Password Management
Netwrix Password Secure
EU origin, foreign-owned Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by MATESO GmbH · www.passwordsafe.com
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Netwrix Password Secure at a glance
- Vendor
- MATESO GmbH
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Netwrix Password Secure 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Netwrix Password Secure, made by MATESO GmbH of Munich and owned since 2022 by the US company Netwrix, earns its best marks for sharing and access control, scored 6-7: role-based access with machine-learning role mining, self-service access requests with approval workflows, ephemeral time-limited accounts and periodic recertification are stated on the vendor's pages. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Netwrix Password Secure, made by MATESO GmbH of Munich and owned since 2022 by the US company Netwrix, earns its best marks for sharing and access control, scored 6-7: role-based access with machine-learning role mining, self-service access requests with approval workflows, ephemeral time-limited accounts and periodic recertification are stated on the vendor's pages. The weakest scores are 2, for security architecture and identity integration — the site carries pages on end-to-end encryption and a 2019 SySS penetration test, but we found no public information on algorithms, key derivation, which fields stay readable to the vendor, or test results; multi-factor authentication is the only confirmed identity claim, with no public information on single sign-on, directory sync or hardware keys. Deployment and portability spread widest, 4 to 6, between documented self-hosting and unevidenced export fidelity, offline behavior and status history. Sovereignty scores 4-5: a German contracting entity and DACH-region data centers for the managed service, beside a Texas headquarters. Pricing transparency scores 1-2 — no prices published, buying via demo booking and a 14-day full-access trial of Netwrix 1Secure.
Speaks for it
- Self-hosting is documented in three forms — on-premises, private cloud and hybrid cloud — with a dedicated whitepaper.
- Role-based governance — approval workflows, ephemeral time-limited accounts, periodic recertification — is stated on the vendor's pages and scored 6-7.
- Password policy enforcement is concrete: per-account minimum length and complexity, blacklisted weak passwords, rule previews and compliance monitoring.
- The managed service states storage of data in secure data centers in the DACH region.
- Clients cover mobile apps, browser extensions and a LightClient across devices.
Held against it
- Security architecture scored 2, with no public information on encryption algorithms, key derivation or which fields stay readable to the vendor.
- Identity integration scored 2: multi-factor authentication is the only confirmed claim, with no public information on single sign-on, directory sync or hardware keys.
- We found no public information on emergency access, administrator account recovery or key custody when an employee leaves.
- We found no public information on log export, SIEM integration or log retention for the audit logbook.
- We found no public information on a product subprocessor list, standard vault-data residency or certifications such as ISO 27001.
Best for
- You need to self-host — on-premises, in a private cloud or a hybrid cloud — so the vendor sits outside your data path.
- You want governance-heavy sharing: approval workflows, ephemeral accounts and periodic recertification, the top-scoring capability in this verdict.
- You are a business customer buying under German terms and prefer a managed service with DACH-region data centers.
- You enforce granular password policies and want rule previews and compliance monitoring before rollout.
Avoid if
- Your procurement excludes US-parented vendors; the maker has belonged to Netwrix of Frisco, Texas since 2022.
- Your access model runs on single sign-on and directory-driven provisioning; the captured pages confirm only multi-factor authentication.
- You need verified cryptography or recent audit results before trusting a vault; security architecture scored 2 on the evidence shown.
- You are a private consumer; the published terms apply only to businesses.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 1 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 1 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 2 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2.5 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The vendor's site carries dedicated pages on end-to-end encryption and on a 2019 SySS penetration test — more than adjectives — but what we captured names no algorithm, no key derivation and no statement of which fields stay readable to the vendor. We found no public information on the test's results, recurring audits, a bug bounty or an incident history. 6 7
The Identity Engineer
Pages on end-to-end encryption and a 2019 penetration test exist on the vendor's site, but I found no public information on the encryption algorithms, the key derivation, what stays readable to the vendor, audit reports, a bug bounty or incident history. The privacy policy I can actually read is about analytics, chatbots and server log files, not vault cryptography, so I cannot credit more than a hint of an architecture. 3 6 7
The Compliance Auditor
The vendor's pages include an end-to-end encryption page and a penetration-test page referencing SYSS and 2019, but nothing captured from either names an algorithm, a key-derivation scheme, which fields remain unencrypted, or a test result. For an ISO 27001 evidence file this is a page reference rather than architecture, and we found no public information on a bug bounty or disclosed incident history. 6 7
The SME Owner
Security is sold to me in adjectives — "strengste Datenschutzbestimmungen", "Made in Germany", multi-factor authentication — and while the site carries dedicated pages for end-to-end encryption and a 2019 penetration test, we found no public information naming the algorithms, key derivation, the auditor or the test results behind them. I also found no statement of what the vendor can or cannot read in my vaults, which is the first thing I would ask before moving forty people off an Excel file. 1 3 6 7
The DevOps Engineer
The sitemap points to pages for end-to-end encryption and a penetration test, but I found no public information on the algorithms, key derivation, which fields stay unencrypted, or any audit with dates, auditors and results. With no whitepaper content and no open-source code I can read, I have to treat the cryptography as adjectives I cannot verify. 6 7
The Skeptic
Security is sold in adjectives — "Made in Germany", "DSGVO-Ready", protection "gemäß strengster Datenschutzbestimmungen" — and while the site carries pages for end-to-end encryption and a penetration test dated 2019, the captures confirm none of their content: no named algorithms, no key derivation, no statement of which fields stay readable to the vendor. We found no public information on audit reports, a bug bounty, or any incident history; a pentest from 2019 with no captured findings is a claim, not proof, and a silent incident record is itself an answer. 1 4 6 7 13
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Role-based access with machine-learning role mining, approval workflows for access requests, time-limited ephemeral accounts and periodic access recertification are documented, which is genuine governance. We found no public information on emergency access with a waiting period, on the admin recovery mechanism and its key model, or on how a leaver's shared credentials are reclaimed beyond generic lifecycle automation. 1 8 9
The Identity Engineer
Role-based access with role mining, self-service access requests with approval workflows, time-limited ephemeral accounts, group lifecycle automation and periodic access certification are documented, which is more governance than most password tools show. I found no public information on granular vault permissions, on admin account recovery and its key model, or on emergency access, so beyond a generic hire-to-departure workflow claim I cannot verify what happens to a leaver's shared items. 1 8 9
The Compliance Auditor
Role-based governance is well evidenced: RBAC with entitlement management, approval workflows with delegated self-service access requests, ephemeral time-limited accounts, joiner-to-leaver automation and periodic certification of user access rights. We found no public information on emergency access, on the admin account recovery mechanism and its key model, or on hiding a password while still permitting autofill. 1 8 9
The SME Owner
Role governance is real: entitlements matched to roles, access requests with self-service and approval workflows, time-limited ephemeral accounts, lifecycle automation "von der Einstellung bis zur Abmeldung", and sharing with internal and external stakeholders. But we found no public information on administrator recovery of a forgotten master password or on emergency access — my two scariest questions — and no evidence of view-only or hide-the-password sharing. 1 8 9
The DevOps Engineer
Sharing with internal and external stakeholders, role-based permissions with machine-learning role mining, self-service access requests with approval workflows, time-limited ephemeral accounts, periodic access recertification and automated joiner-to-leaver workflows are all stated on the vendor's pages, which is genuinely strong governance. What I cannot find is anything on admin account recovery, emergency access, or the key model that governs a shared credential when someone leaves. 1 8 9
The Skeptic
Roles and governance are heavily marketed: RBAC with machine-learning role mining, entitlement management, self-service access requests with approval workflows, ephemeral time-limited accounts, periodic access certification, and identity automation from hiring to departure. What the captures never approach is the key question — we found no public information on admin account recovery and its key model, emergency access, or key custody when an employee leaves; an entitlement story without a custody story is half an answer. 1 8 9
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Multi-factor authentication is claimed without any method named, and that is the only identity claim in the captured pages. We found no public information on single sign-on with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on how a vault would be decrypted after SSO, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on hardware keys and passkeys. 1 12 13
The Identity Engineer
Multi-factor authentication is the only identity capability I could confirm and even its methods are unnamed; I found no public information on single sign-on with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on SCIM or directory sync, or on FIDO2 hardware keys and passkeys. The vendor's solution catalog lists directory and identity management, but nothing ties the vault itself to my directory, and as the person who must suspend two thousand vaults the day an account is disabled, my central question is unanswered here. 1 2 12
The Compliance Auditor
Multi-factor authentication is claimed and identity lifecycle automation from onboarding to offboarding is described, alongside directory and identity management in the solution catalogue. We found no public information on SSO with named identity providers, on how a vault key is derived or released behind SSO, on SCIM or directory sync, on FIDO2 hardware keys, or on passkeys. 1 2 8 12
The SME Owner
Beyond an unspecified "Multi-Faktor-Authentifizierung" claim, we found no public information on single sign-on with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, on hardware keys, or on passkeys; the captured pages do not show the vault fitting into our identity stack at all. For a forty-person company living in Microsoft 365, that is make-or-break. 1 2 13
The DevOps Engineer
Multi-factor authentication is confirmed and that is all I have; I found no public information on single sign-on with any named identity provider, how the vault would then be decrypted, directory synchronisation for joiners and leavers, hardware keys or passkeys. The identity-management entries on the pricing page describe the vendor's wider platform, not how my users would unlock the vault. 1 2 12
The Skeptic
Multi-factor authentication is the only captured identity claim, repeated across pages with no captured detail on its factors. We found no public information on single sign-on with named providers or how the vault would be decrypted behind it, on directory sync or SCIM provisioning, hardware keys, or passkeys; "Directory Management" appears only as a Netwrix 1Secure catalog entry, not a documented vault capability. 1 2 12
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
A logbook tracks password activities, policies are enforceable down to per-account minimum length, complexity and blacklists with rule previews, and access rights can be periodically recertified. We found no public information on exportable logs or an API, SIEM integration, log retention, password health or breach reports, or compliance reporting an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit could rely on. 8 10 11
The Identity Engineer
There is a logbook to review and track password activities and user interactions, and password policy enforcement is concrete — complexity and minimum length per account, blacklisted passwords, rule previews — alongside continuous detection of segregation-of-duties violations and inactive accounts. I found no public information on exporting logs or an API, SIEM targets, log retention or breach reports, which is exactly what my ISO 27001 auditors will ask for. 8 10 11
The Compliance Auditor
Password policy is genuinely enforceable — per-account minimum length and complexity, blacklisting of weak and known passwords, rule previews and compliance monitoring — and a logbook promises review and tracking of user interactions and password activity. To show who could see a shared credential, we found no public information on log export or SIEM integration, log retention, or whether views and copies are recorded with user and device. 8 10 11
The SME Owner
There is a logbook "zur Überprüfung und Verfolgung der Passwortaktivitäten", genuinely granular password policy — per-account minimum length, complexity, blacklists, compliance monitoring, rule previews — plus periodic access recertification and detection of conflicting permissions and inactive accounts. We found no public information on exporting logs, SIEM integration, log retention, or breach-monitoring reports, so the auditor's half of the story is missing from what I can see. 8 10 11
The DevOps Engineer
A logbook to review and track password activities and user interactions, enforceable password policies — per-account complexity, minimum length, blacklists, categories, compliance monitoring — and continuous detection of segregation-of-duties violations and inactive accounts are stated. I found no public information on exporting or streaming the log, named SIEM targets, retention periods, or breach and health reports that an ISO 27001 or NIS2 auditor would ask for. 8 10 11
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Self-hosting is documented unusually well — on-premises, private cloud and hybrid, with a whitepaper and a high-availability claim — alongside a DACH-region data centre for the managed service, mobile apps and browser extensions. The only export statement we found is the statutory right to machine-readable data; we found no public information on a documented export format and its fidelity, import from named competitors, offline access during an outage, or a status page with incident history. 1 3 12 13
The Identity Engineer
Self-hosting is well evidenced — on-premises, private or hybrid cloud, DACH-region data centres for the managed service, a hosting whitepaper and high availability — with browser extensions, mobile apps and a LightClient. The only export statement is the GDPR right to a machine-readable copy, and I found no public information on offline access during an outage, a documented full-fidelity export path, or which desktop operating systems the clients cover. 1 3 12 13
The Compliance Auditor
Self-hosting is the strong half: on-premises, private cloud and hybrid deployment, a DACH-region datacentre for the managed service, mobile apps, browser extensions and a light client. The leaving half is thin — the only portability statement is the GDPR right to machine-readable delivery, and we found no public information on offline access during an outage, a documented export format or attachments, import from named competitors, or a status page with incident history. 1 3 8 12
The SME Owner
Self-hosting is documented in three forms — on-premises, private cloud, hybrid cloud — with a whitepaper, DACH-region datacenters for the managed service, mobile apps, browser extensions and a LightClient across devices, and the privacy policy grants portability of my data "in einem gängigen, maschinenlesbaren Format". We found no public information on offline access during an outage, a status page with incident history, or a documented export format covering attachments and shared items. 1 3 8 12 13
The DevOps Engineer
Self-hosting is really on offer — on-premises, private and hybrid cloud, DACH-region datacentres for the managed service, a dedicated self-hosting whitepaper and a high-availability keyword — which is the direction I want. But I found no public information on documented backup and high-availability procedures, a client list per operating system, offline behaviour during an outage, or a product export: only the privacy policy's general right to machine-readable data portability, with no statement of what an export preserves. 1 3 12 13
The Skeptic
Deployment choice is the strong half: self-hosting on-premises, in a private or hybrid cloud, backed by a dedicated whitepaper, DACH data centers for the managed service, and a high-availability claim. The portability half rests on the privacy policy's legal promise of machine-readable data — we found no public information on offline access, a status page with incident history, or what an export preserves, and client coverage appears only as "Mobile Apps" and browser extensions. 1 3 8 12 13
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The contracting entity is the German maker in Munich, but the parent has been a US company since 2022 with its Texas headquarters shown on the vendor's own pages, and we found no public information on a safeguard for that ownership. The managed service claims DACH data centres and a self-hosted option removes the vendor from the data path, yet we found no public information confirming vault-data residency as standard, a subprocessor list with locations for the service itself, or certifications such as ISO 27001; the privacy policy names Google Analytics and Hotjar for the website. 1 3 5 8
The Identity Engineer
German commercial terms from MATESO and DACH-region hosting with a self-hosted option pull one way; the product line was acquired by the US company Netwrix in 2022 and the captured pages show a corporate headquarters in Frisco, Texas, which pulls the other. No subprocessor list is published, and the website chain includes Google Analytics and Hotjar, so parts of the chain around the vault remain non-European. 1 3 5 8
The Compliance Auditor
The contracting chain is German on paper — MATESO terms of service, DACH datacentres for the managed service and a self-hosted option — but the parent is the US company Netwrix with headquarters in Frisco, Texas, and we found no public information on a product subprocessor list, on where vault data and metadata sit as standard, or on published certifications such as ISO 27001 or C5. The processors we found named are website analytics and the website hoster, under a processor agreement covering the website rather than vault metadata and logs. 1 3 5 8
The SME Owner
The chain is mixed: hosting is named and German — RAIDboxes GmbH in Münster with a data-processing agreement, DACH datacenters — and the terms bind German MATESO with a 12-month warranty, but the product pages carry a US corporate headquarters in Frisco, Texas under Netwrix, and we found no published subprocessor list beyond privacy-policy mentions of Google Analytics and Hotjar. Self-hosting would take the vendor out of the data path, which softens but does not erase the US parent and the unnamed subprocessors. 1 3 5 8
The DevOps Engineer
Made-in-Germany marketing, German terms of business, DACH datacentres and a self-hosted option sit next to a corporate headquarters shown in Frisco, Texas, and a German maker acquired by a US parent in 2022. I found no public subprocessor list covering vault data or logs — the named processors in the record are website analytics and the hoster of the vendor's own site. 1 3 5 8 13
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is German (MATESO GmbH, per the terms) and the managed service advertises DACH data centers, but the parent is the US company Netwrix with its headquarters in Frisco, Texas, and the vendor's own site feeds Google Analytics with 38-month retention and Hotjar. We found no published subprocessor list with locations for the service; documented self-hosting removes the vendor from the data path, yet the client update channel remains trust placed in a US-owned vendor. 1 3 5 8 12
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pricing page offers a 14-day full-access trial of the wider platform and otherwise shows review scores, support channels and a coming edition, while the product site steers buyers to a demo booking. We found no public information on per-user or tier prices, on which business features sit in which tier, on seat minimums, add-ons, minimum terms or VAT treatment, so no invoice can be computed from public pages. 1 2 9
The Identity Engineer
The captured pricing pages offer a fourteen-day full-access trial and a solution catalogue, and purchase runs through demo booking; I found no public information on per-user prices, tier contents, seat minimums, add-ons or minimum terms. A real annual invoice for my user count cannot be computed from what is published. 1 2 9
The Compliance Auditor
We found no public price figures on the captured pricing pages; what is public is a 14-day full-access trial, demo booking, and licence terms (a simple, non-sublicensable right of use, time-limited when rented, with training sold separately). A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from public pages alone. 1 2 5 9
The SME Owner
We found no price figure for the product on any captured page — not even on the pricing page, which shows the wider Netwrix catalogue — so the real annual cost for forty users is unknowable without a sales conversation ("DEMO BUCHEN"). A 14-day trial "with full access" and terms noting that trainings "separat erworben werden" können are the only pricing-adjacent facts I found, and both are unpriced. 1 2 5 9
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pricing page names solutions and peer-review ratings but no price, tier or seat minimum; the documented path to buy is a demo booking, a 14-day full-access trial, business-only terms, and training sold separately. I cannot compute an annual invoice from the public pages, and that alone keeps this near the bottom for me. 1 2 5 9
The Skeptic
We found no public information on per-user prices, tiers, or seat minimums; the captured buying path runs through demo booking, with a 14-day full-access trial of Netwrix 1Secure as the only pre-sales artifact. Published contract terms — a simple, non-exclusive right of use, a 12-month warranty, training sold separately — describe the licence but not the invoice, and we found no public information on self-hosted licensing, minimum term, or VAT treatment. 1 2 5
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Netwrix Password Secure
Is Netwrix Password Secure European?
Partly. whats-best.ai classifies Netwrix Password Secure as EU origin, foreign-owned.
Where does Netwrix Password Secure store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does Netwrix Password Secure have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Netwrix Password Secure?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Netwrix Password Secure alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Ownership, Data residency, Legal entity. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 10 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 9 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (13)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page netwrix.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Legal notice www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Terms of service www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 11 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 12 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 13 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.passwordsafe.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →