Encryption model & independent audits
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The SME Owner
The only concrete specifics are that Secret Server can be told to use a FIPS 140-2 compliant algorithm and a page that promises timely vulnerability advisories; there is no whitepaper, no named cipher or key derivation, and we found no public information on independent audits, certifications, or what Delinea itself can read. Moving my team off Excel on adjectives and one standard reference is not a sale. 3 8