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Whistleblowing Portals

ACT4 Compliance (compliance2b)

EU-Made Report an error

Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 3 of 4 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Compliance 2b GmbH · compliance2b.at

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Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The Security Auditor

Weighted verdict

Pentests the anonymity promise for a living. Optimizes for evidenced security: current certificates with visible scope, published pentests, documented end-to-end encryption, metadata minimization, and hosting outside hostile jurisdictional reach. Rejects adjective security and "military-grade" anything.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The Security Auditor

Reporting channels & reporter experience

How this is scored

The intake side: how a reporter actually submits — web form, anonymous dialog, phone/voice, languages, accessibility — and whether anonymity survives first contact.

0 — A web form that is an email in disguise: no anonymous route, no way to reach the reporter afterwards.

3 — An anonymous form exists but the dialogue ends there — no secured mailbox for follow-up questions, few languages, desktop-only.

5 — Anonymous two-way dialog via a protected mailbox, a usable set of languages, mobile-friendly; voice or phone intake missing or an add-on.

8 — Multiple channels (web, voice message or hotline, QR entry points), broad language coverage with translation support, accessibility considered, and the anonymous dialog is first-class rather than bolted on.

10 — Intake engineered around the frightened reporter: every channel anonymous-capable, dozens of languages, WCAG-conscious, no app install or account required, and the vendor documents how the reporter's identity is kept out of the channel itself.

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The Security Auditor

Intake is built around the anonymous reporter: entry by link or QR code, voice recordings at submission, and a two-way dialog through a randomly generated code with no credentials or install, backed by an explicit statement that no IP addresses or document metadata are stored. Default languages are German and English with claimed extensibility to any number, and we found no public information on translation support or accessibility. 2 5

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Case management & deadline discipline

How this is scored

The case worker's side: triage, statutory deadlines (7-day acknowledgment, 3-month feedback), role separation, audit-proof documentation.

0 — Reports land in an inbox; deadlines, roles and history live in a spreadsheet next door.

3 — A case list with status fields, but deadlines are manual, permissions are all-or-nothing, and the record of who did what is thin.

5 — Deadline tracking with reminders for the statutory clocks, case notes and attachments, basic role separation between case handlers; reporting on the caseload is limited.

8 — Automated statutory clocks, conflict-of-interest handling (excluding implicated case handlers), complete tamper-evident case history, retention and deletion rules applied per case, and management reporting.

10 — A case system an external investigator can rely on: enforced workflows, full audit trail, legally aware retention/deletion automation, evidence handling, and statistics that survive a regulator's questions.

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The Security Auditor

The case management tool offers guided central processing with checklists and deadline management, a need-to-know restriction on data, and external specialists addable as users, which covers the statutory clocks and basic role separation. We found no public information on tamper-evident case history, exclusion of implicated case handlers, per-case retention rules, or management reporting on the caseload. 5 9

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Legal compliance alignment

How this is scored

How specifically the product implements EU Directive 2019/1937 and national transpositions (HinSchG et al.) — not whether the marketing mentions them.

0 — Generic feedback software wearing a whistleblowing label; no reference to the legal obligations it claims to satisfy.

3 — The directive is invoked in marketing but the mapping is vague; deadline rules, documentation duties and retention periods are the customer's problem.

5 — The statutory duties are implemented as product features — acknowledgment and feedback clocks, documentation, deletion after the retention period — for at least one national law, with guidance for the rest.

8 — Multiple national transpositions supported with their differing details, legal templates and process guidance maintained by named counsel or documented review, and updates when the law moves.

10 — The product is a legal instrument: per-country rule sets kept current, documented legal review, guidance for edge cases (group-wide channels, external ombudsman setups), and the vendor shows its homework in public.

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The Security Auditor

The Austrian transposition is documented with real depth — HSchG scope, the 50-employee cutoff and its 2023 date, the 7-day and 3-month notification clocks, protected persons, and six state-level public-sector laws — plus a downloadable summary of the draft law, a training video and a published book. What we can see covers Austria only, and we found no public information on rule sets for other member states' transpositions, legal review by named counsel, or product updates when the law moves; the ISO 37002 mention is a consulting service, not product functionality. 1 7 9

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Security & anonymity assurance

How this is scored

Whether the confidentiality promise is engineered and evidenced: encryption, metadata handling, penetration tests, certifications.

0 — Security is a paragraph of adjectives; no certificates, no test reports, no statement on metadata.

3 — TLS and encryption at rest asserted, but nothing audited: no ISO 27001 or equivalent, no published pentest, silence on IP and metadata logging.

5 — A current ISO 27001 (or equivalent) certificate for vendor or hosting, end-to-end encryption of report content claimed with some technical detail, an explicit no-IP-logging statement.

8 — Certified ISMS covering the product, regular third-party penetration tests attested, documented end-to-end encryption architecture, metadata minimization explained, security contact and disclosure policy published.

10 — Assurance a hostile auditor accepts: current certificates with visible scope, recurring pentest summaries public, cryptographic architecture documented, anonymity analysed against the operator itself — the vendor can answer "how would you unmask a reporter?" with "we cannot, and here is why".

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The Security Auditor

The confidentiality promise rests on bare claims — "100 % Anonym" and "END-END Verschlüsselt" with no cryptographic detail — while the FAQ's explicit statement that no IP addresses or document metadata are stored is the only engineering-grade fact on the page. We found no public information on an ISO 27001 or equivalent certificate, third-party penetration tests, a security contact or disclosure policy, or an analysis of whether the operator itself could unmask a reporter. 1 2 5

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Group & multi-entity capability

How this is scored

Whether one contract can serve a corporate group: separate channels per legal entity, central oversight, ombudsman access, white-labeling.

0 — One company, one channel; a group buys and administers N separate instances.

3 — Multiple channels under one account, but no separation of case access per entity and no consolidated view.

5 — Per-entity channels with separated case handlers and a group-level overview; branding per entity is basic; external counsel access possible.

8 — Real multi-tenant group structure: per-entity channels, languages and branding, delegated administration, external ombudsman roles, group reporting that respects entity boundaries.

10 — Group compliance as architecture: hundreds of entities manageable centrally, per-country legal rule assignment per entity, white-label reporting pages, and access separation strong enough to satisfy each subsidiary's works council.

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The Security Auditor

Unlimited clients run in parallel in closed-off areas, each user holds one credential set across their clients, and external lawyers or insurers can be added to case management; an ombuds service exists as a partner offering. We found no public information on a group-level consolidated view, per-entity branding or white-labeling, delegated administration, or per-entity assignment of legal rules. 1 5

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Where reports about people actually live and under whose law — entity, hosting, subprocessors, DPA. In this category the data is by definition the most sensitive a company holds.

0 — Non-EU entity, non-EU-default hosting, no public DPA or subprocessor list — for whistleblowing data.

3 — A DPA exists and an EU region is available on request or on top tiers; subprocessor exposure to US CLOUD Act reach is broad or undocumented.

5 — EU hosting is the default, DPA and subprocessor list published; the vendor or a critical subprocessor is still within non-European jurisdictional reach.

8 — EU entity, EU hosting with named data centers, published subprocessor list free of content-touching non-EU processors, DPA and TOMs public.

10 — Jurisdictionally clean end to end: European ownership, EU-only hosting and subprocessors for report content and metadata, on-premises or sovereign-cloud options, and the whole chain documented publicly.

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The Security Auditor

An Austrian GmbH with a Vienna register entry stores reports in a named German Azure datacenter — right geography, but the infrastructure provider is US-headquartered Microsoft within CLOUD Act reach, and the location statement sits in an FAQ rather than a data processing agreement. The privacy policy describes standard contractual clauses for transfers to third countries including the USA, and we found no public data processing agreement, subprocessor list, or technical and organisational measures document. 4 5 6

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Pricing transparency

How this is scored

Whether an obligated company can compute the real invoice — per entity, per employee band, per year — from public pages alone.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — An entry price exists, but the tiers most obligated companies need are unpriced, or the maths is obscured by employee bands, per-report fees or mandatory setup charges.

5 — Most tiers carry real numbers with billing period and VAT treatment stated, but at least one commonly needed capability — extra entities, extra languages, phone intake — hides in an unpriced add-on.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with employee-band boundaries, entity rules and setup fees stated; only genuine corporate-group contracts are custom.

10 — Complete price computability: every tier, band, add-on and renewal rule public, so the invoice for a 60-employee company and a 5-entity group is a two-minute exercise.

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The Security Auditor

One figure is public — "EUR 77,00 pro Monat" for small companies — but it comes with one-time implementation costs whose amount is not stated and a price basis of complexity, user count and customization. We found no public information on tier structure, VAT treatment, per-entity or per-language pricing, or renewal terms, so computing a real invoice beyond the smallest deployment is a sales conversation. 5

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European sovereignty — proven facts

3 of 4 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Ownership Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data residency EU only ⚠ unverified 3/3 pts 5 Report an error
Subprocessors US CLOUD Act reach ⚠ unverified 0/2 pts 5 Report an error

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

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Sources (9)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor homepage compliance2b.at Checked 15 Sep 2026 +1 earlier capture: 11 Sep 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Whistleblowing product page compliance2b.at Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Consulting services page compliance2b.at Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Imprint compliance2b.at Checked 15 Sep 2026 Details →
  5. 5 FAQ compliance2b.at Checked 15 Sep 2026 +1 earlier capture: 11 Sep 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Privacy policy compliance2b.at Checked 30 Sep 2026 Details →
  7. 7 Reporting channels & reporter experience — found from sitemap compliance2b.at Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Legal compliance alignment — found from sitemap compliance2b.at Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Legal compliance alignment — found from sitemap compliance2b.at Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →