Password Management
Psono
EU-Made Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by esaqa GmbH · psono.com
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Psono at a glance
- Vendor
- esaqa GmbH
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Psono 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Psono, an open-source, self-hostable password manager from esaqa GmbH of Vorra, Germany, scores highest on deployment and portability, 5 to 7: self-hosting is free of charge with Docker images and Community and Enterprise installation guides, and clients span Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, iOS, three browser stores, a web client and a CLI. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 15 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Psono, an open-source, self-hostable password manager from esaqa GmbH of Vorra, Germany, scores highest on deployment and portability, 5 to 7: self-hosting is free of charge with Docker images and Community and Enterprise installation guides, and clients span Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, iOS, three browser stores, a web client and a CLI. Security architecture follows at 4 to 6 — Curve25519 and Salsa20 through NaCl, scrypt derivation, three transport layers with perfect forward secrecy, on a publicly auditable codebase — but the audits described are the vendor's own internal reviews, and we found no public information on an independent audit, bug bounty or incident history. Weakest is sharing and access control at 2 to 4: password sharing is named as a feature while no public information appears on permission models, admin recovery or a leaver's shared items. Sovereignty scores 3 to 4: the hosted service runs on AWS and Google Cloud with Cloudflare and no region stated. Identity integration is a flat 4, SSO included up to 10 users, and the judges did not materially split on any criterion.
Speaks for it
- Self-hosting is free of charge for on-premises use, with Docker images and dedicated Community and Enterprise installation guides
- Client coverage spans desktop, mobile, three browser extension stores, a web client and a CLI, with signed APT and RPM repositories and a direct Android APK
- The security page names concrete cryptography — Curve25519 and Salsa20 through NaCl, scrypt derivation, three transport layers with perfect forward secrecy — on a publicly auditable codebase
- All business features, including SSO over LDAP, SAML and OIDC, audit logging and the SSH, RDP and VNC gateway, are free up to 10 users
- Self-hosting takes the vendor out of the data path entirely, which judges identified as the strongest sovereignty lever here
Held against it
- We found no public information on a permission model for shared secrets — view-only or time-limited sharing, admin account recovery, or what happens to a leaver's shared items
- The only audits described are the vendor's own internal code reviews, and we found no public information on an independent audit with a named firm, a bug bounty or incident history
- Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement appear as feature names, with no public information on which events are recorded, log export, retention or SIEM integration
- The cloud service runs on AWS and Google Cloud with Cloudflare in front and no region stated, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list or a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs
- The documented backup path is a simple text-file function, with no public information on whether attachments and all item types survive an export or on offline access during an outage
Best for
- You want to run the password manager on your own infrastructure: on-premises hosting is free of charge with Docker images and Community and Enterprise installation guides, and the codebase is publicly auditable
- Your team is 10 users or fewer: all business features, including SSO over LDAP, SAML and OIDC, audit logging, policies and the SSH, RDP and VNC gateway, are free up to 10 users
- Your users and pipelines span platforms: desktop apps for Windows, macOS and Linux from signed repositories, mobile apps with a direct APK, extensions across Chrome, Firefox and Edge, a web client and a CLI for CI workflows
Avoid if
- You need documented rights around shared secrets — view-only access, time limits, admin recovery, a leaver's items: sharing and access control scored 2 to 4 and we found no public information on a permission model
- You must show an ISO 27001 or NIS2 assessor documented audit coverage: audit and policy scored 3 to 4, with audit logging named as a feature but no public information on which events are recorded or whether logs export to a SIEM
- You need a documented full-fidelity exit: the documented backup is a simple text-file function, and we found no public information on whether attachments and all item types survive an export or on offline access during an outage
- You need to compute an annual invoice above 10 users: Psono SaaS and Psono Enterprise Edition are governed by separate agreements, and we found no public prices for either
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2.5 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 1.5 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 2 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security page names real cryptography — Curve25519 and Salsa20 via NaCl, scrypt key derivation, client-side encryption in the browser — and the codebase is publicly auditable, which is more than most vendors publish. But the only audits described are the vendor's own internal code reviews and automated scans; we found no public information on an independent penetration test by a named firm with a date, a bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, a statement of which fields stay unencrypted, or any documented incident history. 5 1
The Identity Engineer
The security page names the actual design — Curve25519 and Salsa20 via NaCl, scrypt deriving the datastore key in the browser, a three-layer transport scheme with perfect forward secrecy — and the full codebase is open for anyone to review, which I rate highly. What I found no public information on is independent verification: no named audit firm, no dated penetration test, no bug bounty, and the checks described are the vendor's own pipeline and manual approvals. I also found no field-level statement of what sits outside the client-side layer, only that the server encrypts items like the email address at rest. 5 1
The Compliance Auditor
The security page is a genuine architecture document — Curve25519 and Salsa20 through NaCl, scrypt derivation from the password, a three-layer transport design with perfect forward secrecy, encryption of private data at rest — sitting on an open, publicly auditable codebase. What I cannot file is the external half: we found no public information on an independent audit or certification with a named auditor and date, a bug bounty or disclosure policy, documented incident history, or a statement of which fields such as URLs and metadata stay outside the client-side encryption. 1 5
The SME Owner
The security page names real cryptography — Curve25519 and Salsa20 through NaCl, scrypt key derivation, three encryption layers with perfect forward secrecy — and the whole codebase is publicly auditable, which is far more than adjectives. What I could not find is any independent audit or certification with a date, a bug bounty, disclosed incident history, or a clear statement of which fields such as URLs stay readable to the server. 5 1
The DevOps Engineer
The security page names the real primitives — Curve25519 and Salsa20 via NaCl, scrypt for the datastore key, a three-layer model with an intermediate tunnel, TLS 1.2 and perfect forward secrecy — and the whole codebase is publicly auditable, which is exactly how I prefer to verify crypto claims. What I found no public information on is any independent penetration test, certification, bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, or disclosed incident history; the audits described are the vendor's own internal code reviews, backed by nightly scans that block vulnerable releases. 5 1
The Skeptic
The security page names its primitives — Curve25519 and Salsa20 through NaCl, scrypt for the datastore key, three transport layers with perfect forward secrecy — and the complete codebase is public, so the cryptography can actually be read. But every audit described is the vendor reviewing its own code, and we found no public information on an independent audit with a named firm and date, a bug bounty or disclosure policy, or any incident history. The email address, meanwhile, is encrypted by the application server itself, a key that stays with the vendor. 1 5
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Password sharing is claimed as a feature alongside policies and audit logging, but we found no public information on permission granularity, roles, admin account recovery, emergency access, or what happens to a leaver's shared credentials. Sharing with no documented recovery path is a liability I cannot underwrite. 1
The Identity Engineer
Password sharing is listed among the core features and policies appear as a label, but the captured pages give no permission model: I found no public information on read, edit or manage rights, view-only or time-limited sharing, or an admin recovery mechanism and its key model. For my offboarding process I found no public information on what happens to a leaver's shared items, and emergency access is likewise unevidenced. 1
The Compliance Auditor
Password sharing, passkeys and policies appear as homepage features, but we found no public information on roles or permission levels, view-only or time-limited sharing, account recovery, or how a leaver's shared items are transferred. In an ISO 27001 file I could not answer who could see a shared credential last quarter from anything published here. 1
The SME Owner
Password sharing is listed as a feature alongside policies and compliance enforcement, but we found no public information on vault-level permissions, roles, admin account recovery, emergency access, or how a leaver's shared credentials are handed over — exactly the things my Excel-file problem needs solved. 1
The DevOps Engineer
Password sharing and multifactor authentication are listed as open-source edition features, but I found no public information on vault-level permissions, roles, view-only or time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, or what happens to a leaver's shared items. A sharing feature with no documented permission model is not something I would hand a company's credentials to. 1
The Skeptic
Password sharing appears as a feature alongside policies, compliance enforcement and a gateway for SSH, RDP and VNC, yet no captured page describes what a recipient of a shared secret can do with it. We found no public information on role-based permissions, view-only or time-limited sharing, the key model behind admin account recovery, emergency access, or how a departing employee's shared items are reclaimed. 1 4
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SSO via LDAP, SAML and OIDC is offered even in the free tier and multifactor authentication is claimed, and passkeys are supported in the browser extension. But we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released after an SSO sign-in, and no evidence of SCIM or directory sync, hardware-key MFA, or passkey-based vault unlock. 1 6
The Identity Engineer
This is the criterion I care about most and it lands in the middle: SSO via SAML, OIDC and LDAP ships in the free tier, and passkeys appear in the extension feature list. But the pages describe scrypt deriving the vault key from the master password while staying silent on how the key is derived or released when sign-in goes through my identity provider, and I found no public information on SCIM, automated suspension on deprovisioning, or FIDO2 and hardware keys as an MFA option. The extension advertises passkeys as a stored credential type; I could not confirm from these pages that a passkey unlocks the vault itself. 1 5 6
The Compliance Auditor
SSO through LDAP, SAML and OIDC ships with all business features free up to 10 users, and the browser extension documents passkey support. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released for an SSO unlock, on SCIM or directory-based provisioning of joiners and leavers, or on multifactor options beyond a single feature bullet, so hardware security keys are unconfirmed. 1 5 6
The SME Owner
SSO via LDAP, SAML and OIDC is available and free up to 10 users, which is refreshingly not buried two tiers up, and multifactor authentication and passkeys in the browser extension are both mentioned. But we found no public information on how the vault key is derived after an SSO login, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on hardware-key MFA. 1 6
The DevOps Engineer
SSO over LDAP, SAML and OIDC ships even in the free tier up to 10 users, and the browser extension handles passkeys, which is a respectable start. But I found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock, on SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or on MFA options such as hardware security keys. 1 6
The Skeptic
SSO over LDAP, SAML and OIDC ships even in the free tier and the browser extension handles passkeys, which is a genuine start. The decisive question goes unanswered: no captured page describes how the vault key is derived or released when a user signs in through SSO. We found no public information on named identity providers, SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers, or hardware-key MFA. 1 6
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement are listed as features, which is a start. But we found no public information on which events are recorded, whether logs can be exported or forwarded to a SIEM, how long they are retained, or whether password health and breach-monitoring reports exist. 1
The Identity Engineer
Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement are named as features and that is where the evidence stops. I found no public information on which events are captured, whether logs export or feed a SIEM, what retention applies, or which master-password, MFA, sharing or export rules an administrator can enforce — everything my ISO 27001 auditors ask me to produce sits on the other side of that gap. 1
The Compliance Auditor
Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement are named as features, and that is the extent of what I can cite. We found no public information on which events are recorded — specifically views and copies of a shared secret — on log export or a SIEM path, on retention, or on reporting aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, so an audit would rest on a feature list rather than documentation. 1
The SME Owner
Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement appear as named business features, which is more than a bare user list, but the captured pages never say which events are logged, whether logs can be exported, or what an administrator can actually enforce. We found no public information on SIEM integration, retention periods, or password health and breach reports. 1
The DevOps Engineer
Audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement are named as free-tier features, but I found no public information on which events are captured, whether logs are exportable or reachable through an API, retention periods, SIEM integration, or password health and breach-monitoring reports. Feature names without documented coverage are not something I could put in front of an ISO 27001 auditor. 1
The Skeptic
The homepage lists audit logging, policies and compliance enforcement, which is more than a bare user list, but nothing captured describes which events are recorded or what a policy can actually enforce. We found no public information on exportable logs or an API, SIEM integration, retention periods, password-health or breach reports — an ISO 27001 or NIS2 auditor would have to take the feature names on faith. 1
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Self-hosting is genuine here: server and clients free of charge with Docker images, Community and Enterprise installation guides, and clients across Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers with signed repositories and a CLI. The gaps: we found no public information on cloud region choice, a status page with incident history, offline access during an outage, or whether the text-file backup preserves attachments and all item types. 5 6 1
The Identity Engineer
Portability is the strong suit: self-hosting is free with Docker images and dedicated Community and Enterprise installation guides, and client coverage spans Windows, macOS and Linux with signed repositories and App Store builds, Android with a direct APK, iOS, three browser families, Chromium variants and a CLI. The gaps are on the cloud side — AWS and GCP are named with no region — and I found no public statement on offline access during an outage, while the documented backup path is a simple text-file function with no word on attachments or folder structure. 6 5 1
The Compliance Auditor
Self-hosting is a first-class path with free Docker-based deployment and dedicated Community and Enterprise guides, and the client matrix is broad: Windows, macOS and Linux with signed repositories, Android and iOS with a direct APK, browser extensions across Chrome, Firefox, Edge and Chromium variants, plus a CLI. We found no public information on the cloud region, a status page with incident history, or an export that states whether attachments and all item types survive — the documented path is a simple text-file backup alongside nightly server-side backups. 1 5 6
The SME Owner
Self-hosting is free with Docker images and dedicated Community and Enterprise installation guides, and client coverage is excellent — Windows, macOS and Linux with signed repositories, Android with a direct APK, iOS, three browser families, web and a CLI. We found no public information on offline access during an outage, on an EU cloud region for the hosted service, or on how completely the text-file backup covers attachments and other item types. 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
This is the part I genuinely like: the server and clients are free of charge for on-premises hosting with Docker images and installation guides for a Community Edition and an Enterprise Edition, a command-line utility for CI and deployment workflows on three Linux architectures, desktop apps for Windows, macOS and Linux from signed repositories, mobile apps with a direct APK, and extensions for Chrome, Firefox and Edge. What I found no public information on is documented high availability and backup procedures for a self-hosted deployment, offline access during an outage, an EU cloud region, a status page with incident history, and whether the simple text-file backup preserves attachments and all item types — that export-fidelity gap is exactly what I care about when leaving a vendor. 6 5 1
The Skeptic
Client coverage is unusually broad — signed APT and RPM repositories, an AppImage, Windows and macOS builds, iOS, a direct Android APK, three browser stores, a web client and a CLI — and self-hosting with Docker is documented for both the community and enterprise editions, which also takes the vendor's service out of the availability path. The exit story is thinner: backups are described as a simple text-file backup function, and we found no public information on offline access during a vendor outage, a status page with incident history, or a documented full-fidelity export and import. 1 5 6
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The terms identify esaqa as the operator and the open-source core with a self-hosted option can remove the vendor from the data path. But the cloud service runs on AWS and Google Cloud with Cloudflare in front and no region stated, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations, a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or published certifications. 4 5 1
The Identity Engineer
The vendor is presented as esaqa GmbH of Vorra, Germany, and the terms name esaqa as the company behind the service, but the independently collected attributes mark jurisdiction, ownership, data residency and subprocessors as unconfirmed on the captured pages. Hosting runs on AWS and GCP with no regions stated and Cloudflare sits in front for DDoS protection; I found no public information on subprocessors or a data-processing agreement covering vault metadata and logs. Self-hosting would take the vendor out of the data path, but the cloud chain as published cannot be traced. 4 5 2
The Compliance Auditor
The terms name esaqa as the operator and the provenance places it in Vorra, Germany, but the security page puts the cloud service on AWS, Google Cloud and Cloudflare, and we found no public information on the hosting region, a subprocessor list with locations, a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or an ISO 27001 or C5 certification. Self-hosting with Docker lets an operator take the vendor out of the data path entirely, which is the strongest sovereignty lever here. 2 4 5
The SME Owner
The vendor is esaqa GmbH in Germany, the code is open source, and the self-hosted route removes the vendor from the data path entirely, which counts for a lot. But the cloud service runs on Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud with no region named, Cloudflare sits in front of it, and we found no public information on a subprocessor list or a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs. 4 5 1
The DevOps Engineer
The vendor is esaqa GmbH in Vorra, Germany, but the cloud service runs on AWS and Google Cloud Platform with no region stated and Cloudflare in front of it, and I found no public information on a published subprocessor list with locations, a data-processing agreement covering metadata and logs, or certifications such as ISO 27001. The open-source, self-hosted route — with publicly auditable code and signed client repositories — is the real answer here, since it takes the vendor out of the data path entirely. 4 5 1 6
The Skeptic
The contracting entity is esaqa, a German company, and the open-source, self-hostable stack can remove the vendor from the data path entirely. The cloud service, though, runs on AWS, Google Cloud and Cloudflare with no statement of which regions hold vault data or metadata, and we found no published subprocessor list with locations, no DPA covering metadata and logs, and no certifications such as ISO 27001 or BSI C5 on the captured pages. 1 4 5
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The only public price points are "All business features free up to 10 users" and on-premises software free of charge. Beyond that, the paid Psono SaaS and Psono Enterprise Edition are expressly governed by separate agreements, and we found no public prices, seat minimums or terms for either — an invoice for an eleven-user company is a sales conversation. 1 4 5
The Identity Engineer
The one public price is clear and generous: all business features, SSO and audit logging included, free up to ten users. Above that the terms say these pages cover only the free psono.pw service, with Psono SaaS and Psono Enterprise Edition governed by separate agreements — for my two thousand staff the annual invoice is not computable from anything published here. 1 4
The Compliance Auditor
The zero end is computable: all business features free up to 10 users, and server and clients free of charge for on-premises use. The terms state that Psono SaaS and Psono Enterprise Edition are governed by separate agreements, and we found no public prices, seat minimums or terms for either, so the real annual cost above 10 users cannot be computed from the public pages. 1 4 5
The SME Owner
"All business features free up to 10 users" is a clear and unusually generous starting point, but my company needs forty seats and we found no public information on what Psono SaaS or the Enterprise Edition cost per user. The terms themselves say those editions are governed by separate agreements, so the annual invoice for a forty-person company is not computable from these pages. 1 4
The DevOps Engineer
"All business features free up to 10 users" including SSO, audit logging and policies is genuinely transparent, and on-premises hosting is free of charge. But I found no public price for the SaaS or Enterprise Edition beyond those 10 seats — the terms state those are governed by separate agreements — so for a team of fifty I cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 1 4 5
The Skeptic
The public pricing story ends at ten users: all business features, including SSO, audit logging and the gateway, are free up to 10 users, and the on-premises software is free of charge. Beyond that the terms point to separate agreements for Psono SaaS and Psono Enterprise Edition, and we found no public per-user prices, seat minimums, term lengths or VAT treatment — for a larger company the invoice is a sales conversation. 1 4 5
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Psono
Is Psono European?
Yes. whats-best.ai classifies Psono as EU-Made.
Where does Psono store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
Does Psono have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Psono?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Psono alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 13 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 4 subprocessors facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 hosting fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 sovereignty dimension could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and is shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (6)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Privacy policy psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Legal notice psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap psono.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →