Password Management
PassCamp
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by PassCamp · passcamp.com
Report an error on this page Is this your product? →
Link to this page
Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds.
The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where
that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.
PassCamp at a glance
- Vendor
- PassCamp
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Default not stated; pages mention the EU source, captured 20 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates PassCamp 1.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. PassCamp is a cloud-based password manager from UAB PassCamp, a Lithuanian company; the vendor places vault data on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium and hosts support and email services primarily in Lithuania. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 20 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 21 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
PassCamp is a cloud-based password manager from UAB PassCamp, a Lithuanian company; the vendor places vault data on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium and hosts support and email services primarily in Lithuania. The bench scored it strongest on deployment and portability and on sharing and access control, both clustering at 4: per-item sharing with view, edit and share permissions, an immutable history log, export at any time, and a read-only frozen state of not less than six months after payment stops. Its weakest area is identity integration, 0 to 1 — the only documented second factor is a code sent to a separate device, and we found no public information on single sign-on, directory sync or hardware keys. Audit and policy scored 2 to 3, the per-item history log standing alone with no public information on exportable logs or enforceable policies. Security architecture scored 3 to 4: AES-256, RSA-4096 and SRP 6A are named, but we found no public information on independent audits. Sovereignty spread widest, 4 to 6, over unknown ownership and subprocessor exposure. Pricing transparency sits at 0.
Speaks for it
- Per-item sharing with view, edit and share permissions, recorded in an immutable history log of edits, shares, modification dates and old versions
- Export available at any time, with a read-only frozen state of not less than six months after payment stops to retrieve data
- A disclosed European chain on the vendor's own pages — UAB PassCamp of Kaunas, Lithuania, vault data on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium, support and email services hosted primarily in Lithuania
- A Kubernetes-based platform the vendor says runs on self-hosted instances under enterprise licensing, alongside web, browser-extension and Android/iOS apps
- Named algorithms — AES-256, RSA-4096, SRP 6A — plus a privacy policy that openly lists staff-visible service data such as server logs, billing information, client IP addresses and email addresses
Held against it
- We found no public information on single sign-on, directory sync or provisioning, and the only second factor described is a code sent to a separate device
- We found no public information on exportable admin event logs, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, password health or breach reports, or SIEM integration
- We found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty or incident history, and the white paper is referenced but not shown
- Sharing requires every recipient to hold a PassCamp account, and we found no public information on shared vaults, admin roles, admin account recovery, emergency access or reclaiming a leaver's items
- We found no public information on ownership, a subprocessor list with locations, a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or certifications, and independent sovereignty checks return unknowns
Best for
- You need per-item credential sharing with view, edit and share permissions and an immutable record of every change, in a team where recipients all hold accounts
- Your procurement asks for a European contracting entity and vault data the vendor states is held on servers within the European Union — UAB PassCamp in Lithuania, Google Cloud Platform in Belgium
- You want a licensed, self-hostable option on the table for enterprise deployment rather than cloud service alone
- You put exit terms first — export at any time plus a read-only frozen state of not less than six months after payment stops
Avoid if
- Your team signs in through a corporate identity provider — identity integration scored 0 to 1, and the only documented second factor is a code sent to a separate device
- You must satisfy an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit — audit and policy scored 2 to 3, and we found no public information on exportable event logs or enforceable policies
- You require third-party verification before adoption — security architecture scored 3 to 4, and we found no public information on independent audits or penetration tests
- You need admin account recovery, emergency access or a way to reclaim a departing employee's shared items — we found no public information on any of these
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 2 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 0.5 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 1.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
AES-256, RSA-4096, SRP 6A and zero-knowledge are named, and the master password is described as unlocking the private key that decrypts the data, but the white paper is only pointed to and its content is not evidenced. The only statement of what the vendor can read is a privacy-policy split between encrypted Secure Data and staff-visible Service Data covering server logs, billing information and client IP addresses; we found no field-level statement for vault items or metadata. We found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty, or disclosed incident history. 2 3 4
The Identity Engineer
AES-256 and RSA-4096 are named, the master password is described as unlocking a private key that decrypts data, and the privacy policy candidly lists what their staff can see — server logs, client IP addresses, billing information and email addresses. But the white paper is only pointed at rather than shown, and I found no public information on key derivation, which fields stay unencrypted beyond that service data list, independent audits, penetration tests or a bug bounty. For something I would put in front of two thousand staff that is algorithms without proof. 4 3 2
The Compliance Auditor
AES-256, RSA-4096, SRP-6A and TLS are named, the master-password-unlocks-private-key model is described, the privacy policy states secure data can only be handed over in encrypted form, and a white paper is referenced. We found no public information on independent audits, certifications, penetration tests, a bug bounty or disclosed incidents — the evidence an ISO 27001 or NIS2 file needs. 2 3 4
The SME Owner
AES-256, RSA-4096, SRP 6A and zero-knowledge are named on the security pages and a white paper is referenced, which is more than adjectives. But there is no dated independent audit anywhere, no bug bounty, and no list of which fields like URLs or titles stay unencrypted — only a privacy policy saying server logs, client IP addresses and email addresses are visible to staff. I can't move my team's credentials into something no outsider has ever examined. 2 3 4
The DevOps Engineer
AES-256 and RSA-4096 are named, SRP 6A, zero-knowledge and TLS are described, and the privacy policy draws a clean line between Secure Data the vendor cannot decrypt and staff-visible Service Data such as server logs, IP addresses and emails. A white paper is referenced but its contents are not shown, and I found no public information on key derivation, independent audits, penetration tests, a bug bounty or incident history, so the design rests on the vendor's own descriptions. 2 3 4
The Skeptic
Algorithms are named — AES-256, RSA-4096, SRP 6A — and the privacy policy admits staff can read server logs, client IP addresses and email addresses, which is more candour than most 'zero knowledge' pages show. The white paper, though, is a pointer rather than a published design, and we found no public information on independent audits, certifications, a bug bounty, incident history, or whether item URLs and titles stay encrypted. 'Secure Data we are not capable of decrypting' is a claim nothing captured shows anyone outside has checked. 2 3 4
Sharing, roles & recovery
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Sharing is per item with multi-tier permissions — view, edit, share — backed by RSA asymmetric encryption and an immutable history log of edits, shares, modification dates and old versions, which is more than all-or-nothing folders. We found no public information on groups, admin roles, an admin account recovery mechanism, emergency access, or what happens to a leaver's shared items. Those last items are the ones I need answered in writing before any company-wide rollout. 4 5
The Identity Engineer
Sharing works item by item with view, edit and share tiers, both sides must hold accounts, and there is an immutable history of edits, shares, modification dates and old versions — genuinely better than all-or-nothing folders. What I found no public information on is everything an enterprise needs around it: shared collections, groups and admin roles, admin account recovery and its key model, emergency access, and any offboarding path that reclaims a leaver's shared items. 5 1
The Compliance Auditor
Item-level sharing with view, edit and share permissions is documented, backed by an immutable history log of edits, shares and old versions of shared passwords. We found no public information on admin roles or groups, an admin account recovery mechanism, emergency access, or an offboarding process that reclaims a departing employee's shared items. 1 4 5
The SME Owner
Item-level permissions — view, edit, or share — plus an immutable history log of every edit, share and old version is genuinely better than our Excel file. But I found no public information on admin account recovery when someone forgets the master password, no emergency access, and no offboarding process for reclaiming a leaver's shared items, which are the two things that keep a forty-person company running. That gap is a risk I can't sign off on. 1 4 5
The DevOps Engineer
Sharing is genuinely tiered — view, edit or share — with per-item permission control and an immutable history log of edits, shares, dates and old versions. I found no public information on shared vaults or collections, groups and admin roles, admin account recovery, emergency access, time-limited sharing, or what happens to a leaver's shared items, so governance ends at the individual item. 1 4 5
The Skeptic
Sharing works per item with view, edit and share tiers plus an immutable history of edits, shares and old versions, though the recipient must hold a PassCamp account. We found no public information on shared vaults with admin roles, documented account recovery, emergency access, or offboarding of a leaver's items — and for a company the offboarding story is the sharing story. 1 4 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Two-factor authentication is documented as a code sent to a separate user device, with SRP 6A handling login; we found no public information on single sign-on with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on how an SSO login would decrypt a vault, on directory sync or provisioning of joiners and leavers, on FIDO2 hardware keys, or on passkeys. Without SSO with a documented key model, this vault cannot join the corporate identity stack. 3 4
The Identity Engineer
The only second factor evidenced is a code sent to a separate user device, and each user is an individual account — sharing itself requires every recipient to hold one. I found no public information on single sign-on with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on any key model behind an SSO unlock, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on FIDO2 keys and passkeys, so the joiner-mover-leaver story simply is not on these pages. 3 4 5
The Compliance Auditor
The only identity control evidenced is two-factor authentication that sends a code to a separate device. We found no public information on single sign-on with named providers or how the vault key would then be handled, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on hardware keys and passkeys. 3 4
The SME Owner
The only second factor described is a code sent to a separate device, and I found no public information on SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, on directory sync or SCIM provisioning, or on hardware keys and passkeys. For a company my size, if single sign-on isn't even on the page, it is either gated somewhere I can't see or it isn't there — and either way my users are signing in one by one. 3 4
The DevOps Engineer
Two-factor is documented as a code sent to a separate user device, which is app-code level and the entirety of the evidenced identity stack. I found no public information on single sign-on with any identity provider, SCIM or directory sync, FIDO2 or hardware keys, or passkeys. 3 4
The Skeptic
We found no public information on single sign-on, directory sync or automated provisioning anywhere in the captured pages. The only second factor described is a code sent to a separate device, and we found no public information on hardware security keys or passkeys — every employee unlocks this vault with its own password. 3 4
Audit logs, policies & reporting
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
The history log is immutable and records edits, shares and old versions per shared item, which is a genuine activity record. We found no public information on exportable or API-accessible event logs, enforceable policies for master password, MFA, sharing or export, password health or breach reports, SIEM integration, or any record of who viewed or copied a shared credential. For an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit I would have nothing to hand the auditor. 5
The Identity Engineer
The one audit-like feature is the per-item history log, which records edits, shares, modification dates and old versions and cannot be modified. Beyond that I found no public information on administrative event logs, exportable logs or an API, enforceable master password or MFA policies, password health or breach reports, or SIEM integration — nothing an ISO 27001 auditor could work from. 5
The Compliance Auditor
An immutable history log covering edits, shares and old versions of shared passwords amounts to a basic activity record, but the pages do not evidence who viewed or copied a shared credential. We found no public information on exportable logs or a SIEM path, enforceable policies for master password or MFA, password health and breach reports, or log retention. 4 5
The SME Owner
There is an immutable history log per item showing edits, shares, dates and old versions, which is a start on activity records. But that is not an administrator's audit view — I found no public information on a record of who viewed or copied a shared credential, no exportable event log, and no enforceable master-password or MFA policies. 5
The DevOps Engineer
The immutable history log records edits, shares and old versions per item, but it is a user-facing change trail rather than an administrator's log of logins, item views or admin actions. I found no public information on exportable or API-accessible event logs, enforceable master password or MFA policies, password health and breach reports, log retention, or SIEM integration. 5
The Skeptic
The immutable item history — edits, shares, modification dates, old versions — is a genuine record for whoever shared the item, but it is the only one on show. We found no public information on exportable organization logs, enforceable master-password or two-factor policies, password health or breach reports, SIEM integration, or log retention, so there is nothing here an ISO 27001 auditor could work with. 4 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Hosting is named — Google Cloud Platform in Belgium — a self-hosted Kubernetes option is referenced for enterprise licensing, and export is available at any time including a read-only frozen state of at least six months after payment stops. However, we found no public information on desktop clients, offline access during a vendor outage, a status page with incident history, or the export's format and whether it covers attachments, folders or TOTP seeds. The frozen-state export clause is the one commitment here I would write into the contract. 1 2 4
The Identity Engineer
EU hosting is concrete — a Google Cloud Platform data center in Belgium — alongside a claimed Kubernetes self-hosted option and an enterprise standalone licence, and the frozen read-only state guarantees at least six months to retrieve and export data after payment stops. Clients evidenced are only the web app, a browser extension and Android/iOS apps: I found no public information on desktop applications or offline access, and the export's format and whether it covers attachments and custom fields are not specified. 1 4 2 3
The Compliance Auditor
EU cloud hosting on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium and a Kubernetes-based self-hosted option are both documented, with a web app, browser extension and Android/iOS apps, export available at any time, and a read-only frozen state of at least six months after payment stops. We found no public information on desktop clients, offline access during an outage, a status page with incident history, or what an export actually preserves. 1 2 3 4
The SME Owner
EU hosting in a named Google Cloud data center in Belgium plus a documented Kubernetes self-hosting option is a real deployment story, and the six-month read-only frozen state after non-payment is a decent exit guarantee. However, I found no public information on offline access during an outage, the client list stops at a web app, browser extension and Android/iOS with no Windows, macOS or Linux apps named, and export is promised at any time with nothing said about whether it covers attachments or every item type. 1 2 4
The DevOps Engineer
One homepage sentence says the platform runs on Kubernetes and is easy to run on self-hosted instances, with enterprise licensing and white-label options, but I found no public information on deployment documentation, high availability and backup guidance for self-hosting, or a command-line interface and API for pipelines. Export is promised at any time and a frozen read-only state of not less than six months after payment stops protects retrieval, though I found no public information on the export format and fidelity, offline access, or desktop clients beyond web, browser extension and Android/iOS apps. 1 2 4
The Skeptic
EU hosting on a named Google Cloud data center in Belgium, a self-hosted Kubernetes option for licensed enterprise deployments, web, browser-extension and Android/iOS apps, and a six-month frozen read-only state in which data can still be exported — that exit door is genuinely good. We found no public information on offline access during a vendor outage, desktop clients for Windows, macOS or Linux, or what the export actually contains, and the self-hosting claim comes without documentation. 1 2 4
European sovereignty
panel opinion
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The vendor's pages state a Lithuanian contracting entity (UAB PassCamp, Kaunas), data on servers in the European Union hosted on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium, and customer support and email services hosted primarily in Lithuania. The independently sourced sovereignty attributes return unknowns for jurisdiction, ownership, data residency and subprocessors, so the captured pages give different pictures of the chain, and we found no public information on the parent company, a subprocessor list with locations, a DPA covering metadata and logs, or published certifications. The links I can see are European; the chain above them is dark. 2 4
The Identity Engineer
UAB PassCamp is a Lithuanian company at a Kaunas address, vault data sits in the European Union on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium, and customer support and email services are hosted in Lithuania — a cleaner chain than most. But I found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations, on the parent company or ownership, on a data processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or on any certification, and the hosting provider sits between us and the data. 2 4
The Compliance Auditor
The privacy policy names UAB PassCamp of Kaunas, Lithuania as the contracting entity, holds data on Google Cloud Platform in Belgium, and states customer support and email services are hosted primarily in Lithuania, with secure data only surrenderable in encrypted form. We found no public information on the parent or ownership structure, a subprocessor list beyond the named hosting provider, a data processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs, or published certifications such as ISO 27001. 2 4
The SME Owner
UAB PassCamp is a Lithuanian company, data sits in the European Union on Google Cloud in Belgium, and customer support and email services run primarily from Lithuania — a European contracting entity with European hosting. But the infrastructure itself sits on Google Cloud Platform, and I found no public information on ownership, a subprocessor list with locations, a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or certifications. 2 4
The DevOps Engineer
The contracting entity is UAB PassCamp in Kaunas, Lithuania, vault data sits in a Google Cloud Platform data center in Belgium, and customer support and email services are hosted primarily in Lithuania. I found no public information on the parent company or ownership, on subprocessors and their locations, or on a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, so the chain around this EU core cannot be verified. 2 4
The Skeptic
The vendor's own pages state a Lithuanian contracting entity, EU data on Google Cloud in Belgium and support hosted in Lithuania — and that is the entire chain disclosed. We found no public information on ownership, a subprocessor list, a data processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or certifications; the infrastructure runs on a US cloud provider, whose Belgian data center narrows but does not close what a foreign authority could compel. 2 4
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pages promote enterprise licensed software, white-label offerings and standalone hosting, but we found no public information on prices, tiers, which business features sit in which tier, seat minimums, or minimum terms. Every business purchase here begins as a sales conversation, and I cannot put an unbudgetable line item in front of finance. 1
The Identity Engineer
I found no public information on prices at all — no per-user tier figures, no seat minimums, no add-on pricing, no term or VAT treatment — so an annual invoice cannot be computed from these pages. The only commercial signal is the phrase "Enterprise licensed software, integrable into existing software suite, bundled with other products or hosted standalone" with no figure attached. 1
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages give no per-user price, tier structure, seat minimum, add-on price or term; the closest thing to pricing is the "Buy 1, get 3" marketing line on the homepage. We found no public information from which a buyer could compute an annual cost, or on which business features sit in which tier. 1
The SME Owner
I found no public information on per-user prices, tiers, seat minimums, or where single sign-on and audit features sit — the captured pages speak of enterprise licensed software and a white-label system adapted to complement your processes, which reads as a sales conversation, not a price list. I can't budget a tool I can't price. 1
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pages show no public prices at all — no per-user tiers, seat minimums, minimum terms or VAT treatment — and the enterprise offer of licensed software "adapted to complement your processes" reads as a sales conversation. The only cost-related fact is a frozen read-only state of not less than six months if payment is discontinued. 1 2
The Skeptic
We found no public information on prices — we found no per-user tiers, seat minimums, add-ons or minimum terms on the captured pages. Enterprise licensing is described in prose, and every figure looks like a sales conversation. 1
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about PassCamp
Is PassCamp European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where PassCamp is based.
Where does PassCamp store data?
The default storage location for customer data is not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026. The vendor’s pages mention the EU as hosting location, per the vendor’s page captured 20 Oct 2026.
Does PassCamp have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to PassCamp?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: PassCamp alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 20 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Data residency, Subprocessors, Legal entity. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We found no public information on pricing on the pages we read (passcamp.com, passcamp.com/passcamp-privacy-policy, passcamp.com/security, passcamp.com/secure-password-sharing). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
- 2 data facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 product fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (5)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page passcamp.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Privacy policy — found from the homepage passcamp.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Security / trust page — found from the homepage passcamp.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.passcamp.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.passcamp.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →