Password Management
Password Manager Pro
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by ManageEngine (a division of Zoho Corporation) · www.manageengine.com
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Password Manager Pro at a glance
- Vendor
- ManageEngine (a division of Zoho Corporation)
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Password Manager Pro 1.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Password Manager Pro's public record is thinnest exactly where a vault buyer needs it thickest. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 20 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 21 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Password Manager Pro's public record is thinnest exactly where a vault buyer needs it thickest. Identity integration is the most consistent strength, 3-5: SAML single sign-on with Okta and Azure AD, LDAP, RADIUS, two-factor authentication and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey are documented. Sovereignty is the record's floor, 1: the pages name Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd. as copyright holder, ManageEngine a division of Zoho Corp., while data residency and subprocessor exposure are recorded as unknown. Security architecture scored 1-2 — compliance badges (NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS, NIS2), but we found no public information on the vault's encryption or key management. Pricing transparency scored 2-3: the never-expiring free edition for 50 users and the 30-day trial are public, but we found no public per-user price. The judges genuinely split on audit and policy, 2-7, and deployment and portability, 2-6 — higher scores credited over 200 schedulable reports and the on-premises option with its US$395 failover add-on, while lower scores held that the captured evidence describes the vendor's AD-auditing and desktop products, not the vault.
Speaks for it
- SAML single sign-on with Okta and Azure AD, LDAP, RADIUS, two-factor authentication and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey are publicly documented.
- On-premises and cloud deployment are both documented, alongside a failover and secure gateway add-on at US$395 and a disaster-recovery module.
- A free edition carrying all Standard Edition features for 50 users never expires, and the 30-day trial is fully functional with no credit card required.
- More than 200 preconfigured, schedulable reports exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV and HTML cover SOX, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, FISMA and GLBA compliance sets and an ISO/IEC 27001:2022 control mapping.
- Custom roles, a request-access workflow and periodic access certification campaigns are documented in the vendor's portfolio pages.
Held against it
- We found no public information on the vault's encryption algorithm, key derivation, a security whitepaper or what the vendor itself can read; security architecture scored 1-2.
- Data residency, subprocessor exposure, ownership and the contracting entity's jurisdiction are recorded as unknown; sovereignty scored 1.
- We found no public per-user price for any paid edition, seat minimums or contract term, so an annual invoice cannot be computed from the captured pages.
- Much of the captured sharing, audit and deployment documentation describes the vendor's device-control, analytics, key-manager and AD-auditing products rather than the vault.
- We found no public information on how a vault is decrypted after single sign-on, on SCIM provisioning, on automated suspension when a user is deprovisioned, or on admin account recovery and emergency access.
Best for
- Your sign-in stack runs on Okta or Azure AD and you value phishing-resistant MFA — identity integration is the most consistent strength at 3-5.
- You want to choose your hosting — on-premises and cloud deployment are both documented, with the US$395 failover and secure gateway add-on for high availability.
- You have up to 50 users — the free edition never expires and carries all Standard Edition features.
- You want to evaluate before committing — the 30-day trial is fully functional, with no credit card required and free 24*5 technical support.
Avoid if
- You must verify the encryption design before buying — we found no public information on algorithms, key derivation or a whitepaper, and security architecture scored 1-2.
- Your procurement requires data-residency and subprocessor facts up front — those attributes are recorded as unknown and sovereignty scored 1.
- You need to budget an annual invoice before signing — we found no public per-user price for any paid edition, and pricing transparency scored 2-3.
- You need evidence that speaks to the vault itself — the captured sharing, audit and deployment pages document sibling products, and the bench split 2-7 on audit and policy over exactly this.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 1 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 1.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 2.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 0.5 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 1.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The captured pages name no encryption algorithm, publish no security whitepaper and make no statement of which fields are encrypted on the device or what the vendor can read; the assurance on offer is a general compliance commitment with downloadable certificates and framework names (NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS, NIS2) with no auditor, date or result attached. We found no public information on penetration tests, a bug bounty, or disclosed incident history for the password manager. 1 2
The Identity Engineer
The only posture evidence is a compliance-commitment page with downloadable but unnamed certificates, and framework lists (NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS, NIS2) that address customers' own compliance rather than the vendor's design. I found no public information on encryption algorithms, key derivation, which fields stay unencrypted, independent audit results, a bug bounty or incident history. That is framework names with no architecture behind them. 1 2
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages offer a compliance page promising downloadable certificates and a list of frameworks — NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS, NIS2 — but I found no public information on the encryption design: no algorithm, no key model, no whitepaper and no statement of what the vendor itself can read. I also found no public information naming an auditor, an audit date or a result. 1 2
The SME Owner
The captured pages list compliance frameworks — NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS, NIS2 — and point to downloadable certificates, but there is no architecture here: no named encryption algorithm, no key model, and no statement of what the vendor can read. I found no public information on independent audits with auditors and dates, a bug bounty, or incident history. 1 2
The DevOps Engineer
We found no public information on the encryption algorithms, key derivation, which fields stay unencrypted, a security whitepaper, a dated audit by a named firm, a bug bounty, or incident history; the closest the pages come is a compliance page with downloadable certificates and framework badges such as NIST, HIPAA, PCI DSS and NIS2. Badges without an architecture I can read are worth little to me. 1 2 6
The Skeptic
We found no public information on the encryption model for Password Manager Pro — no algorithms, no key derivation, no audit of the vault, and no statement of what ManageEngine can read. What the pages do offer is a corporate compliance-certificates page with downloadable certificates and framework claims on a self-service password product's page, neither of which evidences the vault's design; we found no public information on penetration tests, bug bounties or incident history either. 1 2
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
User roles with mapped permissions, custom roles beyond the predefined set, an access-request workflow and periodic access certification campaigns are documented — but on pages for other products in the vendor's portfolio, not the vault. We found no public information on shared vaults or collections, view-only or time-limited sharing, admin account recovery with its key model, emergency access, or offboarding that reclaims a leaver's credentials. 3 4 7
The Identity Engineer
Granular custom roles, an administrator with full control, shared tables with write permissions, a request-access flow and periodic access certification campaigns are all documented — but on pages for the vendor's device-control, analytics and AD-management products. For the password vault itself I found no public information on shared vault permissions, view-only or time-limited sharing, admin account recovery and its key model, or what happens to a leaver's shared credentials. 3 4 7
The Compliance Auditor
Custom roles with a documented permission matrix, a request-access workflow and shared views governed by write permissions are evidenced — though these pages document the device-control and analytics products rather than a password vault. I found no public information on view-only or time-limited sharing, admin account recovery, emergency access, or how a leaver's shared credentials are reclaimed. 3 4 7
The SME Owner
The pages show a real permission model — custom roles, an administrator with full control, even periodic access certification campaigns — but it governs administration of the vendor's endpoint and directory tools, and the sharing described is analytics dashboards with a request-access button. For what I actually need — shared password vaults with read and edit permissions, an admin recovery path when someone forgets the master password, and handover of a leaver's credentials — I found no public information. 3 4 7
The DevOps Engineer
Granular custom roles, role-based delegation, periodic access certification campaigns and rule-based deprovisioning automation for leavers are documented, and the analytics product shows shared views with write-permission control. We found no public information on view-only or time-limited sharing of credentials, emergency access, or an admin recovery mechanism with its key model, and the role documentation captured sits in the device-control product rather than a vault guide. 3 4 7
The Skeptic
We found no public information on shared vaults, admin account recovery, emergency access or offboarding for Password Manager Pro; the role and sharing pages captured document a device-control product and an analytics product instead. The only thing keeping this off the floor is portfolio documentation of custom roles beyond the predefined ones and an administrator role with full control across reports, users and settings. 3 4
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SAML single sign-on with Okta and Azure AD, plus LDAP, RADIUS and two-factor authentication, is documented down to service-provider configuration, and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey are listed. We found no public information on how the vault is decrypted after a single sign-on unlock, on SCIM or directory sync, or on automated suspension when a user is deprovisioned. 2 5
The Identity Engineer
SAML single sign-on is documented out of the box for Okta and Azure AD — service-provider role, IdP metadata import, enable toggle — alongside LDAP, RADIUS, two-factor options, AD-imported users, and phishing-resistant MFA with FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey. Those pages describe Key Manager Plus and the self-service password product, and I found no public information on how a vault key is derived or released at SSO unlock, or on SCIM and directory sync that would suspend a leaver's vault when the account is disabled. As the person who owns joiner-mover-leaver, that silence decides it. 5 2
The Compliance Auditor
SAML single sign-on with Okta and Azure AD is documented down to metadata auto-fill, alongside LDAP, RADIUS, two-factor authentication and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys and YubiKey. What decides it for me is that I found no public information on how the vault is decrypted after a single sign-on, nor on SCIM provisioning or automated suspension of vault access on deprovisioning. 5 2 7
The SME Owner
SAML single sign-on with Okta and Azure AD is documented down to the identity-provider metadata autofill, alongside LDAP, RADIUS and phishing-resistant MFA with FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey — the strongest area for me. But the pages never say how a vault is decrypted after single sign-on, and I found no public information on SCIM or directory sync that provisions and deprovisions users automatically. 2 5
The DevOps Engineer
SAML SSO with Okta and Azure AD is documented with the product as service provider and IdP metadata auto-fill, alongside LDAP, RADIUS, two-factor authentication and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released after an SSO sign-in, on SCIM provisioning, or on automated suspension when a user is deprovisioned. 2 5
The Skeptic
SAML SSO with Okta and Azure AD, two-factor authentication, and phishing-resistant methods including FIDO passkeys, biometrics and YubiKey are documented — on a key-manager help page and a self-service password page — but we found no public information on how a vault is then decrypted after SSO. We also found no public information on SCIM or directory sync provisioning, and nothing tying any of this to Password Manager Pro itself. 2 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
More than 200 preconfigured, schedulable reports exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV or HTML, ISO 27001 control mapping and NIS2 alignment are evidenced — for the vendor's Active Directory auditing and management products rather than the vault. We found no public information on the password manager's own record of who viewed or copied a credential, on SIEM integration targets, on log retention, or on an enforceable master-password policy. 2 6 7
The Identity Engineer
The reporting evidence is real: over 200 preconfigured reports, schedulable and exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV or HTML, compliance report lists for SOX, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, FISMA and GLBA, an ISO 27001:2022 control mapping, real-time risk scoring and role-based access control. It all documents the vendor's AD auditing and management products rather than the vault; I found no public information on vault item-access logs, records of who viewed or copied a shared credential, SIEM integration targets or log retention. 6 7 2
The Compliance Auditor
This is the strongest part of the record: more than two hundred schedulable reports exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV and HTML, compliance report lists for SOX, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, FISMA and GLBA, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 controls mapped, access certification campaigns and enforceable password and MFA policies. But every logged event I can find is an Active Directory or file-server event — I found no public information on logs of vault item views or copies, on a named SIEM export target, or on log retention. 6 7 2
The SME Owner
There is serious audit machinery here: over two hundred preconfigured, schedulable reports exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV or HTML, mapped to SOX, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, NIS2 and ISO 27001:2022, plus access certification campaigns and automated deprovisioning workflows. But those reports watch Active Directory and endpoints; I found no public information on logs of who viewed or copied a shared credential, enforceable vault policies, or SIEM integration for the password vault itself. 2 6 7
The DevOps Engineer
More than 200 preconfigured schedulable reports exportable to PDF, XLS, CSV and HTML, compliance report sets for SOX, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, FISMA and GLBA, an ISO/IEC 27001:2022 control mapping, real-time risk scoring, access certification campaigns and 24x7 monitoring with email alerts give an auditor real material. We found no public information on SIEM integration with named targets, log retention, or a record of individual views and copies of shared credentials. 2 6 7
The Skeptic
The audit evidence captured is abundant but belongs to Active Directory auditing products — more than 200 exportable, schedulable compliance reports aligned to SOX, HIPAA, PCI DSS, FISMA, GLBA and ISO 27001, plus access certification campaigns. We found no public information on event logs of vault access, enforceable password-manager policies, log retention or SIEM integration for Password Manager Pro. 2 6 7
Hosting choice, offline access & export
panel disagrees
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
On-premises and cloud deployment models are documented, alongside a failover and disaster-recovery module and a US$395 failover and secure gateway add-on, with Android and iOS apps listed for a sibling product. We found no public information on an EU cloud region, a status page with incident history, offline vault access during an outage, or any documented export and import path for vault data. 2 5 8 9
The Identity Engineer
On-premises and cloud deployment are both offered, a failover and secure gateway add-on is priced at US$395, disaster recovery is documented, and Android and iOS apps exist. The offline pages describe OS image deployment over WinPE, PXE and bootable media rather than offline vault access, and I found no public information on a documented export and import path for vault data or on desktop clients. 8 9 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
On-premises and cloud deployment models are both documented, a high-availability failover add-on is stated at US$395, and mobile apps exist — though the offline pages describe OS image deployment rather than offline vault access. I found no public information on an EU cloud region, a status page, or a documented export and import path for vault data. 8 9 2 5
The SME Owner
Both on-premises and cloud deployment are offered, with Android and iOS apps and a REST API, and on-premises genuinely matters to me. The offline content captured is about OS deployment boot media rather than vault access during an outage, and I found no public information on a documented export and import path for vault data, data residency choice, or desktop and browser client coverage for the vault. 2 5 8 9
The DevOps Engineer
On-premises and cloud deployment are both documented, high availability and disaster recovery are explicit — a failover add-on with load balancing and secure gateway at US$395, a failover service and disaster-recovery module, backup and recovery listed, plus a RESTful API. We found no public information on offline vault access during an outage, a documented export format for vault contents, desktop and browser client coverage, or a status page with incident history. 2 5 6 8
The Skeptic
On-premises and cloud deployment models are documented, but the captured pages describe operating-system image deployment in a desktop-management product rather than the vault. We found no public information on hosting regions for the password manager, offline access, its client coverage across platforms, or its export and import path. 8 9
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
Copyright is held by Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and ManageEngine is stated to be a division of Zoho Corp., with no EU contracting entity named anywhere in the captures; we found no public information on hosting location, a subprocessor list, a data-processing agreement, or EU certifications. The only lever in evidence is the on-premises deployment option, which would remove the vendor from the data path, though it is documented for another product in the portfolio. 1 8
The Identity Engineer
The pages name Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd. as the entity, with ManageEngine a division of Zoho Corp., but state no hosting region, no subprocessors and no jurisdiction for the contracting entity. I found no public information on EU hosting, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, or any safeguard for the data chain. 1 8
The Compliance Auditor
The corporate chain in the captured pages runs to ManageEngine as a division of Zoho Corp., copyright Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd., and beyond that everything a sovereignty assessment needs is absent: I found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, on where vault data or metadata are hosted, or on any subprocessor. The documented on-premises deployment is the only mitigation I can evidence. 1 8
The SME Owner
Everything visible on the pages runs through Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd., with ManageEngine a division of Zoho Corp., and the captured pages state nothing about where vault data is hosted or name a single subprocessor. The one mitigation I can see is the on-premises deployment option; otherwise this chain is opaque to a European buyer. 1 8
The DevOps Engineer
The parent is identifiable — Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd., with ManageEngine a division of Zoho Corp. — but we found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, on where vault data and metadata are hosted, on the subprocessor chain, or on a DPA covering logs and metadata. An India-focused DPDPA readiness note is the only regional signal in the pages. 1 5
The Skeptic
The only confirmed facts are corporate: the copyright and contracting entity Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd., the parent Zoho Corp., and a marketing page about India's DPDPA. We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction beyond the copyright notice, data residency, hosting locations or the subprocessor list — the sovereignty review records every one of these as unconfirmed on the vendor's own captured pages. 1
Pricing transparency
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
A never-expiring free edition for 50 users, a 30-day fully functional trial with no credit card required, and a US$395 failover and secure gateway add-on are public, and the Professional edition's added features are listed. We found no public information on per-user prices for any paid edition, seat minimums, minimum terms or VAT treatment, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 2 6 7
The Identity Engineer
Editions are named and partly differentiated — a free edition with all Standard Edition features for 50 users that never expires, Professional adding conditional access and logon-screen password reset, and a failover and secure gateway add-on at US$395 — plus a 30-day fully functional trial with no credit card. No per-user tier price, seat minimum, minimum term or VAT treatment appears on the captured pages, so a real annual cost cannot be worked out from them. 2 6 7
The Compliance Auditor
A free edition for 50 users that never expires, a 30-day fully functional trial with no credit card required, and a US$395 failover add-on are stated, with Standard and Professional editions named and partly differentiated. But I found no public information on a per-user price for any paid edition, seat minimums or contract term, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from the captured pages. 2 6 7
The SME Owner
The pages state a never-expiring free edition covering all Standard Edition features for 50 users, a 30-day fully functional trial with no credit card, and a US$395 failover and secure gateway add-on — but no per-user price for any paid tier. I cannot compute what my forty people would pay, nor see where single sign-on and directory features sit; I found no public information on seat minimums or minimum terms. 2 6 7
The DevOps Engineer
Public numbers exist — a free edition carrying all Standard Edition features for 50 users that never expires, the failover and secure gateway add-on at US$395, and a 30-day fully functional trial with no credit card required — but we found no public per-user tier prices, no statement of which tier carries SSO, SCIM, audit logs or self-hosting, and no public information on seat minimums or the minimum term; the Professional edition's extras are listed without a price. 2 6 7
The Skeptic
We found no per-user tier price for Password Manager Pro on the captured pages; the prices that do appear — a US$395 failover add-on, a never-expiring free edition for 50 users, and a 30-day trial with free 24*5 support and no credit card required — sit on other products' pages. We found no public information on which tier carries SSO, SCIM or audit capabilities for the evaluated product, so a buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from what is captured. 2 6
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Password Manager Pro
Is Password Manager Pro European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Password Manager Pro is based.
Where does Password Manager Pro store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026.
Does Password Manager Pro have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 20 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Password Manager Pro?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Password Manager Pro alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 20 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 22 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 5 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
Sources (9)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Security / trust page — found from the homepage www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 7 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 8 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →
- 9 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap www.manageengine.com Checked 20 Oct 2026 Details →