-based real-time provisioning and deprovisioning, group sync into shared folders and policies, and FIDO2 passwordless vault unlock — this fits the identity stack I run. What I cannot find is the key model: employees log in with Entra credentials instead of a master password, and we found no public information on how the vault key is then derived or released, or any statement that the vendor cannot derive it. The single sign-on app cap — limited to 3 apps on Business, unlimited on Business Max — means I would read the small print before promising my team anything. 11 2 3 10
The DevOps Engineer
Entra ID federated login that unlocks the vault without a master password, real-time SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning, group syncing that assigns users to policies and shared folders, Okta, OneLogin, Ping, Google Directory and on-premise AD integrations, and FIDO2 passwordless login make a serious identity stack. The one thing I insist on and cannot find is how the vault key is derived or released on the SSO path, since the published key derivation covers only the master-password route. Without that statement I cannot confirm the vendor cannot derive the key under SSO. 6 10 11 2
The Skeptic
Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, Ping and Google Workspace integrations with a SCIM API for real-time provisioning and deprovisioning, group sync driving policies and shared folders, and FIDO2 passwordless vault login are all on the record. The pages say federated login replaces the master password without ever saying how the vault encryption key is then derived or released, and we found no public statement that the provider cannot derive it — the one assurance that matters here. 2 3 10 11
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
More than a hundred enforceable policies at individual, group and organization level, a security dashboard flagging weak, reused and exposed credentials, continuous dark-web monitoring, and SIEM destinations named as Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel are all documented. What an auditor needs is thinner: we found no public information on which events are recorded — above all who viewed or copied a shared credential — on log retention, or on an auditor role that can read logs without reaching the secrets. 10 1 8 2
The Identity Engineer
Policies are the strong suit: more than 100 enforceable at individual, group and organization level from the admin dashboard, a security dashboard flagging weak, reused and old passwords, 24/7 dark-web monitoring, and SIEM centralization to Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel. We found no public information on event logs of item views, copies and permission changes, on log retention, or on compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2 — the compliance and trust centers are referenced without their contents. 2 10 11 9
The Compliance Auditor
SIEM export to named targets Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel, 100-plus policies at individual, group and organisation level, tiered reporting, an admin dashboard, and password-health with 24/7 breach monitoring are evidenced. We found no public information on event logs covering logins, item access and sharing — nothing shows who viewed or copied a shared credential — nor on log retention or compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, so the evidence an auditor would sample is not on these pages. 1 10 13 2
The SME Owner
More than 100 enforceable policies at individual, group and organization level, a security dashboard flagging weak and reused passwords, round-the-clock dark-web monitoring, and SIEM delivery to Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel are all stated publicly. But we found no public information on what the event logs actually record — logins, item views, sharing, admin changes — whether they export, or how long they are retained. For an auditor's questions I would be guessing. 10 2 9 8
The DevOps Engineer
Over a hundred configurable policies at individual, group and organisation level, an admin dashboard with reporting, SIEM centralisation to Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel, and a developer API for reports are documented. We found no public information on which events are captured — logins, item views, copies of shared credentials — on log retention, or on tamper-evidence, and the report API endpoints shown cover billing and admin users rather than audit events. Enforcement is strong; the audit trail itself is undocumented. 10 11 13 2
The Skeptic
A hundred-plus policies at individual, group and organization level, an admin dashboard with reporting, password-health and breach monitoring, and export to Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel for compliance and auditing are documented. We found no public information on which events the logs actually record, how long they are retained, or compliance reporting aligned to a named framework. 8 10 11 2
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Offline vault access is documented and the product ships as a browser extension plus desktop and mobile apps, with no per-operating-system coverage stated. The exit and the ground are otherwise dark: we found no public information on a hosting region or an EU choice, on any self-hosted option, on a status page with incident history, or on a documented export path — the privacy notice confirms an export right but is silent on formats, attachments or one-time passcode seeds. 2 1 3
The Identity Engineer
Offline vault access, a browser extension, and desktop and mobile apps are documented, and the privacy notice grants an export right. We found no public information on an EU hosting region, a self-hosted option, which operating systems the clients cover, what the export preserves, or a status page with incident history. 1 2 3
The Compliance Auditor
Offline vault access and clients as a browser extension plus desktop and mobile apps are stated. We found no public information on a hosting region, a self-hosted or on-premises option, a status page with incident history, or any documented export and import path, so a buyer cannot verify from the captured pages how their data would leave the product. 1 2
The SME Owner
Offline access to the vault is stated, and browser, desktop and mobile apps cover how my people actually work, so an outage should not stop us. But we found no public information on a hosting region, a self-hosted or on-premises option, a status page with incident history, or a documented export path — the only export reference is the privacy-policy right to transfer personal data. I can see how we get in when the service is down; I cannot see the door out. 2 1 3
The DevOps Engineer
The only portability facts on the captured pages are clients as a browser extension, desktop and mobile app, plus an offline mode. We found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises deployment, on a hosting region, on a documented export format and its fidelity, or on a status page with incident history. For anyone who wants to run the vault in his own data centre and leave on his own terms, these pages give me nothing to plan with. 1 2
The Skeptic
Browser, desktop and mobile clients and an offline mode are stated, and that is where the evidence ends. We found no public information on a hosting region, a self-hosted option, a status page with incident history, or a documented export and import path — the right to export in the privacy notice is a legal remedy, not a product path. 1 2 3
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The legal notice names LastPass Ireland Limited in Dublin, which is the one European element I can point to. The group is US-based out of Boston, the privacy notice routes its Data Protection Officer through a Boston postal address and relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers out of the EEA, and we found no public information on where vault data or metadata are hosted. Subprocessor information is offered on request rather than published with locations. 4 3
The Identity Engineer
The legal notice names LastPass Ireland Limited in Dublin while the privacy contact and the group sit in Boston, and the privacy notice relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers out of the EEA, so parts of the chain are non-EU. Vault hosting location is not stated on the captured pages, and subprocessor information is offered only on request rather than published; we found no public information on data residency. 4 3
The Compliance Auditor
The imprint names LastPass Ireland Limited in Dublin as provider while the group is US-based in Boston, the privacy notice relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses to safeguard transfers from the EEA, the Data Protection Officer's postal address is in Boston, and subprocessor details are offered on request rather than published with locations. We found no public information on where vault data and metadata are hosted. 3 4
The SME Owner
The imprint names LastPass Ireland Limited of Dublin as provider, but the group is US-based, the privacy contact is a postal address in Boston, and transfers out of the EEA rely on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses. We found no public information on where vault data or metadata are hosted, and the subprocessor list appears only as something I can request. An Irish signature with an American chain is workable, but it is not something I can present as European. 4 3
The DevOps Engineer
The legal notice names LastPass Ireland Limited in Dublin, but the group is US-based in Boston and the privacy notice relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers out of the EEA. Vault-data residency is not confirmed anywhere on the captured pages, ownership is unstated, and subprocessors are available only on request rather than published with locations. An Irish entity on the contract does not compensate for an unknown region and an unpublished subprocessor chain. 3 4
The Skeptic
The imprint names LastPass Ireland Limited in Dublin as provider, but the privacy notice routes the Data Protection Officer to a Boston address and relies on the Data Privacy Framework and Standard Contractual Clauses for transfers out of the EEA. We found no public information on where vault data and metadata are hosted, and the subprocessor list is available only on request rather than published with locations. 3 4
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
Three tiers are priced publicly — Teams at €4.42 user/month billed annually, Business at €6.50 user/month billed annually, Business Max at €10.00 user/month billed annually — with seat limits and the main feature splits visible, including which tier caps SSO at three apps. The renewal invoice is not fully computable: taxes are only said to be applied at checkout, the asterisk warns promotional pricing may not apply to current customers or partners, account-based support is listed as inquire with sales, and we found no public information on seat minimums. 2 2
The Identity Engineer
Per-user prices for all three tiers are published in euros with a feature mapping that shows where single sign-on sits — limited to three apps on Business, unlimited on Business Max — plus policy counts per tier and taxes applied at checkout. The account-based customer success manager is listed as inquire with sales, and we found no public information on seat minimums or the minimum term beyond annual billing. 2 2
The Compliance Auditor
Three business tiers are priced publicly at €4.42, €6.50 and €10.00 per user per month billed annually, with an unusually detailed feature mapping of policy counts, SSO app limits, storage and reporting per tier. The minimum term and seat minimums are not stated, the top support level is 'inquire with sales', and promotional pricing 'may not apply to current customers or partners', so the renewal invoice cannot be derived from the captured pages. 2 2
The SME Owner
Per-user prices are public with the tier features: €4.42 user/month billed annually for Teams (up to 50 users), €6.50 for Business, €10.00 for Business Max, and the tiers spell out SSO app limits, policy counts and reporting levels, with a free trial that requires no credit card. What still moves the invoice: we found no public information on seat minimums or a monthly-billing price, personal support is 'inquire with sales', taxes are only 'applied at checkout', and the prices are flagged as promotional with separate terms. I can estimate the annual bill for forty users, but I cannot pin it to the cent. 2 2
The DevOps Engineer
Every tier is priced publicly — Teams at €4.42, Business at €6.50 and Business Max at €10.00 per user per month billed annually — with the feature split by tier including SSO app limits, policy counts and reporting levels, and taxes stated as applied at checkout. Beyond that the invoice stops being computable: premium support is account-based on inquiry with sales, and we found no public information on seat minimums or the minimum contract term. Good enough for an estimate, not for a signed budget. 2 2
The Skeptic
All three business tiers carry a public per-user monthly price on annual billing (€4.42, €6.50, €10.00) with a detailed feature matrix covering policy counts, SSO app limits, user caps, storage and support levels. The invoice is still not computable end to end: we found no public information on minimum seats or minimum term, the personal manager support is "inquire with sales", and taxes are only said to be applied at checkout. 2 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about LastPass
Is LastPass European?
No. whats-best.ai classifies LastPass as Rest of world.
Where does LastPass store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does LastPass have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to LastPass?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: LastPass alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 1 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity, Data residency. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 18 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 12 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 11 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 data fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (13)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 +1 earlier capture: 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Legal notice www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Terms of service www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap developer.lastpass.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →